Tag Archives: Af-PAk

US, India and aid for Pakistan

In his budget proposal for 2012, President Obama has proposed $3.1 billion in aid to Pakistan. The aid is spread across various parts and will be provided partly under the five year Kerry-Lugar-Berman initiative and Oversees Contingency Operations (OCO). This proposal comes even as the two countries stand-off over the Raymond Davis affair and the news of Pakistan expanding its nuclear weapons program.

Out of the $3.1 billion, $1.9 billion will go towards promoting a “secure, stable, democratic and prosperous Pakistan with a focus on energy, economic growth, agriculture, the delivery of health and education services, and strengthening the government of Pakistan’s capacity to govern effectively and accountably.” However, a recent U.S. Inspector General’s report said that the U.S. (in effect Pakistan) has failed to demonstrate that the $7.5 billion civilian aid package provided in 2009 has improved the availability of basic needs such as food, education, healthcare etc in Pakistan. The former Chairman of Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP), Mr. Khalid Mirza reiterated the lack of economic growth in Pakistan when he said that there is no clarity in the Pakistani government’s economic vision. The political and economic instability in Pakistan gives us no reason to believe that the new $1.9 billion will be spent wisely and to the benefit of the Pakistani people as intended.

Another $1.1 billion of the package will be dedicated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) set up for training Pakistani forces to better fight insurgents along the Western border with Afghanistan. Here again, Pakistan has not provided us sufficient reason to believe that the aid is being used only to fight terrorists and insurgents along its Western border, or the terrorist safe-havens within its own territory. Instead there have been news of an increase in Pakistan’s nuclear capability with the country having more than 100 deployed nuclear weapons; followed by doubts about the construction of a fourth plutonium reactor. U.S. officials themselves are not convinced that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is safe, and are concerned about the volatility in the country.

But apparently U.S. desperation in Afghanistan supersedes all other considerations, and the U.S. is willing to overlook Pakistan’s inefficiency and transgressions in fighting terrorists and insurgents. The carrots and stick strategy is but a populist rhetoric, and the U.S. is willing to forgo the sticks and appease Pakistan with carrots and more in the hope that Pakistan will help it win the war on terror. The irony of the situation is however, appalling.

The Obama administration, with its call for change, has not managed to change the U.S. attitude on Pakistan, and continues to be willing to excuse all of its excesses. New Delhi has also been unsuccessful in breaking the cycle in spite of its ‘strong’ relations with Washington. All it gets is a couple of statements from the U.S. showing support and sympathy for its position and threat from Pakistan. But when it comes to action, all is forgotten and Pakistan emerges the winner with billions in aid every year it fails. Probably India needs to learn diplomatic manipulation from its western neighbor.

Along with talking with the U.S. administration and agencies, India should begin engaging the Indian-American community that has a large stake in the security of both the U.S. and India. The increasing political participation and strength of the community should be harnessed by the Indian government to lobby the U.S. to rethink the quantity and nature of economic assistance, and enforce strict accountability mechanisms for all aid to Pakistan. It is incumbent upon the Indian side to secure its own national security interests. The U.S. cannot be expected to reprioritize its national interests and goals to align with Indian interests.

The Raymond Davis Drama

Looks like the North Waziristan operation will be postponed again

From the very beginning, it was hard to shake off the suspicion that the Raymond Davis affair involved covert operatives from both the United States and Pakistan. That Mr Davis was engaged in diplomacy by other means should have been clear to anyone with a passing familiarity of the business (attained, perhaps, by the study of the scholarly works of David John Moore Cornwell or Ian Lancaster Fleming). Once the U.S. embassy confirmed that he enjoyed diplomatic immunity it was a matter of pedantic or professional interest as to whether he worked for the CIA, DHA, State Department or indeed was a private security contractor employed by the U.S. government.

raymond.davisBut what was less discussed, at least until a couple of days ago, was that the two Pakistanis men (referred to as ‘youths’ or ‘boys’ in the Pakistani media) he killed might have also been engaged in diplomacy by other means. (Incidentally, Express Tribune pulled the initial report, here’s the cached article). Diplomats and foreign journalists who have served in Pakistan are familiar with such diplomacy, not infrequently conducted from a motorcycle. It would be of pedantic or professional interest as to whether they worked for the ISI, Intelligence Bureau or some other “agency”.

It is possible that the dust-up between Mr Davis and the two Pakistanis was the result of the escalation of free and frank discussions to a higher calibre. It is also possible that the two Pakistanis, and one of their innocent counterparts, lost their lives in the risky venture of creating a dust-up.

Consider. There are two possibilities why Lahore police would arrest a white American man who identified himself as U.S. diplomat with immunity. First, that they were told to do so by higher authorities. Second, that the local authorities were so radically anti-American—consistent with general public sentiment—that they were willing to disregard claims of diplomatic immunity, and brazen out the consequences. This is unlikely, not least because it would mean some people would lose their jobs in the process.

General Kayani’s guidance to the interior minister reminding him to keep Mr Davis’ military background in mind supports the hypothesis that the military-jihadi complex instigated this drama. Why?

That is hard to say. It is, however, the biggest beneficiary of the crisis. Politically, it is the Zardari government—which it has no love for—that is on the ropes, caught between an increasingly tough Washington and an increasingly anti-American public sentiment. Even if the matter is resolved in a few days’ time by getting the judiciary to affirm his diplomatic immunity, the episode can be offered as a reason, yet again, for the Pakistani army to avoid launching the much delayed operation against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in North Waziristan. The overall rise in temperature works to call for a reduction in U.S. drone attacks, using the argument that doing so is necessary to lower anti-American feelings.

The Pakistani military leadership calculates that the United States can suspend bilateral relations or aid for a short while, but overall, the risk of a permanent break is low. It is not wrong. That is why it can afford to rock the boat—with terrorist attacks or diplomatic dramas—to pre-empt U.S. coercion. After all, for the Pakistani military-jihadi complex, poking the United States in the eye is less risky compared to having to really fight itself.