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Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Continuing Turmoil in Gilgit-Baltistan

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Reports of a major Chinese presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area have been pouring in. While Selig Harrison of the New York Times put the figure at 11,000, the Indian Army Chief said recently that about 4,000 Chinese workers, many of them PLA soldiers, are engaged in construction and mining activities in the Northern Areas. This unprecedented Chinese presence is being deeply resented by the local people.

The Gilgit Agency and Baltistan in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), that now comprise the Northern Areas, were part of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) at the time of partition. The woes of the people of the Northern Areas began on November 4, 1947, soon after J&K acceded to India in terms of the Independence of India Act. A young British major who was commanding the Gilgit Scouts overstepped his authority and illegally declared the accession of the Northern Areas to Pakistan. It shall remain one of the quirks of history that a Major of the British Raj could violate good order and military discipline and seal the fate of the people of an area almost as large as England.

Since then, the people of the Northern Areas have been denied all fundamental and political rights by Pakistan just like the Kashmiris in the rest of POK. They had for long been governed with an iron hand by a Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas nominated from Islamabad and supported by the Pakistan army. Now, while the Governor is still appointed by the president of Pakistan, there is a Legislative Assembly with 24 members. The Assembly elects a Chief Minister. The judiciary still exists only in name and civil administration is virtually non-existent. The result has been that almost no development has taken place and the people live poverty stricken lives without even a semblance of health care and with only primitive educational facilities based primarily on madrasas run by Islamist fundamentalists.

These simple and hardy people have never reconciled themselves to their second-class status and have for long resented the tyrannical attitude of the Pakistan government. Consequently, there have been frequent riots and uprisings. The most violent political outbursts took place in 1971, 1988 and 1997. In fact, it was General Pervez Musharraf, then a brigadier commanding the Special Service Group (SSG) commandos, who had been handpicked to put down a Shia uprising in Gilgit in 1988. He let loose Wahabi Pakhtoon tribesmen from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) on the hapless protestors. These tribesmen invaded Gilgit and went on a deliberately unchecked rampage. They lynched and burnt people to death, indulged in loot, rape and arson, ransacked houses and destroyed standing crops and left the area smoldering for years.

The Pakistan army used the people of the Northern Areas as cannon fodder during the 1999 conflict with India. It refused to acknowledge the contribution of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) battalions to Operation Badr. Of the 772 Pakistani soldiers, including 69 officers and 76 SSG personnel, who laid down their lives for a militarily futile venture, almost 80 percent belonged to NLI battalions. Of these, over 200 were buried with military honours by the Indian army in graves at heights ranging from 15,000 to 17,000 feet because the Pakistan army had refused to take their bodies back. The people of the Northern Areas were extremely agitated by these developments.

The simmering discontent of the last 60 years and deep resentment against being treated as second-class citizens has led to a widespread demand for the state of Balawaristan. The people are demanding genuine democratic rule and the right to govern themselves. A large number of influential leaders of the Northern Areas have buried their political differences and joined hands to form the Balawaristan National Front (BNF), with its head office at Majini Mohalla, Gilgit.

Though some sops are now being offered to them, the people of the Northern Areas are completely disenchanted. Their alienation from the Pakistan mainstream is too deep to be ever reconciled and Balawaristan is quite obviously an idea they will pursue vigorously.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India-Myanmar Strategic Cooperation

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The winds of change are blowing across Myanmar. Elections of a sort have been held and Ms Aung San Suu Kyi has been released. President Thein Sein recently invited her for direct talks, with which she expressed satisfaction. The international community is gradually opening up to the country and speculation is rife that sanctions may soon be lifted.

India’s relations with Myanmar, a devoutly Buddhist country, have been traditionally close and friendly. Geographically, India and Myanmar share a long land and maritime boundary, including in the area of the strategically important Andaman and Nicobar islands where the two closest Indian and Myanmarese islands are barely 30 km apart. Myanmarese ports provide India the shortest approach route to several of India’s north-eastern states.

