Tag Archives: Osama bin Laden

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Strategic Uncertainty: Managing Emerging Threats and Challenges

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Though the year gone by was relatively peaceful for India, the security environment in India’s regional neighbourhood has been steadily deteriorating. The greatest causes of regional instability are the strident march of Islamist fundamentalism across the Af-Pak border and the unresolved conflict in Afghanistan. In fact, the scourge of Talibanisation is creeping forward gradually and threatens to cross the Radcliff Line into India if it goes unchecked.

The unstable security situation in Afghanistan continues to be worrisome. The US-led NATO-ISAF troops will soon begin their planned withdrawal even though the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are as yet incapable of taking over independent charge of security, particularly in the districts which are strongholds of the Taliban. The ANSF are too few in number – only 200,000 army and police personnel have been trained so far. They are inadequately trained and ill-equipped and lack the standards of junior leadership that are critical for success in intense counter-insurgency operations.

Since the elimination of Osama bin Laden, the precarious relationship between the Pakistan army and the ISI and their U.S. counterparts – ostensibly major allies in the war against terrorism – has weakened further. The killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers during the bombardment of a border post by NATO-ISAF aircraft in November outraged Pakistan and led to the decision to stop the flow of logistics convoys through Quetta and Peshawar, deny base facilities at Shamsi and demand re-negotiation of the rules of engagement. The worst fallout has been the politico-military standoff within Pakistan that threatens the continuation in office of the fledgling civilian government.

Marked reduction in the levels of infiltration across the LoC into Kashmir over the last few years and the fact that no major terrorist strike has been initiated by ISI-backed organisations like the LeT and JeM since 26/11, convinced India to resume the stalled rapprochement process. However, the two armies continue to face off eyeball-to-eyeball on the LoC and at the Saltoro Ridge west of Siachen Glacier and a small incident could bring the informal cease-fire to an abrupt end. Toning down of the anti-India rhetoric and terrorist strikes is a tactical ploy to tide over internal difficulties, rather than a long-term change in the military strategy designed to bleed India through a thousand cuts. The Pakistan army and the ISI are keeping the machinery for terrorist strikes well oiled so that they can raise the ante in a short time frame whenever they choose to do so.

The Chinese have been aggressively opposing even a non-military Indian presence aimed at prospecting for oil and gas in the South China Sea while themselves seeking naval bases in the Indian Ocean. Chinese scholars have expressed strong reservations against India’s quest to reach out strategically to democracies in East Asia. They have denounced multilateral (Australia, India, Japan and US) naval exercises aimed at enhancing maritime cooperation in the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean as being aimed at the strategic encirclement of China.

The Chinese abruptly postponed the 15th round of boundary talks between the special representatives in November 2011 as India refused to relent on the Dalai Lama’s participation in a private conference on Buddhism. Chinese diplomatic, political and military assertiveness at the tactical level is likely to continue into 2012 and beyond. However, at the strategic level the relationship will remain stable.

The government of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh has reversed decades old anti-India policies and has begun to cooperate with India in rooting out insurgent groups operating against from its soil. The resolution of the boundary dispute is now being addressed in a friendly manner. Iran’s continuing quest to obtain nuclear weapons may lead to a standoff with the U.S. in the Strait of Hormuz if Iran blocks the flow of oil. India’s relations with Myanmar’s relatively more open Thein Sein regime have been improving steadily, resulting in better security cooperation. However, the Myanmarese government is struggling to bring the Kachin, Karen and Shan insurgencies under control.

Despite many extensions in the deadline, Nepal has failed to frame a new constitution or find an amicable solution to the integration of former Maoist cadres in the army. With the increasingly pervasive Chinese presence in Nepal, resentment against India is growing. Even though the Sri Lankan government has made little effort to successfully address the decades old aspiration of the Tamil people for ‘eelam’, the country has remained free of violent conflict.

