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Winning the Future Together

The global ascendance of India as an economic power, technology hub and a source of professional talent will create major opportunities for Indian and multinational businesses alike. But this development has also injected a not-insignificant measure of zero-sum thinking into US-India economic affairs, especially in the area of human capital. These contradictory themes are a growing source of irritation, but if managed smartly could also be a good opportunity for advancing the bilateral relationship.

These contradictions have been in full view in recent months. Last year saw the rise of a populist anti-India backlash as Americans increasingly blamed the country for their economic hardships. Election campaigns trafficked in the outsourcing issue, Congress enacted heavy India-specific fee hikes on the H-1B temporary visa program for skilled foreign workers, and President Obama called for tightening tax penalties on corporate outsourcing in language that pitted U.S. prosperity against that of India’s.

Yet when Mr. Obama arrived in India for a state visit last November, his rhetoric markedly shifted. The country was now portrayed as an economic opportunity too golden to pass up; indeed, the main purpose of his visit seemed to be securing as many commercial deals for American companies as possible. In an address to Indian corporate leaders in Mumbai, he emphasized that “in our interconnected world, increased commerce between the United States and India can be and will be a win-win proposition for both nations. I realize that for some, this truth may not be readily apparent.” For good measure, he added that “there still exists a caricature of India as a land of call centers and back offices that cost American jobs. But these old stereotypes, these old concerns ignore today’s reality.”

The antinomies of the bilateral economic relationship similarly were on display in Obama’s State of the Union address in January. He cited the growth of science and technology capacity in China and India as a threat to America’s competitive edge, while also acknowledging that continued U.S. prosperity requires greater access to the human capital originating from both countries. The success of U.S. enterprises engaged in the advanced technology sectors Mr. Obama identified in his address as key to “winning the future” will increasingly depend on access to the global reservoir of skilled professionals, of which India is a major contributor. The president admitted as much when he criticized the self-defeating nature of U.S. immigration policy: “[Students] come here from abroad to study in our colleges and universities.  But as soon as they obtain advanced degrees, we send them back home to compete against us.  It makes no sense.”

The President has regularly sounded off on this latter theme, most recently in a series of events over the last month aimed at reviving the issue of immigration reform.  In a speech in El Paso earlier this month, for example, he noted that:

[W]e provide students from around the world with visas to get engineering and computer science degrees at our top universities. But our laws discourage them from using those skills to start a business or power a new industry right here in the United States. So instead of training entrepreneurs to create jobs in America, we train them to create jobs for our competition. That makes no sense. In a global marketplace, we need all the talent we can get – not just to benefit those individuals, but because their contributions will benefit all Americans.

The President added that “We don’t want the next Intel or Google to be created in China or India. We want those companies and jobs to take root in America.”*

Obama’s remarks picks up a proposal he made during the last presidential campaign to create a “fast track” mechanism allowing foreign students with advanced technical degrees from U.S. institutions to receive an employment-based visa. At present, 20,000 H-1B visas are reserved for such graduates – many of whom are Indian – though demand greatly eclipses this number.

Although immigration policy remains a hotly-contested issue, the adverse consequences of limiting U.S. access to foreign-born skilled labor are widely acknowledged. New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, for example, is at the head of a broad group of civic and business leaders calling for a job-creation strategy based on visa reform.

The United States has been able to maintain its global preeminence in no small part due to the influx of foreign science and engineering professionals and graduate students. Immigrants comprise nearly half of the science and engineering workforce holding PhD degrees. High-skilled immigrants are a significant driving force of American prosperity and innovation, most famously in building the information technology industry.  Research indicates, for instance, that Indian immigrant entrepreneurs play a leading role in founding some of the most dynamic high-tech companies. Studies also point to the valuable entrepreneurial streak immigrants possess: They are 30 percent more likely to form new businesses than native-born Americans, and foreign-born university graduates are some three-times more likely to file patent applications than US-born citizens.

Foreign-born scientific and engineering talent – particularly Indian – is an important pillar of the faculties in America’s top universities. And foreign students earn the majority of engineering doctoral degrees awarded by U.S. universities, and of this number a large percentage opt to remain in the country for some period of time. Their presence, along with other high-skilled immigrants, has helped the U.S. technology workforce expand at a faster rate than the United States is graduating native-born scientists and engineers.

