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India-US Relations Blog

How will Wikileaks affect the U.S.-India dynamic?

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Last week began with a bang as Wikileaks snuck out its latest offering of classified government cables and documents causing a stir in diplomatic circles. The leaked documents provide a glimpse into the U.S. State Department’s dealings with and impressions of various countries and global leaders. While the veracity of these documents will continue to remain suspect, there is little to suggest that all of the contents of the documents are doctored. Assuming that the information contained in these documents is partially true, there are some interesting and disturbing revelations for India, particularly with regard to Pakistan and China.

Image credit www.skuggen.comProbably the most disparaging of comments about India is a poor assessment of the Cold Start strategy, a military strategy to be implemented in retaliation of terrorist attacks in India. The exposed document revels U.S’ doubts about the deterrent capability of Cold Start for Pakistan, and India’s intentions of every using it given that it did not do so after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. It also says that several senior government officials have neither “supported, endorsed or advocated” for Cold Start.

Other documents reveal how China blocked a UN Security Council vote on sanctions against Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and its leader Hafiz Saeed at the behest of Pakistan before the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai.  JuD and Hafiz Saeed have been accused by India of having planned terrorist attacks on India. Since then JuD has been put under sanctions and the Pakistan government is tasked with implementing the freeze on assets. However, JuD and Saeed continue to be operational even today.

Another set of documents show the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s annual budget, raised through private funds and charitable networks of JuD, is $ 5.2 million. Hafiz Saeed and LeT’s Zakir-ul-Rehman Lakhvi are said to continue operating and generating funds in spite of having been detained by Pakistani agencies for their involvement in the Mumbai attacks. Still other documents talk of how Pakistan would not stop supporting terrorists against India no matter how much aid poured in from the U.S.  The documents shows a Pakistan obsessed with animosity with India and no amount of money would not make a difference to its intentions about India.

These and other documents from Wikileaks vindicate India’s allegations about Pakistan sponsored terrorism against India, and their role particularly in the 26/11 attacks. While the contents of these documents might not be particularly surprising, it brings a mixed bag of emotions as far as its relations with the U.S. are concerned. On the one hand the leaked cables show how the U.S. is concerned about terrorism emanating from Pakistan, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and a circumstance necessitated relationship filled with suspicion and distrust. On the other it raises questions about what the U.S was doing sitting on such extensive information about Hafiz Saeed and other terrorist activities in Pakistan? Why did it not act against terrorism in Pakistan with the same speed and determination as it did against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan or against Iraq? Is the U.S. genuinely concerned about terrorism as a whole, or only when it lands on its shores? Is India good only as a trading partner for America, or does it appreciate its strategic importance in South Asia? How true is the ‘natural allies’ rhetoric, or would short term strategic considerations continue to override long-term gains that the U.S-India partnership can provide each country?

India has so far chosen to maintain a stoic silence on the Wikileaks and refrained from criticizing the U.S for the leaking of classified conversations. Irrespective of how damaging the leaks are to security interests or bilateral relations, the sheer number of documents leaked (over 90000) is enough to raise concerns about the confidentiality and privacy of future interactions with the U.S. Though the revelations might not have been too startling, diplomatic bridges have been damaged as is evident from the U.S’ hurried damage control response, including plans to charge Wikileaks founder Julian Assange. With time the memory of these embarrassing revelations will be relegated to history, and all might seem well with the India-U.S relationship. But will the two countries truly be natural allies? Or will the ghosts of Pakistan and U.S’ inaction to the detriment of Indian security interests loom large over this nascent relationship?

Important links:

“WikiLeaks U.S. embassy cables: as it happened”

“US doubts Pak will fight militants”

“WikiLeaks cables portray Saudi Arabia as a cash machine for terrorists.”

“Wikileaks: China thwarted action against anti-India terrorists”

“Cash from Haj pilgrims used to finance 26/11: WikiLeaks”

“WikiLeaks cables: Accused Mumbai plotter runs operations from jail”

India-US Relations Blog

An Untold Story of US-India Relations

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My belief and experience is that the U.S. and India have a great deal in common, both as people and as nations. Some of these commonalities are rather obvious such as the democracies in the two countries, and the multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious societies. People in both nations cherish their diversity. Both nations have taken practical steps to build institutional safeguards to protect the freedoms of minorities. They are welcoming of immigrants such that the U.S. is even recognized as the land of immigrants. Maybe very few people know though that India has been for centuries the land of immigrants.

As the world gets more complex, both nations are discovering that they have a similar view towards major geo-strategic issues facing the world. Both view China as their major economic partner and a potential adversary. India and the U.S are interested in a stable Afghanistan with strong institutions even if not fully democratic one. Both nations have tremendous stake in protecting maritime links and freedom of navigation. Both are victims of Islamic terrorism and face the prospects of constant terrorist attacks.

