Tag Archives: Myanmar

China is Emerging as a Water Hegemon in Asia

A crisis of gargantuan proportions with unprecedented geo-political repercussions is gradually taking shape in Asia. Tibet is the source of several large Asian rivers. The Indus River with its source in Tibet flows through India and Pakistan; the Brahmaputra (known as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) flows from Tibet through India and Bangladesh; and, the Sutlej flows through India into Pakistan. From its source in Tibet, the Salween enters Yunnan in China and then flows through Myanmar, finally forming the border between Myanmar and Thailand. Originating on the Tibetan Plateau, the Mekong River, which is the heart and soul of mainland Southeast Asia, flows through Yunnan, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Similarly, the Amur, Illy, and Irtysh rivers flow through Russia and Central Asia.

Amazingly, contrary to good international practices, as the upper riparian state with physical possession of the headwaters of Asia’s major rivers, China has not entered into equitable international agreements with any of the lower riparian states the lives and livelihood of whose people depend on the uninterrupted flow of these rivers. And, to confound matters even further, news reports keep surfacing with alarming regularity about China’s plans to divert the waters of some of these rivers to make up for the declining water levels in the rapidly drying up rivers in the heartland of China. These include the Yangtze River, which too originates in Tibet, and the Huang He (formerly Howang Ho or Yellow River, also called ‘China’s Sorrow’).

According to Indian analyst Brahma Chellaney, “China rejects the very notion of water sharing or institutionalised cooperation with downriver countries… Whereas riparian neighbours in Southeast and South Asia are bound by water pacts that they have negotiated between themselves, China does not have a single water treaty with any co-riparian country.” Only recently China has begun to selectively share ‘flow statistics’ with the lower riparians. However, Chellaney is of the view that “these are not agreements to cooperate on shared resources, but rather commercial accords to sell hydrological data that other upstream countries provide free to downriver states.”

China’s diabolical plans to divert the waters of the Brahmaputra and other rivers to the deficient Yangtze River along the ‘Great Western Route’, though officially denied, will cause untold misery to the downstream populations of many Asian countries, including India and Bangladesh. According to Tibetan data, 10 dams have already been completed on the Brahmaputra, three others are under construction, seven new dams are under active consideration and eight more have been proposed.

Satellite images reveal that plans are proceeding at a rapid pace to construct a 38,000 megawatt dam at Metog (Motuo in Chinese) on the Brahmaputra. The project will be double the size of the Three Gorges Dam, which has caused immense environmental damage.  This project on the ‘Great Bend’ of the river will result in a large dam with serious seismological repercussions as the Himalayas are young mountains with frequent earthquakes. China is also planning to construct a hydro-electric power project at Dadiqua. This project will exploit the natural 2,500 metres drop in the river and will not need a large dam.

Run-of-the-river projects, like the one proposed to be constructed at Dadiqua, will not materially affect the lower riparians, but large dams with plans for the diversion of water to areas on mainland China will have serious implications for the people downstream. It is in the interest of China as well as the lower riparian nations to enter into multilateral river water sharing agreements in keeping with international norms and practices. So far, China has steadfastly refused to enter into any such agreements. Contrary to its self-professed ‘peaceful rise’, China is pursuing hegemonic tendencies that are a sure recipe for instability that may ultimately lead to conflict.

India-Myanmar Strategic Cooperation

The winds of change are blowing across Myanmar. Elections of a sort have been held and Ms Aung San Suu Kyi has been released. President Thein Sein recently invited her for direct talks, with which she expressed satisfaction. The international community is gradually opening up to the country and speculation is rife that sanctions may soon be lifted.

India’s relations with Myanmar, a devoutly Buddhist country, have been traditionally close and friendly. Geographically, India and Myanmar share a long land and maritime boundary, including in the area of the strategically important Andaman and Nicobar islands where the two closest Indian and Myanmarese islands are barely 30 km apart. Myanmarese ports provide India the shortest approach route to several of India’s north-eastern states.

India’s national interest lies in a strong and stable Myanmar that observes strict neutrality between India and China and cooperates with India in the common fight against the insurgencies raging in the border areas of both the countries. For India, Myanmar is a bridge between all the countries comprising the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC – Myanmar has observer status) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). External Affairs Minister S M Krishna visited Myanmar in June 2011 to further cement the growing relationship.

The key drivers of the India-Myanmar strategic relationship are cooperation in counter-insurgency operations and the need for India to ensure that Myanmar is not driven into Chinese arms through Indian neglect of its security concerns and arms requirements. Indian insurgent groups (NSCN, ULFA and Manipur rebels among others) have been operating out of bases in the weakly controlled areas across the borders of the Indian states of Manipur and Mizoram and Myanmarese rebels, primarily the Chins and the Arakanese, have often taken shelter on the Indian side. It is in the interest of both the countries to cooperate with each other to fight these insurgent groups in a coordinated manner. The two armies have been cooperating with each other for mutual benefit. India-Myanmar cooperation is also essential to control narcotics trafficking and to curb the proliferation of small arms in the region.

China has made rapid advances into Myanmar and established close political, military and economic relations. Myanmar provides China the shortest land route access to the northern Indian Ocean. China is engaged in exploiting Myanmar’s oil and gas reserves, is building a 1,100 km overland pipeline from Kyaukryu port in Myanmar to the border city of Ruili in Yunnan and is developing Sittwe as a commercial port on Myanmar’s west coast. It is natural that Chinese naval activity in the Bay of Bengal will soon follow. China has also been stepping up arms sales to Myanmar as other nations, including India, are loathe to sell offensive military hardware to the country.

While India is concerned with the slow pace of progress on the issue of national reconciliation and the consequent delay in installing a democratically elected government in power in Yangon, the strategic scenario compels India to balance its security concerns with its support for the emergence of democratic rule. It is only through close engagement that India can promote leverages with the ruling regime to nudge it gently towards national reconciliation. India must also increase its economic footprint in Myanmar, particularly in areas that are contiguous to India.

India and the other regional powers can play a positive role in the re-entry of Myanmar into the international mainstream so that it can be nudged towards becoming a strong and stable democracy that is also mature and responsible and willing to play by the rules and traditions governing international relations. Perhaps multi-national talks, which include India, China, Japan, ASEAN and other stakeholders, would be the best way forward. At least in the initial stages it may be prudent for the U.S. to stay away from such talks.