Tag Archives: UNSC

Blowing hot and cold

As many news reports noted, the past week was significant just for the numbers of Indian ministers in the United States at a given point in time. However, the more did not necessarily make the merrier.

cdn.wn.comNo less than nine members of the Indian Council of Ministers were in the US, including the primus inter pares, PM Manmohan Singh. The PM was in the  U.S. to address a session of the UN General Assembly and  his speech was notable, as one commentator put it, for its reference to “old ideological positions and  old constitutencies,” meant to signal his “disappointment with the West.” The PM seemed to emphasise the point by having a bilateral meeting with an old foe of the West, Iranian President Ahmedinajad, an event described by another commentator as a virtual affront to the United States. What India has to be disappointed about is unclear, and whether the disappointment will be followed up with distancing remains to be seen. Whether that is the most appropriate strategy is also moot in the rapidly changing global scenario.

Many of the Ministers, from Commerce to Power, to Finance were in the U.S. to drum up investment for mega- infrastructure projects back home. There were the usual assortment of think tank reports and seminars that usually coincide with such ministerial visits, but increasingly, they offer only new wine in old bottles, reflecting the current stalemate, if not slump, in relations.  An address by the recently promoted Deputy Secretary William J Burns at the Brookings Institution was even titled “Is there a Future for the US-India Partnership?

Commerce Minister Anand Sharma made a valiant effort to break the logjam on the Totalization Agreement issue but came a cropper. This issue has been attacked from various angles, having earlier being piloted by the Minister of Overseas Indian Affairs. Mr Sharma made the point to his interlocutors that there was no reason not to sign an agreement with India pleading incompatibility between social security systems since India had signed totalisation agreements with many European countries  with which the U.S. had an agreement but this argument cut no ice.  This was not surprising since Under Secretary Blake had made it clear in his last read-out on US-India relations that the U.S. was in no mood to transfer over a billion dollars to India in the current economic mess it found itself in. There was also talk of progress made on a Bilateral Investment Treaty, even though it is almost as if when one side blows hot, the other side blows cold.

The other legs of the relationship, business and the diaspora, can, at best only play a supporting role, and are to an extent affected by the buffeting winds of the strategic relationship. The India-US CEOs forum also held its annual meeting in Washington this past week, but has increasingly less to show for being such a high-powered gathering. While India has a ready-made constituency in the U.S. in the form of the Indian Diaspora, Hillary Clinton’s public diplomacy initiatives are beginning to show results at least in India, with U.S. embassies and missions making all out efforts to engage with the average Indian through all the resources available from   social media to innovative meetups titled Charcha, Chai aur Coffee. The American Center in Delhi even provides a venue for Startup Saturday, a forum for young entrepreneurs to come together to share and learn from each other.

The blow hot, blow cold phase of the relationship into which we have entered seems set to continue into the foreseeable future with, as William Burns himself admitted in his speech, both governments distracted and pulled in different direction by a combination of domestic and external issues.

Taking the Long View

Over time, the expansion of Chinese strength will undoubtedly push New Delhi to tighten its security relations with Washington, though the process will neither be as smooth nor as speedy as many would like.

Just as US-India ties were at a nadir following New Delhi’s nuclear tests in 1998 – and just as the United States and China were declaring their own strategic partnership – Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee famously characterized Washington and New Delhi as “natural allies” who would form “the mainstay of tomorrow’s stable, democratic world order.” Two years later, Vajpayee reaffirmed this description.

Judging by the dense bilateral links the two countries have crafted over the past decade, Vajpayee phrase seems to have been vindicated. Not only have a landmark civilian nuclear accord and a spate of defense contracts been concluded, but the two countries have established some 30 bilateral dialogues and working groups on a wide gamut of issues, and the United States holds more bilateral military exercises each year with India than with any other nation.