India’s national interest lies in a strong and stable Myanmar that observes strict neutrality between India and China and cooperates with India in the common fight against the insurgencies raging in the border areas of both the countries. For India, Myanmar is a bridge between all the countries comprising the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC – Myanmar has observer status) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). External Affairs Minister S M Krishna visited Myanmar in June 2011 to further cement the growing relationship.

The key drivers of the India-Myanmar strategic relationship are cooperation in counter-insurgency operations and the need for India to ensure that Myanmar is not driven into Chinese arms through Indian neglect of its security concerns and arms requirements. Indian insurgent groups (NSCN, ULFA and Manipur rebels among others) have been operating out of bases in the weakly controlled areas across the borders of the Indian states of Manipur and Mizoram and Myanmarese rebels, primarily the Chins and the Arakanese, have often taken shelter on the Indian side. It is in the interest of both the countries to cooperate with each other to fight these insurgent groups in a coordinated manner. The two armies have been cooperating with each other for mutual benefit. India-Myanmar cooperation is also essential to control narcotics trafficking and to curb the proliferation of small arms in the region.

China has made rapid advances into Myanmar and established close political, military and economic relations. Myanmar provides China the shortest land route access to the northern Indian Ocean. China is engaged in exploiting Myanmar’s oil and gas reserves, is building a 1,100 km overland pipeline from Kyaukryu port in Myanmar to the border city of Ruili in Yunnan and is developing Sittwe as a commercial port on Myanmar’s west coast. It is natural that Chinese naval activity in the Bay of Bengal will soon follow. China has also been stepping up arms sales to Myanmar as other nations, including India, are loathe to sell offensive military hardware to the country.

While India is concerned with the slow pace of progress on the issue of national reconciliation and the consequent delay in installing a democratically elected government in power in Yangon, the strategic scenario compels India to balance its security concerns with its support for the emergence of democratic rule. It is only through close engagement that India can promote leverages with the ruling regime to nudge it gently towards national reconciliation. India must also increase its economic footprint in Myanmar, particularly in areas that are contiguous to India.

India and the other regional powers can play a positive role in the re-entry of Myanmar into the international mainstream so that it can be nudged towards becoming a strong and stable democracy that is also mature and responsible and willing to play by the rules and traditions governing international relations. Perhaps multi-national talks, which include India, China, Japan, ASEAN and other stakeholders, would be the best way forward. At least in the initial stages it may be prudent for the U.S. to stay away from such talks.

India-US Relations Blog

Blowing hot and cold

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As many news reports noted, the past week was significant just for the numbers of Indian ministers in the United States at a given point in time. However, the more did not necessarily make the merrier.

cdn.wn.comNo less than nine members of the Indian Council of Ministers were in the US, including the primus inter pares, PM Manmohan Singh. The PM was in the  U.S. to address a session of the UN General Assembly and  his speech was notable, as one commentator put it, for its reference to “old ideological positions and  old constitutencies,” meant to signal his “disappointment with the West.” The PM seemed to emphasise the point by having a bilateral meeting with an old foe of the West, Iranian President Ahmedinajad, an event described by another commentator as a virtual affront to the United States. What India has to be disappointed about is unclear, and whether the disappointment will be followed up with distancing remains to be seen. Whether that is the most appropriate strategy is also moot in the rapidly changing global scenario.

Many of the Ministers, from Commerce to Power, to Finance were in the U.S. to drum up investment for mega- infrastructure projects back home. There were the usual assortment of think tank reports and seminars that usually coincide with such ministerial visits, but increasingly, they offer only new wine in old bottles, reflecting the current stalemate, if not slump, in relations.  An address by the recently promoted Deputy Secretary William J Burns at the Brookings Institution was even titled “Is there a Future for the US-India Partnership?”

