Tag Archives: ISI

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India-Pakistan Track-II Peace-making Efforts

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India-Pakistan Track-II (back channel diplomacy) conferences and round-table discussions have been taking place for many years. The Neemrana Group is perhaps the oldest and the best known. The participants in these discussions mainly comprise retired Generals, Admirals and Marshals and a few diplomats and academics. Recently, members of the other branches of civil society – civil servants, media persons and human rights activists, among others – have also been invited.

Given the levels of hostility between the official establishments on both the sides, Track-II gatherings are usually held in other countries. Kathmandu used to be the perennial favourite for these dialogues, but has fallen out of favour since the Maoist insurgency began. Now the discussions take place at exotic overseas locales like Bangkok, Colombo, Dubai and Singapore and, occasionally, in European towns like Como and the Bellagio Centre, both located on the bank of the very pretty Lake Como near Milan in Italy. Salubrious surroundings – and good wine – undoubtedly contribute immensely to the success of these verbal sparring bouts!

The sponsors, who are frowned upon by both the governments, include well-meaning overseas foundations like the Frederick Foundation and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Germany, several overseas universities that manage to raise funds from their respective governments, well-known think tanks in India and abroad and, sometimes, organisations with an advocacy agenda like the infamous Ghulam Nabi Fai’s various ISI-supported centres in Europe and the United States.

The primary aim of most of these Track-II dialogues is to enhance strategic stability in South Asia by reducing the risk of conventional conflict and, if it breaks out, preventing its escalation to nuclear exchanges. The agenda invariably revolves around confidence building measures (CBMs) in the military field, nuclear CBMs and risk reduction measures and measures to improve trade and people-to-people relations through increased contact, cultural exchanges and sports tournaments. Specific issues like the demilitarisation of the Siachen Conflict Zone and the settlement of the international boundary in Sir Creek have been taken up several times.

The Indian participants assume that their Pakistani counterparts were briefed in GHQ Rawalpindi and by the ISI before their departure and that they will be debriefed on return. The Pakistani participants know that military people do not count for much in India and wonder why they are talking to them at all. However, they are wary of those of us who have a presence in the media. I have noticed that in the last couple of years, members of the civil society from Pakistan like academics and media people have become increasingly strident in their criticism of both the government of Pakistan and the handling of the security situation by the army. And, the Pakistani Generals are now far more conciliatory in their approach to conflict resolution.

The first session, if not the entire first day, is usually spent in telling the other side how obnoxious its policies are and how destabilising its actions are, particularly covert intelligence operations. While the Pakistani participants harp on the fact that they provide only ‘political, diplomatic and moral support’ to so-called Kashmiri freedom fighters, the Indians insist on placing on the record their condemnation of the ISI’s continuing sponsorship of terrorism in India. Though the seasoned veterans of Track-II diplomacy are fairly reserved in their outpourings, the first timers are invariably garrulous and use the occasion to let off pent up steam against their former military adversaries, whom they are meeting for the first time.

The first evening’s dinner serves to calm frayed nerves and, as they talk about dozens of commonalities including cricket, Hindi movies and music, the participants discover that their counterparts from across the international boundary do not have horns – though some of them do have long hair or beards! On the second evening, a dinner on a river cruise or a visit to a famous landmark is thrown in for good measure and adds to the bonhomie.

The second day is spent more fruitfully in getting to grips with the precarious security situation in the Indian Sub-continent, especially the fighting along the Af-Pak border and the impact of creeping Talibanisation in Pakistan. The participants usually agree on the need to institute comprehensive military and nuclear CBMs and promise to take up all the serious issues plaguing the India-Pakistan relationship with their governments and write about them in the media. They concede that conflict is not desirable and that wisdom lies in preventing it rather than in fanning the flames of hatred.

