Tag Archives: military-jihadi complex

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan’s Unsafe Nuclear Warheads

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Increasing urban terrorism and uncontrollable radical extremism in the tribal areas in NWFP-Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA in Pakistan’s north-west have led to internal instability in Pakistan. The ongoing crisis can be attributed to the resurgence of fundamentalist forces and the Army’s inability to fight them effectively. Consequently, the world faces the spectre of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organisations. The assassination of Salman Taseer, Governor of Punjab, by a specially selected bodyguard has led to speculation that perhaps the loyalty of some security guards of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads could also be subverted by Jihadi elements.

The possession of nuclear weapons by Islamist fundamentalist terrorists will pose a grave danger to international security. The Al Qaeda has declared war on the United States (US) and it allies, and Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri are known to have made attempts to buy nuclear warheads. Among Pakistan’s neighbouring countries, India will be particularly vulnerable if hard-line LeT or JeM terrorists and their Al Qaeda and Taliban brothers ever lay their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear warheads. India is one of the nations that the Al Qaeda has named as an enemy. Being a contiguous land neighbour, it is also easier to target, even if sophisticated delivery systems like ballistic missiles are not available.

There is a possibility that an Islamist fundamentalist regime might overthrow the civilian government with support from a radicalised faction of the army. In such an eventuality, the U.S. and its allies may justifiably form another ‘coalition of the willing’ to bomb the nuclear warhead storage sites in Pakistan from the air. The coalition forces could employ cruise missiles and fighter-bombers from stand-off ranges to physically destroy the warheads with deep penetration bombs. A non-kinetic option that employs high-energy microwaves to “fry” the electronic circuitry of the nuclear warheads may also be considered.

The clear and present danger, however, and one that continues to be underestimated, is from nuclear terrorism. Terrorist organisations may assemble radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) – ‘dirty bombs’ in which high explosives (RDX or TNT) are used to blow up and scatter uranium or other radioactive materials over a densely populated area, or to pollute a major water source. Crude RDDs do not require a very high degree of technological sophistication and can be assembled quite easily.

Contingency plans must be debated, analysed, approved, rehearsed and readied for execution to meet unforeseen eventualities. Maximum cooperation must be extended by the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to Pakistan by way of technology, intelligence and training to help Pakistan to secure its own nuclear warheads. While the world waits with bated breath for the crisis in Pakistan to blow over, the government of Pakistan would do well to ensure that all possible measures are adopted to further enhance the safety and security of the country’s nuclear warheads and delivery means.

(The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

The Raymond Davis Drama

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Looks like the North Waziristan operation will be postponed again

From the very beginning, it was hard to shake off the suspicion that the Raymond Davis affair involved covert operatives from both the United States and Pakistan. That Mr Davis was engaged in diplomacy by other means should have been clear to anyone with a passing familiarity of the business (attained, perhaps, by the study of the scholarly works of David John Moore Cornwell or Ian Lancaster Fleming). Once the U.S. embassy confirmed that he enjoyed diplomatic immunity it was a matter of pedantic or professional interest as to whether he worked for the CIA, DHA, State Department or indeed was a private security contractor employed by the U.S. government.

raymond.davisBut what was less discussed, at least until a couple of days ago, was that the two Pakistanis men (referred to as ‘youths’ or ‘boys’ in the Pakistani media) he killed might have also been engaged in diplomacy by other means. (Incidentally, Express Tribune pulled the initial report, here’s the cached article). Diplomats and foreign journalists who have served in Pakistan are familiar with such diplomacy, not infrequently conducted from a motorcycle. It would be of pedantic or professional interest as to whether they worked for the ISI, Intelligence Bureau or some other “agency”.

It is possible that the dust-up between Mr Davis and the two Pakistanis was the result of the escalation of free and frank discussions to a higher calibre. It is also possible that the two Pakistanis, and one of their innocent counterparts, lost their lives in the risky venture of creating a dust-up.

Consider. There are two possibilities why Lahore police would arrest a white American man who identified himself as U.S. diplomat with immunity. First, that they were told to do so by higher authorities. Second, that the local authorities were so radically anti-American—consistent with general public sentiment—that they were willing to disregard claims of diplomatic immunity, and brazen out the consequences. This is unlikely, not least because it would mean some people would lose their jobs in the process.

General Kayani’s guidance to the interior minister reminding him to keep Mr Davis’ military background in mind supports the hypothesis that the military-jihadi complex instigated this drama. Why?

That is hard to say. It is, however, the biggest beneficiary of the crisis. Politically, it is the Zardari government—which it has no love for—that is on the ropes, caught between an increasingly tough Washington and an increasingly anti-American public sentiment. Even if the matter is resolved in a few days’ time by getting the judiciary to affirm his diplomatic immunity, the episode can be offered as a reason, yet again, for the Pakistani army to avoid launching the much delayed operation against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in North Waziristan. The overall rise in temperature works to call for a reduction in U.S. drone attacks, using the argument that doing so is necessary to lower anti-American feelings.

