Tag Archives: South Asia

BRICS – India is the biggest loser

Guest post by Sumantra Maitra

Among other interminable dross that were churned in the recently concluded 5th annual BRICS summit in South Africa, was the idea of a Development bank, by the five ever-rising economic powers. Although the details are vague, like any other diplomatic summit declaration trying to obfuscate the deep fissures within this coalition of unequals, the fact that India agreed to this disaster in the making is a new low in the foreign policy of a country, which is not much known for rational and realistic choices. The idea behind the development bank is indeed noble, “to address…the infrastructure gap in developing countries…”, especially in Africa. But the intention to make it successful or meaningful or the national interest of each member of the coalition is not clear. One thing, which is however clear, is Indian ambivalent skepticism about bandwagoning with any power simultaneously coupled with the Nehruvian idea of being a “messiah of the mass” and trying to be a leader of the third world, which reflects the mindset of Indian bureaucracy and ruling elite, is increasingly drawing India into a dilemma.

The BRIC leaders

The BRICS is not an alliance. It is an arbitrarily formed group, mentioned in passing by an ex-banker, which was so captivating to the ruling elite of the grouped nations that they thought of formalizing it in an institution. Initially starting as rising economies, a perceivable counter balance to the G-8, these economies are no longer rising, with deep structural and institutional flaws, different modes of governance, deteriorating law and order situation and freedom of expression and censorship issues, different economic fundamentals and most importantly, absolutely different and divergent world view and interest. Joshua Keating pointed out why the BRICS couldn’t be more different than each other. The last addition to this coalition, South Africa, is the messiest of them all. The selection of South Africa is ofcourse controversial and political, regarded often as a quota position from the African continent, as it leaves out far more competent and growing economies like Indonesia, Turkey and South Korea. This comes when BRICS are accused of neo-imperialism, and banners like “don’t carve out Africa” were found everywhere near the summit in Durban.

It is well known, that the primary drivers behind the ideation in the BRICS are Russia and China. Russia wants to bandwagon with China to balance the influence of United States. The motivation and Great power nostalgia of Russian elite is simple enough to fathom. The Chinese interest is however far more complex. As a growing hegemon, China actually has interest in Africa, both geo-politically and economically. The resources of Africa are mostly still unexplored, and the market potential of cheap Chinese manufactured goods is enormous. This however comes at a time, when China is increasingly viewed with suspicion in Africa. The last couple of years have seen the murder of Chinese engineers by disgruntled and exploited African labourers, incessant strikes in Chinese operated industries and mines, and the now infamous op-ed by Lamido Sanusi, the governor of Central Bank of Nigeria, where he accused China of having neo-colonial ambitions. China now wants to portray itself as a benevolent and altruistic force, and therefore wanted to soothe Africa under the BRICS front. India, for all its independent and non-aligned foreign policy, is legitimizing Chinese actions.

It is puzzling to fathom why India is following Chinese and Russian lead. For a start, Russia is not what it used to be. It clearly views China as a far superior partner than India, and a market for superior weapons and technology, ironically at the same time when India received massive aid grant from Japan. India and China are not really partners, and as I wrote here before, will probably not be in the near foreseeable future. Nor is Indian business interest in Africa that important, scalable or maintainable. For example, assuming that India invests in some African country under the BRICS development bank, tomorrow if there is some kind of unrest, is India capable or willing to defend its business interest? India never showed any willingness to aggressively promote or defend its business interests, be it Afghanistan, Maldives, or South China Sea, and there is no reason to believe India would do that in Africa. India also lacks such far off power projection capability. Which brings us to question the wisdom; do the benefits of Indian investment in Africa outweigh the cost? What is the incentive of pledging tens of billions of dollars, all Indian taxpayers’ money, in a region which is beset by uncertainty, instability and conflict, or starting a monetary organization, potentially rival to IMF/World Bank which will not be of any direct benefit to the already slowing economy and growth rate?

On the other hand, India will eventually be viewed as just another neo-colonial resource grabbing power like China, if it continues to be with the BRICS. The respect that India enjoyed in Africa, and the goodwill as a potential democratic competitor of China will fade away, with India just being a satellite of Chinese ambitions, a satisfied mid level power in an institution guided by Russian and Chinese geo-political interests. Nor is Indian interest, in the BRICS assisted conflict resolution in Central African Republic understandable. Again, the question is geo-political, what IS India’s interest? Tomorrow if Russia leads the BRICS into conflict resolution in Syria, will India be willing to commit its resources?

