Monthly Archives: January 2011

Indian-Americans and U.S. Politics Blog

Startup America

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President Obama has announced the launch of the ‘Startup America’ initiative to boost high-growth entrepreneurship throughout the country. This initative aims to “encourage private sector investment in job-creating startups and small firms, accelerate research, and address barriers to success for entrepreneurs and small businesses.”

The program will work to:

* “Expand access to capital for high-growth startups throughout the country;
* Expand entrepreneurship education and mentorship programs that empower more Americans not just to get a job, but to create jobs;
* Strengthen commercialization of the about $148 billion in annual federally-funded research and development, which can generate innovative startups and entirely new industries;
* Identify and remove unnecessary barriers to high-growth startups; and
* Expand collaborations between large companies and startups.”

Learn more about Startup America at http://www.whitehouse.gov/startup-america-fact-sheet

The Indian-American community is entrepreneurial and has been greatly involved in startups. E.g. more than 15% of Silicon Valley start-up firms are owned by Indian-Americans.

Related links:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/startup-america
http://www.startupamericapartnership.org

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

War Strategy in Afghanistan and Regional Concerns

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The long awaited review of U.S. and NATO strategy in Afghanistan was completed by the Obama administration in December 2010. The publicly released version of the report claimed major gains against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, particularly in the core areas under their control for long including the Helmand and Kandahar provinces. However, the report acknowledged that the gains were fragile and could be undone unless the Pakistan army acted against the Taliban operating from safe havens in the NWFP and FATA with equal vigour.

The broad goal of the U.S.-NATO-ISAF war strategy in Afghanistan is to ensure that Afghanistan acquires the stability that is necessary to be able to control its territory so that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are prevented from operating successfully from its soil against the U.S. and its allies, and also to reduce the risk of a return to civil war. The U.S. plans to transfer all combat responsibilities to the Afghan security forces by 2014. President Obama cannot afford to lose a war on his watch and yet hope to win re-election in 2012. The exit strategy will be based on a phased drawdown with not more than 10,000 troops being withdrawn each year till an “equilibrium that is manageable” is achieved. The U.S. and NATO troops are still thin on the ground while the Taliban has shown a marked degree of resurgence.

Afghanistan lies on the strategic crossroads between South Asia and Iran, West Asia, the Caucasus and the Central Asian Republics. Its regional neighbours have important geo-political and energy security interests in the area. Neighbours like India have invested over US$ 1 billion and immense time and effort in the post-2001 reconstruction of Afghanistan, but have been completely marginalised in U.S.-NATO-ISAF discussions for the resolution of the ongoing conflict.

The foremost concern of Afghanistan’s regional neighbours is that the coalition forces will begin their deadline-mandated exit before putting in place a strong alternative force to continue their work. A major apprehension is that the Taliban will defeat the weak and poorly trained Afghan National Army, take over Kabul, extend their reach to the countryside in due course and once again begin to practice their peculiar brand of Jihad and cultural bigotry. Both Iran and China are wary of the return of Wahabi Islam to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s regional neighbours, including the CARs, China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia, must come together to seek a solution to the conflict. This would involve putting together a regional force, preferably under a UN flag, to provide a stable environment for governance and development till the Afghan National Army can take over. The diplomatic aim should be to work towards a stable Afghan state, which is governed by a dispensation that is neutral between India and Pakistan. It is in the regional interest to support the continued operational commitment of U.S.-NATO-ISAF forces beyond July 2011 till the situation comes under control and security can be handed over to the Afghan National Army.

(Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

New UNSC member India takes firm, ‘mature’ stances on international issues

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By Nilova Roy Chaudhury
Indian Review of Global Affairs

A key new aspect of India’s foreign policy positions in 2011, to coincide with its assumption earlier this month of a non-permanent seat at the United Nations’ high table, will be “firmness and maturity”, a government official said, indicating that New Delhi would increasingly articulate positions on issues on which it would earlier have remained silent.

