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Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

On the death of Osama and a future with Pakistan

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The location of Osama’s death underlines the work required on Pakistan

After a decade of anxiety, fear and anticipation, the friends and families of the victims of 9/11 have finally received closure. Osama bin Laden was killed in his hideout in Abbottabad in Pakistan through a special operation by U.S. forces in the wee hours of May 1. Osama was found hiding in a mansion, just kilometers from a Pakistani military academy and a few hours from Islamabad.

Though Osama’s killing is a humongous achievement for the U.S. counterterrorism operations and intelligence services, and is sure to affect the morale of the al- Qaeda foot-soldiers, it is by no means the end of the war on terrorism. As security agencies (particularly in US, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan) prepare for a backlash of the killing, it would be necessary to capture the moment and the momentum, and drill deeper to eradicate more such terrorists. The U.S. cannot relax and retreat now that its primary target has been eliminated; it should push forward even harder.

Equally important is dealing with Pakistan. The very fact that Osama bin Laden was found hiding in a ‘mansion’ near a Pakistani military academy, probably for about five years, reconfirms doubts about Pakistan’s support and genuine participation in the war on terror. Given the “efficiency” of the ISI (Pakistan secret service) and the Pakistan Army, it seems improbable that they were oblivious to the location of Osama, on their soil and close to their elite establishment. Rather, it seems as if Osama was secure under the protection of the military and intelligence elite who frequented the region. Otherwise, why would he choose such a “dangerous” location to hide?

To make matters worse for Pakistan, the entire operation was kept secret from its forces, and they did not participate in it in any manner. It is a humiliating display of the distrust for Pakistan, and further rocks the already precarious US-Pakistan relationship. An operation as crucial as this, on Pakistani soil, without the knowledge and participation of Pakistan, is a big slap in its face. From an Indian perspective, it vindicates India’s claims about Pakistan harboring terrorists.

It is about time the U.S. realized and acted upon the double-standards of Pakistan where it claims to fight terrorism and harbor terrorist organizations on its soil at the same time. Last month, David Headley (on trial in U.S. courts for prominent role in 26/11 Mumbai attacks) claimed links to ISI and the Pakistani army. India has submitted dossiers after dossiers on the involvement of Pakistan in 26/11, and other terrorist attacks in India. Wikileaks said U.S. considered ISI a terrorist organization. Khaled Sheikh Mohammed was caught in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

The death of Osama bin Laden gives credence to the stories of dangerous liaisons that Pakistan entertains, and President Obama should take a realistic view of his AfPak strategy and engagement with Pakistan. This is a moment to honestly evaluate Pakistan, and the significant time that was wasted chasing mirages in Afghanistan.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Afghanistan: No Cause for Hope

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The unending conflict in Afghanistan poses the foremost threat to regional stability in Southern Asia. Although President Obama has tripled the number of U.S. forces to 100,000 in the two years he has been in office,,this surge in force levels has failed to effectively counter the long-term threat posed by the Taliban and its Al Qaeda partners. In 2010, every single month was worse than the preceding month in terms of the number of incidents, the casualties to ISAF forces and the killing of innocent civilians. Along the Af-Pak border, despite continuing drone attacks, there has been a steady deterioration in the ability of ISAF to eliminate safe havens for the Taliqaeda extremists. Even the Pakistan army has not fared well in its fight against the TTP cadres holding out in North Waziristan.

The report on the situation in Afghanistan released recently by the White House banks more on hope than reality. It admits that the “challenge remains to make our goals durable and sustainable.” Commanders on the ground, including General Petraeus, continue to claim that the security situation is improving steadily and that the Taliban offensive has been contained. In testimony before Congress in early March 2011, Petraeus claimed that the momentum achieved by the Taliban has been “arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of areas.” However, he stressed that the “successes are fragile and reversible.”

The Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan police are to be entrusted with the responsibility to independently take over the security function from ISAF in selected provinces beginning in July 2011 so that the planned draw-down of forces can begin. So far the Afghan security forces have not exhibited the standards of professionalism, battalion cohesion and the qualities of junior leadership that are necessary for success in the complex and challenging security environment prevailing in Afghanistan. They still need ISAF officers and quick reaction teams to accompany them for operations, failing which they tend to lose unit cohesion very quickly and disperse in panic.

