Tag Archives: Pakistan’s arsenal

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan’s Unsafe Nuclear Warheads

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Pakistan is facing a grave internal security crisis as radical extremists are gradually gaining ground. The crisis is attributable to a large extent to the resurgence of Islamist fundamentalist forces and the army’s inability to fight them effectively. Consequently, the spectre of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations has once again come to the fore. Western commentators are calling for contingency plans to physically secure or destroy the nuclear warheads in the event of a meltdown in the country.

Islamist terrorists can gain possession of nuclear warheads by physically breaching the security ring around them, by subverting the personnel on guard duty or if they succeed in overthrowing the regime in power in Islamabad through a coup. The Pakistani military authorities are extremely concerned about such eventualities and have made elaborate arrangements to ensure that all their nuclear warheads are stored safely. They claim that carefully formulated personnel reliability policies and electronic safety mechanisms have been developed and incorporated by Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority.
The Pakistani military establishment loses no opportunity to emphasize that as a responsible nuclear weapon state Pakistan has always attached great significance to the security of its strategic assets and that these assets are completely safe and secure under multi-layered security and command and control structures that are fully indigenous.

Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are reported to be stored at up to six to 10 separate locations. Besides the actual locations, there are a large number of dummy locations. The warheads are moved frequently to keep American satellites and spies from ascertaining their real locations. The warheads are stored separately from the launchers so as to guard against accidents and unauthorized use. The warheads are reported to be equipped with electronic locks (Permissive Action Links). A three-tier security system has been instituted for the physical protection of the various components of the warheads.

The fissionable atomic core made of highly enriched uranium and the high explosive trigger assembly are stored in fortified underground storage sites. Entry and exit into these “bunkers” is controlled by armed and well-equipped specially selected and meticulously trained personnel of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). As part of the Personnel Reliability Programme, these personnel are screened carefully before induction, are kept under constant surveillance and are frequently rotated.

Personnel selected for the security of the outer perimeter are reported to belong to elite infantry battalions of the Pakistani army. The possibility of any of these personnel being subverted is guarded against by counter-intelligence teams. Military regimes have very strong survival instincts and the SPD ensures that hard-line radical elements are ruthlessly weeded out from the nuclear security detail. The storage sites also have air defense assets allotted to them to defend against attacks from the air.

The delivery systems of Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command, comprising Chinese supplied M-11 and M-9 and the North Korean Nodong and Taepo Dong nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles and their launchers, are based at separate locations. These sites or “hides” are well-dispersed to ensure that maximum warheads survive a conventional air attack during war. They are also well defended against possible commando raids.

However, the possibility that an Islamist fundamentalist organization might overthrow the unstable civilian government with support from a large faction of the army cannot be ruled out. In such an eventuality, the U.S. and its allies may justifiably form another ‘coalition of the willing’ to seize maximum number of warheads in raids by Special Forces and bomb the remaining storage sites from the air to destroy the warheads. It would be in India’s interest to provide the maximum possible assistance that it can.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

The Continuing Proxy War in Kashmir

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The situation in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) continues to remain a cause for concern to the government of India. Since end-1989, Pakistan has been waging a ‘proxy war’ against India in J&K. It has done this by aiding and abetting disaffected and misguided Kashmiri youth to rise against the Indian state. Despite the cease-fire on the Line of Control (LoC) since November 2003 and the tenuous rapprochement process, Pakistan continues to surreptitiously practice its peculiar brand of state-sponsored terrorism. This is borne out by the continuing attempts at infiltration in Kashmir during the summer of 2011.