As this Economist essay explains, India is utterly confused about its growing clout and new found respect as a rising power, lacks a political will, strategic culture, a status-quo bureaucracy, and timely and fast decision making infrastructure. Added to that is the notorious ambivalence towards aligning with the West, even though being perfectly aware that in the great scheme of the game, China stands as the largest potential rival. This ambivalence and skepticism stems from the utterly discredited NAM mentality which is still somehow widely followed among the Indian foreign policy circles, and the moral, altruistic, socialist Nehruvian world view, without any long term planning or Realist Raison D’etat. With the BRICS now attracting countries like Egypt, a slow and painful repetition of the outdated Indian NAM policies are in the process. Everyone knows how NAM turned out. One can only hope that India’s policymakers realize soon where her interests lie.

(Sumantra Maitra is a freelance journalist from India and a tutor of New Zealand Foreign Policy and Theories of International Relations, at the University of Otago, New Zealand. You can follow him on twitter @dailyworldwatch.)

The H-1B conundrum

A new legislation intends to check H-1 B related frauds

Guest post by Madhu Nair

Ever since the 2008 economic crash, Americans have been accusing the H-1 B visa as an instrument used to steal their jobs. The United States is battling a high unemployment rate and the voice for a pro-American job policy is increasing day by day. With critics crying foul over the provisions of the policy and its abuse by technology majors, America’s H-1B visa policy has run into troubled waters.

According to a recent report, Senator Chuck Grassley, a ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has introduced a legislation which aims to eliminate fraud and abuse of the H-1B visa policy. The legislation intends to make reforms to increase enforcement, modify wage requirements and ensure protection of visa holders and American workers. Grassley says that the legislation will not only benefit American workers, but also help U.S. companies to get quality specialized workers from abroad.

Grassley adds, “Somewhere along the line, the H-1B program got side-tracked. The program was never meant to replace qualified American workers, but it was instead intended as a means to fill gaps in highly specialized areas of employment. When times are tough, like they are now, it’s especially important that Americans get every consideration before an employer looks to hire from abroad.”

The legislation, if passed, may affect jobseekers from India and elsewhere. The recently passed H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2013 ensures that an H-1B application filed by a company employing 50 or more U.S. workers will not be accepted unless the employer attests that less than 50% of the its workforce are H-1B and L-1 visa holders. This, in addition, to the legislation introduced by Grassley could mean trouble for companies who seek cheap and quality workers, largely from developing economies. A recently published article had also highlighted that many of the H-1B hires do not belong to the “best and the brightest” category. This further pushed the need to reform the policy which has gained a political face of late.

With a cap of 65,000 H-1B visas a year, Indian companies were seen scrambling for approvals with over 50,000 applications being filed on the very first day of screening. Market analysts say that the cap on visas and other such compulsions will impact the margins of companies adversely. The increasing unemployment has also forced companies in the U.S. to take to sub-contracting and local hiring. This further adds pressure on companies to take to other means in order to achieve their ambitions.

While a short-term impact looks imminent, it would be better to come out with options to avoid such situations in the future. The global economy changed remarkably after the 2008 crisis with the world turning towards developing economies to pave the path ahead. India, with its growing young and abundant workforce, has an edge over other countries in reaping the benefits. But it would be rather cynical to neglect developed economies while doing so. The only way forward is to find a middle ground where countries can work together for a sustainable future.

India’s foreign policy: A year in review

Guest post by Gateway House

As 2012 draws to a close, it’s imperative to assess India’s foreign policy performance, and look ahead to what we can expect in 2013.

So far, the report is mixed: Four foreign policy hotspots, five sweet spots, and two blind spots. About the same as 2011, when we gave six jeers and five cheers for India’s foreign policy performance.

Geopolitically, 2011 was the year of celebrating the shift of global growth and power to Asia; a year later, 2012 has seen the beginning of pushback on Asia from the U.S., which has seen the confidence of newly elected governments in Japan and South Korea and increased aggression from China as a result of its own domestic power shift.

Internationally, India has been an active participant in the creation of alternate financial instruments and institutions from emerging countries. And so far New Delhi has deftly handled the U.S. pivot to Asia, and maintained bi-partisan support in Washington, while simultaneously balancing its energy imports from Iran.