Yet U.S. elites are suddenly shying away from the term “ally.” Assistant Secretary of State for South & Central Asia Robert Blake, for instance, states that “India and the United States will never be allies in the traditional sense of the term.”  Strobe Talbott, who as Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton administration began the first institutionalized dialogue between Washington and New Delhi, contends that the countries “are not now, and may never be, allies.” Stephen P. Cohen, dean of U.S. South Asianists, likewise maintains that “India is a friend, not an ally” and the new US-Indian strategic alliance is “still more symbolic than real.”

All three underscore the distinction between long-standing U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea, and partners like India that are not bound by formal security commitments. And Blake’s statement was undoubtedly in deference to Indian sensitivities about being sucked into America’s strategic orbit, although he adds that India can no longer be considered a non-aligned country given the “increased convergences in strategic outlook” between Washington and New Delhi. But Talbott and Cohen are less sanguine on this count. The former argues that:

One reason we may never be [allies] or not in the any foreseeable future, is because there is still a huge constituency in support of India’s non-aligned status, despite the fact that I would say that non-alignment and the non-aligned movement is very much an artifact of the Cold War. I remember having a conversation with Natwar Singh [retired Indian diplomat and Manmohan Singh’s first foreign minister] when Congress was out of power and him saying to me that the proudest moment of his career was being secretary general of the non-aligned movement. That sticks in my mind. I took that as a sign that there are still a lot of Indians who take non-alignment seriously.

Cohen strikes a similar note: “New Delhi has a deep commitment to strategic autonomy, as indicated by its insistent use of the moderating prefix ‘natural’ to describe its U.S. relationship. In the end, India got what it needed from Washington, including recognition of its nuclear weapons program and support for its permanent membership on the United Nations’ Security Council, at little or no cost.”

Believing that strategic ties remain, at best, “aspirational,” Michael Auslin, at the American Enterprise Institute, likewise notes that the

continued adherence to Jawaharlal Nehru’s non-aligned strategy clearly animates the worldview of most thinkers [in India], even if the language used to describe it no longer partakes of such Cold War imagery. There is a firm commitment in New Delhi not to have any firm commitments to any one state. It seems the Indians have taken to heart, far more than the Americans, George Washington’s warning against entangling foreign alliances.

All of these comments come at a time of widespread disappointment in Washington that the bilateral relationship has not lived up to the strategic and economic possibilities that seemed so alive just a few years ago. As my last post noted, some observers are even questioning whether the Bush-Singh nuclear deal has succeeded in its primary aim of invigorating US-India geopolitical cooperation in the face of a rapidly growing and more assertive China.

The Bush administration devoted singular energy to courting New Delhi as a key part of its strategy of strengthening security links with China’s neighbors. In a widely-read article, Condoleezza Rice, then serving as chief foreign adviser to the George W. Bush presidential campaign, observed that Washington “should pay closer attention to India’s role in the regional balance.” She pointedly noted that “India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s, too.” In his first major foreign policy address as a candidate, Bush argued that “we should work with the Indian government, ensuring it is a force for stability and security in Asia.”

Once the nuclear deal was unveiled at a July 2005 summit between Bush and Prime Minister Singh, Rice justified it by calling India “a rising global power that we believe could be a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia.” At the summit, a senior Indian diplomat was quoted as saying that “Bush has a vision that we in India often don’t have. With Europe in decline and China rising, the U.S. sees India as a future global power with the ability to maintain [the] power balance in the 21st century.” A Bush administration official closely involved in the making of policy toward New Delhi commented that “China is a central element in our effort to encourage India’s emergence as a world power. But we don’t need to talk about the containment of China. It will take care of itself as India rises.”

Singh-Wen_PhotoIn the years since, has the growth of Chinese strategic power nudged Washington and New Delhi into tighter security collaboration, as many in the Bush administration expected? Or is Michael Krepon, one of the nuclear deal’s prominent detractors, correct in arguing that “New Delhi continues to titrate improved strategic cooperation with the United States” and that it “continues to improve ties with Beijing.  It is folly to presume that Washington can leverage New Delhi’s dealings with Beijing.”

