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Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Building up on the rubble of Japan’s nuclear disaster

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Japan was struck by a massive earthquake on March 11, followed by a devastating tsunami that deluged many parts of Japan. Not only was the disaster colossal in terms of the human casualties (more than 10000 at last count), but it also damaged Japan’s nuclear reactors causing radiation leakage. As of this writing, the Fukushima nuclear facility was emitting radiation and warnings about tap-water and certain other foods contamination were being issued.

The nuclear disaster in Japan, led analysts and policy experts across the world to contemplate the safety and disaster preparedness of other nuclear installations in countries such as the US, India, China, Pakistan etc. The radiation leakage prompted some to question the benefits of nuclear energy and if the world would be better off without it. However, the disaster in Japan was also a case in point that the correct design, security mechanisms and emergency preparedness can contain and even avert a nuclear catastrophe when natural disasters strike. Radiation fears are valid, but their actual levels and impact might be exaggerated.

In India, it did not take long for doubts to be raised about the US-India nuclear deal (the U.S. clarified that Japan’s disaster would not affect the deal, and it would continue) and India’s plans to maximize the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation. Though India’s disaster relief and emergency preparedness leaves a lot to be desired, India has so far displayed a disaster-free record when it comes to its nuclear facilities. Expect for minor instances of accidents at such facilities, India’s nuclear program has been disaster-free. The Indian nuclear program and the US-India nuclear deal are also in compliance with the IAEA and NSG safeguards and guidelines. Nothing in India’s nuclear history suggests that India might not be able to deal with a disaster as the one that struck Japan. In fact, during the 2001 and 2004 earthquakes in Gujarat and the Indian Ocean, the nuclear reactors in the vicinity had been successfully shut down.

In 2009, India’s National Disaster Management Authority issued a researched set for guidelines for management of nuclear and radiological emergencies. The report lays down exhaustive guidelines for natural as well as man-made nuclear disasters, and reading it instills confidence that India can effectively deal with and control a nuclear disaster. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has also asked for a security review of all nuclear installations in the country following the Japan earthquake.

While accounting and preparing for a worst-case scenario is essential when it comes to sensitive issues such as nuclear disasters, it is also important to remember that such instances are rare. Earthquakes and tsunamis of the magnitude of that in Japan do not occur regularly. And even when they do, adequate preparations and an efficient people (such as the Japanese) can effectively tame any situation. At a time when global energy needs are expanding and non-renewable resources depleting rapidly, nuclear energy is an important and efficient resource for us to consider. Instead of scurrying to shut down nuclear plants and scrapping nuclear deals out of fear, it is important to build even better reactor designs and safety mechanisms that attempt to nullify the effects of any potential disaster.

The Nuclear Liability Bill (2010) passed recently by the Indian Parliament (as part of the long-drawn process of implementing the US-India nuclear deal) could have been integrated completely into this safety mechanism. However, the bill leaves out liability for the operator in case of “grave natural disasters.” The Japanese earthquake and tsunami combo is definitely a grave natural disaster. While it can be argued that the operator cannot predict natural disasters, and therefore cannot be held accountable for damages caused by forces beyond his control; it also cannot be argued that a company and/or operator is totally without responsibility for ensuring maximum safety standards, including for natural disasters. In fact, attributing accountability would force operators to ensure maximum safeguards at nuclear facilities out of fear of potential monetary losses in case of nuclear disasters. Because such disasters are rare, the probability of them losing money by having to pay compensation is very little.

Along with continuing their commitment to nuclear energy, the U.S. and India should look at the Japanese nuclear disaster as an opportunity to increase collaboration in nuclear research and development, disaster management and emergency preparedness. Nuclear technology has developed significantly since the Fukushima nuclear reactor was installed, but its reaction to the earthquake and subsequent disaster should be studied to make reactors even better equipped to deal with crisis situations. Both India and the U.S. have a big pool of skilled nuclear scientists and engineers, and it is time to increase collaboration between them.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Humanitarian Intervention: Should the international community intervene in Libya?