In contrast, New Delhi has been ham-handed at home. This is the year in which the government has been put on the mat by a strong anti-corruption movement started in 2011, to the current anti-rape movement engulfing the country. An enfeebled centre could hang on, or bring on mid-term elections in 2012 – a distinct possibility after the Bharatiya Janata Party’s win in Gujarat this month. It could change if the ruling Congress government genuinely confronts corruption and addresses law and order issues, continues on its path to economic reform and provides jobs to the 14 million youth who join the workforce every year. They are the boiling cauldron of the under-educated and unemployed young who yearn for political and economic change.

Clearly, our international stature is better than our image at home. We present our top foreign policy Hotspots, Sweet spots and Blind spots for 2012.

Foreign Policy Hot spots

The Maldives: In the wake of the regime change in the Maldives in February, New Delhi may have reacted hastily by recognising the new government led by Mohammed Waheed and bypassing the friendly and more secular former president, Mohamed Nasheed. The increasing fundamentalism and political breakdown that have followed in the Maldives have made India an easy target – most recently highlighted by the GMR-Maldives dispute. But two external factors may also be at play: China’s increasing economic influence in the island-nation and possible Western interest in the old World War II military base in Gan, the southernmost island in the Maldives.

Sri Lanka: Bowing to pressure from both domestic coalition politics and international organisations and allies, India voted against Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council in March; the vote eroded our position of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations. In September, the bilateral hit a new low, with threats and attacks on Sri Lankan pilgrims and school children travelling in Tamil Nadu. It was exacerbated by the politically opportunistic demands of the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, that India must stop training Sri Lankan military personnel. Meanwhile, China raised military aid to more than $100 million and billions in strategic infrastructure for Sri Lanka.

South China Sea: Our Chief of Naval Staff’s statement that India is “prepared” to protect Indian interests in the South China Sea was subsequently watered down. Nevertheless, Beijing reacted sharply, stating that it “opposes any unilateral oil and gas exploration activities in disputed areas in the South China Sea,” despite its own infrastructure-building activities in disputed areas of Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The U.S.’s rebalancing in Asia juxtaposed with recent election outcomes in Japan and South Korea have given New Delhi more strategic space to be firm with China. We must continue our policy of balancing our economic interests in trade and attracting Chinese investment and negotiating our concerns on the border with positioning on Chinese disputes with ASEAN members in the South China Sea and its adversarial posturing towards the U.S.

Syria: India’s Track II diplomacy in Syria was not successful for the people of Syria, who remain caught in the battle between the West and Gulf-funded “rebels” and fundamentalists, and the Bashar al-Assad government. Despite India’s close relations with Damascus and efforts to mediate an acceptable solution at the UN Security Council in July, India voted, along with the West, for stronger sanctions against the Syrian regime, while fellow BRICS nations Russia and China exercised a veto. It is only a matter of time before the exit of Assad, but the sectarian fighting could continue for decades, at great cost to the Syrian people and secularism in the region. The conflict may cause further regional destabilisation, more friction between Israel and Iran, and eventually a rise in the price of oil.

Foreign Policy Sweet spots

India-Myanmar: After 25 years of cautious engagement, India’s policy of not shunning military governments – while simultaneously maintaining support for Myanmar’s democratisation – put us on the right side of history. Successive high-level visits this year resulted in a credit line worth $500 million to Myanmar and various agreements on border issues, energy and infrastructure. India is poised to play a vital role in Myanmar: as a model for democratic institution-building and also with business and development solutions that are affordable and adaptable. In particular, Myanmar can benefit from India’s experience in addressing complex identity issues.

Alternate financial instruments: In March, New Delhi proposed a BRICS Bank and in December the government moved further to promote more SAARC currency swaps. India already has currency swap deals with Japan worth $15 billion and is part of a SAARC deal worth $2 billion. These are positive signs of emerging economies taking the initiative to design alternative financial instruments to mitigate the volatility caused by the financial crises of the U.S. and Europe. Could a viable multilateral option emerge from BRICS? Can bilateral currency swap deals be the building blocks of an alternative financial system?