There’s no denying the American disillusionment caused by India’s rejection of Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s bids in its $11 billion fighter aircraft competition and by the prolonged inability of U.S. companies to capitalize on the nuclear deal due to an Indian liability law that does not conform to international norms. It is also true that India and China have aligned to thwart U.S. objectives in global negotiations on trade and climate change, and that they often take the same side in UN deliberations.

But stepping back a bit in order to take in the wider perspective, it is clear that some fundamental geopolitical forces are at work in spurring India-China strategic frictions.  Instead of being the fraternal titans that drive the Asian Century forward, as envisioned in the “Chindia” chimera, it is more likely that their relationship in the coming years will be marked by increased suspicion and rivalry. The relationship has never really recovered from the trauma of their 1962 border war, and the strains have only increased over the past five years or so. Beijing is now taking a much more hawkish line on territorial disputes in the Himalayans, including asserting a brand new claim that the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh is actually “Southern Tibet.”  It is also expanding its presence in territory controlled by Pakistan, and trying to block New Delhi’s efforts to play a greater role in regional and international institutions.

Much is made of the fact that China is now India’s largest trading partner and that two-way trade soared from $12 billion in 2004 to $60 billion in 2010, and that the countries are on track to reach $100 billion in 2015. When Premier Wen Jaibao visited New Delhi last December, he brought along a larger business delegation than President Obama did a month earlier, and the $16 billion in resulting trade deals eclipsed the $10 billion-mark struck by the Americans. Yet compared to US-India economic links, there are far more competitive elements, and far fewer complementary features, operating in India’s business interactions with China.

All of these developments have not gone unnoticed by the Singh government.  Famous for his cautious, taciturn nature, Singh has caused a stir with his public expressions of disapproval regarding what he terms Chinese “assertiveness.” In a September 2010 interview he complained that Beijing sought to “keep India in a low-level equilibrium” and that “it would like to have a foothold in South Asia.” Three months later, he shocked his Chinese guests during the Wen visit by refusing to reiterate India’s traditional endorsement of the “One China” policy or customary recognition of Tibet being an inviolable part of the People’s Republic.

Indian military planning is also increasingly focused on the threat from its northern neighbor, from taking major steps to fortify its northeastern border to accelerating the development of the Agni-V ballistic missile. With a reach of over 5,000 kilometers, and capable of carrying multiple warheads, the missile puts China fully within range of a retaliatory nuclear strike.

The strategic entente with India is Washington’s first geopolitical partnership to be forged in the post-Cold War era, meaning that its rhythm is bound to be quite different from the security alliances the United States rapidly created in the aftermath of World War II. Back then, the national power of Washington’s new-found allies was in stark decline, while India’s current power trajectory is visibly upward. The structural dynamics of a bipolar global order also were simpler than today’s messy multipolarity.  Over time, however, the expansion of Chinese strength will undoubtedly push New Delhi to tighten its security relations with Washington, though the process will neither be as smooth nor as speedy as many would like.

New UNSC member India takes firm, ‘mature’ stances on international issues

By Nilova Roy Chaudhury
Indian Review of Global Affairs

A key new aspect of India’s foreign policy positions in 2011, to coincide with its assumption earlier this month of a non-permanent seat at the United Nations’ high table, will be “firmness and maturity”, a government official said, indicating that New Delhi would increasingly articulate positions on issues on which it would earlier have remained silent.

Whether it was an unequivocal condemnation of terror or quiet satisfaction at the exit of the UNMIN from Nepal, or the strong affirmation of support for the referendum in South Sudan while expressing “concern” over “a high and worrying level of violence in the region of Abyei which led to loss of lives” and urging an expeditious return to dialogue for “the situation in Darfur (which) also remains a cause for concern”, or firming up a position on issues as delicate as the report of the UN Security Council – mandated Special Tribunal on Lebanon on the Hariri assassination, India’s foreign office is working overtime to ensure it will not be caught unawares and will make its presence felt.

Hardeep Puri, India’s Permanent Representative at the UN, has articulated Indian positions strongly at every opportunity, most recently reiterating “India’s unwavering support for the Palestinian people’s struggle for a sovereign, independent, viable and united State of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital living within secure and recognized borders, side by side and at peace with Israel as endorsed in the Arab Peace initiative, Quartet Road map and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions,” clearly indicating that New Delhi will not shy away from taking positions when required.

