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India-US Relations Blog

Taking the Long View

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Over time, the expansion of Chinese strength will undoubtedly push New Delhi to tighten its security relations with Washington, though the process will neither be as smooth nor as speedy as many would like.

Just as US-India ties were at a nadir following New Delhi’s nuclear tests in 1998 – and just as the United States and China were declaring their own strategic partnership – Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee famously characterized Washington and New Delhi as “natural allies” who would form “the mainstay of tomorrow’s stable, democratic world order.” Two years later, Vajpayee reaffirmed this description.

Judging by the dense bilateral links the two countries have crafted over the past decade, Vajpayee phrase seems to have been vindicated. Not only have a landmark civilian nuclear accord and a spate of defense contracts been concluded, but the two countries have established some 30 bilateral dialogues and working groups on a wide gamut of issues, and the United States holds more bilateral military exercises each year with India than with any other nation.

Yet U.S. elites are suddenly shying away from the term “ally.” Assistant Secretary of State for South & Central Asia Robert Blake, for instance, states that “India and the United States will never be allies in the traditional sense of the term.”  Strobe Talbott, who as Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton administration began the first institutionalized dialogue between Washington and New Delhi, contends that the countries “are not now, and may never be, allies.” Stephen P. Cohen, dean of U.S. South Asianists, likewise maintains that “India is a friend, not an ally” and the new US-Indian strategic alliance is “still more symbolic than real.”

All three underscore the distinction between long-standing U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea, and partners like India that are not bound by formal security commitments. And Blake’s statement was undoubtedly in deference to Indian sensitivities about being sucked into America’s strategic orbit, although he adds that India can no longer be considered a non-aligned country given the “increased convergences in strategic outlook” between Washington and New Delhi. But Talbott and Cohen are less sanguine on this count. The former argues that:

“One reason we may never be [allies] or not in the any foreseeable future, is because there is still a huge constituency in support of India’s non-aligned status, despite the fact that I would say that non-alignment and the non-aligned movement is very much an artifact of the Cold War. I remember having a conversation with Natwar Singh [retired Indian diplomat and Manmohan Singh’s first foreign minister] when Congress was out of power and him saying to me that the proudest moment of his career was being secretary general of the non-aligned movement. That sticks in my mind. I took that as a sign that there are still a lot of Indians who take non-alignment seriously.”

Cohen strikes a similar note: “New Delhi has a deep commitment to strategic autonomy, as indicated by its insistent use of the moderating prefix ‘natural’ to describe its U.S. relationship. In the end, India got what it needed from Washington, including recognition of its nuclear weapons program and support for its permanent membership on the United Nations’ Security Council, at little or no cost.”

Believing that strategic ties remain, at best, “aspirational,” Michael Auslin, at the American Enterprise Institute, likewise notes that the

“continued adherence to Jawaharlal Nehru’s non-aligned strategy clearly animates the worldview of most thinkers [in India], even if the language used to describe it no longer partakes of such Cold War imagery. There is a firm commitment in New Delhi not to have any firm commitments to any one state. It seems the Indians have taken to heart, far more than the Americans, George Washington’s warning against entangling foreign alliances.”

All of these comments come at a time of widespread disappointment in Washington that the bilateral relationship has not lived up to the strategic and economic possibilities that seemed so alive just a few years ago. As my last post noted, some observers are even questioning whether the Bush-Singh nuclear deal has succeeded in its primary aim of invigorating US-India geopolitical cooperation in the face of a rapidly growing and more assertive China.

The Bush administration devoted singular energy to courting New Delhi as a key part of its strategy of strengthening security links with China’s neighbors. In a widely-read article, Condoleezza Rice, then serving as chief foreign adviser to the George W. Bush presidential campaign, observed that Washington “should pay closer attention to India’s role in the regional balance.” She pointedly noted that “India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s, too.” In his first major foreign policy address as a candidate, Bush argued that “we should work with the Indian government, ensuring it is a force for stability and security in Asia.”