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The ongoing struggle of people across the Arab world to get rid of military dictators and tyrannical monarchies has led to a new debate about the efficacy of the emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention. A UN Security Council resolution approved the imposition of a no fly zone on March 17 but ruled out the deployment of a “foreign occupation force.” The Western Alliance has launched air and missile strikes on Libya – ostensibly to protect the population against attacks from Gaddafi’s forces. However, the strikes are clearly designed to bring about a regime change.

Credit: d.yimg.comJohn Mackinlay of King’s College, London, has argued that in the “complex emergencies which increasingly threaten security in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Africa, international response mechanisms have failed from the outset to take a realistic approach that reflected the needs of the crisis… due to vested interest, conservatism and a lack of vision beyond the narrow limitations of national and professional interest.” With some exceptions, most nations today agree to join an international intervention effort only when their own national interests are served by intervening and rarely so where the cause is humanitarian. The world had failed to intervene to stop the genocide in Rwanda.

John Hillen, a policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, a U.S. think tank, has suggested the following criteria for future U.S. military interventions: should defend national security interests; should not jeopardise the ability of the U.S. to meet more important security commitments; should strive to achieve military goals that are clearly defined, decisive, attainable and sustainable; should enjoy Congressional and public support; and, the armed forces must be allowed to create the conditions for success.

Justifications of the right to intervene militarily, which are being increasingly propagated and are finding reluctant acceptance among some countries forming part of the Western alliance, include: defence of democracy and the prevention of the excessive curtailment of a people’s right to participate in decision making; prevention of severe violation of human rights of a people by a totalitarian regime; protection of minority groups from severe repression; prevention of acute environmental degradation; and, prevention of possible attempts to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction.

Regardless of the contours of the emerging doctrine of intervention, it must remain a cardinal principle of international relations that the territorial integrity of each member state of the UN must be collectively guaranteed by all the other member states. The non-observance of this collective security imperative can only lead to anarchy and the rule of the jungle where might is right. This can be done only by strengthening the UN system to emerge as the sole arbiter of the need for intervention. Individual nation-states must not be permitted to assemble “coalitions of the willing” to intervene anywhere in the world to further their own necessarily narrow national interests.

As Gaddafi’s forces were clearly targeting civilians along with the rebel forces, the ongoing military intervention is justified. Surgically precise air and missile strikes should continue to be employed to achieve limited military objectives. Emphasis should be laid on the minimum use of force. However, all out efforts must be made to prevent collateral damage, with particular reference to civilian casualties and property.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Middle East: Wolves in Sheeps’ Clothing

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Sometimes, foes get identified as friends, something that India has been enduring since the 1980s, the period when Pakistan began its assymetric battle for Kashmir. To this day, the jihad in Kashmir has around it a protective shield of Western NGOs, diplomats, conflict resolution specialists and a miscellany of do-gooders who back them in their violent war against the unity of modern Asia’s first democracy. Uncritical distribution takes place of video footage of jihadi elements in military fatigues molesting women and other innocents, elements that they cull from the pool of those they consider too moderate for their cause. These are transmitted as “evidence” of “atrocities by the Indian army”. Unverified repetition of claims of torture and intentional killings of the Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley by the armed forces get made by such well-meaning but misguided citizens of countries not otherwise known for tolerance to jihad and its numerous violent manifestations. In the many teary accounts of the travails of jihad elements in Kashmir that regularly appear in Western publications, few correspondents seem to have understood that the purpose of the Kashmir jihad is to set up a Wahabbi emirate in that state, one where minorities would be either driven out or exterminated ( as indeed, most have been in the Valley) and where women would enjoy the exalted status they had in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

What may be termed the hard core of the Wahabbi movement is a mass of individuals united in their belief in the supremacy of their 300-year old faith. This core is distributed throughout the Middle East as well as in locations such as Turkey, Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and it has taken a lesson from the Saudi Arabian and ISI playbook of professing fealty to western interests and values while clandestinely undermining both. These days, the coverage of channels such as CNN across the Middle East would be laughable, were it not so tragic. An Arwa Damon goes breathlessly around the east of Libya with a collection of youths who come from the same tribal and other groups that have ensured a steady flow of Libyan citizens to the ranks of the jihadists. These have understood the fact that the only bait that they need to throw in the direction of western correspondents are fuzzy words about democracy, interspersed with cries against dictatorship.