The internal security situation in India has shown significant improvement. The army and other security forces have gained ascendancy in Kashmir and the number of incidents of violence has declined sharply. Insurgencies in north-east India have begun to recede and negotiations to resolve the crises are making progress. The areas worst affected by Naxalite or left wing extremism have been fairly quiet and the central police organisations are gradually gaining ground.

Concerted political, diplomatic and military efforts must continue to resolve outstanding disputes and better manage the manifold threats and challenges to national security. The armed forces and the central police and para-military forces must keep their chins up and their powder dry.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan: The Turmoil Within

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The situation in Pakistan appears to worsen by the day. Consequent to President Asif Ali Zardari’s return from Dubai, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has spoken of “conspiracies being hatched to bring down his elected government.” He has vowed to “continue to fight for the rights of the people of Pakistan, whether or not we remain in the government.” Fears of another military coup are writ large in Gilani’s statement made in Pakistan’s parliament.

In a related development, in the wake of the tensions between the elected government and the army, Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence has stated that it has “no operational control over the army and ISI.” It made this admission in an affidavit filed in the Supreme Court regarding its inability to respond formally on behalf of the armed forces and the ISI in respect of their stand on the ‘memogate’ scandal. Tensions between the army and the civilian government have been rising over a memo that was reportedly sent at President Zardari’s behest to Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, about a coup that the army was said to be planning following the killing of Osama bin Laden.

Meanwhile, the army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani, has petitioned the Supreme Court to “thoroughly investigate” the memogate scandal as it has a bearing on national security and sovereignty. It emerges clearly that the army and the ISI are at loggerheads with the elected civilian government and would like it to go. However, they do not as yet appear to be prepared to stage another military coup to dislodge the government.

Given the stranglehold that the Pakistan army enjoys over the country’s polity, the army should be content to drive the country’s major policies from the back seat. However, if there is another military coup, it will certainly not be the last one. Pakistan has a history of military coups that go back to the era of General Ayub Khan. General Musharraf was the last military dictator of the country. He yielded power to a civilian dispensation very reluctantly and that too only after being hounded by an uncharacteristically pro-active Supreme Court.

Pakistan has become a rentier state that is dependent on Uncle Sam’s aid. Its economy is in shambles. It can default any time on its loan repayment obligations. Its currency is down to rupees 90 to a U.S. dollar. Inflation is flying high in double digits. The number of people living below the subsistence level is going up steadily. Relations with the U.S. are at an all time low. The security situation within Pakistan is dismal. Interior Minister Rehman Malik was recently reduced to thanking the Taliban for maintaining peace during Muharram.

At a time when all sections of Pakistan’s polity should unite together to fight the scourge of internal instability and creeping Talibanisation, it is incomprehensible that the army and the ISI should be jostling for narrow political gains to restore their hegemony. Unless Pakistan’s army is tamed and cut to size, it will continue to thwart Pakistan’s fledgling democracy from taking firm roots. Only an Arab Spring type of revolution will be able to clip the army’s wings. Alas, it does not look imminent.

 

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Troubles increase for the US-Pak relationship

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The post-Osama phase of the US-Pakistan relationship is proving to be extremely turbulent. The swift U.S. reaction to the attack on its embassy in Kabul and the killing of the chief Afghan government negotiator, former president Rabbani, led to an equally strong backlash from the Pakistani establishment.

www.mca-marines.orgIn a scathing indictment of the Pakistan security establishment, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “…the Quetta Shoora and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers. For example, we believe the Haqqani Network – which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency – is responsible for the September 13th attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.”

“We strongly reject assertions of complicity with the Haqqanis or of proxy war,” Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said. “The allegations betray confusion and policy disarray within the U.S. establishment on the way forward in Afghanistan.” General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff dismissed the charge as “very unfortunate and not based on facts.” Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan’s foreign minister, warned that Washington “could lose an ally” if it keeps humiliating Pakistan with unsubstantiated allegations.