What will test this uncharacteristically forthright set of positions from South Block will be issues that more directly impact India’s bilateral relations with strategically sensitive countries, particularly like Iran and Myanmar. With the P-5+1 (five permanent UNSC members and Germany) countries beginning another round of talks with Iran about its nuclear programme on Friday, the issue will sorely test New Delhi’s diplomatic manoeuverability. However, according to senior officials, the idea is to show that it can take positions and be firm when required to do so.

Equally, sources indicated, India would not get provoked into responding to “regular pinpricks” from neighbouring countries like Pakistan, or to China’s aggressive, even expansionist posturing,  like the official launch this week by China of its state-run mapping website called ‘Map World’ (that Beijing has authorised to rival Google Earth), showing Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir;  two key areas of its long-standing boundary dispute with India; as part of its territory.

As it articulates its positions on strategic issues more strongly, India is also pushing an agenda for reforms of UN organs including the UNSC, a text of which is circulating with some speed among members of the UN General Assembly. Also, working with two key allies from the Group of four, Germany and Brazil, India is aiming to ensure that its non-permanent presence on the UN Security Council translates into a permanent presence by the end of its current tenure in December 2012.

The United States is clearly upbeat about India’s so-called “coming out party” with State Department Spokesman PJ Crowley saying, “India is an emerging global power in its own right, and it is increasingly involved and engaged in global challenges from regional security to the environment. So we value the role that India is playing on the world stage and look forward to working with India on the Security Council,” Crowley said. U.S. President Barack Obama had, during his visit to India in November, articulated U.S. support for a permanent place for India on the UNSC after reforms. Strong expressions of support have also been made by French President Nicholas Sarkozy, Russian President Dimitry Medvedev and British Prime Minister David Cameron.

India’s neighbour China is, however, wary and has cautioned patience, though its Premier Wen Jiabao claimed Beijing “understood” New Delhi’s aspirations. The China Daily said reforms at the United Nations could not be achieved “overnight” and the complex issue requires a lot of patience.”UNSC reform will not occur overnight, or in a few years. It will require many rounds of thorough consultations and negotiations. Therefore any attempt to set an artificial time limit for UNSC reform is both far-fetched and reckless,” the state-run daily said in a recent editorial.

India, meanwhile, has been elected to chair several UNSC subsidiary bodies, including two crucial committees on counter-terrorism, a committee on sanctions against Eritrea and Somalia and a working group on additional measures against terrorism.

(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)


Invading the strategic space: the Dragon fires another salvo at India

By A Adityanjee
Indian Review of Global Affairs

The Chinese have fired yet another salvo in its cloak and dagger strategic games directed at India. It has gone totally unnoticed in the Indian media but for the last few days, both the Peoples’ Daily of China and the China Daily along with their Indian Sinophile minions have been crowing about the latest Chinese “smart” success in invading India’s international strategic space. By itself, the current Chinese salvo seems pretty innocuous but it has far reaching consequences. The stapled visa issue also started as an innocuous action by low level visa officers in the Chinese embassy. One has to read in between the tea leaves to ascertain Chinese motives. By these aggressive containment efforts, China has proved once again that it is not a friend or an ally of India but at worst a determined and hostile strategic adversary and at best a peer competitor.

There is a very clear cut pattern to Chinese geo-political endeavours. China is behaving as a classical hegemon that is determined to prevent emergence of a rival power by any means. Despite India’s serious reservations, a few years ago, China manipulated the SAARC process to enter as an observer, on an  Invitation from Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh When India wanted to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the full membership was frozen and India was again hyphenated with Pakistan and Iran as an observer. China is the only country among the P5 nations that has yet to endorse India’s candidature for the permanent membership of the UNSC. This, even though China has been making noises about harmony, democracy and consensus building in the UNSC reform process. This will help the Coffee Group (so-called United for Consensus group) orchestrated by Pakistan.

