Tag Archives: terrorism

How will Wikileaks affect the U.S.-India dynamic?

Last week began with a bang as Wikileaks snuck out its latest offering of classified government cables and documents causing a stir in diplomatic circles. The leaked documents provide a glimpse into the U.S. State Department’s dealings with and impressions of various countries and global leaders. While the veracity of these documents will continue to remain suspect, there is little to suggest that all of the contents of the documents are doctored. Assuming that the information contained in these documents is partially true, there are some interesting and disturbing revelations for India, particularly with regard to Pakistan and China.

Image credit www.skuggen.comProbably the most disparaging of comments about India is a poor assessment of the Cold Start strategy, a military strategy to be implemented in retaliation of terrorist attacks in India. The exposed document revels U.S’ doubts about the deterrent capability of Cold Start for Pakistan, and India’s intentions of every using it given that it did not do so after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. It also says that several senior government officials have neither “supported, endorsed or advocated” for Cold Start.

Other documents reveal how China blocked a UN Security Council vote on sanctions against Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and its leader Hafiz Saeed at the behest of Pakistan before the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai.  JuD and Hafiz Saeed have been accused by India of having planned terrorist attacks on India. Since then JuD has been put under sanctions and the Pakistan government is tasked with implementing the freeze on assets. However, JuD and Saeed continue to be operational even today.

Another set of documents show the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s annual budget, raised through private funds and charitable networks of JuD, is $ 5.2 million. Hafiz Saeed and LeT’s Zakir-ul-Rehman Lakhvi are said to continue operating and generating funds in spite of having been detained by Pakistani agencies for their involvement in the Mumbai attacks. Still other documents talk of how Pakistan would not stop supporting terrorists against India no matter how much aid poured in from the U.S.  The documents shows a Pakistan obsessed with animosity with India and no amount of money would not make a difference to its intentions about India.

These and other documents from Wikileaks vindicate India’s allegations about Pakistan sponsored terrorism against India, and their role particularly in the 26/11 attacks. While the contents of these documents might not be particularly surprising, it brings a mixed bag of emotions as far as its relations with the U.S. are concerned. On the one hand the leaked cables show how the U.S. is concerned about terrorism emanating from Pakistan, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and a circumstance necessitated relationship filled with suspicion and distrust. On the other it raises questions about what the U.S was doing sitting on such extensive information about Hafiz Saeed and other terrorist activities in Pakistan? Why did it not act against terrorism in Pakistan with the same speed and determination as it did against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan or against Iraq? Is the U.S. genuinely concerned about terrorism as a whole, or only when it lands on its shores? Is India good only as a trading partner for America, or does it appreciate its strategic importance in South Asia? How true is the ‘natural allies’ rhetoric, or would short term strategic considerations continue to override long-term gains that the U.S-India partnership can provide each country?

India has so far chosen to maintain a stoic silence on the Wikileaks and refrained from criticizing the U.S for the leaking of classified conversations. Irrespective of how damaging the leaks are to security interests or bilateral relations, the sheer number of documents leaked (over 90000) is enough to raise concerns about the confidentiality and privacy of future interactions with the U.S. Though the revelations might not have been too startling, diplomatic bridges have been damaged as is evident from the U.S’ hurried damage control response, including plans to charge Wikileaks founder Julian Assange. With time the memory of these embarrassing revelations will be relegated to history, and all might seem well with the India-U.S relationship. But will the two countries truly be natural allies? Or will the ghosts of Pakistan and U.S’ inaction to the detriment of Indian security interests loom large over this nascent relationship?

Important links:

WikiLeaks U.S. embassy cables: as it happened

US doubts Pak will fight militants

WikiLeaks cables portray Saudi Arabia as a cash machine for terrorists.”

“Wikileaks: China thwarted action against anti-India terrorists”

Cash from Haj pilgrims used to finance 26/11: WikiLeaks”

WikiLeaks cables: Accused Mumbai plotter runs operations from jail

26/11: India’s options two years after

Two years ago, on Thanksgiving, as American families sat down to dinner, their TV screens came to life with a macabre spectacle. Ten terrorists, trained to numb their emotions, went on a killing spree in Mumbai unparalleled in modern history.