The international community has known for long that the Pakistan army and the ISI follow a Janus-faced policy on Afghanistan. While pretending to be allies in the ‘war on terror’, they are careful to target only those terrorist organisations that strike within Pakistan, like the TTP and the TNSM, and nurture and support the Afghan Taliban and their sympathisers. In February 2009, David Sanger, New York Times correspondent, had written in his new book The Inheritance that in a transcript passed to Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence in May 2008, General Kayani was overheard referring to Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani as “a strategic asset”. This had led to the first few armed UAV strikes against the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan inside Pakistan’s FATA province.

While U.S. frustration with Pakistani duplicity is understandable, the U.S. still has 98,000 troops in Afghanistan and is still dependent on the two land routes through Peshawar and Quetta for the logistics sustenance of its own and other NATO-ISAF forces. Though it could step up armed UAV strikes and even launch air strikes into North Waziristan, it does not have the capability to launch follow-on air assault strikes. Also, ground strikes will surely lead to war with Pakistan and war, with all its nuclear overtones, is not in anybody’s interest.

What the U.S. can do is to carefully calibrate the aid being given to Pakistan and make the government and the army accountable for cooperation in the war on terror. The Pakistan army and the ISI must not be allowed to get away with impunity for their support to terrorist organisations operating against the US and NATO-ISAF forces as well as in India. It should also consider rescinding its alliance with Pakistan when the bulk of troops are drawn down by 2014. As Stephen Cohen has put it so eloquently, “India is a friend, but not an ally; and, Pakistan is an ally, but not a friend.”

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

How not to Exit Afghanistan

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According to Henry Kissinger (“How to Exit Afghanistan,” Washington Post, June 8, 2011), four conditions must be met to make the exit strategy viable: “A cease-fire; withdrawal of all or most American and allied forces; the creation of a coalition government or division of territories among the contending parties (or both); and an enforcement mechanism.” None of the four appears viable at present. Nor do these conditions look achievable in the 2014-15 time frame that the exit strategy is planned to be completed.

As had been widely anticipated, the Taliban has launched a vigorous spring offensive and the US-led NATO-ISAF forces have retaliated with equal force. The Pakistan army has apparently learnt nothing from the killing of Osama bin Laden and continues to pretend that his presence at Abbottabad was a mystery. Instead of reinvigorating its efforts to eliminate terrorists who are undermining Pakistan’s security, the army is still holding off from launching the long-delayed offensive against the TTP in North Waziristan. Meanwhile, reports of US drone attacks against terrorists along the Af-Pak border continue to trickle in virtually on a daily basis. While it is early days yet in this year’s military confrontation, a continuing stalemate can be foreseen.

A U.S. Congressional study report, released on June 8, 2011, has found that nation-building efforts in Afghanistan are floundering as the massive economic aid programme lacks proper oversight and breeds corruption. It says that most local officials are incapable of “spending wisely”. It also says that there is little evidence to support the view that even the “politically pleasing” short term results will be sustainable once the draw-down begins. The report notes that the Afghan economy could easily slip into a depression as it is mainly a “war-time” economy that is a “huge distortion”. It is well known, of course, that the U.S. military conducts its own development programme in the areas cleared of the Taliban to win the people’s support, irrespective of the aid programmes approved by the Afghan government.

The two-year old efforts to move towards reconciliation with the so-called “good Taliban” have not made much headway. Secret talks being mediated by Germany between the U.S. government and Tayyab Agha, said to be a close confidante of Mullah Mohammed Omar, are unlikely to achieve a major breakthrough as no one is quite sure whether Agha is actually negotiating on behalf of Mullah Omar or whether the Taliban are simply using the talks as a ploy to buy time. The Haqqani shoora, that enjoys ISI support and patronage, is not part of the reconciliation process.

