Tag Archives: South Asia

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

‘Ugly Stability’ in Southern Asia

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The key geo-strategic challenges in Southern Asia emanate from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and on the AfPak border; unresolved territorial disputes between India and China, and India-Pakistan; and, the almost unbridled scourge of radical extremism that is sweeping across the strategic landscape.

In May 1998, India and Pakistan had crossed the nuclear Rubicon and declared themselves states armed with nuclear weapons. Tensions are inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons by neighbours with a long history of conflict. The latest manifestation of this long-drawn conflict is the 20-year old state-sponsored ‘proxy war’ waged by Pakistan’s ISI-controlled mercenary terrorists against the Indian state.

While there was some nuclear sabre-rattling between India and Pakistan, particularly during the Kargil conflict, the two nations have never come close to a situation of deterrence breakdown. The “ugly stability” that is prevailing can be attributed primarily to India’s unwavering strategic restraint in the face of grave provocation, democratic checks and balances in its policy processes and tight civilian control over its nuclear forces. However, the Pakistan army, which also controls the country’s nuclear arsenal, has lost India’s trust after the Kargil conflict and the terrorist strikes at Mumbai. It is capable of once again stepping up trans-LoC terrorism or even engendering a Kargil-like situation that could escalate to a major war.

India’s border with China has been relatively more stable than that with Pakistan. However, China is in physical occupation of 38,000 sq km of Indian territory in Ladakh, J&K, and China claims the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (96,000 sq km) in the north-east. Even the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has not been demarcated on the ground and on military maps. Recently China has exhibited unprecedented assertiveness in its diplomacy and military posture. Until the territorial dispute between the two countries is resolved satisfactorily, another border conflict cannot be ruled out even though the probability is quite low.

China does not recognise India as a state armed with nuclear weapons and demands that India should go back to a non-nuclear status in terms of UNSC Resolution 1172 and, hence, refuses to discuss nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs) with India. There is also a collusive nexus between China and Pakistan for nuclear weapons, nuclear-capable missiles and military hardware. Most analysts in India believe that this nexus will lead to India having to face a two-front situation during any future conflict.

The prevailing security environment in Southern Asia is not conducive to long-term strategic stability even though in the short-term there is no cause for major concern. India is developing robust military capabilities and is in the process of upgrading its military strategy against China from dissuasion to deterrence. In the nuclear weapons field, India is moving towards the deployment of the third leg of its triad, i.e. a nuclear-powered submarine armed with a submarine launched nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles (SSBN with SLBMs). This will give India genuine nuclear deterrence capability so as to prevent deterrence breakdown and reduce the risk of nuclear exchanges in any future conflict.

(Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Peace and Stability in 2011: Turbulence will Continue

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From the point of view of international peace and stability, 2010 ended on a positive note with the ratification by the U.S. Senate of the new START treaty that will further reduce deployed strategic nuclear weapons of Russia and the U.S. to 1,550 in seven years. However, in view of the ongoing conflicts and possible conflagrations, 2011 is likely to be a turbulent year.

The strategic stalemate in Afghanistan will continue with the Taliban and NATO-ISAF forces alternately gaining local ascendancy for short durations in the core provinces of Helmand, Marja and Kandahar. While U.S. forces may be expected to step up drone strikes in Pakistan against extremists sheltering in the NWFP and FATA areas, the results are not likely to appear justifiable in view of the diplomatic fallout in Pakistan. The Afghan National Army is still many years away from achieving the professional standards necessary to manage security on its own. Hence, it will be difficult for the U.S. to begin its planned drawdown of troops in July 2011.

The military stand-off along the 38th Parallel in Korea has further exacerbated the already unstable situation in East Asia caused by increasing Chinese assertiveness that appears out of character with its stated objective of a peaceful rise. Though the international community may be able to ensure that a major conflict does not erupt again between the two Koreas, the sub-region will remain volatile unless the Chinese use their influence with North Korea to persuade it to back off from the path of confrontation. As of now they do not appear inclined to do so.

Turmoil in West Asia will continue through 2011 as Israel stubbornly refuses to halt the construction of new settlements in the West Bank and the Palestinian militias are getting increasingly restive. Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the vaguely stated threats of several of its neighbours to follow suit will continue to add to instability in the region. Saudi Arabia, in particular, may fund Pakistan’s nuclear expansion programme as a hedging strategy against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran. Such a course of action would be a disastrous blow to international non-proliferation efforts.

It can be deduced form recent arrests in the U.K. and elsewhere that international fundamentalist terrorists may succeed in launching another spectacular strike in the West. A successful strike would resurrect the al Qaeda and enable it to rally its wavering cadres. All in all, 2011 will see a continuation of ongoing conflicts without major let up.

(Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Continuing Instability in South Asia Hampering Development

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Though this past year has been relatively peaceful in South Asia, the unstable regional security environment, India’s unresolved territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, and the continuing internal security challenges are a cause for concern. After West Asia, this region is perhaps the most trouble prone region in the world. With a history of four conflicts in 60 years and three nuclear-armed adversaries continuing to face off, South Asia has often been described as a nuclear flash-point.

The regional security environment in South Asia continues to be marred by Afghanistan’s endless civil war despite the induction of additional troops in 2010 by the U.S.-led NATO-ISAF coalition forces. Pakistan’s halfhearted struggle against the remnants of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, fissiparous tendencies in Baluchistan and the Pushtun heartland, continuing radical extremism and creeping Talibanisation, the unstable civilian government, the floundering economy and, consequently, the nation’s gradual slide towards becoming a ‘failed state’, pose a major security threat to India. The collusive nuclear weapons-cum-missile development programme of China, North Korea and Pakistan as also Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons are serious issues of concern.

Sri Lanka’s inability to find a lasting solution to its ethnic problems despite the comprehensive defeat of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) has serious repercussions for stability in the island nation. Bangladesh’s emergence as the new hub of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism, even as it struggles for economic upliftment to subsistence levels, could trigger a new wave of terrorism if left unchecked. The Maoist ascendancy in Nepal and its adverse impact on Nepal’s fledgling democracy, as also Nepal’s new found inclination to seek neutrality between India and China, are a blow to what has historically been a stable India-Nepal relationship. Simmering discontentment in Tibet and Xinjiang against China’s repressive regime is gathering momentum and could result in an open revolt. The peoples’ nascent movement for democracy in Myanmar and several long festering insurgencies may destabilize the military Junta despite its post-election confidence. The spillover of religious extremism and terrorism from Afghanistan and political instability in the CARs are undermining development and governance.

Other vitiating factors impacting regional stability in South Asia include the unchecked proliferation of small arms, nurtured and encouraged by large-scale narcotics trafficking. India’s standing as a regional power with global power ambitions, and one that aspires to a seat on the UN Security Council has been seriously compromised by its inability to successfully manage ongoing conflicts in its neighborhood, singly or in concert with its strategic partners.

These conflicts are undermining South Asia’s efforts towards socio-economic development and poverty alleviation by hampering governance and vitiating the investment climate. Here’s hoping that the new year will bring in better opportunities to reduce tensions in the region, and improve the socio-economic conditions.

(Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Is It Terrorism Or A Long Term Covert War Strategy?

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This week a small bomb exploded in the Holy City of Varanasi at the Dashashwamedha Ghat where prayers are held. Hundreds of people watch this event either at the Ghat or from boats in the River Ganga. This bomb attack was terrorism, a dastardly act intended to injure and kill innocent people.

VaranasiBut this attack is very different from the horrific attack on Mumbai by commandos from Pakistan in November 2008. The attack on Mumbai was NOT terrorism, but a totally different operation. It was an exquisitely planned and flawlessly executed attack by professionally trained commandos armed with an arsenal of lethal weapons. Prior to the attack, the supporting cadres had scouted the targets, established base camps in nondescript buildings, and stockpiled on weapons and support material. The attackers traveled from Karachi to Mumbai in trawlers; they came ashore in inflatables in isolated portions off the Mumbai coastline at night, and went quietly to their planned rendezvous points. Then, like clockwork, they carried out their mission.

Based on the testimony and interrogation of David Coleman Headley, media analysts have reported that the attack was assisted or masterminded by elements associated with Pakistan’s Intelligence Service, the ISI. Whether this is true or not, we leave to the relevant officials. The more relevant question is whether this was one isolated attack or part of a long-term strategy.

The Pakistan military, in my opinion, has been a relentless enemy of India since the partition. They attacked India in 1947, 1965, 1971 and then finally in 1999. After the disastrous defeat in the 1999 Kargil conflict, I believe, the Pakistani Army came to the conclusion that they could not afford to engage the Indian Army in combat. It was time for a different strategy.

A New Strategy for Covert War against Indian Society?

We do not know what the Pakistani Army designed. But let us indulge in speculative analysis.

Readers, if you had to design a strategy, what would you do? You would realize that a successful strategy should pit your strengths against the weaknesses of your enemy. So a smart strategy against India should bypass the professional, well-trained Indian Military and attack the soft underbelly of India, the local Indian administrations. It is no secret that the local administrations in India are rather pathetic – inefficient, incompetent and sometimes corrupt. If the Indian Army is made of “Lions”, the local administrations are made of “Sheep”; complacent people content to graze in their local fiefdoms and conditioned to follow the direction of their shepherds or of their bosses above.