These factors make India and the U.S. natural allies in today’s world. There is therefore also a bipartisan support for President Obama’s initiatives for a broader India-U.S. interaction and partnership.

However, one area has escaped attention, and could very well be the most relevant area of U.S.-India congruence. It is a shared view of economic and monetary policy. The United States is an open economy, an economy that has invited companies from other countries to export their goods and services to America. This posture of the United States has benefited the U.S. consumer by bringing goods to them at a lower price, and it has benefited the exporting countries by increasing their prosperity. Threatened by neo-mercantile countries, America has begun to feel that it is the only country with such an open-minded posture.

At this time, it is important to note that India shares this American vision. India is increasingly open to trade and to foreign companies exporting their goods and services to India. A quick visit to India confirms this. American and European companies are increasing their presence in India and, unlike in China, these companies are making money.

Both the U.S and India are principally domestic consumption economies. This may not be obvious to many. India is now anchored in people’s minds as a technology outsourcing economy and the global success of U.S. brands makes America appear intent on dominating the world. But under this imagery lies the reality of domestic consumption as the principal driver of American and Indian economies. Both countries have physically large and deep markets with the capacity to absorb foreign goods and foreign capital. Perhaps because of this, both the U.S. and India have large current account deficits and trade deficits. These two countries are also dependent on foreign capital to sustain their growth.

This makes the U.S.-India pair relatively unique in the G-20. China, Germany, Japan and Brazil are export dynamos. Most of the Asian countries are semi-mercantile exporting economies. They depend on weak currencies to make their products less expensive. They have gathered a huge hoard of foreign exchange reserves in the past 10 years. These forex reserves are now approaching $6 trillion and have grown ten-fold in the past 10 years. The principal beneficiary is, of course, China that has accumulated about $2.5 trillion in reserves, almost 50% of the total growth in the past decade.

These neo-mercantile countries are engaged in exporting their capital to domestic consumption countries like America and India in addition to their products. They need domestic consumption countries to increase spending and consumption, increase imports and maintain strong currency levels.

This is where the global battle lines are being drawn today. The U.S. and India find themselves on the same side & as partners in this battle. This is why Prime Minister Singh seconded President Obama’s strong partnership mantra and said, “A strong, robust, fast-growing United States is in the interests of the world.”

India-US Relations Blog

When Obama won over the Indian Parliament

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As expected, Obama’s maiden visit to India this weekend has been a success. President Obama struck all the right notes, and the First Lady charmed India as she danced with children. The highlight of the visit was Obama’s address to the joint session of the Indian Parliament on Monday where he endorsed India’s permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, and took a tough stance on Pakistan and said that terrorist safe-havens within its borders were unacceptable.

Even before the President arrived in India, there was speculation about whether he would call out Pakistan for harboring terrorists within its borders, terrorists that have been shown to carry out attacks on India. During the first two days of his trips, Obama was hesitant and the Indians seemed disappointed with his Pakistan attitude. India’s skepticism about the Obama administration, in particular due to its constant appeasement of Pakistan and their “efforts” in fighting terrorists within their borders, was evident in the build up to the visit. However, Obama choose the right place to confirm his support for India’s concerns about Pakistani terrorism – the grand halls of the Indian democracy. It is no wonder then that Obama received one of the largest and longest applauses of the evening when he said,

“And we will continue to insist to Pakistan’s leaders that terrorist safe-havens within their borders are unacceptable, and that the terrorists behind the Mumbai attacks be brought to justice. We must also recognize that all of us have an interest in both an Afghanistan and a Pakistan that is stable, prosperous and democratic—and none more so than India.”

But the home-run of the evening was his endorsement of India for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Indian leaders across party lines have demanded a permanent seat for India at the UNSC on the basis of India’s nuclear prowess, economic growth and regional eminence. The U.S. on its part has evaded the endorsement for an equally long time. Monday’s endorsement was open-ended, dependent upon overall reforms of the UNSC which might take a number of years to be implemented. But India can hope that the endorsement from the U.S. would help initiate reforms to the UNSC sooner. The support by John McCain brings hope that the support would become a permanent part of U.S. foreign policy.

Addressing the Parliament Obama said,

“And as two global leaders, the United States and India can partner for global security—especially as India serves on the Security Council over the next two years.  Indeed, the just and sustainable international order that America seeks includes a United Nations that is efficient, effective, credible and legitimate.  That is why I can say today—in the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed U.N. Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.”