Once the nuclear deal was unveiled at a July 2005 summit between Bush and Prime Minister Singh, Rice justified it by calling India “a rising global power that we believe could be a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia.” At the summit, a senior Indian diplomat was quoted as saying that “Bush has a vision that we in India often don’t have. With Europe in decline and China rising, the U.S. sees India as a future global power with the ability to maintain [the] power balance in the 21st century.” A Bush administration official closely involved in the making of policy toward New Delhi commented that “China is a central element in our effort to encourage India’s emergence as a world power. But we don’t need to talk about the containment of China. It will take care of itself as India rises.”

Singh-Wen_PhotoIn the years since, has the growth of Chinese strategic power nudged Washington and New Delhi into tighter security collaboration, as many in the Bush administration expected? Or is Michael Krepon, one of the nuclear deal’s prominent detractors, correct in arguing that “New Delhi continues to titrate improved strategic cooperation with the United States” and that it “continues to improve ties with Beijing.  It is folly to presume that Washington can leverage New Delhi’s dealings with Beijing.”

There’s no denying the American disillusionment caused by India’s rejection of Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s bids in its $11 billion fighter aircraft competition and by the prolonged inability of U.S. companies to capitalize on the nuclear deal due to an Indian liability law that does not conform to international norms. It is also true that India and China have aligned to thwart U.S. objectives in global negotiations on trade and climate change, and that they often take the same side in UN deliberations.

But stepping back a bit in order to take in the wider perspective, it is clear that some fundamental geopolitical forces are at work in spurring India-China strategic frictions.  Instead of being the fraternal titans that drive the Asian Century forward, as envisioned in the “Chindia” chimera, it is more likely that their relationship in the coming years will be marked by increased suspicion and rivalry. The relationship has never really recovered from the trauma of their 1962 border war, and the strains have only increased over the past five years or so. Beijing is now taking a much more hawkish line on territorial disputes in the Himalayans, including asserting a brand new claim that the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh is actually “Southern Tibet.”  It is also expanding its presence in territory controlled by Pakistan, and trying to block New Delhi’s efforts to play a greater role in regional and international institutions.

Much is made of the fact that China is now India’s largest trading partner and that two-way trade soared from $12 billion in 2004 to $60 billion in 2010, and that the countries are on track to reach $100 billion in 2015. When Premier Wen Jaibao visited New Delhi last December, he brought along a larger business delegation than President Obama did a month earlier, and the $16 billion in resulting trade deals eclipsed the $10 billion-mark struck by the Americans. Yet compared to US-India economic links, there are far more competitive elements, and far fewer complementary features, operating in India’s business interactions with China.

All of these developments have not gone unnoticed by the Singh government.  Famous for his cautious, taciturn nature, Singh has caused a stir with his public expressions of disapproval regarding what he terms Chinese “assertiveness.” In a September 2010 interview he complained that Beijing sought to “keep India in a low-level equilibrium” and that “it would like to have a foothold in South Asia.” Three months later, he shocked his Chinese guests during the Wen visit by refusing to reiterate India’s traditional endorsement of the “One China” policy or customary recognition of Tibet being an inviolable part of the People’s Republic.

Indian military planning is also increasingly focused on the threat from its northern neighbor, from taking major steps to fortify its northeastern border to accelerating the development of the Agni-V ballistic missile. With a reach of over 5,000 kilometers, and capable of carrying multiple warheads, the missile puts China fully within range of a retaliatory nuclear strike.

The strategic entente with India is Washington’s first geopolitical partnership to be forged in the post-Cold War era, meaning that its rhythm is bound to be quite different from the security alliances the United States rapidly created in the aftermath of World War II. Back then, the national power of Washington’s new-found allies was in stark decline, while India’s current power trajectory is visibly upward. The structural dynamics of a bipolar global order also were simpler than today’s messy multipolarity.  Over time, however, the expansion of Chinese strength will undoubtedly push New Delhi to tighten its security relations with Washington, though the process will neither be as smooth nor as speedy as many would like.