There have been commentators who’ve pointed out that after all, there are terrorist attacks on a daily basis in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia etc. So why should the Mumbai attacks raise so much consternation? And yet the Mumbai attacks stand out neither for their scale nor the murder – but for their modus operandi and intent. And it wasn’t just the fact that the attackers seemed unmoved by the horror of murder – the slow and calculated shooting of scores of unarmed people. It was also the fact that unlike in other terrorist attacks in the region, the terrorists in Mumbai were neither domestic insurgents nor disaffected citizens of the country. Instead, in Mumbai, the attackers were foreign nationals…Citizens of another country who had crossed an international border explicitly for the task of carrying out an essentially military action during peacetime. The causes cited by the Mumbai attackers were hardly personal. Given the legacy of relations between Pakistan and India the ten terrorists’ action could have been a causus belli. But, India chose not to respond with any form of military action and gave Pakistan an opportunity to deracinate Lashkar-e-Taiba from its soil. And yet the Lashkar, as much a nationalist group as it is a religious extremist group, has thus not been smashed by the strong arm of the Pakistani state. Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, despite being proscribed by the UN, continues to be in public life and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa continues to make news, most recently through its fund-raising drive during Eid-ul-Adha. Ajmal Amir Kasab’s confessions and David Headley’s testimony prove that Lashkar-e-Taiba’s plans are far from over.

Commandos in action during Mumbai attacksSome Pakistani analysts say that deracinating the Lashkar-e-Taiba is impossible because Pakistan’s establishment fears the repercussions of opening up another front by taking on Lashkar-e-Taiba which has powerful patronage networks in the country. Others aver that Pakistan’s military establishment needs such groups for the insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir and that they serve as a “strategic reserve” to achieve the strategic goals of the establishment vis-à-vis India. These reasons are anything but reassuring for anyone that believes in peace between the two countries.

It is clear that should a terrorist attack such as the Mumbai attacks recur, India would not be able to show restraint against the groups. Public opinion is often a strong factor in democracies as was seen in the U.S. response to 9/11. Unsurprisingly, a recent Pew poll indicated that most Indians would support military action against Lashkar-e-Taiba and other extremist groups if they conducted another terrorist attack in India. The only question for India is to determine when its red lines have been breached.

The response by India would be anything but vindictive. India’s objective would not be about destabilizing Pakistan. India recognizes the far-reaching consequences of such a scenario for India’s and international security.  Instead, should another such terrorist attack occur, what India is likely to do is target the cogs and wheels of the “terror machine” – the complex web of non-state actors who are willing to cross an international border to execute military actions – inside Pakistan.

India of course would have costs to bear.  Indian policymakers understand that there are no reliable patterns to be drawn from the history of military response to cross-border terrorist attacks. The attack and India’s response could alleviate tensions in the region enough to have an impact on the India’s economy. There would be costs in terms of human casualties. There may be no guarantees against future attacks. And yet… should a terrorist attack by a Pakistani national or a terrorist attack traceable to Pakistan recur on Indian soil, all the above costs for India would be overshadowed by the cost of doing nothing. India also remembers the adverse impact of the Mumbai attacks on the Indian economy. In short, the cost of doing nothing would have such a serious impact on the political-economy of India that it would have no other option but to respond and strike.

The onus of preventing a future attack therefore, lies as much with Pakistan as with India. The latter would of course have to strengthen its anti-terrorism institutions and structures. Pakistan, on the other hand, has to be resolute and come down hard on Lashkar-e-Taiba and its allies, and extend India the kind of security cooperation that it has extended to other countries such as Iran.

The Mumbai attacks will forever be remembered as one of the most brutal assaults ever perpetrated. Allowing another attack to happen would be just as grave a crime.

Cold Start as Deterrence against Proxy War

By Sushant Sareen
Indian Review of Global Affairs

For some months now, the Indian Army’s ‘Cold Start’ (CS) doctrine has been attracting a lot of attention from Western diplomats, generals and political leaders. The reason is simple: the Pakistanis, who were reluctant to move against their ‘strategic assets’ (aka Taliban and al Qaeda affiliates like Lashkar-e-Taiba), have self-servingly flagged this doctrine as proof of India’s hostile and aggressive design. Waving the ‘threat’ from India, the Pakistan Army has been resisting pressure from the West to redeploy troops from the eastern border to the western front. The gullible Westerners appear to have bought the Pakistani line and are seeking to persuade India to renounce the CS doctrine. This, the Westerners believe, is the magic bullet to address Pakistan’s sense of insecurity and allow the Pakistan Army to move against terrorist safe havens inside Pakistani territory.