Whether it was an unequivocal condemnation of terror or quiet satisfaction at the exit of the UNMIN from Nepal, or the strong affirmation of support for the referendum in South Sudan while expressing “concern” over “a high and worrying level of violence in the region of Abyei which led to loss of lives” and urging an expeditious return to dialogue for “the situation in Darfur (which) also remains a cause for concern”, or firming up a position on issues as delicate as the report of the UN Security Council – mandated Special Tribunal on Lebanon on the Hariri assassination, India’s foreign office is working overtime to ensure it will not be caught unawares and will make its presence felt.

Hardeep Puri, India’s Permanent Representative at the UN, has articulated Indian positions strongly at every opportunity, most recently reiterating “India’s unwavering support for the Palestinian people’s struggle for a sovereign, independent, viable and united State of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital living within secure and recognized borders, side by side and at peace with Israel as endorsed in the Arab Peace initiative, Quartet Road map and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions,” clearly indicating that New Delhi will not shy away from taking positions when required.

What will test this uncharacteristically forthright set of positions from South Block will be issues that more directly impact India’s bilateral relations with strategically sensitive countries, particularly like Iran and Myanmar. With the P-5+1 (five permanent UNSC members and Germany) countries beginning another round of talks with Iran about its nuclear programme on Friday, the issue will sorely test New Delhi’s diplomatic manoeuverability. However, according to senior officials, the idea is to show that it can take positions and be firm when required to do so.

Equally, sources indicated, India would not get provoked into responding to “regular pinpricks” from neighbouring countries like Pakistan, or to China’s aggressive, even expansionist posturing,  like the official launch this week by China of its state-run mapping website called ‘Map World’ (that Beijing has authorised to rival Google Earth), showing Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir;  two key areas of its long-standing boundary dispute with India; as part of its territory.

As it articulates its positions on strategic issues more strongly, India is also pushing an agenda for reforms of UN organs including the UNSC, a text of which is circulating with some speed among members of the UN General Assembly. Also, working with two key allies from the Group of four, Germany and Brazil, India is aiming to ensure that its non-permanent presence on the UN Security Council translates into a permanent presence by the end of its current tenure in December 2012.

The United States is clearly upbeat about India’s so-called “coming out party” with State Department Spokesman PJ Crowley saying, “India is an emerging global power in its own right, and it is increasingly involved and engaged in global challenges from regional security to the environment. So we value the role that India is playing on the world stage and look forward to working with India on the Security Council,” Crowley said. U.S. President Barack Obama had, during his visit to India in November, articulated U.S. support for a permanent place for India on the UNSC after reforms. Strong expressions of support have also been made by French President Nicholas Sarkozy, Russian President Dimitry Medvedev and British Prime Minister David Cameron.

India’s neighbour China is, however, wary and has cautioned patience, though its Premier Wen Jiabao claimed Beijing “understood” New Delhi’s aspirations. The China Daily said reforms at the United Nations could not be achieved “overnight” and the complex issue requires a lot of patience.”UNSC reform will not occur overnight, or in a few years. It will require many rounds of thorough consultations and negotiations. Therefore any attempt to set an artificial time limit for UNSC reform is both far-fetched and reckless,” the state-run daily said in a recent editorial.

India, meanwhile, has been elected to chair several UNSC subsidiary bodies, including two crucial committees on counter-terrorism, a committee on sanctions against Eritrea and Somalia and a working group on additional measures against terrorism.

(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)


Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Invading the strategic space: the Dragon fires another salvo at India

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By A Adityanjee
Indian Review of Global Affairs

The Chinese have fired yet another salvo in its cloak and dagger strategic games directed at India. It has gone totally unnoticed in the Indian media but for the last few days, both the Peoples’ Daily of China and the China Daily along with their Indian Sinophile minions have been crowing about the latest Chinese “smart” success in invading India’s international strategic space. By itself, the current Chinese salvo seems pretty innocuous but it has far reaching consequences. The stapled visa issue also started as an innocuous action by low level visa officers in the Chinese embassy. One has to read in between the tea leaves to ascertain Chinese motives. By these aggressive containment efforts, China has proved once again that it is not a friend or an ally of India but at worst a determined and hostile strategic adversary and at best a peer competitor.