The dialogue thus ends on a happy note and the sponsors are pleased with their efforts. They are relieved that they can report back positively about the usefulness of the dialogue – and hope to raise more funds for the next round.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan’s Intransigence over Prosecution of Perpetrators of the Mumbai Terror Strikes is Hampering Rapprochement

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Three years ago, on November 26, 2008, ten Lashkar-e-Tayebba terrorists, trained, equipped, sponsored and directed by Pakistan’s ISI, landed by boat at Mumbai and carried out audacious strikes on four iconic targets before nine of them were eliminated by Indian security forces. Ajmal Kasab, the lone survivor, was tried by a Special Court and has been sentenced to death. Despite the voluminous evidence provided to Pakistan about the perpetrators and the planners of the diabolical strikes by India, and corroborated by independent investigations conducted by the United States and Israel, the Pakistan government has failed to act against any of them.

Writing in the Hindu last week, Praveen Swami stated, “Sajid Mir, Lashkar commander who crafted the assault plan, has been reported by both the United States and India’s intelligence services as operating out of his family home near the Garrison Club in Lahore; Pakistan’s Federal Investigations Agency hasn’t yet got around to paying him a visit. Muzammil Bhat, who trained the assault team, is claimed by Pakistan to be a fugitive, though two journalists who went looking for the terror commander in Muzaffarabad located him without great effort. Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, sole senior Lashkar operative held for his alleged role in the attacks, has continued to communicate with his organisation from prison. Pakistan hasn’t, tellingly, even sought to question David Headley, Pakistani-American jihadist who has provided the investigators with a detailed insider account of the attacks — including the role of the Inter-Services Intelligence in directing them.”

Pakistan’s intransigence in bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror strikes to justice does not augur well for the recently resumed Composite Dialogue Process. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has stated that he will travel to Pakistan only after the terrorists who attacked Mumbai are convicted by Pakistani courts. Even Hillary Clinton, the U.S. secretary of State has expressed her reservations about the Pakistan government’s “continuing failure, in our view, to fulfil all of the requirements necessary for prosecution related to the Mumbai attacks.” Unless Pakistan makes serious efforts to prosecute the terrorists and their handlers, the gains in the relationship made recently due to the announcement of MFN status by Pakistan and the proposed liberalisation of the Visa regime will lose value.

Within India too the follow up action to prevent another Mumbai-type terror strike has left much to be desired. The government had launched five major initiatives to shore up counter-terrorism capabilities. The first of these was to decentralise the deployment of the National Security Guards (NSG) – the agency that had eliminated the terrorists holed up in two hotels and the Jewish centre at Mumbai – to the major metropolitan centres besides Delhi so as to reduce the time taken to react against a terrorist strike. This has been done though the NSG commandos continue to face accommodation problems. The government has set up the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for post-incident investigation of major terrorist strikes. Unlike the U.S. FBI, the NIA lacks a counter-terrorism punch and cannot, therefore, assist in the prevention of terrorist strikes. It is to be hoped that the NIA will not be politicised like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CB).

While some efforts have been made to enhance coastal security, these efforts have fallen much short of the desired capabilities and India’s long coastline remains vulnerable to attacks from the sea. This was demonstrated with telling effect when an abandoned ship drifted all the way across the Arabian Sea to beach on the Mumbai coast without being detected by either the Indian Navy or the Coast Guard or the Marine Police.

Intelligence gathering, analysis, assessment and dissemination still need to be improved by an order of magnitude. The functioning of the existing Multi-agency Centre (MAC) has been streamlined but Home Minister P Chidambaram’s initiatives to establish a National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC) to coordinate all counter-terrorism efforts and a National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) database to maintain widely shared records of all terrorism-related intelligence and activities, are still to see the light of day because of Centre-State issues and inter-ministerial turf battles.

Clearly, India’s counter-terrorism responses continue to resemble a lumbering elephant, rather than a tiger ready to pounce.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Troubles increase for the US-Pak relationship

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The post-Osama phase of the US-Pakistan relationship is proving to be extremely turbulent. The swift U.S. reaction to the attack on its embassy in Kabul and the killing of the chief Afghan government negotiator, former president Rabbani, led to an equally strong backlash from the Pakistani establishment.

www.mca-marines.orgIn a scathing indictment of the Pakistan security establishment, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “…the Quetta Shoora and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers. For example, we believe the Haqqani Network – which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency – is responsible for the September 13th attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.”