Commerce Minister Anand Sharma made a valiant effort to break the logjam on the Totalization Agreement issue but came a cropper. This issue has been attacked from various angles, having earlier being piloted by the Minister of Overseas Indian Affairs. Mr Sharma made the point to his interlocutors that there was no reason not to sign an agreement with India pleading incompatibility between social security systems since India had signed totalisation agreements with many European countries  with which the U.S. had an agreement but this argument cut no ice.  This was not surprising since Under Secretary Blake had made it clear in his last read-out on US-India relations that the U.S. was in no mood to transfer over a billion dollars to India in the current economic mess it found itself in. There was also talk of progress made on a Bilateral Investment Treaty, even though it is almost as if when one side blows hot, the other side blows cold.

The other legs of the relationship, business and the diaspora, can, at best only play a supporting role, and are to an extent affected by the buffeting winds of the strategic relationship. The India-US CEOs forum also held its annual meeting in Washington this past week, but has increasingly less to show for being such a high-powered gathering. While India has a ready-made constituency in the U.S. in the form of the Indian Diaspora, Hillary Clinton’s public diplomacy initiatives are beginning to show results at least in India, with U.S. embassies and missions making all out efforts to engage with the average Indian through all the resources available from   social media to innovative meetups titled Charcha, Chai aur Coffee. The American Center in Delhi even provides a venue for Startup Saturday, a forum for young entrepreneurs to come together to share and learn from each other.

The blow hot, blow cold phase of the relationship into which we have entered seems set to continue into the foreseeable future with, as William Burns himself admitted in his speech, both governments distracted and pulled in different direction by a combination of domestic and external issues.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Red Lines and Reversed Roles

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The South China Sea controversy demonstrates how Beijing’s actions will inevitably draw Washington and New Delhi closer together.

The respective security roles that the United States and India traditionally play in East Asia seemed to switch last week. By deciding not to supply Taiwan with the new fighter aircraft it has requested, the U.S. appeared to defer to China, which had cautioned that the sale was a “red line” that must not be crossed. In contrast, New Delhi’s determined sally into the South China Sea, in defiance of Beijing’s explicit warnings, exemplified the strategic assertion that the Obama administration has been urging on India. The dichotomy offers a glimpse of the shifting power dynamics now underway in Asia and, perhaps, a preview of what the regional security order might look like beyond the horizon.

america20xy.comThe U.S. decision to refurbish Taiwan’s aging F-16 fleet rather than provide it with more sophisticated versions of the aircraft is taken by some in Asia as the latest sign of China’s ascent and America’s subsidence in the western Pacific, an area long thought of as a U.S. lake. The Associated Press reported that Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin sees the decision primarily as a function of Beijing’s growing financial leverage vis-à-vis Washington. “It has a large debt and if China will try to apply pressure, the U.S. can end up in trouble,” he said. “The U.S. has to temper its relations with Taiwan for China.” The report also quoted a South Korean defense analyst as saying that some in that country have reached the conclusion that it would be better to bandwagon with China than continue to adhere to the decades-old security alliance with the United States.

By striking coincidence, a similar storyline was being replicated last week in another part of the world in which Washington has long exercised sway. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner put in an unprecedented appearance at a gathering of European finance officials called to address the region’s burgeoning debt crisis. His presence was intended to signal U.S. concern about the spillover potential of Europe’s financial woes. But some in the audience did not take kindly to his telling them what to do.  Both the Austrian and Belgian finance ministers tartly questioned how the Americans could presume to dispense advice when their own fiscal house is in such visible disarray. One media commentator observed the proceedings underscore that “in the wake of the debt-ceiling debacle, Geithner has lost a significant amount of international heft.” The Europeans, on the other, are much more interested these days in China’s views. With Beijing sitting on top of the world’s largest pile of foreign exchange, regional leaders have started to look to it as a potential financial savior.