There is a very clear cut pattern to Chinese geo-political endeavours. China is behaving as a classical hegemon that is determined to prevent emergence of a rival power by any means. Despite India’s serious reservations, a few years ago, China manipulated the SAARC process to enter as an observer, on an  Invitation from Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh When India wanted to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the full membership was frozen and India was again hyphenated with Pakistan and Iran as an observer. China is the only country among the P5 nations that has yet to endorse India’s candidature for the permanent membership of the UNSC. This, even though China has been making noises about harmony, democracy and consensus building in the UNSC reform process. This will help the Coffee Group (so-called United for Consensus group) orchestrated by Pakistan.

China had initially put up a number of conditions at the time of approval of the India-US civil nuclear energy deal by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Ultimately, the U.S. forced China to support the deal in the NSG. Now, China wants a similar deal in the NSG for its all-weather friend and client state Pakistan. Turning to the ASEAN, China has, for last several years prevented India’s entry by stringently opposing the ASEAN plus six formula that includes India (ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and US) while supporting the ASEAN plus three formula (ASEAN, China, U.S. and Japan). We also see continued exclusion of India from the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Conference). Primarily as a result of Chinese machinations, the APEC is not ready to enlarge itself. If we carefully analyse the Chinese behaviour towards India, not only has China tried to confine India to the sub-continent as a mere regional player, but also China has made no secret of its efforts to contain India’s rising profile in other international fora to suit its narrow mercantile and hegemonic purposes.

At the same time, China has been seconding the Manmohan Singh mantra about the world having enough space for both China and India to rise peacefully at the same time. Similar to Nehru’s endorsement of “Panchsheel”, the current Indian PM has fallen in the same trap laid by China for India in the international organizations. Nehru was privately characterised as a “useful idiot” by the Chinese leadership. One wonders what Hu Jintao is saying about Dr. Singh privately. A few years ago, India’s then petroleum minister Mani Shankar Aiyar was naively talking about developing hydrocarbon resources jointly with China, while China successfully outbid India for every hydrocarbon asset internationally whether in Africa or closer to home in Myanmar. Indian politicians have failed to learn from the previous treacherous behaviour on part of China, and regularly succumb to Chinese bullying. The lack of proactive strategic planning has always been missing from India’s leadership’s mindset and time and again we are left to react to geo-political situations by fire-fighting each avoidable crisis.

Although India and China have tangoed at the G20, RIC, BRIC, BASIC and SCO groupings for a few years now, China has been keen to neutralise India’s influence in the IBSA, a grouping that excludes China specifically. India has been lukewarm to the idea of China joining the IBSA because China is not a democracy while all the three countries of IBSA are thriving democracies in three separate continents. China has been working very hard with Brazil and South Africa for the last couple of years to achieve its stated purpose. The next BRIC meeting is scheduled in April 2011 in Beijing. And, lo and behold, China has had the chutzpah to foist South Africa on to the BRIC. Enlarging the economic grouping to BRICS tremendously helps China’s foreign policy objectives of containing Indian economic, strategic, political and diplomatic influence. China has effectively managed to collapse BRIC and IBSA into one single grouping (BRICS). Currently China is South Africa’s largest trading partner and South Africa is the largest destination in Africa for China’s direct investment. South Africa’s small population, the size of its economy and the relatively slow growth rate did not meet the original BRIC standards. By inviting South Africa to BRIC(S), China has deftly dented India’s economic outreach in Africa. China has also quickly out-manoeuvred the proposed India-US collaboration and cooperation in Africa as suggested by President Barack Obama during his November 2010 India trip recently.

By this master-stroke, China has shown the audacity to adopt the colonial and imperialistic policy of “Divide and Rule” vis-a-vis the G4 countries (Brazil, India, Germany and Japan) who are aspiring to be members of the UNSC as permanent members. Brazil has been torn asunder from the G4 in toto and firmly aligned with China in the now enlarged BRICS. By claiming the leadership of BRICS and harping on its political role in the developing world, China has tried to marginalise India’s rise as an emerging pole in the emerging oligo-polar geo-political balance of power hierarchy. For all practical purposes, we can say goodbye to IBSA as an economic vehicle for India to access increasingly lucrative African and Latin American markets. Chinese efforts are ostensibly geared towards strengthening South Africa’s and Brazil’s claims for the UNSC permanent membership while simultaneously over-looking and demeaning India’s global role. People’s Daily Online ominously notes that “In 2011, all the members of the BRICS countries will serve as members of the UN security council, permanent or non-permanent. Their active roles deserve people’s attention in the year to come”. China Daily, while neglecting India focuses on the role of China, Russia and Brazil have played in the international arena.