Afghanistan: India hosted the first ‘Investment Summit on Afghanistan’ in June, probably with the cooperation of Washington, and then participated in the first India-U.S.-Afghanistan trilateral dialogue in September. Indian business is supporting New Delhi’s efforts in Afghanistan, and more than $10 billion is likely to be invested in the Hajigak iron ore mines and various coal, fertiliser and small development projects. New Delhi must now amplify its role on the ground in Afghanistan – through both security and infrastructure cooperation. This, however, entails a dilemma: how can India expand its presence without becoming a target for the Taliban and unfriendly Pakistani entities?

Energy security: So far, India has successfully balanced two fundamental interests: our strategic relationship with the U.S. and our escalating energy requirements. The MT Omvati Prem became the first ship with Indian insurance to load oil from Iran in August, after European Union sanctions came into force in July. With increasing instability in West Asia, we will need more such creativity to maintain the steady flow of oil from the Gulf and we must also look for alternative suppliers in other geographies.

ASEAN: The recently-concluded negotiations of the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in services and investments is a significant step in improving regional connectivity. Over the past two decades, our engagement with ASEAN has intensified and become multifaceted, with a massive increase in trade from $2.9 billion in 1993 to $80 billion in 2012. The region is not only at the centre of our Look East policy, but it is also vital to our efforts to economically and strategically balance China in an Asia that is increasingly important globally.

Foreign Policy Blind Spots

Central Asia: We have not been able to leverage our cordial relations with the Central Asian states to advantageous positions on energy, on membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), trade, and tactical cooperation in Afghanistan. We should more actively engage with Central Asia to press our case for membership of the SCO and to expand economic exchanges.

Lost Opportunities for Growth: India’s fiscal problems were highlighted many times in 2012 – in April, for instance, when S&P revised our outlook from stable to “negative” with the threat of an investment rating downgrade to “junk” status within 24 months. India’s growth rate continues to slide and is now 5.3 percent. India is struggling with a falling rupee and a rising oil import burden, along with the budgetary imperative to reduce fuel subsidies. We are condemned to a continuing economic slowdown unless the government confronts corruption more seriously and implements economic reforms.

Looking forward to 2013

What can we expect for 2013? Despite the best efforts of our Prime Minister to keep India-Pakistan relations on an even keel, the critical issues with Pakistan – Jammu & Kashmir, water, terrorism – remain intractable. Don’t hold your breath: nothing will change till Pakistan’s elections in May 2013 and perhaps even our own in 2014. Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik’s disastrous recent visit to India has set back the improvements that had come with New Delhi’s patient diplomacy. Just as we have been able to successfully do with Myanmar and Iran, we should resist American efforts to influence us to make concessions on Pakistan, and handle the relationship according to our own imperatives.

For India-U.S. relations, a visit by Barack Obama, which would be an unprecedented second visit by a serving U.S. president, could propel the strategic bilateral relationship to new heights.

We hope for better times in 2013: an end to the conflict in Syria, more stability in Pakistan, less aggressive posturing by China in Asia and a recovered global – and Indian – economy.

(This article originally appeared at Gateway House and has been republished with their approval. All views mentioned in the article are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or positions of USINPAC in any manner.)

Blood Feud in Islamabad Complicates U.S.-Pakistan Relations

A long summer of political turmoil has begun that makes harder the search for a new equilibrium with Washington

A tale of two capital cities in the grip of political uncertainty unfolded in South Asia last week.   Islamabad was the scene of a fast-paced soap opera that throws into further doubt the future of the democratization process and complicates efforts to repair the breakdown of U.S.-Pakistan relations.  Meanwhile in New Delhi, simmering tensions within the coalition government erupted into open revolt, further constraining decision-making at a time when the United States in seeking to draw closer strategically.

This post will focus on the Pakistani case, the more acute of the two; a subsequent post will deal with the political tussles in India, which might ultimately prove to be cathartic.

Pakistan has long been marred by political ructions that have more to do with clashing personalities than principled disputes.  The country’s trajectory might well be materially different absent the blood feud between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s.  Likewise the on-going vendetta between Sharif and Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan’s current president and Bhutto’s widower, is impeding progress on critical national problems as well as tarnishing the very concept of democratic governance.

Yet even against this background, last week’s events were extraordinary.  Striking, too, was how, with the country once again earning a top place in the roster of failed states, Pakistan could reliably be counted on to give credence to that dubious billing.   This time Zardari and Iftikhar Chaudhry, the Supreme Court’s chief justice, were the ones spewing bad blood, in the process upending a tenuous measure of political stability that had recently emerged in Islamabad.