The Pakistani military leadership calculates that the United States can suspend bilateral relations or aid for a short while, but overall, the risk of a permanent break is low. It is not wrong. That is why it can afford to rock the boat—with terrorist attacks or diplomatic dramas—to pre-empt U.S. coercion. After all, for the Pakistani military-jihadi complex, poking the United States in the eye is less risky compared to having to really fight itself.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

FMCT Negotiations: Games Pakistan Plays

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By P R Chari
Indian Review of Global Affairs

Pakistan is at it again. Whenever it is in trouble, Pakistan turns up the volume of its anti-India rhetoric. Suicide terrorism is taking a daily toll of lives in Pakistan. Its Afghanistan policy is going nowhere. The Pakistan army is obsessed with gaining ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, and has drafted the Taliban to achieve this objective. But, elements of the Taliban have turned against Pakistan, and are indulging in sustained, uncontrollable violence within the country. The assassination of Salman Taseer – a voice of reason raised against Pakistan’s medieval blasphemy laws – highlights the growing Islamization and chaos in Pakistan. Taseer’s murder was condemnable, but the horrifying fact is that his assassin has become a national hero. Rose petals were showered on him when he was produced in court. Lawyers are flocking to defend him. Liberal opinion in Pakistan, on the other hand, has been marginalized.

In true Nero-fashion Pakistan has now blocked negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in Geneva. Its Ambassador, Zamir Akram, has argued that by ceasing fissile materials production, Pakistan would concede a ‘strategic advantage’ to India. The WikiLeaks inform that Pakistan is currently manufacturing nuclear weapons faster than any other country, according to a cable sent by the U.S. embassy in Islamabad to Washington. A recent study by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists also informs that Pakistan possesses more nuclear weapons than India, but is feverishly manufacturing fissile materials to further enlarge its inventory. Nuclear weapons are not comparable to conventional weapons, and adding to their numbers beyond a point makes no sense. But, this logic is unlikely to impress Pakistan, whose defense and foreign policy is basically driven by the obsessions of the Pakistan Army. Zamir Akram had another grouse. President Obama had pledged to assist India’s admission into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Waasenaar Arrangement during his visit to New Delhi last November. Delivering on that promise the United States has very recently removed export controls on several Indian space and defense-related organizations, signaling a new era in U.S.-India nonproliferation cooperation. Zamir argued that this represented a “paradigm shift in strategic terms.”

Pakistan is actually hoping to somehow revive the debate on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal that was generated in 2008 when that deal was under process. The Bush administration had hammered that deal through the U.S. Congress, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), despite reservations voiced in some countries, collectively named the White Knights. Pakistan is seeking a similar dispensation, and China is working hard to provide Pakistan a comparable nuclear deal by supplying two more 300 MW atomic power reactors for its Chashma complex. Without going into the legal complexities involved, it should be noticed that China needs to place this matter before the Nuclear Suppliers Group for getting its prior approval. A similar approval had been obtained by the United States before finalizing the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. China is reluctant to pursue this route in the knowledge that the NSG may not endorse this deal between two blatant proliferators in the international system.

Reverting back to the collaterally damaged and stalled FMCT negotiations Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State, has unequivocally declared, “Let me just place full emphasis and priority today on my main message, which is to launch the negotiations this year on a fissile material cutoff treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.” She added, “That is a kind of general time frame,” though 2011 was not a “specific deadline.” In diplomatic language these words amount to expressing extreme displeasure with Pakistan, and with good reason. The 65-nation Conference on Disarmament transcended a ten-year deadlock in 2009 by agreeing to address four issues: nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off pact, the prohibition of space-based weapons, and an agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed countries against non-nuclear weapon states. Pakistan has reneged now after endorsing this plan, which derails President Obama’s hopes to operationalize his disarmament agenda; hence, Gottemoeller’s subsequent threat, “If we cannot find a way to begin these negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, then we will need to consider options.”

And, what could be these options? Most effectively, by stopping financial assistance to keep a bankrupt Pakistan afloat. And, cutting off arms transfers, which includes spares and ancillaries, would heighten pressure on Pakistan’s armed forces who are its real rulers. Can the United States afford to ignore Pakistan’s logistics support to sustain the American and ISAF operations in Afghanistan? Will China bail out its distressed ally by defying the international community in this effort, and promoting a further closing of ranks by its neighbours? The United States and China will, no doubt, weigh all their options carefully. Pakistan seems likely to witness interesting times.

(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

War Strategy in Afghanistan and Regional Concerns

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The long awaited review of U.S. and NATO strategy in Afghanistan was completed by the Obama administration in December 2010. The publicly released version of the report claimed major gains against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, particularly in the core areas under their control for long including the Helmand and Kandahar provinces. However, the report acknowledged that the gains were fragile and could be undone unless the Pakistan army acted against the Taliban operating from safe havens in the NWFP and FATA with equal vigour.