Immigration Blog

Call Centers, Outsourcing, and Immigration

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Globalization is not a one-way street. It’s really a multi-lane superhighway with multiple entry and exit ramps. Contrary to the view that globalization means the loss of US jobs, we see that trade and immigration that involves Indians and Americans means jobs in both India and America and an increased variety of products and services for consumers.

The Anti-Outsourcing Hysteria of 2004

During the 2004 election campaign Democratic presidential candidate Sen. John Kerry famously declared that U.S. executives who set up operations in India were, in essence, committing treason. He labeled such executives “Benedict Arnold,” after the colonial officer who switched sides and joined the British during the American Revolution. Kerry said, “When I am President, and with your help, I’m going to repeal every benefit, every loophole, every reward that entices any Benedict Arnold company or CEO to take the money and the jobs overseas and stick the American people with the bill.”

It wasn’t just rhetoric. Local lawmakers began introducing anti-outsourcing legislation at a furious pace. In 2003 state legislators introduced fewer than 10 bills to restrict work from being performed overseas. By 2004, that number increased to over 100 such bills. State lawmakers who would never otherwise receive national attention suddenly found that by introducing a bill they could garner appearances on national television with Lou Dobbs on CNN.

The vast majority of the bills did not pass and the pace of such legislation eventually diminished. However, New Jersey passed legislation that forbids work to be performed outside the United States on contracts with the New Jersey government. A legal analysis by the National Foundation for American Policy found such state bills, including New Jersey’s, were likely unconstitutional because only the federal government, not individual state governments, possesses the authority to regulate international trade. (That study can be found here.) However New Jersey’s law was never challenged in court, in part, because the state provided a generous “grandfather” policy that allowed existing contract arrangements with the state to continue.

What’s Happened Since 2004?

The past 7 years have seen changes to globalization. Indian companies have continued to thrive with US-based customers but have adopted an approach that seeks to maintain a U.S. presence with more US workers, according to recent news reports. The goal is not to mollify critics, although that might be a side effect, but rather to be close to customers and supply better service at a reasonable cost.

A lengthy Washington Post article recently detailed the efforts of India call center operations to place more employees in the United States. The key part of the article explains: “India’s outsourcing giants — faced with rising wages at home — have looked for growth opportunities in the United States. But with Washington crimping visas for visiting Indian workers, some companies such as Aegis are slowly hiring workers in North America, where their largest corporate customers are based. In this evolution, outsourcing has come home.”

Conclusion

The bottom line is important. To remain profitable employers, including Indian companies, most compete both on price and the quality of service. The idea that employers hire only employees who will work the cheapest is belied by experience. A company will soon lose customers and profitability if it hires people whose only virtue is to work for little money. Such employees are unreliable and result in labeling a company as unreliable as well. Most importantly, companies will place employees where customers can be served most effectively.

The marketplace is addressing concerns about jobs going to India and U.S. workers “losing” in the process. Globalization is a boon to Americans, who enjoy great products and services made possible by globalization, such as iPods, iPhones, Androids, flat screen television sets, gaming devices and computers that be serviced with a phone call. New restrictions on either trade or immigration that inhibit the growth of such products and services will only make Americans poorer.

India-US Relations Blog

Winning the Future Together

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The global ascendance of India as an economic power, technology hub and a source of professional talent will create major opportunities for Indian and multinational businesses alike. But this development has also injected a not-insignificant measure of zero-sum thinking into US-India economic affairs, especially in the area of human capital. These contradictory themes are a growing source of irritation, but if managed smartly could also be a good opportunity for advancing the bilateral relationship.

These contradictions have been in full view in recent months. Last year saw the rise of a populist anti-India backlash as Americans increasingly blamed the country for their economic hardships. Election campaigns trafficked in the outsourcing issue, Congress enacted heavy India-specific fee hikes on the H-1B temporary visa program for skilled foreign workers, and President Obama called for tightening tax penalties on corporate outsourcing in language that pitted U.S. prosperity against that of India’s.