Since its installation in March 2008, Zardari’s government has been in a running struggle with the powerful military establishment and an assertive judiciary.  These ructions have given rise to persistent fears of yet another army coup – as recently as earlier this year – as well as accusations that the Supreme Court is acting in cahoots with the military to undermine Zardari and his prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani.  Against heavy odds, however, the two somehow managed to limp along.  Last month Gilani became the country’s longest-serving prime minister, a signal accomplishment in view of how many of his predecessors have been hanged, exiled and otherwise forcibly evicted from office.  And while his administration was highly unpopular and hardly a model of competence, it was well on its way to becoming the country’s first democratically-elected government to serve out its allotted five-year term.

Yet this past week, the Supreme Court suddenly sent Gilani packing on the grounds that his contempt-of-court conviction in April disqualified him from holding office and serving in parliament.  The conviction stemmed from Gilani’s defiance of the court’s order to reactivate a dormant money-laundering case brought by the Swiss government against Bhutto and Zardari.  Chaudhry’s focus on the case strikes many observers as overzealous, given Swiss reluctance to re-open the investigation, the constitutional immunity Zardari enjoys as president, and the long record of Islamabad power brokers using corruption allegations to harass political opponents.

Chaudhry justified Gilani’s removal as demonstrating the rule of law in a country where governmental malfeasance is endemic.  Some commentators view the action as part of the institutional skirmishes that can be expected in Pakistan’s halting democratic transformation and note that Chaudhry also has turned his attention on abuses perpetuated by the security establishment.  An activist Supreme Court that sees itself as a guardian of the public integrity has likewise emerged in neighboring India.

But Gilani’s dismissal appears to be less about the advancement of constitutional concepts than the settling of personal scores.  The chief justice, a hero of the popular movement that forced Pervez Musharraf into exile, is reportedly indignant that Zardari refused, until forced to bow to public pressure, to reinstate him to the bench after Musharraf sacked him at the start of the state of emergency that was declared in November 2007.  Once returned to the court, Chaudhry promptly struck back by invalidating a general amnesty that Musharraf had forged with Bhutto and Zardari, thereby opening Zardari to criminal prosecution once he leaves the presidency.

The rationale and timing of Gilani’s ouster also seems suspect.  Since parliament is the only body empowered to dismiss a prime minister, many observers (here and here) describe it as a sort of judicial coup.  Moreover, when the Supreme Court first convicted Gilani on contempt charges, it seemed content to limit itself to the highly symbolic sentence it meted out – detention amounting to mere seconds.  Its abrupt ruling last week has led some to conclude that it was a diversion meant to deflect attention away from bribe-taking accusations against Chaudhry’s own son, which Zardari’s camp may be orchestrating.

Gilani’s removal proved to be the opening act of a chaotic week.  Zardari quickly settled on Makhdoom Shahabuddin as a replacement, only to have a court issue an arrest warrant for the man.  The warrant has to do with Shahabuddin’s alleged involvement in a drug importation scandal while he was serving as health minister.  Significantly, the court acted upon the request of an anti-narcotics body run by the military.  Gilani’s son is also implicated in the matter and a warrant was similarly issued for his detention.

Zardari’s second choice, Raja Pervez Ashraf, easily won parliamentary approval by week’s end but he, too, has had run-ins with the judiciary.  The Supreme Court earlier ended his stint as the federal minister in charge of power production when it found that a program he oversaw to spur private generation of electricity was riddled with graft.  Ruling that he is “liable both for civil and criminal action,” the court has instructed the National Accountability Bureau, an anti-corruption agency, to open an inquiry.

Given Chaudhry’s doggedness on the matter, Ashraf is unlikely to be left off the hook regarding Zardari’s corruption case, opening up the possibility that he, too, could be removed from office in short order.  And another opportunity to nettle the president will arrive in the coming days as the Supreme Court moves forward on the bizarre Memogate affair.  A judicial commission earlier this month concluded that Zardari confidante Husain Haqqani was guilty of disloyalty to the nation during his recent stint as Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington.  The finding opens Haqqani open to possible treason charges and has become another political headache for the beleaguered Zardari.