The broad goal of the U.S.-NATO-ISAF war strategy in Afghanistan is to ensure that Afghanistan acquires the stability that is necessary to be able to control its territory so that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are prevented from operating successfully from its soil against the U.S. and its allies, and also to reduce the risk of a return to civil war. The U.S. plans to transfer all combat responsibilities to the Afghan security forces by 2014. President Obama cannot afford to lose a war on his watch and yet hope to win re-election in 2012. The exit strategy will be based on a phased drawdown with not more than 10,000 troops being withdrawn each year till an “equilibrium that is manageable” is achieved. The U.S. and NATO troops are still thin on the ground while the Taliban has shown a marked degree of resurgence.

Afghanistan lies on the strategic crossroads between South Asia and Iran, West Asia, the Caucasus and the Central Asian Republics. Its regional neighbours have important geo-political and energy security interests in the area. Neighbours like India have invested over US$ 1 billion and immense time and effort in the post-2001 reconstruction of Afghanistan, but have been completely marginalised in U.S.-NATO-ISAF discussions for the resolution of the ongoing conflict.

The foremost concern of Afghanistan’s regional neighbours is that the coalition forces will begin their deadline-mandated exit before putting in place a strong alternative force to continue their work. A major apprehension is that the Taliban will defeat the weak and poorly trained Afghan National Army, take over Kabul, extend their reach to the countryside in due course and once again begin to practice their peculiar brand of Jihad and cultural bigotry. Both Iran and China are wary of the return of Wahabi Islam to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s regional neighbours, including the CARs, China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia, must come together to seek a solution to the conflict. This would involve putting together a regional force, preferably under a UN flag, to provide a stable environment for governance and development till the Afghan National Army can take over. The diplomatic aim should be to work towards a stable Afghan state, which is governed by a dispensation that is neutral between India and Pakistan. It is in the regional interest to support the continued operational commitment of U.S.-NATO-ISAF forces beyond July 2011 till the situation comes under control and security can be handed over to the Afghan National Army.

(Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Bruce Riedel’s underwhelming new book

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It doesn’t tell us any more than we already know

It is hard to see what Bruce Riedel’s new book “Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of Global Jihad” seeks to do.

Book cover (credit:bestofferbuyuk.com

It covers the history of the United States’ relationship with Pakistan from Partition onwards, but is too brief and too shallow to provide a good picture. Dennis Kux and Howard Schaffer deal with this in much greater detail. As an analysis of Pakistani politics and civil-military relations, it is a subset of Stephen P Cohen’s excellent book. As a narrative of the creation and growth of the military-jihadi complex, it is supered by Ahmed Rashid and Hussain Haqqani, who go much deeper. Finally, as an account of the Obama administration’s handling of the war in Afghanistan-Pakistan, it has little to add to Bob Woodward’s book published last year.

Coming from one of the most astute analysts of Pakistan, and from someone who was “in the room” during important moments in contemporary history, the book is a disappointment. Mr Riedel could well have cited Kux, Schaffer, Cohen & Rashid as references in his introductory chapter and gone on to provide us with a deeper, broader analysis of Pakistan’s current situation and fleshed out the possible directions it may take in the future. Yet, we are left with just one single chapter on the implications of one single—what he calls “possible (but not probable)”—outcome: the implications of a jihadist state in Pakistan. That begs the question: what about the probable outcomes? Shouldn’t the book be discussing those in detail?

Perhaps because he is still too close to the policy-making in Washington, Mr Riedel uses statements like “the United States currently has better relations with both India and Pakistan than any other time in the past several decades”. This, after he lays out in great detail how deeply unpopular the United States is in Pakistan (not least because of Washington’s improved relations with India), how the Pakistani military is at loggerheads with its U.S. counterpart, and after mentioning incidents like the suicide attack on the CIA base in Khost. Let’s hope Mr Riedel was merely being diplomatic and politically correct, because the alternative is unflattering.

The disappointment deepens when you see the author accepting the trite argument that Pakistan’s insecurities vis-a-vis India will assuaged if there is a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, even on Pakistan’s own terms. A person who correctly sees a hasty U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as a victory for Al-Qaeda’s global jihad somehow fails to consider the geopolitical implications of India yielding to Pakistan’s military-jihadi blackmail. To be fair, Mr Riedel recommends nothing more than what was agreed in India-Pakistan back channel talks, but even so, the premise that Pakistan will pose less of a threat to international security if only India were to make some concessions takes the heat off the protagonists—Pakistan and its scaffold states. And no, privately nudging the Indian leadership to pursue dialogue with Pakistan is unlikely to be any more effective than doing so publicly.

What is the book’s big prescription for Pakistan? The combination of carrots (Kerry-Lugar long-term aid) and sticks (drone attacks and suchlike) that are currently employed by the Obama administration. There is very little by way of identification and evaluation of other options. This might, again, be due to the fact the Mr Riedel was recently a part of, and still very close to, the ongoing deadly embrace. By that token, this book might have come too early.