Like Pavlov’s canines, correspondents leap at such titbits, fashioning a narrative that ignores the reality that much of the current ferment in the Middle East is driven not by a yearning for western-style democracy, but for a Wahabbi emirate. In such reporting, they resemble the many western journalists who have taken the side of the jihad in Kashmir, and in the 1990s, wrote much romantic twaddle about the Taliban in Afghanistan. As indeed, they have about the Pakistan army, the only substantial military force in the world that has jihad as its official motto. After the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement that established the French and the British zones of influence in the Middle east, arbitrarily drawing boundaries that made little geopolitical or historical sense, UNSC 1973 has opened the door to a 2011 version of Sykes-Picot, with France and the U.K. once again in the lead. However,the Middle East is not Eastern Europe, nor is it the former Yugoslavia. The current chemistries and future societal trajectories there are entirely different. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi surrendered to the West in 2003, giving up his nuclear program and disarming himself of WMD. In a previous post, it had been warned that the treatment given to him would discourage other despots- notably in Iran and North Korea – from agreeing to surrender their nuclear weapon programs. The North Koreans have already expressed the view that the self-disarmament of Muammar Gaddafi – who acted on the advice of his spoilt and nincompoop sons, the way any doting father would – is the reason why he seems to be on the same path that Saddam Hussein, heading towards capture and execution.

Since the heady days of the 1980s,after Brezezinski-Casey ensured U.S. muscle to the more extreme elements of the Wahabbi faith in their obsession with a moribund USSR, several misguided elements in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait who mistake Wahabbism for Islam have been funding groups of ultra-Wahabbis,especially in non-monarchical Arab states such as Egypt, Syria and Libya. It is these groups that have formed the core of the so-called “democracy movements” in these countries. In contrast,in East Europe,it was the Christian churches who formed the base of the ideological resistance to Communism, a set of beliefs somewhat at variance with Wahabbism and its practitioners. In countries across the region, through the use of catchwords that they know will ensnare western journalists and policymakers, Wahabbi groups are seeking to replace regimes that came down hard on the faith. Not that they have been secretive about this, or at least not until they saw the need to taolir their message so as to appeal to the sensibilities of the populations of the NATO powers that are helping to install them in power. Even a cursory perusal of the literature churned out by the very elements now posing as liberal democrats would reveal that the basis of their opposition to Gaddafi is the fact that in Libya, women are permitted to go about without the veil and – even more horrifying – actually work alongside males. If this is not degeneracy,what is? There are few calls for democracy in the numerous tracts against Gaddafi, if we exclude those brought out by Libyan and other expats living in the West, who are proving to be about as accurate about ground reality in their country as were the Iraqi expats so dear to Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz. By taking sides in what is in essence in part a tribal war where the primary faultline dividing regime elements from their foes is not democracy but fealty to Wahabbism, Sykes-Picot circa 2011 is likely to create a fresh round of boundary change in the Middle East, with the effective partition of several states and the spillage of unrest into the monarchies (this time because of the groups funded by the mullahs of Iran). The Wahabbi wolves have dressed themselves as sheep,and are prancing before a gullible international audience. Once victory gets assured through NATO arms, the disguise will come off.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India’s Attempts at Conflict Resolution: A Balance Sheet