The announcement was at best a shrewd high impact low risk diplomatic gesture, an opportunity to surpass Bush’s Nuclear Deal moment and ensure reciprocal support from India on issues such as human rights in Myanmar or tougher sanctions on Iran. Obama’s support was followed by a call to India to take up more responsibility and reprimand for not speaking out against and condemning human right abuses. He said,

“Faced with such gross violations of human rights, it is the responsibility of the international community—especially leaders like the United States and India—to condemn it.  If I can be frank, in international fora, India has often avoided these issues.  But speaking up for those who cannot do so for themselves is not interfering in the affairs of other countries.  It’s not violating the rights of sovereign nations.  It’s staying true to our democratic principles.”

So far there have not been disapproving voices in the media or the Indian polity about Obama preaching India how to conduct itself in the world. And it would be in Indian interests not to take offense. The U.S. has played its superpower role for a long time and with considerable success. There have been strategic miscalculations that caused pain to many innocents, but its intentions have been largely humane. Obama and Singh may have declared that the two countries would work as equal partner, but India has a lot to learn when it comes to playing superpower.

Obama’s address to the Indian Parliament was also unique in that it touched upon not only the usual suspects – Gandhi, great civilization, diversity, contributions to medicine and science, economic growth – but also talked about Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar (a lower caste leader who rose to be the chief architect of the Indian Constitution), the Panchatantra (a collection of stories that reflect the moral framework of the Indian civilization), Swami Vivekananda (who preached equality of religions in Chicago) and increasing engagement with East Asia.

What was conspicuously missing though is a reference to China in relation to India. While the India-China rivalry might not be as evident to the world as the India-Pakistan rivalry, it exists and poses a serious concern to India’s aspirations. China is one of Pakistan’s closest allies and will soon begin construction of two new nuclear reactors in Pakistan among other things. The two countries have festering border issues in the North-East as well as the Jammu & Kashmir region where Pakistan has handed over a part of the territory to China. The Dalai Lama finds refuge in India, and Chinese influence is growing among India’s neighbors such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh etc. The economic competition between the two countries is well-known.

The missing reference to China is important because India featured prominently when Obama visited China last year. He had irked India by suggesting that China help India and Pakistan resolve their issues. However, while in India, Obama did not mention China even in reference to the nuclear reactor agreement between China and Pakistan which would only add to the nuclear capability of Pakistan and consequentially the instability in the region. The Pakistan and UNSC mentions seem to have sidelined the thoughts about China.

Overall, the Obama visit and his speech before the Indian Parliament was a step forward for U.S-India bilateral relations. President Obama also managed to quell apprehensions in India about his administration’s pro-India attitude. The discontent and fear in India due to the Democratic Party’s protectionist attitude in response to the economic recession, continuing appeasement of Pakistan (as evident in the new $2 billion aid package) and uncertainty about the estimation of India’s role in Afghanistan is sure to have been reduced by the Obamas’ charm offensive over the last weekend. India has become an important economic partner for the U.S., and the relationship is sure to grow stronger in days to come.

India-US Relations Blog

Obama’s visit: India’s red lines

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Guest post by Raja Karthikeya

The briefing books are ready. The red carpet has been laid out. Indian leaders have made up their mind on the talking points with Obama. However, for what promises to be a historic occasion, U.S. President Obama’s visit has been hailed with surprisingly down-to-earth expectations. But understanding India’s concerns on one element that concerns the U.S. equally – terrorism – may still change the outcome of this visit and this factor goes far beyond David Headley.

Veteran South Asia analyst Ashley Tellis recently wrote that it is ironic that the key issues that pre-occupy policymakers in the U.S. and India alike – Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China have become irritants in bilateral relations. Indeed, there are yet things that Obama can do to converge U.S. and Indian strategy, particularly on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Obama can start by addressing the red lines that India has vis-à-vis specific non-state actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Red lines, in diplomatic parlance, are points that are non-negotiable. But they can also represent the bare minimum demands that a negotiating side expects to have fulfilled, in order to call the discussion a success.

On Afghanistan, India has its reservations on the pace and potential outcome of the Karzai government’s negotiations with the Taliban. Irrespective of how much distance the U.S. puts between itself and the negotiations, Indians continue to believe that the talks could not happen without an implicit U.S. nod. While India closely watches the talks, it has one red line that it expects the U.S. to respect: no negotiation with the Haqqani network. This group, which has most notably been behind the 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, represents everything that worries India about the future of the region. And India’s sentiments towards the Haqqani network are not very different from what the U.S. feels about Hezbollah for the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon or Al Qaeda for the attacks on embassies in East Africa.

