Tag Archives: Leon Panetta

A Tough Week for Pakistani Diplomacy

Events lay bare just how strategically isolated Islamabad has become

As my last post noted, the events of the past week show that New Delhi is sitting pretty diplomatically, being courted ardently by both Washington and Beijing.  Conversely, they also laid bare just how strategically isolated Islamabad has become.

Pakistan’s most recent troubles began with President Obama giving President Asif Ali Zardari the cold shoulder at the NATO summit in Chicago three weeks ago.  Since then Washington has dramatically ramped up its campaign of drone attacks in the country’s tribal areas, which last week killed Al Qaeda’s second in command in North Warizistan.  Officials in Islamabad publicly denounce the strikes as violating the country’s sovereignty and they have helped drive a marked increase in anti-American sentiment.  Yet U.S. officials reportedly believe that they have very little to lose by defying Pakistani sensitivities.

While Defense Secretary Leon Panetta was in New Delhi last week making overtures for a strategic partnership with Pakistan’s arch-rival – including calls for greater Indian involvement in Afghanistan, a neuralgic issue for the Pakistanis – he was also telling Islamabad to stuff it.  Stoutly defending the drone campaign, he declared that “we have made it very clear that we are going to continue to defend ourselves” and “we are fighting a war” in the tribal badlands.

Adding insult to injury from Islamabad’s view was his public chuckle about the necessity of keeping Pakistani officials in the dark about the U.S. commando raid that killed Osama bin Laden – “They did not know about our operation.  That was the whole point.” – as well as his comparison of U.S.-Pakistan affairs with that of India’s own torturous relationship.  As the Associated Press wryly notes,

You know a friendship has gone sour when you start making mean jokes about your friend in front of his most bitter nemesis.

Panetta regularly traveled to Pakistan during his recent stint as CIA director but has purposively avoided going there in the year since he’s moved over to the Pentagon.  Although his eight-day tour of Asia took him to New Delhi and Kabul, among other places, Islamabad was conspicuously missing from his itinerary.  Indeed, showing up in the Afghan capital, he once again unloaded on the Pakistanis, warning them that U.S. leaders are reaching “the limits of our patience.”  General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed up by telling reporters in Washington that he too is “extraordinarily dissatisfied” with Pakistani actions.

Further evidence of Islamabad’s deteriorating position came from the transit agreements NATO signed last week with several Central Asian countries in an attempt to bypass Pakistan’s blockade on supplies going into Afghanistan, as well as the multiplying calls in the U.S. Congress for reducing military and economic assistance.

Pakistanis like to believe that China is the trump card they can play against the Americans.  This tenet was once again expressed in a recent op-ed that called on Pakistanis to liberate themselves “from the hold of the West by embracing our friends in the East.”  But the real limits to this strategy were once again apparent over the last few weeks.  During a visit to Islamabad in late May, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi publicly pledged Beijing’s firm commitment to “firmly support Pakistan in protecting its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and dignity.”  Privately, however, he was counseling Pakistani leaders to settle their differences with the Americans.

Zardari must have been shocked by Chinese actions when he showed up in Beijing for last week’s summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang (who is widely expected to become the next head of government) made a special point of telling Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna, also attending the forum, that Sino-Indian ties were destined to become the century’s important bilateral relationship.  Li’s phrase is a virtual echo of the Obama administration’s regular formulation about Washington and New Delhi constituting “an indispensable partnership for the 21st century,” and it signals that the two most important external powers in South Asian security affairs are in competition for India’s strategic allegiances.  Underscoring this point is Beijing’s recent move upgrading its ambassador in New Delhi to vice-ministerial status.

Dawn, Pakistan’s largest English-language newspaper, advised the other week that links with China “should not become cause for complacency or reason to assume that a functional relationship with the U.S. is not critical and long overdue.”  If Pakistani leaders had yet to absorb this lesson, this week’s events should have driven it home.  Perhaps that explains Zardari’s conciliatory reaction to Panetta’s broadsides.

This commentary was originally posted on Chanakya’s Notebook.  I invite you to follow me on Twitter.

India Shining, At Least in Geopolitics

New Delhi is being wooed by both Washington and Beijing, though its ultimate choice is becoming increasingly clearer

A previous post focused on the unexpected improvement in India’s strategic position in its own neighborhood.  Events this week brought evidence of how New Delhi is emerging as an important pivot point on Asia’s broader geopolitical stage.  Indeed, for every global investor fleeing the country these days, there is a foreign statesman who wants to partner more closely with it.

The visit of U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to New Delhi illustrates how the Obama administration has shaken off its disillusionment with India and is now resuming its predecessors’ practice of engaging the country on high-profile security initiatives.   Panetta stopped in India as part of an eight-day swing through Asia designed to fill in the details about Washington’s new military buildup in the Asia-Pacific region that is plainly directed against China even if no one in Washington cares to admit it publicly.  As part of the strategy, the United States will shift the bulk of its naval combat power to the Pacific in the coming years as well as deepen military ties with regional allies and friends.