Till some years ago, Pakistan’s official position was that it provides only ‘diplomatic, political and moral’ support to ‘freedom fighters’. However, it is now internationally accepted that the Pakistan army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate have been providing military training, weapons, military equipment, ammunition and explosives to the terrorists, besides financial support. The ISI spends approximately Rs 5 to 10 crore (USD 1 to 2 million) per month on its proxy war campaign. Till the present cease-fire came into effect, the Pakistan army actively supported terrorist bids to infiltrate into J&K by engaging Indian posts along the routes of infiltration with artillery and small arms fire.  Though infiltration has now been reduced due to effective counter-infiltration measures by the Indian army, even the present low levels would not be possible but for the encouragement and steady support being given to the Jihadi extremists by the Pakistan army.

Throughout the prolonged period of Pakistan’s proxy war, India has shown tremendous restraint and immense tolerance in the face of grave provocation to its security. It is inconceivable that any other nation would have acted with the sense of responsibility that India has in not launching trans-LoC operations to eliminate militant training camps and interdict known routes of infiltration. Many Indian analysts have been advocating a pro-active trans-LoC and trans-border counter-proxy war policy.

Former RAW analyst B. Raman has written: “The main reason why India has not yet been able to effectively put an end to Jihadi terrorism against it and its civilian population sponsored by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is because India’s counter-terrorism operations are directed only against the terrorists operating in its territory. They are not yet directed against the State sponsoring them despite a persistent demand from growing sections of the Indian population for targeting the State of Pakistan too.”

While Pakistan had reduced the overt infiltration of so-called Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’ across the LoC during Musharraf’s rule, it continued to do so covertly by looking for smarter methods of inducting more Jihadis; for example, through neighbouring countries like Nepal and Bangladesh. The remaining roots of terrorism in Kashmir now lie in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and in Pakistan itself and, unless India shows the political will necessary to eliminate these roots, Pakistan’s proxy war is likely to continue unabated even though it may become more sophisticated and covert in its approach.

The Pakistan army is under tremendous pressure from Jihadi elements responsible for internal instability and from the Americans to deliver more in the so-called War on Terror. Despite these pressures, there is unlikely to be any change in the Pakistan army’s hostility towards India and its covert support, even sponsorship, of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism across the LoC and the international boundary (IB) from Pakistan soil. Prime Minister Gilani said recently that Pakistan will continue to provide diplomatic, moral and political support for what he says is a ‘freedom struggle’ in Kashmir.

Clearly, the rapprochement process is a tactical ploy to tide over current domestic difficulties and there has not been a strategic change of heart. Pakistan’s proxy war with India will go on because the Pakistan army will not allow the civilian leadership to change its fundamental policy towards India. Hence, lasting peace in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan will remain a distant dream.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Building Trust in South Asia through Cooperative Retirement of Obsolescent Missiles

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(Mr. Feroz Khan also contributed to the piece.)

Nuclear deterrence is growing roots in South Asia. India and Pakistan have both incorporated nuclear capabilities into their defence planning. Both are guided by a philosophy of minimum credible deterrence, although within this context modest growth is expected to achieve desired force postures. It is natural that asymmetries exist in the forces held by India and Pakistan. These will persist along with different perceptions of strategy and tactics. Despite these differences, we believe India and Pakistan have both reached a point where they should share perceptions about deterrence and nuclear stability in the region.

indiapakThe time is right for India and Pakistan to expand shared understandings through cooperative exchanges of information about their respective deterrence postures. Such understanding could be critical in a crisis. Both India and Pakistan have mutually resolved to enhance strategic stability in our region, as affirmed in the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in February 1999.  One possibility for furthering this goal is to consider retiring their oldest, first generation, nuclear capable, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which are at the end of their natural lifespan. Pakistan’s HATF 1 & 2 and India’s Prithvi 1 & 2 have served their purpose and will be eventually retired unilaterally according to each nation’s normal decommissioning process.  We propose a plan of mutual transparency measures that would share information about the retirement of these missiles on a reciprocal, bilateral basis — without impinging on the continuing modernisation of both sides’ strategic forces. The retirement of other nuclear capable, obsolescent ballistic missiles can then follow in the same cooperative spirit.