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The ultimate aim of a nation’s armed forces is to deter war; fighting and winning is necessary only if deterrence breaks down. As the primary underlying cause of future conventional conflict on the Indian sub-continent is likely to be unresolved territorial and boundary disputes, it is necessary to speedily resolve the existing disputes. Despite over one dozen rounds of talks between India’s National Security Advisor and China’s Vice Foreign Minister, it has not been possible to make major headway in the resolution of the India-China territorial dispute. In fact, it has not even been possible to demarcate the Line of Actual Control on the ground and on military maps so as to prevent frequent complaints about intrusions and transgressions and to minimise the probability of an armed clash between patrols. China’s intransigence and its recent claims to Tawang have led to a stalemate in negotiations. On its part India must continue to impress on the Chinese leadership the importance of the early resolution of the territorial and boundary dispute. Simultaneously, India must continue its efforts to improve border infrastructure and create adequate offensive operations capability to deter another round of conflict.

Resolution of the dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is equally complex as, besides India and Pakistan, the people of J&K – straddling the Line of Control (LoC) – are also party to the conflict. While some progress had been made during the Musharraf regime, the General’s troubles at home led him to back off. A ray of hope had emerged once again with the installation of an elected civilian government in Pakistan but the terror strikes in Mumbai in November 2008 put paid to the rapprochement process, which is still in limbo despite recent talks between the Foreign Secretaries. Neither government has made any effort to mould public opinion for a possible solution. Entrenched political and religious constituencies on both the sides are likely to noisily stall any understanding that the two governments might reach. Hence, it is difficult to be optimistic about the early resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

In stark contrast with the difficulties of conflict resolution on the external front, the last couple of years have seen substantial progress in resolving internal conflicts. The central government’s cease-fire with the Nagas, which has now held fairly well for over a decade even while internecine quarrels among the Nagas have continued unabated, has led to tangible progress in negotiations with both the Issak-Muivah and the Khaplang factions of the NSCN and there is cause for optimism about the early resolution of the long drawn conflict. The ULFA in Assam has begun negotiations with the central government without any pre-conditions except for the break-away military wing led by Paresh Barua who is said to be taking shelter in Myanmar and is getting covert support from the Chinese. It is to be hoped that the ULFA leadership will act in a statesman-like manner for the good of the people of Assam rather than continue to pursue power for its own sake.

There is less cause for optimism regarding resolution of the conflict being waged by Maoist or Naxalite insurgents in almost 220 districts of Central India. The leadership of the CPI (Maoist) seeks to one day fly its flag from the ramparts of the Red Fort in Delhi and is pursuing its aim methodically and systematically. Despite the Home Minister’s offer for talks, it continues to indulge in wanton acts of violence, kidnappings and extortion. A comprehensive three-pronged strategy that simultaneously emphasises security, development and governance – with skilful perception management – is necessary to defeat the menace of left Wing Extremism (LWE).

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan’s Annual Deception

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By Rajiv Nayan,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses

The Conference on Disarmament is an organ of United Nations (UN) for negotiations on disarmament and related issues. The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is the centre for pre-negotiation activities on disarmament. The FMCT is a core issue in CD negotiations. Other issues are nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. All 65 members have to agree before, negotiations can commence on any issue. No decision can be possible without a consensus.

Over and above other reasons articulated in previous years, Pakistan had an additional excuse this time. On earlier occasions, Pakistan had stated that the 2008 India-specific exemptions given by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) had adversely affected the strategic balance in its neighbourhood. Though it did not mention India this year, yet the language and its earlier explicit references to India leave no doubt about what it wants to convey. Referring to South Asia’s strategic environment and to a non- NPT member, Pakistan said: “…it cannot agree to negotiations on a FMCT in the CD owing to the discriminatory waiver provided by the NSG to our neighbour for nuclear cooperation by several major powers, as this arrangement will further accentuate the asymmetry in fissile materials stockpiles in the region, to the detriment of Pakistan’s security interests.”