India has now very hard strategic choices. It should insist that BRICS in its latest avatar must remain primarily an economic block without any scope for creeping politicisation of the economic group into a geo-political formation. India cannot be seen to be opposing South Africa’s entry into the BRICS for historical, diplomatic and geo-political reasons, though it remains lukewarm to the proposal. India should take a serious note of China’s audacious move in the international chess game and counteract it by joining the ASEAN formally, resurrecting the BIMSTEC and vigorously strengthening the IBSA as a trade block. India should use her current membership of the UNSC to catapult into the NSG as a full-fledged member. India should make determined efforts to join the proposed East Asian Economic Community and prevent her further exclusion from any economic or trade group in order to balance China’s growing influence in international economic diplomacy.

(Dr Adityanjee is President, Council for Strategic Affairs, New Delhi)


(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Bruce Riedel’s underwhelming new book

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It doesn’t tell us any more than we already know

It is hard to see what Bruce Riedel’s new book “Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of Global Jihad” seeks to do.

Book cover (credit:bestofferbuyuk.com

It covers the history of the United States’ relationship with Pakistan from Partition onwards, but is too brief and too shallow to provide a good picture. Dennis Kux and Howard Schaffer deal with this in much greater detail. As an analysis of Pakistani politics and civil-military relations, it is a subset of Stephen P Cohen’s excellent book. As a narrative of the creation and growth of the military-jihadi complex, it is supered by Ahmed Rashid and Hussain Haqqani, who go much deeper. Finally, as an account of the Obama administration’s handling of the war in Afghanistan-Pakistan, it has little to add to Bob Woodward’s book published last year.

Coming from one of the most astute analysts of Pakistan, and from someone who was “in the room” during important moments in contemporary history, the book is a disappointment. Mr Riedel could well have cited Kux, Schaffer, Cohen & Rashid as references in his introductory chapter and gone on to provide us with a deeper, broader analysis of Pakistan’s current situation and fleshed out the possible directions it may take in the future. Yet, we are left with just one single chapter on the implications of one single—what he calls “possible (but not probable)”—outcome: the implications of a jihadist state in Pakistan. That begs the question: what about the probable outcomes? Shouldn’t the book be discussing those in detail?

Perhaps because he is still too close to the policy-making in Washington, Mr Riedel uses statements like “the United States currently has better relations with both India and Pakistan than any other time in the past several decades”. This, after he lays out in great detail how deeply unpopular the United States is in Pakistan (not least because of Washington’s improved relations with India), how the Pakistani military is at loggerheads with its U.S. counterpart, and after mentioning incidents like the suicide attack on the CIA base in Khost. Let’s hope Mr Riedel was merely being diplomatic and politically correct, because the alternative is unflattering.

The disappointment deepens when you see the author accepting the trite argument that Pakistan’s insecurities vis-a-vis India will assuaged if there is a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, even on Pakistan’s own terms. A person who correctly sees a hasty U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as a victory for Al-Qaeda’s global jihad somehow fails to consider the geopolitical implications of India yielding to Pakistan’s military-jihadi blackmail. To be fair, Mr Riedel recommends nothing more than what was agreed in India-Pakistan back channel talks, but even so, the premise that Pakistan will pose less of a threat to international security if only India were to make some concessions takes the heat off the protagonists—Pakistan and its scaffold states. And no, privately nudging the Indian leadership to pursue dialogue with Pakistan is unlikely to be any more effective than doing so publicly.

What is the book’s big prescription for Pakistan? The combination of carrots (Kerry-Lugar long-term aid) and sticks (drone attacks and suchlike) that are currently employed by the Obama administration. There is very little by way of identification and evaluation of other options. This might, again, be due to the fact the Mr Riedel was recently a part of, and still very close to, the ongoing deadly embrace. By that token, this book might have come too early.