China had initially put up a number of conditions at the time of approval of the India-US civil nuclear energy deal by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Ultimately, the U.S. forced China to support the deal in the NSG. Now, China wants a similar deal in the NSG for its all-weather friend and client state Pakistan. Turning to the ASEAN, China has, for last several years prevented India’s entry by stringently opposing the ASEAN plus six formula that includes India (ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and US) while supporting the ASEAN plus three formula (ASEAN, China, U.S. and Japan). We also see continued exclusion of India from the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Conference). Primarily as a result of Chinese machinations, the APEC is not ready to enlarge itself. If we carefully analyse the Chinese behaviour towards India, not only has China tried to confine India to the sub-continent as a mere regional player, but also China has made no secret of its efforts to contain India’s rising profile in other international fora to suit its narrow mercantile and hegemonic purposes.

At the same time, China has been seconding the Manmohan Singh mantra about the world having enough space for both China and India to rise peacefully at the same time. Similar to Nehru’s endorsement of “Panchsheel”, the current Indian PM has fallen in the same trap laid by China for India in the international organizations. Nehru was privately characterised as a “useful idiot” by the Chinese leadership. One wonders what Hu Jintao is saying about Dr. Singh privately. A few years ago, India’s then petroleum minister Mani Shankar Aiyar was naively talking about developing hydrocarbon resources jointly with China, while China successfully outbid India for every hydrocarbon asset internationally whether in Africa or closer to home in Myanmar. Indian politicians have failed to learn from the previous treacherous behaviour on part of China, and regularly succumb to Chinese bullying. The lack of proactive strategic planning has always been missing from India’s leadership’s mindset and time and again we are left to react to geo-political situations by fire-fighting each avoidable crisis.

Although India and China have tangoed at the G20, RIC, BRIC, BASIC and SCO groupings for a few years now, China has been keen to neutralise India’s influence in the IBSA, a grouping that excludes China specifically. India has been lukewarm to the idea of China joining the IBSA because China is not a democracy while all the three countries of IBSA are thriving democracies in three separate continents. China has been working very hard with Brazil and South Africa for the last couple of years to achieve its stated purpose. The next BRIC meeting is scheduled in April 2011 in Beijing. And, lo and behold, China has had the chutzpah to foist South Africa on to the BRIC. Enlarging the economic grouping to BRICS tremendously helps China’s foreign policy objectives of containing Indian economic, strategic, political and diplomatic influence. China has effectively managed to collapse BRIC and IBSA into one single grouping (BRICS). Currently China is South Africa’s largest trading partner and South Africa is the largest destination in Africa for China’s direct investment. South Africa’s small population, the size of its economy and the relatively slow growth rate did not meet the original BRIC standards. By inviting South Africa to BRIC(S), China has deftly dented India’s economic outreach in Africa. China has also quickly out-manoeuvred the proposed India-US collaboration and cooperation in Africa as suggested by President Barack Obama during his November 2010 India trip recently.

By this master-stroke, China has shown the audacity to adopt the colonial and imperialistic policy of “Divide and Rule” vis-a-vis the G4 countries (Brazil, India, Germany and Japan) who are aspiring to be members of the UNSC as permanent members. Brazil has been torn asunder from the G4 in toto and firmly aligned with China in the now enlarged BRICS. By claiming the leadership of BRICS and harping on its political role in the developing world, China has tried to marginalise India’s rise as an emerging pole in the emerging oligo-polar geo-political balance of power hierarchy. For all practical purposes, we can say goodbye to IBSA as an economic vehicle for India to access increasingly lucrative African and Latin American markets. Chinese efforts are ostensibly geared towards strengthening South Africa’s and Brazil’s claims for the UNSC permanent membership while simultaneously over-looking and demeaning India’s global role. People’s Daily Online ominously notes that “In 2011, all the members of the BRICS countries will serve as members of the UN security council, permanent or non-permanent. Their active roles deserve people’s attention in the year to come”. China Daily, while neglecting India focuses on the role of China, Russia and Brazil have played in the international arena.