When it comes to non-state actors based in Pakistan, the red lines are clear as well. The U.S. should push Pakistan to act against one group’s leadership more than anything else: Lashkar-e-Taiba. It is no surprise that in the latest Pew opinion poll, Indians cited Lashkar-e-Taiba as the greatest threat to their country. And it is hardly reassuring when despite Pakistan’s claims of crackdown on the group, as cited in Bob Woodward’s Obama Wars, the U.S. National Security Advisor finds Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi directing the group’s operations from inside a Pakistani prison.

Obama is likely to ask what would inspire trust in India that Pakistan’s establishment is serious about acting against terrorism. Some very tangible measures by Islamabad would help: 1. Disallow police permission to any public gatherings or rallies by the Jamat-ud-Dawa, an organization proscribed by the UN, particularly in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi. 2. List Jamat-ud-Dawa as a banned organization under the Anti-Terrorism Acts. The absence of this measure led to Hafiz Saeed being released by the courts after arrest more than once 3. Put Hafiz Saeed away for good. His speeches themselves have led to murder and mayhem. And the fingerprints of the organization he leads, Jamat-ud-Dawa, and of LeT’s alumni have been found on several major international terrorist plots from the Mumbai attacks to the 7/7 London bombings to the 2006 transatlantic airliner “liquid bomb” plot. Again, putting a man in prison is not enough if prison turns into a mere retreat from where one can tele-commute. Take the case of Omar Sheikh, the man released in the 1999 Indian airliner hijacking who was later imprisoned in Pakistan for the murder of journalist Daniel Pearl. Just after the Mumbai attacks, safe in the confines of his prison, Omar Sheikh called Pakistani President Zardari pretending to be the Indian foreign minister and raised tempers enough for Pakistan to scramble its jets and for the two nations to almost go to war. To avoid the repetition of such events, the red line on Hafiz Saeed would be that his imprisonment should imply he would not be heard from anymore.

There are those on Obama’s team who believe that the key to peace between India and Pakistan lies in resolution of differences over Kashmir. But if the Zardari government seeks to pick up the thread of the back-channel process that was aborted in 2007, a good start would be to disallow meetings of the “United Jihad Council” – the consortium of violent terrorist groups that strike in Jammu & Kashmir. This consortium holds its annual meetings in Muzaffarabad in full media spotlight where its members, carrying arms, call for violent attacks in India.

If President Obama can assure India of using his influence and sees that these red lines are addressed and that these tangible concerns are met, then this visit would not just be a success – it would be the beginning of a whole new era of trust in India-US relations.

(Raja Karthikeya is a foreign policy researcher.)

India-US Relations Blog

It’s not transactional, stupid!

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Obama’s visit to India is a sign of the symbolism that characterizes a strategic relationship.

People are missing the point.

It doesn’t require the U.S. president to come all the way to India to sell military equipment, make a case for reforming the UN security council, remove hurdles for high-technology co-operation, or indeed, as White House officials tried to project last week, encourage Indian companies to create jobs in the United States.

Such issues are negotiated by the minions, need bureaucratic and political consensus on both sides and are settled at their own pace. Official visits and summits between heads of state at best impose artificial deadlines and can be used to inject urgency into the negotiating machines. We saw it a few years ago when the India-US nuclear deal was pushed through in time for a Bush-Manmohan Singh summit.

Those who measure the significance and success of Barack Obama’s upcoming visit to India through the prism of deals signed and statements made miss the fact that the India-US relationship is strategic, not transactional. Ironically, the strategic nature of the relationship was sealed by a transaction—the nuclear deal—leading many to expect more of the same. Now, there are good reasons for the Indian government to purchase U.S. military aircraft, but not doing so isn’t about to wreck the bilateral relationship. Similarly, there are good reasons for Mr Obama to declare support for India’s place in a reformed UN Security Council, but other than disappointing his hosts, he won’t do much damage if he skips this topic.

For the first time in more than 50 years, the interests of the United States and India are converging geopolitically, geo-economically and, to coin a phrase, geo-democratically. As K Subrahmanyam points out succinctly, the United States needs India to counter China’s rising power. Likewise, India needs a strong United States, not to ally with, but for its own reasons of swing. This is as true from the economic perspective as it is from a political one. [Also see this CNAS report] Most importantly, India and the United States are mutually popular—the bottom-up factor is a powerful driver of closer bilateral relations.

It’s very hard to measure the extent of strategic relationships. Signing of business or arms deals are poor proxies. That’s where symbolism comes in. Obama has no real business to do in India. Yet he is coming. Sure, he’ll do some business when he’s here, but none that absolutely requires his presence. It’s symbolic and it counts.

For that reason Barack Obama will have a very successful trip to India next week. He just has to turn up.