We have participated in an in-depth study and also recently in a mock exercise to explore how information exchanges between our two countries could be conducted. We are confident that such an exchange could be achieved with minimal risk and costs and yet provide important reassurance about significant changes in deterrence postures.

The Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan have recently reaffirmed their commitment to pursue confidence building measures (CBM) in connection with their ongoing Composite Dialogue. A working group on peace and security matters is charged with exploring CBMs in the security area. One candidate CBM would be to conduct a Joint Transparency Exercise (JTE) to exchange information about retired missiles. With the voluntary retirement of these obsolescent missiles already imminent, New Delhi and Islamabad could make a virtue of a necessity by adding reciprocal transparency to the retirement process. Our studies show such a joint CBM is ripe for consideration and could be conducted in the near term. A first step might be to declare these nuclear capable missiles to be non-nuclear delivery systems. Then, as these missiles are removed from the nuclear arsenal, our two countries can build trust and understanding as our respective experts expand cooperation in the drawdown of obsolete forces.

This is a small step. It has been endorsed by several prestigious expert groups. We have studied the practical details of how such ideas could be implemented. We concluded that such exchanges could be powerful tools in enhancing mutual confidence and signal maturity as responsible nuclear powers. The costs and risks for India and Pakistan are small, but the potential benefits are great. It is a step whose time has come.

(Feroz Khan and Gurmeet Kanwal, both retired Brigadiers, are with the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA, and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, respectively. Views are personal.)


Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Worst-case scenario for Pakistan

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Pakistan’s civil society is gradually being torn apart by radical extremism and sectarian violence and its powerful army seems incapable of stemming the rot. The daring attack by terrorists of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on the naval aviation base at Mehran, Karachi is the latest case in point. The hypothesis that Pakistan’s nuclear warheads may fall into Jihadi hands has once again gained currency.

Pakistan has been besieged by creeping Talibanization. Ground attack fighter aircraft, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery had to be used in 2007-08 to liberate the Swat Valley and Buner from the Sharia rule imposed by Maulana Fazlullah‘s militants. It took major military operations and large-scale army casualties to drive TTP extremists out of South Waziristan in 2009. Though TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a U.S. drone strike, the extremists simply moved into North Waziristan and still operate from there. The Army HQ at Rawalpindi and ISI headquarters in Lahore have been successfully attacked by the Taliban in league with al-Qaeda. Bomb blasts in Peshawar and elsewhere are a daily occurrence. Bahawalpur in south Punjab has become a hub for ideological indoctrination.

The Pakistan army and its rogue intelligence agency, the ISI, are having a tough time living up to their carefully cultivated hype as the self-appointed ‘defenders of the faith’ and the custodians of Pakistan’s ‘ideological frontiers’. The rank and file supports the Taliban cause and is unwilling to forgive the generals for allying with the U.S. in its war on terror. The troops are reluctant to operate against fellow Sunni Muslims. The Pushtuns, in particular, are unwilling to fight fellow Pushtuns. In 2007, an army company surrendered to the Taliban. Desertions are commonplace; cases of fratricide are often reported and many weapons have been lost to the Taliban. Apprehensions have been expressed about the radicalization of the officer cadre. Nearly six army divisions are employed in counter-insurgency operations in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA areas but progress in eliminating the Taliban has been painfully slow.

Despite being in tight spot, the Pakistan army and ISI continue to make facetious distinctions between the good Taliban—’strategic’ assets for employment against India and in Afghanistan—and bad Taliban. Their support for the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed is undiminished. In Afghanistan they are running with the hares and hunting with the hounds and are still looking for strategic depth. If Pakistan has earned the dubious distinction of having become the epicentre of fundamentalist terrorism, it is because the army and ISI, driven by their hatred for India, have blundered so badly.