As argued in a previous post, the rising tumult of domestic politics is exacerbating the strains in U.S.-Pakistan relations and complicating efforts to resolve the seven month-long blockade of NATO supply lines into Afghanistan that is costing Washington a $100 million a month as cargo is shipped via more expensive routes in Central Asia.  A quick end of the dispute is very much in Islamabad’s interests and on several occasions appeared to be within reach.  The thread-bare public treasury – not to mention the Pakistani army’s vast business empire – is in desperate need of revenue that would come from increased transit fees as well as the $3.5 billion in military and economic assistance that the Obama administration has requested for the upcoming fiscal year.  Moreover, the country will soon be forced to turn once again to the International Monetary Fund for a financial lifeline, a move that will require Washington’s sufferance.

Given Islamabad’s record of turning over Al Qaeda figures as a means of buying American good will, last week’s announcement of the capture of a militant thought to be in charge of some of the terror network’s international operations may be a further signal that the security establishment wants to mend ties with Washington.

Yet events of the past week herald the beginning of a long summer of political turmoil in Islamabad that makes harder the search for a new equilibrium in U.S.-Pakistan relations.  Don’t be surprised if the resulting exasperation in Washington results in renewed calls for unilateral military action on Pakistani soil, for further reductions in U.S. aid levels, and an for overall approach of “congagement” or “benign neglect” toward Islamabad.

This commentary was originally posted on Chanakya’s Notebook.   I invite you to follow me on Twitter.

Pakistan’s Unsafe Nuclear Warheads

Pakistan is facing a grave internal security crisis as radical extremists are gradually gaining ground. The crisis is attributable to a large extent to the resurgence of Islamist fundamentalist forces and the army’s inability to fight them effectively. Consequently, the spectre of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations has once again come to the fore. Western commentators are calling for contingency plans to physically secure or destroy the nuclear warheads in the event of a meltdown in the country.

Islamist terrorists can gain possession of nuclear warheads by physically breaching the security ring around them, by subverting the personnel on guard duty or if they succeed in overthrowing the regime in power in Islamabad through a coup. The Pakistani military authorities are extremely concerned about such eventualities and have made elaborate arrangements to ensure that all their nuclear warheads are stored safely. They claim that carefully formulated personnel reliability policies and electronic safety mechanisms have been developed and incorporated by Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority.
The Pakistani military establishment loses no opportunity to emphasize that as a responsible nuclear weapon state Pakistan has always attached great significance to the security of its strategic assets and that these assets are completely safe and secure under multi-layered security and command and control structures that are fully indigenous.

Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are reported to be stored at up to six to 10 separate locations. Besides the actual locations, there are a large number of dummy locations. The warheads are moved frequently to keep American satellites and spies from ascertaining their real locations. The warheads are stored separately from the launchers so as to guard against accidents and unauthorized use. The warheads are reported to be equipped with electronic locks (Permissive Action Links). A three-tier security system has been instituted for the physical protection of the various components of the warheads.

The fissionable atomic core made of highly enriched uranium and the high explosive trigger assembly are stored in fortified underground storage sites. Entry and exit into these “bunkers” is controlled by armed and well-equipped specially selected and meticulously trained personnel of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). As part of the Personnel Reliability Programme, these personnel are screened carefully before induction, are kept under constant surveillance and are frequently rotated.

Personnel selected for the security of the outer perimeter are reported to belong to elite infantry battalions of the Pakistani army. The possibility of any of these personnel being subverted is guarded against by counter-intelligence teams. Military regimes have very strong survival instincts and the SPD ensures that hard-line radical elements are ruthlessly weeded out from the nuclear security detail. The storage sites also have air defense assets allotted to them to defend against attacks from the air.

The delivery systems of Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command, comprising Chinese supplied M-11 and M-9 and the North Korean Nodong and Taepo Dong nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles and their launchers, are based at separate locations. These sites or “hides” are well-dispersed to ensure that maximum warheads survive a conventional air attack during war. They are also well defended against possible commando raids.

However, the possibility that an Islamist fundamentalist organization might overthrow the unstable civilian government with support from a large faction of the army cannot be ruled out. In such an eventuality, the U.S. and its allies may justifiably form another ‘coalition of the willing’ to seize maximum number of warheads in raids by Special Forces and bomb the remaining storage sites from the air to destroy the warheads. It would be in India’s interest to provide the maximum possible assistance that it can.