“We strongly reject assertions of complicity with the Haqqanis or of proxy war,” Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said. “The allegations betray confusion and policy disarray within the U.S. establishment on the way forward in Afghanistan.” General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff dismissed the charge as “very unfortunate and not based on facts.” Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan’s foreign minister, warned that Washington “could lose an ally” if it keeps humiliating Pakistan with unsubstantiated allegations.

The international community has known for long that the Pakistan army and the ISI follow a Janus-faced policy on Afghanistan. While pretending to be allies in the ‘war on terror’, they are careful to target only those terrorist organisations that strike within Pakistan, like the TTP and the TNSM, and nurture and support the Afghan Taliban and their sympathisers. In February 2009, David Sanger, New York Times correspondent, had written in his new book The Inheritance that in a transcript passed to Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence in May 2008, General Kayani was overheard referring to Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani as “a strategic asset”. This had led to the first few armed UAV strikes against the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan inside Pakistan’s FATA province.

While U.S. frustration with Pakistani duplicity is understandable, the U.S. still has 98,000 troops in Afghanistan and is still dependent on the two land routes through Peshawar and Quetta for the logistics sustenance of its own and other NATO-ISAF forces. Though it could step up armed UAV strikes and even launch air strikes into North Waziristan, it does not have the capability to launch follow-on air assault strikes. Also, ground strikes will surely lead to war with Pakistan and war, with all its nuclear overtones, is not in anybody’s interest.

What the U.S. can do is to carefully calibrate the aid being given to Pakistan and make the government and the army accountable for cooperation in the war on terror. The Pakistan army and the ISI must not be allowed to get away with impunity for their support to terrorist organisations operating against the US and NATO-ISAF forces as well as in India. It should also consider rescinding its alliance with Pakistan when the bulk of troops are drawn down by 2014. As Stephen Cohen has put it so eloquently, “India is a friend, but not an ally; and, Pakistan is an ally, but not a friend.”

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

The Continuing Proxy War in Kashmir

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The situation in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) continues to remain a cause for concern to the government of India. Since end-1989, Pakistan has been waging a ‘proxy war’ against India in J&K. It has done this by aiding and abetting disaffected and misguided Kashmiri youth to rise against the Indian state. Despite the cease-fire on the Line of Control (LoC) since November 2003 and the tenuous rapprochement process, Pakistan continues to surreptitiously practice its peculiar brand of state-sponsored terrorism. This is borne out by the continuing attempts at infiltration in Kashmir during the summer of 2011.

Till some years ago, Pakistan’s official position was that it provides only ‘diplomatic, political and moral’ support to ‘freedom fighters’. However, it is now internationally accepted that the Pakistan army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate have been providing military training, weapons, military equipment, ammunition and explosives to the terrorists, besides financial support. The ISI spends approximately Rs 5 to 10 crore (USD 1 to 2 million) per month on its proxy war campaign. Till the present cease-fire came into effect, the Pakistan army actively supported terrorist bids to infiltrate into J&K by engaging Indian posts along the routes of infiltration with artillery and small arms fire.  Though infiltration has now been reduced due to effective counter-infiltration measures by the Indian army, even the present low levels would not be possible but for the encouragement and steady support being given to the Jihadi extremists by the Pakistan army.

Throughout the prolonged period of Pakistan’s proxy war, India has shown tremendous restraint and immense tolerance in the face of grave provocation to its security. It is inconceivable that any other nation would have acted with the sense of responsibility that India has in not launching trans-LoC operations to eliminate militant training camps and interdict known routes of infiltration. Many Indian analysts have been advocating a pro-active trans-LoC and trans-border counter-proxy war policy.

Former RAW analyst B. Raman has written: “The main reason why India has not yet been able to effectively put an end to Jihadi terrorism against it and its civilian population sponsored by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is because India’s counter-terrorism operations are directed only against the terrorists operating in its territory. They are not yet directed against the State sponsoring them despite a persistent demand from growing sections of the Indian population for targeting the State of Pakistan too.”