While regional efforts to secure peace in Afghanistan remain haphazard, these are likely to slowly gather momentum as the date for the draw-down of forces approaches. During a visit to Kabul in mid-May, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh endorsed President Karzai’s “process of national reconciliation” and said, “We hope that Afghanistan will be able to build a framework of regional cooperation that will help its nation-building efforts.”

There is so far no sign that the U.S. and its allies are planning to make substantive efforts to put in place a viable international peacekeeping force to help the Afghan government to maintain security after their own exit from Afghanistan in 2014. If this is not done, the Taliban will gradually seize one province after another, with covert help from Pakistan, and will eventually force the capitulation of the government – paving the way for their triumphant return to power. Conflict termination on such terms would signify the failure of President Obama’s exit strategy.

India-US Relations Blog

Is America Achieving The Improbable in Afghanistan, India & Pakistan?

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Recently I returned from a trip to India. The biggest story during my visit was the spectacular raid inside Pakistan to get Osama Bin Laden. It was pure shock and awe. There was an instantaneous burst of applause for America’s brilliant action.

Unfortunately, within a day or two, the sentiment changed. India, like Afghanistan, had always maintained that Pakistan provides sanctuary to terrorists and in many cases actively encourages, aids and provides material support to terrorists. This reality, Indians thought, was ignored by America either because of America’s self-interest or gullibility.

The discovery that Bin Laden was hiding in the open in a Pakistani military town confirmed to Indians that they were right and America was wrong for all these years. Indian society then compared the execution of Osama Bin Laden to the complete freedom provided within Pakistan to the terror-masters of the horrific 2008 Mumbai attack.

Indians have always accused America of a double standard for terrorists. This feeling morphed into certainty after the Bin Laden raid. Then came statements by American officials exonerating Pakistan’s Top Leadership and proclamations about how Pakistan was still America’s ally.

The insult and the injury cut very deep. The people I spoke to were quietly livid. I was stunned by the intensity of their feelings against what they see as America’s duplicitous dealings with Pakistan.

These were Lawyers, Doctors, Teachers and others in India’s middle class, the heart of India’s educated society. They understand the good about America. They understand the need for Indo-American partnership. But gone is their euphoria about the heady Bush days of Indo-US Strategic Partnership. Today, their anger and contempt towards America seemed unanimous. As one said simply, “this country (America) cannot be our friend”.

The India-Pakistan relationship has been a zero-sum game. So this sentiment within India should translate into a vote of confidence for America inside Pakistan. Right?

But the anger against America seems to be even more intense within Pakistan. From reports in the New York Times and the Washington Post, the rank and file of the Pakistani Army is “seething with anger” against America. Most Pakistanis seem convinced that America is trying to bring mayhem and terror to Pakistan to meet its own objectives in Afghanistan.

What about Afghanistan? America is pouring billions into Afghanistan every year to protect Afghans from the Taliban. This seems more and more like a waste of money and more importantly lives of young American soldiers.

credit: static.guim.co.ukThis week, the Taleban launched attacks in the northern cities of Herat and Taloqan. Also this week, about 200 Afghan militants crossed into northwestern Pakistan and engaged in a gun battle with Pakistani security forces. Rather than work even more closely with American forces, President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan issued an ultimatum this week to American Forces and NATO to cease all strikes against Afghan homes. Why?

As Stratfor, the widely respected geo-strategy firm wrote this week “Opposition to the ISAF and the counterinsurgency-focused campaign across the country is on the rise among even anti-Taliban elements of the government and general population…… the trajectory of declining patience and tolerance of and increasingly virulent opposition to ISAF military operations across broader and broader swaths of Afghan society continue to worsen,…..”.

America is deeply involved in these three countries in different ways. American leadership would like to be a mediator between these countries and facilitate accommodation between them, if not peace. Unfortunately, America seems to be achieving just the opposite.

These are three societies at conflict with one another. When you are a friend or enemy of one society, you automatically are not an enemy or a friend of the other society. But today these vastly different societies have developed the same image of America.

If this isn’t an improbable achievement, I don’t know what is!