Ajmal KasabIt is a characteristic of wolves to attack sheep. Where would you find wolves? You would look to the poor, destitute areas of Pakistan-Pashtunistan. No shortage there of young men who, for a relatively small amount of money, could be trained in military combat, bomb-making and other terrorist activities. These men could be infiltrated into India for specific missions, a simple task given Indian complacency and laxness. If these young men are successful, mission accomplished. If these young men fail, no harm done as long as the masterminds could claim plausible deniability.

Such a strategy of attacking local Indian administrations would be easy and effective. It would cost little and create havoc in India. The pathetic state of the Indian political machine would render it incompetent to taker any effective action. In this way, you would be able to create a strategy of a long-term relentless Covert War against the Indian society.

How would such a strategy succeed? Go back and recall the events of November 2008. You will see that such a strategy could succeed brilliantly without incurring any liability or damage to the masterminds of the strategy.

Long Term Implications for India

If such a strategy actually exists, then it could have long-term implications for India. It would require the entire Indian establishment to act upon it. It would need an innovative hard set of responses, each calibrated to trigger upon a specific type or level of scenarios.

Unfortunately, this is not an Indian strength. India has not demonstrated any long-term strategic vision since Independence. No Indian agency has demonstrated the ability to work in tandem with other agencies, and the Indian Government has not created an awareness of the long-term danger to India.

At the current rate of economic progress, the Indian society would be richer, more educated and generally content with its prosperity within the next ten years. Next to this wealthy soft Indian society, the Pakistan-Pashtunistan area would be home to almost 300 million people, most of them poor, destitute and without any real means of employment. This would be an army of hungry wolves ready to descend on a rich, soft India to loot and plunder just like their ancestors began doing about 1,200 years ago. These would not be military attacks from a government but attacks from ‘independent’ groups of professionally trained wolf packs on Indian society.

What is the solution against attacks by Wolves on the Sheep? The protectors of the Sheep have to enter the den of the Wolves to unleash punishment.

Will India ever have the mental and military strength to do so? Or will India, the seeker of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, keep running to America with its grievances?

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

US-India Strategic Partnership: Irritants Cast a Shadow

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The U.S-India strategic partnership is moving on an upward trajectory, though not a predictably smooth one. In fact, after the euphoric “indispensable partners” phase of the second administration of President George W. Bush when the Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement was successfully concluded in July 2005, the pace of growth has slowed down.

Though President Bill Clinton had realised the potential of engaging India and had begun the process to get India out of the nuclear dog house, it was President Bush who made it a key foreign policy initiative. India was recognised as a state with nuclear weapons outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), given an NSG waiver to import nuclear technology and fuel, and allowed to sign an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Additional Protocol only placed  India’s civilian nuclear reactors under international safeguards while keeping strategic facilities out of the scope of the safeguards. India was also permitted to reprocess uranium under safeguards for its pressurized heavy water reactors leading to the development of the three-stage thorium fuel cycle.

Under the Next Steps for Strategic Partnership and the Defence Framework Agreement of June 2005 signed under the Bush administration, the technology denial regime is being gradually eased and defense cooperation considerably enhanced. For both the countries, the growing partnership is a hedging strategy against Chinese hegemony in Asia and will prove to be mutually beneficial in case China implodes due to its internal contradictions.

Another crucial area of cooperation between India and the U.S. includes enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation. The CIA has not only given India substantial evidence about the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, but also allowed Indian agencies to interrogate its key plotter David Coleman Headley. The sale of U.S. defense equipment to India has also gained momentum. Besides the P8I Poseidon maritime reconnaissance aircraft, C-130J Super Hercules aircraft for Special Forces, C-17 Globemaster strategic airlift aircraft and the USS Trenton, an amphibious warfare ship, many other defense acquisitions are in the pipeline. India is likely to spend up to $ 100 billion on defense purchases over the next 10 years. However, India would like to move away from a buyer-seller relationship towards transfer of technology and joint development, joint production and joint marketing of latest weapons and technology.

In the midst of this flourishing defense relationship, India feels slighted at being left out of negotiations for the resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan despite its obvious strategic stakes, and immense contribution to the development effort. The sale of conventional arms to Pakistan, including F-16 aircraft and 155mm artillery, ostensibly for counter-insurgency operations, also rankles with India as U.S. arms have emboldened Pakistan to launch both covert and overt military operations against India in the past.

While the End User Monitoring Agreement was signed recently, the U.S. would like to see early progress on the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and the two technology and information safeguards agreements – the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA).

There is no doubt that the growing U.S.-India strategic partnership will define the contours of the geo-politics of the 21st century. However, expectations from president Obama’s forthcoming visit to India are rather low as he has so far not provided the type of leadership and impetus to the relationship that his predecessor had. At best, the two countries might sign a free trade agreement, which in itself will be a good step forward for bilateral trade.

(Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.)