This time, Pakistan’s objection was that India’s membership of the four multilateral export control regimes, with the support of the U.S. and other countries, would destabilise the region. In November 2010, the U.S. supported India’s candidature for membership of the NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Later, France also endorsed the U.S. move. It was followed by the Russian support for the membership of those régimes of which Russia is a member – Russia is not a member of the Australia Group. Many more countries are expected to support India’s candidature given its rising global status. Pakistan’s statement in the CD showed its resentment regarding the likely modification of criteria to accommodate India in the NSG and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

It is necessary to examine the objections raised by Pakistan regarding the 2008 India-specific waiver in the NSG. Is it really going to allow India to accumulate so much fissile material that the region around Pakistan would be destabilised? Would the exemption enhance the fissile production capabilities of India? Actually, such propaganda may well serve as an excuse for Pakistan to increase its own fissile material production. In the past, some Pakistani diplomats misled the world by saying that India’s eight unsafeguarded reactors can comfortably produce 1400 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium – sufficient for around 280 nuclear weapons a year – if run for that purpose, or even more if totally dedicated to fissile material production purposes.

When the India-US civil nuclear energy agreement was being debated before the 2008 waiver, one of India’s leading strategic analysts argued in favour of the agreement saying that it would enable India to ‘release’ its indigenous uranium for nuclear weapons, and to use imported uranium for nuclear energy generation. This was one of the many arguments used by both the supporters and opponents of the agreement. However, many of these arguments were unsubstantiated and polemical. The U.S. non-proliferation community followed by the Pakistan government used some of these polemics for their convenience and propaganda. Moreover, India’s indigenous uranium can be allocated in any way by the government, so, the word—release—is basically meaningless.

First, India’s strategic and security imperatives demand that it rely on nuclear weapons mainly for deterrence. If there is a choice between national security and electricity generation, India may prefer the former. Electricity can be generated by other means – despite the growth in nuclear energy production in recent months, overall electricity generation stays around three per cent.

True, there are eight reactors in the strategic category. The categorisation of these and other fast breeder reactors outside the civil category should not imply that India would go in for unlimited and unnecessary fissile material production. These reactors are not going to produce fissile materials round the clock. India’s nuclear doctrine is one of credible minimum deterrence, meaning India will not needlessly hoard nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Moreover, a new nuclear weapon country like India has the benefit of learning from the Cold War experience of nuclear weapons accumulation by the two super powers. The unnecessary accumulation of nuclear weapons created the problem of disposal – not only of nuclear weapons through arms control – but also of excess fissile materials.

Even if we accept the logic that the reactors outside the civil category may be used to produce fissile materials, under the Indo-US nuclear deal India has increased its number of power reactors in the civil category from 6 to 14. Therefore the increase in the number of power reactors in the civil category and the decrease of power reactors outside it should indicate that Indian fissile material production may be decreased, not increased. Any logical analysis would underscore this. Of course, propaganda has its own logic!

This leads to the question: If India is not interested in unnecessary production of fissile materials, why is it retaining eight reactors in the strategic category? The answer is simple: to deal with an uncertain strategic environment. There are some declared NPT and non-NPT nuclear weapon countries which have not made their fissile material stockpiles public. The nuclear weapon declarations of these countries are also uncertain and lack credibility. At the same time, there are undeclared and potential nuclear weapon countries, which are likely to further complicate the strategic environment in the future.

The new Pakistani argument against FMCT negotiations in the CD, namely, that the Indian membership of the multilateral export controls regimes may adversely affect regional stability, is superficial. The membership of the regimes has nothing to do with regional stability; in fact, it is about enabling India to play a role in promoting international peace and stability by participating in the global strategic trade management. Pakistan’s obsession with projecting itself as a competitor to India is frequently leading it to make ridiculous and incomprehensible moves like the one in the CD. Instead, it may do well to imitate India’s responsible nuclear behaviour. It does not realise that the proliferation network and terrorism may not be able to sustain the Pakistani state for long. Pakistan needs to change.

(This post originially appeared at IDSA. USINPAC and IDSA are content partners.)