While Pakistan had reduced the overt infiltration of so-called Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’ across the LoC during Musharraf’s rule, it continued to do so covertly by looking for smarter methods of inducting more Jihadis; for example, through neighbouring countries like Nepal and Bangladesh. The remaining roots of terrorism in Kashmir now lie in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and in Pakistan itself and, unless India shows the political will necessary to eliminate these roots, Pakistan’s proxy war is likely to continue unabated even though it may become more sophisticated and covert in its approach.

The Pakistan army is under tremendous pressure from Jihadi elements responsible for internal instability and from the Americans to deliver more in the so-called War on Terror. Despite these pressures, there is unlikely to be any change in the Pakistan army’s hostility towards India and its covert support, even sponsorship, of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism across the LoC and the international boundary (IB) from Pakistan soil. Prime Minister Gilani said recently that Pakistan will continue to provide diplomatic, moral and political support for what he says is a ‘freedom struggle’ in Kashmir.

Clearly, the rapprochement process is a tactical ploy to tide over current domestic difficulties and there has not been a strategic change of heart. Pakistan’s proxy war with India will go on because the Pakistan army will not allow the civilian leadership to change its fundamental policy towards India. Hence, lasting peace in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan will remain a distant dream.

Immigration Blog

News that Pakistan Spies on Immigrants Shows Risks Faced by Émigrés

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The New York Times recently reported the disturbing news that Pakistani immigrants to the United States may not feel safe from their government – even when living thousands of miles away from the homeland they departed. The news fits a pattern that shows immigrants often face risks most native-born American may find hard to fathom.

Credit: indiavision.comThe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) discovered that Mohammed Tasleem, an attaché in Pakistan’s New York consulate, was engaging in systematic intimidation of Pakistani immigrants and temporary visa holders on behalf of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). “Mr. Tasleem, they discovered, had been posing as an F.B.I. agent to extract information from Pakistanis living in the United States and was issuing threats to keep them from speaking openly about Pakistan’s government,” reports the New York Times. “His activities were part of what government officials in Washington, along with a range of Pakistani journalists and scholars, say is a systematic ISI campaign to keep tabs on the Pakistani diaspora inside the United States.”

The article describes how at conferences and seminars in the U.S. individuals would identify themselves as working for ISI and sometimes ask threatening questions. “The ISI guys will look into your eyes and will indirectly threaten you by introducing themselves,” the author said. “The ISI makes sure that they are present in every occasion relating to Pakistan, and in some cases they pay ordinary Pakistanis for attending events and pass them information.”

That’s not the end of the story. “Several Pakistani journalists and scholars in the United States interviewed over the past week said that they were approached regularly by Pakistani officials, some of whom openly identified themselves as ISI officials,” according to the New York Times. “The journalists and scholars said the officials caution them against speaking out on politically delicate subjects like the indigenous insurgency in Baluchistan or accusations of human rights abuses by Pakistani soldiers. The verbal pressure is often accompanied by veiled warnings about the welfare of family members in Pakistan, they said.”

Here is some free advice for the members of Pakistan’s government: If you don’t want people to accuse Pakistani soldiers of human rights abuses then do your best to make sure such individuals do not abuse human rights. Attempting to intimidate people who now live and work in the United States is counterproductive, making Americans less sympathetic to policy arguments that may be offered by Pakistan.

Visits to international students and scholars by officials of other governments are not unheard of. There are specific provisions in the U.S. immigration code designed to protect asylum seekers who fear repression under China’s one-child policy. Stories of Chinese government officials visiting one or more pregnant Chinese students in the United States helped make the case for such provisions.

It is difficult for immigrants or temporary visa holders to the United States to ignore threats (implied or otherwise) made against family members still living in their homeland. One can imagine the guilt experienced by someone who feels that by exercising the right to freedom of speech in America he or she is putting at risk a family member back home.

Middle Eastern governments are also known to keep tabs on nationals studying or working in the United States, although reports indicate a degree of subtleness in how they deal with such individuals in America. But as with the case of Pakistan, when Americans become aware of attempts to intimidate people working or studying in the U.S. they look unkindly on whichever government is doing the intimidating.