In an important address in New Delhi, Panetta made clear that the Obama administration sees India as a “linchpin” in this strategy.  Stating that the United States “views India as a net provider of security from the Indian Ocean to Afghanistan and beyond,” Panetta proposed the formation of a long-term strategic partnership, one that featured greater Indian access to the latest U.S. military technology and a defense trade relationship that went beyond a focus on one-off transactions to include joint research and co-production efforts.

The path from Washington to New Delhi has been busy in recent weeks.  In late March, Commerce Secretary John Bryson showed up at the head of a high-level trade mission.  In April, Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman stopped by to discuss preparations for the upcoming round of the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue that will take place next week in Washington; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell paid a visit to continue the on-going exchange of views on East Asia policy that has sprung up over the last few years; and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro arrived to resume a bilateral dialogue on non-proliferation and defense trade issues that has not convened in six years.  Last month, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton alighted to talk about Iran, followed by Peter R. Lavoy, the Pentagon’s point person on Asia, who wanted to encourage a greater Indian role in Afghanistan.

While Panetta was paying court in New Delhi, Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna was being serenaded by Chinese officials in Beijing.  In town to attend a summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – a regional security grouping comprised of China, Russia and four Central Asian states – Krishna was told by Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang (who is widely expected to become China’s head of government) that the Sino-Indian equation would be the important bilateral relationship in the 21st century.  Li’s phrase is a virtual echo of the Obama administration’s regular formulation about Washington and New Delhi constituting “an indispensable partnership for the 21st century.”  Beijing has also upgraded its ambassador in New Delhi to vice-ministerial status.

So India’s geopolitical dance card is filling up.  Officially it remains uncertain about who to take to the prom through its inclinations are becoming increasingly clearer.  Like Washington, New Delhi seeks deeper economic cooperation with Beijing and during his visit Krishna was keen to secure Chinese investment in much-needed infrastructure projects.  China is now the country’s top partner in merchandise trade and according to one estimate the two could form the world’s largest trading combination by 2030.  Moreover, a deep-seated desire for strategic autonomy will continue to limit just how close New Delhi aligns itself with Washington.

Yet Beijing’s expanding strategic reach has also become a cause of deep concern to New Delhi, leading it gradually to tighten security ties with Washington.  Over the past few years, India has moved to fortify its northeastern border areas where China has made renewed territorial claims; tested a nuclear missile capable of targeting China’s largest cities; laid down a conspicuous marker in the South China Sea dispute; ramped up its purchase of U.S. military systems and the number of exercises with U.S. forces; expanded defense relations with Japan; and begun to concert East Asia policy with Washington and Tokyo.

The cross-currents affecting New Delhi’s approach toward Beijing are on display in a report issued a few months ago by prominent members of the Indian foreign policy establishment.  Seeking to chart out a set of basic principles to guide national security policy over the next decade, the report emphasizes that strategic independence remains “the core of India’s global engagements even today.”  Yet it surprisingly had much more to say about China than about the United States.  On the former, it argued that:

China will, for the foreseeable future, remain a significant foreign policy and security challenge for India.  It is the one major power which impinges directly on India’s geopolitical space.  As its economic and military capabilities expand, its power differential with India is likely to widen….

….The challenge for Indian diplomacy will be to develop a diversified network of relations with several major powers to compel China to exercise restraint in its dealings with India, while simultaneously avoiding relationships that go beyond conveying a certain threat threshold in Chinese perceptions.

In a subsequent newspaper piece, Shyam Saran, a former foreign secretary who was involved in the report, elaborated on these themes.  He argued that it would be best, at least for the time being, to avoid the encumbrances of an alliance with Washington.  Yet he also acknowledged that:

Given the challenge that China’s apparently relentless rise poses to India, the pursuit of a “non-aligned” policy appears unwise.  The U.S. has greater affinity and empathy with India.  It supports India’s acquisition of economic and technological capabilities and has convergent concerns over Chinese hegemony.  But the U.S. has not yet determined whether, in its relative decline, its interests are better served by playing a balancing role in Asia among Asian powers including between China and India, or seeking to contain China through a network of allies. Neither precludes India and the U.S. pursuing closer partnership and both seeking a more cautious and nuanced relationship with China.

Panetta’s tour of Asia and his visit to New Delhi have addressed Saran’s concern: The Obama administration is committed to organizing a regional balance of power against China and desires India’s key assistance toward that goal.  New Delhi’s response to this overture will undoubtedly be halting, more than occasionally causing frustration in Washington.  But over time its strategic imperatives will ineluctably draw it into a closer geopolitical affiliation with the United States.

This commentary was originally posted on Chanakya’s Notebook.  I invite you to follow me on Twitter.