India’s actions last week, in contrast, were the very definition of foreign policy steadfastness. On a visit to Vietnam, Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna announced that the overseas arm of India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) would proceed with hydrocarbon exploration activities in the South China Sea, an energy-rich area that in claimed in almost its entirety by Beijing. China has been increasingly brusque in asserting its claim of “indisputable sovereignty” over the waters, which it last year elevated to a “core national interest.” The marker Krishna laid down comes two months after Beijing warned New Delhi against involving itself in the area and after an unusual incident between the INS Airavat, an amphibious warfare vessel, and the Chinese navy off the coast of Vietnam.

New Delhi’s temerity sparked a passionate reaction in the China Times, a nationalist tabloid affiliated with the Communist Party. It lashed out in a lead editorial that India was engaged in “a serious political provocation” that constitutes a major challenge to China’s national resolve. It urged the Chinese leadership to use “every means possible” to reverse Indian actions. And in what seemed to be a retaliatory move, Beijing quickly announced that it would expand seabed explorations in the southwestern Indian Ocean.

Media commentary in India saw things differently. A Times of India editorial averred that “India has done well to hold its ground” and termed the ONGC move as a befitting response to the infrastructure projects China is conducting in the disputed territory of Kashmir. In a similar vein, Harsh V. Pant, a well-known foreign policy expert, noted that if “China wants to expand its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, New Delhi’s thinking goes, India can do the same thing in East Asia.” And M.K. Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat, called India’s actions “a historic move,” arguing that “India’s ‘Look East’ policy acquires swagger.  The Sino-Indian geostrategic rivalry is not going to be the same again.”

Observing the train of events, Time magazine’s “Global Spin” blog asked “Is This How Wars Start?” Of course, a booming bilateral economic relationship gives New Delhi and Beijing strong reason to moderate impulses toward outright military conflict. But as both countries continue simultaneously to rise in power and prestige, dynamics of competition and one-upmanship will inevitability deepen. This pattern is already evident in their Himalayan border area, in Burma and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean region and as far afield as Africa. And as last week’s events demonstrate, the South China Sea is now emerging as a new arena for strategic rivalry.

Pundits in Washington who doubt the prospects for the United States and India conjoining in a coalition directed against China should take note. The meteoric rise of Beijing’s power and the assertiveness in which it is exercised will ineluctably draw Washington and New Delhi even closer together. As a former U.S. official once predicted, “we don’t need to talk about the containment of China. It will take care of itself as India rises.”

India-US Relations Blog

Back to Basics

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With the intergovernmental drivers of the US-India partnership now in a period of languor, it is time for the economic relationship to return to the forefront. This is the moment for business leaders in both countries to once again step forward.

As earlier posts have argued, relations between Washington and New Delhi – which not too long ago seemed destined to reach for the stars – are now feeling the heavy tug of gravity. In place of soaring rhetoric and high-profile undertakings, ties between the two capitals are weighed down by bureaucratic inertia and small-bore ideas.

Image back to basicsTwo recent episodes confirm this downward trajectory. The annual US-India economic and financial partnership talks took place this past June in Washington, though few beyond the personal staffs of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee took any notice. The anodyne communiqué that was issued highlighted the deepening of “institutional relationships” as a major achievement of the talks, but the lack of specific commitments contrasted unfavorably with the detailed work plan that emanated from the US-China economic dialogue occurring just six weeks earlier. Indeed, the Washington-Beijing nexus has a way of upstaging US-India economic exchanges. When Geithner traveled to New Delhi in April 2010, for the launch of the bilateral economic partnership, all of the media attention was focused on whether he would fly off on a spur-of-the-moment trip to China, to engage in talks over the relative value of the yuan. (To nobody’s surprise, he subsequently did end up in Beijing.)  Similarly the US-India Strategic Dialogue that took place six weeks ago in New Delhi was an exercise in modest output and mutual frustration.