Negotiations with the so-called “good Taliban” have also floundered. None of the main Taliban leaders – Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – have shown any inclination to conduct serious negotiations with the Karzai government or directly with Western negotiators. They are, of course, keen to buy time by pretending to be interested in a negotiated settlement.  

The development work being undertaken by the Karzai government and the PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams) has not reached the poorest provinces as efforts are concentrated on areas that are well connected by roads. The PRTs spend large sums of money on security for their supply convoys and most of this money ultimately ends up as a source of funding for the Taliban. The traditional notion that development work can be successfully undertaken by external agencies has not been borne out over the last 10 years in Afghanistan. A better method would be assist the Afghans with aid, materials and expertise and let them take the responsibility for development. However, due to the lack of efficient governance and rampant corruption, this method is also has serious pitfalls.

The Taliban are fond of saying that the ISAF forces have the watches but they have the time. They are convinced that the U.S. and NATO forces do not have the political will or the military staying power to last the course and they are biding their time for the foreign forces to quit. Their Pakistani friends are giving them similar advice: hang in there; these guys will soon go away. The prognosis for Afghanistan is far from rosy and a spring offensive may soon muddy the waters further.

India-US Relations Blog

An Untold Story of US-India Relations

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My belief and experience is that the U.S. and India have a great deal in common, both as people and as nations. Some of these commonalities are rather obvious such as the democracies in the two countries, and the multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious societies. People in both nations cherish their diversity. Both nations have taken practical steps to build institutional safeguards to protect the freedoms of minorities. They are welcoming of immigrants such that the U.S. is even recognized as the land of immigrants. Maybe very few people know though that India has been for centuries the land of immigrants.

As the world gets more complex, both nations are discovering that they have a similar view towards major geo-strategic issues facing the world. Both view China as their major economic partner and a potential adversary. India and the U.S are interested in a stable Afghanistan with strong institutions even if not fully democratic one. Both nations have tremendous stake in protecting maritime links and freedom of navigation. Both are victims of Islamic terrorism and face the prospects of constant terrorist attacks.

These factors make India and the U.S. natural allies in today’s world. There is therefore also a bipartisan support for President Obama’s initiatives for a broader India-U.S. interaction and partnership.

However, one area has escaped attention, and could very well be the most relevant area of U.S.-India congruence. It is a shared view of economic and monetary policy. The United States is an open economy, an economy that has invited companies from other countries to export their goods and services to America. This posture of the United States has benefited the U.S. consumer by bringing goods to them at a lower price, and it has benefited the exporting countries by increasing their prosperity. Threatened by neo-mercantile countries, America has begun to feel that it is the only country with such an open-minded posture.

At this time, it is important to note that India shares this American vision. India is increasingly open to trade and to foreign companies exporting their goods and services to India. A quick visit to India confirms this. American and European companies are increasing their presence in India and, unlike in China, these companies are making money.

Both the U.S and India are principally domestic consumption economies. This may not be obvious to many. India is now anchored in people’s minds as a technology outsourcing economy and the global success of U.S. brands makes America appear intent on dominating the world. But under this imagery lies the reality of domestic consumption as the principal driver of American and Indian economies. Both countries have physically large and deep markets with the capacity to absorb foreign goods and foreign capital. Perhaps because of this, both the U.S. and India have large current account deficits and trade deficits. These two countries are also dependent on foreign capital to sustain their growth.

This makes the U.S.-India pair relatively unique in the G-20. China, Germany, Japan and Brazil are export dynamos. Most of the Asian countries are semi-mercantile exporting economies. They depend on weak currencies to make their products less expensive. They have gathered a huge hoard of foreign exchange reserves in the past 10 years. These forex reserves are now approaching $6 trillion and have grown ten-fold in the past 10 years. The principal beneficiary is, of course, China that has accumulated about $2.5 trillion in reserves, almost 50% of the total growth in the past decade.

These neo-mercantile countries are engaged in exporting their capital to domestic consumption countries like America and India in addition to their products. They need domestic consumption countries to increase spending and consumption, increase imports and maintain strong currency levels.

This is where the global battle lines are being drawn today. The U.S. and India find themselves on the same side & as partners in this battle. This is why Prime Minister Singh seconded President Obama’s strong partnership mantra and said, “A strong, robust, fast-growing United States is in the interests of the world.”