The worst case scenario for Pakistan over the next two to three years will be a Jihadi-led coup from within the army. Radicalized officers owing allegiance to the TTP variety of Taliban could come to power. The probability of this is low but the steady deterioration in the security situation and the army’s unwillingness and inability to fight the scourge of Talibanization means the possibility cannot be ruled out. In such a nightmarish scenario, with near civil war conditions prevailing, nuclear weapons may actually be used against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and targets in India. This would mean a holocaust on the Indian subcontinent.

It is time the international community seriously considered neutralizing Pakistan’s nuclear warhead storage sites and the delivery systems. It would be in India’s interest to join such an initiative. India should be prepared to provide military assistance, including direct intervention. The U.S. must lead the international community in efforts to convince General Kayani that the only way forward is to launch determined counter-terrorism operations to weed out the TTP, LeT, JeM and other terrorist groups that have enjoyed state patronage. The consequences of not doing so are too horrendous to contemplate.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Constructive Engagement: India-Pakistan Foreign Secretaries Talks

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Although talks between India’s Nirupama Rao and Pakistan’s Salman Bashir in the last week of June 2011 did not produce a major breakthrough, the fact that these were viewed positively by both the sides and were described as constructive and cordial makes the talks special. This is because nothing more than the reiteration of known positions on the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute and on the export of terrorism into India had been anticipated in both the countries. The talks focussed on peace and security, including terrorism and nuclear and military confidence bldg measures; the Kashmir issue; and, the promotion of people-to-people contacts as well as friendly exchanges.

During the talks, India sought early closure on the trial of Pakistani terrorists who were involved in the planning and execution of the Mumbai terror strikes in November 2008 and pointed out that there cannot be any meaningful discussion on Kashmir under the shadow of the gun. Calling for an end to the “shadow of the gun and the violence it has unleashed”, Ms Rao expressed concern over continuing infiltration into Kashmir. She said at a joint press conference that the “ideology of military conflict should have no place in the paradigm of our relationship of the 21st century… Instead, this relationship should be characterised by the vocabulary of peace, all-round cooperation in the interest of our people, growing trade and economic interaction, as well as people to people contacts — and, all this, let me emphasise, in an atmosphere free of terror and violence.”

The issue of terrorism figured prominently in the joint statement: “The foreign secretaries noted that both countries recognize that terrorism poses a continuing threat to peace and security and they reiterated the firm and undiluted commitment of the two countries to fight and eliminate this scourge in all its forms and manifestations. They agreed on the need to strengthen cooperation on counter-terrorism.”

Both the sides agreed to make efforts to expand trans-LoC trade, increase the frequency of the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service and to examine the feasibility of starting a bus service between Kargil and Skardu. Frank talks were held on the issue of peace and security between India and Pakistan. Discussions on CBMs included the establishment of contacts between the training establishments of the armed forces of the two countries, including India’s National Defence College and Pakistan’s National Defence University. New nuclear CBMs and measures for better coordination between India’s Coast Guard and Pakistan’s Maritime Security Agency were also discussed. India had presented a draft agreement to prevent “situations at sea” involving vessels of the two countries at a previous meeting. The Pakistani side agreed to examine the document.

A suggestion for contacts between defence and security think tanks, including the holding of seminars and conferences, was also taken up for discussion. Both the sides agreed that hostile propaganda should not be allowed to cloud the relationship. The two countries decided to constitute a group of experts to discuss conventional and nuclear CBMs to “discuss implementation and strengthening of existing arrangements, and to consider additional measures, which are mutually acceptable, to build trust and confidence and promote peace and security.”

Unlike the frosty talks between India’s External Affairs Minister S M Krishna and his Pakistani counterpart Shah Mehmood Qureshi in 2010, the Foreign Secretary talks resulted in some forward movement. Krishna and Pakistan’s new Foreign Minister – to be appointed shortly, will meet in July 2011 and take up these issues where the two Foreign Secretaries have left off. If they succeed in building on the gains made at Islamabad, the India-Pakistan rapprochement process will once again begin to gather momentum.