Given the serious domestic problems diverting the attention of both capitals, it is difficult to imagine how the government-to-government relationship can be advanced significantly in the next few years.  Nonetheless, the outlook for bilateral affairs is not entirely dim.  One exceedingly bright spot is the accelerating pace of economic engagement.  A decade ago, then-U.S. ambassador to India Robert Blackwill lamented that the volume of bilateral trade was as “flat as a chapati.” But trade levels have risen markedly in the years since.  Indeed, even with the global economy in the doldrums and the torpor in official ties, 2010 was a banner year for the trade relationship, with two-way goods exports surging nearly 30 percent to $48.8 billion. Merchandise exports are also up significantly in the first half of 2011 compared to the same period last year. All told, India is now America’s 12th largest good trading partner and the country constitutes one of the fastest-growing destinations for U.S. exports.

It is true that the economic relationship is very far from achieving critical mass and that US-China trade flows eclipse the US-India figures many times over. Still, the trend lines are quite hopeful and they illuminate the vital role that economic engagement plays in securing the growth of a resilient partnership over the long term.  This last point is persuasively set out in a new book, The Eagle and the Elephant, by Raymond E. Vickery, Jr.  A former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce in the Clinton administration and now a leading figure in the US-India Business Council, Vickery argues that “economic engagement is fundamental to the ability of the United States and India to cooperate politically.” He demonstrates in great detail how over the past decade the private sectors on both sides forged the foundation for the diplomatic rapprochement that eventuated in the path-breaking civilian nuclear accord and an ever-closer security relationship. (Importantly, too, the book illustrates how mismanaged episodes of economic interaction can have far-reaching negative impact, such as the Dabhol debacle in the mid-1990s that continues to impede bilateral cooperation on energy and environmental matters, as well as impairing India’s international credibility as a respecter of contractual rights.)

So how can policymakers in Washington and New Delhi leverage the vitality of the economic relationship in order to re-energize the overall partnership? Two of the usual answers – concluding a broad-based free trade agreement and an investment treaty – are problematic, at least for the next few years. Considering that the two countries are at loggerheads in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, plus the neuralgic agricultural issues that must be dealt with, the prospects for a comprehensive trade accord are well off in the distance. And although U.S. and Indian policymakers recently agreed to accelerate discussions over an investment treaty, its full value is really contingent upon additional reforms within India – such as liberalizing foreign direct investment in the retail and financial sectors, deregulating labor markets, regularizing the land acquisition process, and dramatically addressing infrastructure bottlenecks. With decision-making in New Delhi all but paralyzed these days, it is anyone’s guess when these key reforms will be enacted.

There are several initiatives that have more promising prospects, however. As spelled out in earlier posts, Washington and New Delhi should aim to build upon their striking record of engagement in the innovation economy sectors by crafting a free trade mechanism relevant to advanced technology products and drafting an immigration accord that allows high-skilled Indian professionals to work in the United States. Both undertakings would capitalize on important economic complementaries and would build up economic capacities that are so significant to the long-term prospects of both countries.

Continuing to think outside the box, negotiators also might explore whether India would be willing to address manifold U.S. concerns about its regime for protecting intellectual property in exchange for a totalization agreement covering Indian technology workers posted to the United States on temporary assignments (as Derek Scissors suggests, or for the special restoration of trade privileges (amounting to $3.5 billion in value in 2010) that expired when the U.S. Congress failed to reauthorize the Generalized System of Preferences at the end of last year.

Finally, taking page from its successful campaign several years ago to bring India into global nonproliferation institutions, the United States should use the upcoming APEC Summit, which takes place this November in Honolulu, to lobby for New Delhi’s admission into the group.  Given that India is poised to become one of the world’s top economies in the coming years, its absence is a serious lacuna for the organization.  (My next post will deal with this issue in greater detail.)

With the intergovernmental drivers of the US-India partnership now in a period of languor, it is time for the economic relationship to return to the forefront.  This is the moment for business leaders in both countries to once again step forward.