Yet when Mr. Obama arrived in India for a state visit last November, his rhetoric markedly shifted. The country was now portrayed as an economic opportunity too golden to pass up; indeed, the main purpose of his visit seemed to be securing as many commercial deals for American companies as possible. In an address to Indian corporate leaders in Mumbai, he emphasized that “in our interconnected world, increased commerce between the United States and India can be and will be a win-win proposition for both nations. I realize that for some, this truth may not be readily apparent.” For good measure, he added that “there still exists a caricature of India as a land of call centers and back offices that cost American jobs. But these old stereotypes, these old concerns ignore today’s reality.”

The antinomies of the bilateral economic relationship similarly were on display in Obama’s State of the Union address in January. He cited the growth of science and technology capacity in China and India as a threat to America’s competitive edge, while also acknowledging that continued U.S. prosperity requires greater access to the human capital originating from both countries. The success of U.S. enterprises engaged in the advanced technology sectors Mr. Obama identified in his address as key to “winning the future” will increasingly depend on access to the global reservoir of skilled professionals, of which India is a major contributor. The president admitted as much when he criticized the self-defeating nature of U.S. immigration policy: “[Students] come here from abroad to study in our colleges and universities.  But as soon as they obtain advanced degrees, we send them back home to compete against us.  It makes no sense.”

The President has regularly sounded off on this latter theme, most recently in a series of events over the last month aimed at reviving the issue of immigration reform.  In a speech in El Paso earlier this month, for example, he noted that:

[W]e provide students from around the world with visas to get engineering and computer science degrees at our top universities. But our laws discourage them from using those skills to start a business or power a new industry right here in the United States. So instead of training entrepreneurs to create jobs in America, we train them to create jobs for our competition. That makes no sense. In a global marketplace, we need all the talent we can get – not just to benefit those individuals, but because their contributions will benefit all Americans.

The President added that “We don’t want the next Intel or Google to be created in China or India. We want those companies and jobs to take root in America.”*

Obama’s remarks picks up a proposal he made during the last presidential campaign to create a “fast track” mechanism allowing foreign students with advanced technical degrees from U.S. institutions to receive an employment-based visa. At present, 20,000 H-1B visas are reserved for such graduates – many of whom are Indian – though demand greatly eclipses this number.

Although immigration policy remains a hotly-contested issue, the adverse consequences of limiting U.S. access to foreign-born skilled labor are widely acknowledged. New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, for example, is at the head of a broad group of civic and business leaders calling for a job-creation strategy based on visa reform.

The United States has been able to maintain its global preeminence in no small part due to the influx of foreign science and engineering professionals and graduate students. Immigrants comprise nearly half of the science and engineering workforce holding PhD degrees. High-skilled immigrants are a significant driving force of American prosperity and innovation, most famously in building the information technology industry.  Research indicates, for instance, that Indian immigrant entrepreneurs play a leading role in founding some of the most dynamic high-tech companies. Studies also point to the valuable entrepreneurial streak immigrants possess: They are 30 percent more likely to form new businesses than native-born Americans, and foreign-born university graduates are some three-times more likely to file patent applications than US-born citizens.

Foreign-born scientific and engineering talent – particularly Indian – is an important pillar of the faculties in America’s top universities. And foreign students earn the majority of engineering doctoral degrees awarded by U.S. universities, and of this number a large percentage opt to remain in the country for some period of time. Their presence, along with other high-skilled immigrants, has helped the U.S. technology workforce expand at a faster rate than the United States is graduating native-born scientists and engineers.

America’s dependence on foreign-born technology professionals will shortly become all the greater. Since younger native-born workers tend to lack the skill levels of their baby boomer parents now nearing retirement age, the United States could face broad and substantial skill shortages in the coming decade. Thus, the United States should be promoting greater access to the global talent pool, and India is a good place to start.