India has now very hard strategic choices. It should insist that BRICS in its latest avatar must remain primarily an economic block without any scope for creeping politicisation of the economic group into a geo-political formation. India cannot be seen to be opposing South Africa’s entry into the BRICS for historical, diplomatic and geo-political reasons, though it remains lukewarm to the proposal. India should take a serious note of China’s audacious move in the international chess game and counteract it by joining the ASEAN formally, resurrecting the BIMSTEC and vigorously strengthening the IBSA as a trade block. India should use her current membership of the UNSC to catapult into the NSG as a full-fledged member. India should make determined efforts to join the proposed East Asian Economic Community and prevent her further exclusion from any economic or trade group in order to balance China’s growing influence in international economic diplomacy.

(Dr Adityanjee is President, Council for Strategic Affairs, New Delhi)


(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)

Up Persian creek without a strategy

India must get its act together on Iran…quickly.

The apparent lack of policy co-ordination within the Indian government over Iran is really worrying.

We are referring to the RBI’s decisions in recent days closing the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) mechanism to imports—beginning with oil and extending to other goods and services—from Iran. The move not only caught the industry by surprise, it looks like it caught the relevant government ministries by surprise as well. Given that Iran is India’s second largest supplier of crude oil accounting for around 13 percent ($12 billion) of oil imports and the risk of a short-term supply shock sending oil prices higher, the lack of policy coordination amounts to dereliction of duty.

The lack of coordination reflects a deeper malaise—the UPA government’s inability to evolve a coherent policy on Iran, with the result that New Delhi is forever in reactive mode. [See: Will the Ayatollah step behind the line?] The overall failure of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his government to communicate with the public—witness how they botched up the India-U.S. nuclear deal—means that no political leader explains why the government is doing whatever it is doing, and why difficult decisions have to be made. The latter would still be acceptable if the government executed in a competent fashion—like in the case of the nuclear deal—but intolerable where execution is poor.

In this case, there is no evidence that the relevant cabinet committees ever discussed the implications of RBI’s move and took the necessary measures to manage the fallout. The RBI’s independence doesn’t preclude coordination in matters like this. A competent government would have reassured the markets and the public that although RBI’s measures against imports from Iran would put 13% of India’s supply of crude at risk, it has alternative plans to protect the Indian economy. Instead we were left working out the implications of terse press releases issued by the central bank.

What might those alternative plans be? These could involve arrangements to import Iranian oil through other currencies (or the Indian rupee), assurances from other suppliers (read Saudi Arabia) that they will make up the shortfall or both. Given Saudi interests in keeping the lid on Iran’s nuclear programme, New Delhi could have extracted the latter as the price of tightening the financial screws on Iran. Indeed, not extracting such a price is a good opportunity squandered.

India must get its act together on Iran. First, it is in India’s interests to ensure that Iranian oil and gas continue to provide the economy with the supply diversity that an oil-importing country needs. If this objective is inconsistent with playing responsible global citizen then so be it.

Second, given that Iran shares an interest in preventing Afghanistan from falling under the sway of a Saudi-Pakistani-Taliban nexus, India needs to continue to engage Iran.

Third, while a nuclear-armed Iran may or may not be entirely in India’s interests, it is far better to manage the consequences thereof than to countenance the use of military force in a futile attempt to stop it.

Finally, while international sanctions are unlikely to prevent a determined Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, it is geopolitically costly to stay out of the Western consensus. Unless sanctions prohibit India from purchasing Iranian oil and gas, it is better for India to be part of the sanctions regime.

Reconciling these objectives is not easy, but not impossible either. The big prize in foreign policy, however, is for India to assiduously work to bridge the divide between the United States and Iran. This—more than securing a permanent seat at the UN Security Council—is a project that is worthy of a rising global power. This task of international statesmanship requires a real leadership at South Block and the PMO. Till that time we can have day-to-day issue management, not strategy.

The new year begins with a question mark on oil imports from Iran. The larger question mark though is whether the UPA government will now realise that it finds itself in a jam over Iran because it has no ideas of its own.