How much the CS doctrine has spooked the Pakistanis is clear from the statements of the Pakistani political leaders and generals. Addressing senior officers in the GHQ on 1st January, the Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani called the CS doctrine “an adventurous and dangerous path”. He flogged this theme during his talk at the NATO headquarters in Brussels and later in a meeting with Pakistani journalists where he showed deep concern over the Indian Army’s preparations for making the CS doctrine operational. Taking the cue from him, the National Command Authority of Pakistan issued a statement in which it said that “offensive doctrines like Cold Start…tend to destabilise the regional balance.” The Azm-e-Nau military exercises, held in April-May 2010, were primarily aimed at countering the CS strategy of the Indian Army. Completely at a loss to understand Pakistan’s recalcitrance over acting against Islamist terror groups, the West appears to have latched on to Pakistan’s India bogey as a possible solution to end the Pakistani double-game in the war on terror. Hence, the efforts to try and make India back off from the CS strategy.

Wagah border ceremony The problem, however, is that no amount of disavowals by India, and no amount of security assurances by the U.S. or other Western nations, will ever convince Pakistan, which has been badly rattled by the CS doctrine, that India’s basic defence posture is defensive in nature and orientation. Despite the Indian Army Chief General VK Singh denying the existence of any such doctrine, the CS strategy has acquired a life of its own in the Pakistani military mind.

Come to think of if, this is probably not such a bad thing from India’s point of view. Even as strategists debate the practicality or otherwise of the concept of a limited war under a nuclear overhang and the CS doctrine as a military strategy – after all, the battleground has a nasty habit of springing surprises that can ground the most well-prepared battle plans – the doctrine’s validity has been confirmed by Pakistan’s frenetic efforts to put in place a counter strategy. That the Pakistan Army is preparing to counter the CS by its conventional forces and not through use of nuclear weapons is a tacit acceptance of both the theory of limited war under a nuclear overhang as well as the exploitation of this strategic space through the device of CS doctrine.

More important, however, has been the utility of the CS doctrine as a tool of psy-war. Not only has it unsettled the adversary, it has also put in place an effective deterrent against the proxy war unleashed by Pakistan-sponsored terror groups in India. In other words, Pakistan can no longer be sure whether or not India will resort to lightening strikes across the border in response to actions by Pakistani terror groups inside India. The prospect of sudden retaliation by India effectively means that the impunity with which Pakistan was exporting terror to India is in grave danger. Perhaps, this is one of the major reasons why there has been no major terrorist attack in India since 26/11.

But the utility of CS as a deterrent to sub-conventional warfare or proxy warfare depends in large measure on the credibility of the deterrent. In a sense, the dynamics and dialectics of a sub-conventional deterrence like CS are no different from those of nuclear deterrence. As and when India effectively operationalises the CS doctrine, it will have to ensure that the adversary knows the resolve of the Indian state to implement this strategy in response to another major terrorist strike. This is critical to prevent any miscalculation or misreading by Pakistan of India’s resolve. While the retaliation does not have to be immediate – to quote Mario Puzo “revenge is a dish that tastes best when it is cold” – any failure by India to resort to CS in response to a terror attack supported, inspired or originating from Pakistan will degrade the value of the deterrence.

It is in this sense that the CS doctrine is a double-edged weapon for both India and Pakistan. To retain credibility India will have to retaliate militarily using the CS strategy, otherwise not only will India lose all credibility but it will also embolden Pakistan to continue to unleash jihadist terror on India. But retaliation will put India on the escalation ladder which could easily go beyond the scope and scale of CS operations. The big unknown is that with sub-conventional deterrence in the form of CS doctrine breaking down, how much time and what level of desperation of either party will force them to take the next escalatory step which in turn could lead to making real the spectre of a nuclear exchange in the subcontinent.

To an extent, the escalation ladder will depend on how Pakistan responds to a CS by India. The dilemma for Pakistan will be that if it does not respond with its nuclear weapons, it will not only validate India’s belief of space for a limited war under a nuclear overhang but, more seriously, rob Pakistan of its nuclear deterrent, if only in the context of a limited war. In other words, Pakistan will face a Hobson’s choice: it can either degrade the quality of its nuclear deterrent or it can unleash a nuclear holocaust which will not only wipe it out but wreck horrendous damage on India and indeed on the rest of the world.

As long as the sub-conventional deterrence holds, the enunciation of the Cold Start doctrine actually introduces a degree of strategic stability in the region by forcing Pakistan to exercise extreme caution in unleashing terrorist violence in India. Far from asking India to renounce the CS doctrine or put it in the cold storage, the West needs to impress upon Pakistan that it can no longer expect India to roll over and play dead in response to actions of terror groups based inside Pakistan. If Pakistan stops using terror as an instrument of state policy, the CS strategy will stay in the cold storage. Otherwise, all bets are off.

(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)

Arise! Awake! And Stop Not Till the Goal is Reached!