With India a major source of high-skill professionals and the U.S. needing to draw on foreign talent to fortify its own science and engineering workforce, both countries have a keen mutual interest in cooperating in the area of human capital, the most critical resource in the dawning global innovation economy. To this end, Washington and New Delhi should conclude a bilateral agreement guaranteeing a set number of temporary work visas for high-skill Indian professionals. The United States has crafted bilateral agreements with a select number of other countries that could serve as a template, including the TN temporary visa program (created via the North American Free Trade Agreement) that exempts qualified Canadian and Mexican professionals from the annual quota on H-1B work permits.

Admittedly, important constituencies in both countries regard the global talent pool as a zero-sum equation.  In the United States, some argue that increased mobility of foreign high-skill workers will displace or depress wages of native professionals. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that greater numbers of talented immigrants actually supports job creation in the United States and that immigrant entrepreneurs complement rather than crowd out native-born counterparts.

India likewise would stand to benefit from the increased mobility of its technology professionals. Instead of causing “brain drain,” the global innovation economy is actually generating “brain circulation” or a “brain chain,” in which expatriate talent returns home with acquired capital, skills and knowledge, as well as personal links to transnational entrepreneurial and technological networks. Obviously, some of the high-skill Indians who benefit from the bilateral immigration accord will choose to remain permanently in the United States, though they would in time contribute a significant stream of remittance income and serve an important bridging function between Indian innovators and entrepreneurs and those in other countries.  But others, empowered by new ideas and experiences, will return in time and play a direct role in the nation’s development; indeed, this process is already underway (see here and here).

The United States and India are prime constituents in the brain circulation process. Far from seeing access to the global talent pool as a competitive proposition, the interdependency of their skills base requires them to act in a cooperative, synergistic way. Doing so not only makes sound economic sense for both countries, but would also strengthen the foundation of US-India relations.

* Ironically, as Mr. Obama was uttering these words, the Indian science minister was lamenting that the country’s lack of innovation infrastructure keeps India from producing companies like Google and Blackberry.


India-US Relations Blog

How to lose friends and alienate people

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India’s decision to reject U.S. fighter planes is strategic stupidity.

New Delhi, it is reported, has shortlisted two European vendors for its long-drawn procurement of fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force. Now, military analysts can have endless debates and even objective opinions on which among the American, European and Russian aircraft is technically superior and better suits the stated requirements of the IAF. Financial analysts can have similar debates and objective opinions on which is the cheapest or the best value for money. These opinions may or may not converge. But when you are buying 126 planes worth more than $11 billion dollars, you are essentially making a geostrategic decision, not a narrow technical/financial one.

The UPA government’s decision to reject both American proposals, of the F-16 and F/A-18, demonstrates either a poor appreciation of the geostrategic aspect or worse, indicative of a lingering anti-American mindset. While the U.S. ambassador has resigned, whether or not it will prove to be a setback for India-US relations remains to be seen. Damaging the careers of pro-India American officials is a silly thing to do.

This move will most certainly reduce India’s geopolitical leverage with the U.S. military-industrial complex, at a time when India needs it most. From the unfolding dynamics in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, to the changing balance of power in East Asia, to UN Security Council reform, to a number of geoeconomic issues, the United States can take positions that can have long-lasting consequences for India’s interests. Is the United States more likely to be sympathetic to India’s interests after a $11 billion contract—which means much needed jobs for the U.S. economy —is awarded to someone else? Long used to complaining that the United States doesn’t care for India’s interests, will awarding the contract to some European firms help change the situation?

The argument that the European bids were ‘technically’ superior are not entirely credible either, for two reasons. First, at sufficiently high levels of technology, the difference between the planes on offer is marginal. To suggest that the European models are vastly superior defies logic, because some of the world’s most powerful air forces are flying F-16s, leave along F/A-18s. Second, the notion that combat requirements can be perfectly defined at the time of procurement is false. It is the combination of man and machine that wins battles. The focus on machines ignores the reality that much swings on the man flying it. Moreover, given the nuclear deterrence relationships obtaining in the subcontinent and across the Himalayas, those planes might never see an aircraft-to-aircraft dogfight in their lifetimes. For other tasks like air support for ground operations, the specifications are even lower.

What about those alphabet soup agreements and fine-print contracts that the U.S. insists that India sign, that might prevent the planes from being used when needed? Those who make these arguments do not understand what war means. War means all bets are off, and India will do whatever necessary to protect its interests. While the existence of those agreements was a usual bargaining chip for India, to get a discount, to believe that such arguments will hamstring India’s military options is naivete. The government might not need to spell this out in public, but it should know it.

It has been this blog’s argument that in the contemporary geopolitical environment, India’s interests are best served by being a swing power, holding the balance between the United States and China. It must enjoy better relations with each of them than they have with each other. It must also have the credible capacity to give pleasure and inflict pain. In this context, buying fighter planes from the United States would have been an excellent move.

And who has New Delhi shortlisted instead? European companies. The European Union is a bit player in the international system, zealously safeguarding its own legacy position at the United Nations Security Council, the G-20, the World Bank, IMF and other places, against India. Italy is engaged in process of blocking India’s UNSC candidature. An order placed with Eurofighter or Rafael isn’t going to change its plans. EU busybodies can be found everywhere from inviting Kashmiri separatists to speak, to attending court hearings of Binayak Sen. Some small EU states almost wrecked the India-specific waiver that the United States was obtaining at the Nuclear Supplier’s Group. When it’s crunch time in Afghanistan, does anyone in New Delhi think that the EU will or can make any move that’ll safeguard India’s interests? Why is India being gratuitously generous to Europe when there is much to gain from giving the contract to the United States?

Yes, France, Britain and Germany are countries that India must engage. There are ways to allow them to benefit from India’s growth process—from power projects to manufacturing to services. The fighter aircraft contract need not be awarded to European firms, because it has higher strategic opportunity costs.

The downshot is that the UPA government has squandered a unique opportunity to gain leverage in Washington at a crucial time when closer ties are in India’s interests. It first took way too long to decide, dragging the procurement process even China built its own new fighter plane. It now decided to pick two vendors who might well sell a technically superior and cheaper product, but do no more than that. To put it mildly, this is strategic stupidity.

(This post originially appeared on this author’s blog at acorn.nationalinterest.in)

Immigration Blog

Are H-1B Visa Holders Really Only Hired for Cheap Labor? Let’s Look at the Law, Common Sense and Some Data

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The argument made by critics of H-1B professionals is straightforward – the only reason companies hire them is because they will work more cheaply. In fact, the argument is central to criticism of H-1Bs and will likely never be conceded by critics, since all assertions about skilled foreign nationals rest on the premise that they work more cheaply.

One can recognize the value of permitting skilled foreign nationals to work in the United States without assuming the entry of every individual results in a storybook ending. America is an immense country with large and small employers and when tens of thousands of new people enter the U.S. labor market for the first time each year it is possible some of these individuals will be taken advantage of or will not recognize their true market value. This may be more likely to occur at some small IT services companies, which have been cited in the press.

However, the law, common sense and available data indicate that, on the whole, H-1B visa holders are paid appropriately based on their age and work experience – even if this does not take place in all circumstances.

Under section 212(n)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, employers must pay H-1B visa holders the higher of the prevailing wage or actual wage paid to “all other individuals with similar experience and qualifications for the specific employment in question.”

To knowingly violate this law risks heavy fines, debarment from using the immigration system for hiring skilled individuals and much bad publicity for the company. That is why one rarely hears of any company with a recognizable name found to have willfully underpaid an individual on an H-1B visa.

Think about what would be necessary for a large or even medium-sized company to (unlawfully) maintain two wage scales – one for foreign nationals, one for U.S. workers. The records would be available and accessible to government auditors on demand – and such audits are frequent these days from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Moreover, a mid-level employee in the human resources department, perhaps several of them, would have to work with a company’s general counsel office and likely an outside law firm in a conspiracy to underpay foreign nationals. All of this would risk the reputation of the company and the livelihood of the employees involved. And since employers generally pay up to $5,000 to $6,000 in legal and government fees to hire H-1B visa holders, to make this conspiracy worthwhile the amount of underpayment would have to be significant.