Today Indian-Americans are an envied group in the United States. They represent what the American mainstream desires in immigrants – a hardworking, law-abiding community, a community focused on education, family values, assimilation and one that articulates its views in discussions and debates – in short, a group that succeeds in the right way.

But there is one area where Indian-Americans are sorely absent – participation in the political and civic process. Indian-Americans speak up only occasionally even on issues that are of deep concern to them; they rarely call or write to their Congressional Representative. In my experience, Indian-Americans tend to express their discontent in private circles, over dinners, often on Saturday evenings with their close friends. The common expression at these dinners is “someone should do something”. Unfortunately, that someone is most often, if not always, supposed to be someone else.

There are valid socio-historical reasons for this reticence. A vast majority of Indian-Americans came to the U.S. from middle class backgrounds. They were taught from childhood to focus on education and not get embroiled in activities that might distract them away from a good education and career.

As immigrants, success in the U.S. did not come easy for Indian-Americans. Each profession found itself stereotyped at different times in the journey. For example, in the 1980s, American managers routinely stereotyped Indian technology professionals as “good techies” but “not good managers.” This was not deemed to be a racist statement at the time but a rational, reasonable one. Even today, physicians educated in India have to suffer grossly stereotyped statements about the quality of their medical education and clinical experience in India.

Despite all of these obstacles, Indian-Americans have achieved enviable success in America. In this quest, the Indian attributes of keeping one’s head down and focusing on one’s education, career and family paid off.

But, now it is time to get on to the next stage in being an important part of the American society. It is time to bring issues that are near and dear to the hearts of Indian-Americans into the American mainstream. These could be issues of culture, education, employment, history or religion. We Indian-Americans owe it to ourselves and to our next generation to be active and vocal. If we learn to be both, we will obtain a level of political success that we only dream of today. The 2010 mod terms elections were only a preview of what one can expect when the Indian-American community becomes truly political active.

My column today has been triggered by two recent events and the media attention they received. The first shows the weakness of the Indian-American community and the second shows a new spirit among Indian-Americans.

•    Mumbai suffered a vicious, horrific attack by Pakistani terrorists in November 2008. This week, according to media reports, a lawsuit was filed in Brooklyn Federal Court by of relatives of four Jewish victims slain in that attack and one survivor. The suit contends Pakistan’s shadowy Inter-Services Intelligence provided support to the gunmen who killed 166 and wounded more than 300 people. The government of Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Taiba are also named as defendants in the suit according to media articles. The plaintiffs are represented by Lawyer James Kreindler, whose law firm successfully sued Libya on behalf of the 259 passengers who died in the attack on Pan Am Flight 103 and the 11 people killed on the ground.

To me, this illustrates the difference between an awake, active Jewish community that lost 4 members in the Mumbai attack and a relatively asleep, inactive Indian community that lost approx 160 people.

•    This past Sunday, the second most read article on the New York Times website was Hindu Group Stirs a Debate Over Yoga’s Soul. This article is about the Campaign “Take Back Yoga” by the Hindu American Foundation. As the article states, the Campaign “suggests only that people become more aware of yoga’s debt to the faith’s ancient traditions”. This campaign has generated media articles including a column on the On Faith blog of the Washington Post and an article about the philosophy underlying Yoga titled Bin Ladenism in Religion & The Practice of Yoga.

My objective here is not to discuss the merits or demerits of the campaign but to point out one of the first attempts by a group of Indian-Americans to create in the American mainstream a debate, to an awareness of a topic near and dear to their hearts. I hope we look back at this campaign as the first among many such campaigns by Indian-Americans that impact the American mainstream.

The title of the article is the exhortation by Swami Vivek-Anand to all Indians to Arise and Awake. It is up to each Indian-American to decide what goal he or she wants to reach. But the message, a variation of the ancient exhortation from Kathopanisad, applies to each and every Indian-American.

I believe the country wants the Indian-American community to Arise, Awaken and Participate actively and vocally in the American political and civic mainstream. I sincerely hope it begins to do so.

When Obama won over the Indian Parliament

As expected, Obama’s maiden visit to India this weekend has been a success. President Obama struck all the right notes, and the First Lady charmed India as she danced with children. The highlight of the visit was Obama’s address to the joint session of the Indian Parliament on Monday where he endorsed India’s permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, and took a tough stance on Pakistan and said that terrorist safe-havens within its borders were unacceptable.