After all this is done, can the H-1B professional thwart this conspiracy by simply leaving the employer to work elsewhere? Yes. Do H-1B visa holders change jobs? Yes, it happens quite often, particularly when the economy is good. Immigration attorney and former INS general counsel Bo Cooper recently noted in Congressional testimony that his law firm often processes cases for clients for an H-1B professional to move from one employer to another.

Again, none of this is to deny that some individuals may be shortchanged. It’s more to explore the extent to which one can say that H-1B visa holders in general are underpaid and only hired to save money.

What the Research Shows

In a January 2011 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found H-1B visa holders generally earned the same as U.S. professionals when compared in the same fields and age groups. For example, in the category Systems Analysis, Programming, and Other Computer-Related Occupations, the median salary for an H-1B professional was higher ($60,000 vs. $58,000) than for a U.S. professional in the age group 20-29 and the same ($70,000) in ages 30-39. (See Table 1 below.)

Table 1

Median Reported Salaries of H-1B and U.S. Workers: Systems Analysis, Programming, and Other Computer-Related Occupations

Age Group H-1B U.S. Workers
20-29 $60,000 $58,000
30-39 $70,000 $70,000

Source: H-1B Visa Program: Reforms Are Needed to Minimize the Risks and Costs of Current Program, Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-26, January 2011, Table 1.; Salaries are 2008.

In the age group 20-39 for Electrical/Electronics Engineering Occupations, the median salary for an engineer in H-1B status was higher than for a U.S. engineer – $80,000 vs. $75,000. (See Table 2.) For some reason, U.S. workers in the age 40-50 range earn more in this field than their H-1B counterparts, but since relatively few H-1B visa holders enter the U.S. after the age of 40 (less than 10 percent) and only a portion of those enter this field it is difficult to know whether the data are significant in any way.

Table 2

Median Reported Salaries of H-1B and U.S. Workers: Electrical/Electronics Engineering Occupations


Age Group H-1B U.S. Workers
20-39 $80,000 $75,000

Source: H-1B Visa Program: Reforms Are Needed to Minimize the Risks and Costs of Current Program, Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-26, January 2011, Table 1.; Salaries are 2008.

Table 3 shows in the age group 20-39, H-1B professionals earned $47,237 compared to $35,000 for U.S. professionals for jobs in college and universities.

Table 3

Median Reported Salaries of H-1B and U.S. Workers: Occupations in College and University Education

Age Group H-1B U.S. Workers
20-39 $47,237 $35,000

Source: H-1B Visa Program: Reforms Are Needed to Minimize the Risks and Costs of Current Program, Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-26, January 2011, Table 1.; Salaries are 2008.

What Do These Results Mean?

The data show one needs to compare individuals with similar ages and fields when comparing salaries. Since U.S. professionals tend to be older than H-1B visa holders, U.S. professionals will tend to earn higher salaries. But that doesn’t mean H-1B professionals are only hired because they earn less. Recent U.S.-native-born college graduates earn less money than more experienced native-born professionals in the same field. Does that mean recent native-born college graduates are paid less than more experienced individuals because of wrongdoing by American employers? Of course not. Salaries in America are based on a variety of factors. Individuals with greater experience should be expected to earn higher salaries.

Conclusion

There are reforms that would make the situation better both for workers and legitimate employers. First, strengthen the rules for whistleblowers and make such rules more widely known. Second, increase portability for individuals with pending green card applications so it is easier for a professional to leave a current job if necessary. Third, increase the employment-based green card quota and/or exempt from the quota individuals who received a masters degree or higher from a U.S. university, which would move many people into permanent resident status much more quickly. The green card backlog makes it even more important that Congress refrain from enacting crippling restrictions on H-1B visas, since otherwise it would be difficult for skilled foreign nationals to work in the United States.

The debate over H-1B visas is rarely civil. But hopefully more people will agree that individuals born outside the United States have much more to offer America than, as critics assert, a willingness to work for less money.