Even before the President arrived in India, there was speculation about whether he would call out Pakistan for harboring terrorists within its borders, terrorists that have been shown to carry out attacks on India. During the first two days of his trips, Obama was hesitant and the Indians seemed disappointed with his Pakistan attitude. India’s skepticism about the Obama administration, in particular due to its constant appeasement of Pakistan and their “efforts” in fighting terrorists within their borders, was evident in the build up to the visit. However, Obama choose the right place to confirm his support for India’s concerns about Pakistani terrorism – the grand halls of the Indian democracy. It is no wonder then that Obama received one of the largest and longest applauses of the evening when he said,

And we will continue to insist to Pakistan’s leaders that terrorist safe-havens within their borders are unacceptable, and that the terrorists behind the Mumbai attacks be brought to justice. We must also recognize that all of us have an interest in both an Afghanistan and a Pakistan that is stable, prosperous and democratic—and none more so than India.”

But the home-run of the evening was his endorsement of India for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Indian leaders across party lines have demanded a permanent seat for India at the UNSC on the basis of India’s nuclear prowess, economic growth and regional eminence. The U.S. on its part has evaded the endorsement for an equally long time. Monday’s endorsement was open-ended, dependent upon overall reforms of the UNSC which might take a number of years to be implemented. But India can hope that the endorsement from the U.S. would help initiate reforms to the UNSC sooner. The support by John McCain brings hope that the support would become a permanent part of U.S. foreign policy.

Addressing the Parliament Obama said,

And as two global leaders, the United States and India can partner for global security—especially as India serves on the Security Council over the next two years.  Indeed, the just and sustainable international order that America seeks includes a United Nations that is efficient, effective, credible and legitimate.  That is why I can say today—in the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed U.N. Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.”

The announcement was at best a shrewd high impact low risk diplomatic gesture, an opportunity to surpass Bush’s Nuclear Deal moment and ensure reciprocal support from India on issues such as human rights in Myanmar or tougher sanctions on Iran. Obama’s support was followed by a call to India to take up more responsibility and reprimand for not speaking out against and condemning human right abuses. He said,

Faced with such gross violations of human rights, it is the responsibility of the international community—especially leaders like the United States and India—to condemn it.  If I can be frank, in international fora, India has often avoided these issues.  But speaking up for those who cannot do so for themselves is not interfering in the affairs of other countries.  It’s not violating the rights of sovereign nations.  It’s staying true to our democratic principles.”

So far there have not been disapproving voices in the media or the Indian polity about Obama preaching India how to conduct itself in the world. And it would be in Indian interests not to take offense. The U.S. has played its superpower role for a long time and with considerable success. There have been strategic miscalculations that caused pain to many innocents, but its intentions have been largely humane. Obama and Singh may have declared that the two countries would work as equal partner, but India has a lot to learn when it comes to playing superpower.

Obama’s address to the Indian Parliament was also unique in that it touched upon not only the usual suspects – Gandhi, great civilization, diversity, contributions to medicine and science, economic growth – but also talked about Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar (a lower caste leader who rose to be the chief architect of the Indian Constitution), the Panchatantra (a collection of stories that reflect the moral framework of the Indian civilization), Swami Vivekananda (who preached equality of religions in Chicago) and increasing engagement with East Asia.

What was conspicuously missing though is a reference to China in relation to India. While the India-China rivalry might not be as evident to the world as the India-Pakistan rivalry, it exists and poses a serious concern to India’s aspirations. China is one of Pakistan’s closest allies and will soon begin construction of two new nuclear reactors in Pakistan among other things. The two countries have festering border issues in the North-East as well as the Jammu & Kashmir region where Pakistan has handed over a part of the territory to China. The Dalai Lama finds refuge in India, and Chinese influence is growing among India’s neighbors such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh etc. The economic competition between the two countries is well-known.

The missing reference to China is important because India featured prominently when Obama visited China last year. He had irked India by suggesting that China help India and Pakistan resolve their issues. However, while in India, Obama did not mention China even in reference to the nuclear reactor agreement between China and Pakistan which would only add to the nuclear capability of Pakistan and consequentially the instability in the region. The Pakistan and UNSC mentions seem to have sidelined the thoughts about China.

Overall, the Obama visit and his speech before the Indian Parliament was a step forward for U.S-India bilateral relations. President Obama also managed to quell apprehensions in India about his administration’s pro-India attitude. The discontent and fear in India due to the Democratic Party’s protectionist attitude in response to the economic recession, continuing appeasement of Pakistan (as evident in the new $2 billion aid package) and uncertainty about the estimation of India’s role in Afghanistan is sure to have been reduced by the Obamas’ charm offensive over the last weekend. India has become an important economic partner for the U.S., and the relationship is sure to grow stronger in days to come.