America’s dependence on foreign-born technology professionals will shortly become all the greater. Since younger native-born workers tend to lack the skill levels of their baby boomer parents now nearing retirement age, the United States could face broad and substantial skill shortages in the coming decade. Thus, the United States should be promoting greater access to the global talent pool, and India is a good place to start.

With India a major source of high-skill professionals and the U.S. needing to draw on foreign talent to fortify its own science and engineering workforce, both countries have a keen mutual interest in cooperating in the area of human capital, the most critical resource in the dawning global innovation economy. To this end, Washington and New Delhi should conclude a bilateral agreement guaranteeing a set number of temporary work visas for high-skill Indian professionals. The United States has crafted bilateral agreements with a select number of other countries that could serve as a template, including the TN temporary visa program (created via the North American Free Trade Agreement) that exempts qualified Canadian and Mexican professionals from the annual quota on H-1B work permits.

Admittedly, important constituencies in both countries regard the global talent pool as a zero-sum equation.  In the United States, some argue that increased mobility of foreign high-skill workers will displace or depress wages of native professionals. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that greater numbers of talented immigrants actually supports job creation in the United States and that immigrant entrepreneurs complement rather than crowd out native-born counterparts.

India likewise would stand to benefit from the increased mobility of its technology professionals. Instead of causing “brain drain,” the global innovation economy is actually generating “brain circulation” or a “brain chain,” in which expatriate talent returns home with acquired capital, skills and knowledge, as well as personal links to transnational entrepreneurial and technological networks. Obviously, some of the high-skill Indians who benefit from the bilateral immigration accord will choose to remain permanently in the United States, though they would in time contribute a significant stream of remittance income and serve an important bridging function between Indian innovators and entrepreneurs and those in other countries.  But others, empowered by new ideas and experiences, will return in time and play a direct role in the nation’s development; indeed, this process is already underway (see here and here).

The United States and India are prime constituents in the brain circulation process. Far from seeing access to the global talent pool as a competitive proposition, the interdependency of their skills base requires them to act in a cooperative, synergistic way. Doing so not only makes sound economic sense for both countries, but would also strengthen the foundation of US-India relations.

* Ironically, as Mr. Obama was uttering these words, the Indian science minister was lamenting that the country’s lack of innovation infrastructure keeps India from producing companies like Google and Blackberry.


Addressing the Arguments Against Comprehensive Immigration Reform

Indian-Americans know that for the past several years failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform legislation has blocked other changes to U.S. immigration law. Smaller, more targeted measures to fix problems associated with employment and family immigration, including reducing the large backlogs, have not see light of day to due to the inability to pass large-scale immigration legislation. Important measures on employer-sponsored green cards were part of a 2006 immigration reform bill that passed the Senate but failed to become law after opposition from House Republicans.

What are the main arguments against comprehensive immigration reform? And are there good responses to those arguments? I recently addressed the five main arguments offered against comprehensive immigration reform in a paper for the Cato Institute. (The study can be found here.)

1) Immigration Reform Will Not Harm Taxpayers. The paper notes that legalizing both the flow of workers and those already in the country without legal status will help taxpayers by raising the newly legalized workers’ earnings, productivity, and the likelihood they will pay taxes. Columbia University economist Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz found that illegal immigrants who received legal status under 1986 legislation received “significantly” higher wages once they became legal. (Higher wages equals higher taxes.) Peter Dixon and Maureen Rimmer, both with Monash University in Australia, found compared to more increases in border enforcement, using legal temporary workers to replace the flow of illegal immigrants would benefit U.S. households by $260 billion a year.

2) Newly Legalized workers will not burden the welfare rolls. In general, newly arriving immigrants are not heavy users of welfare and, in fact, are usually not eligible for federal means-tested programs. In 2006, according to the House Ways and Means Committee, only 0.7 percent of noncitizen used TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). Much use of benefits declined for immigrants after eligibility rules changed in the 1996 welfare reform law, though even before the changes immigrant welfare use tended to be overstated. It’s true U.S.-born children of immigrants may receive more benefits than their immigrant parents. However, the comparisons of who is a net taxpayer can be misleading if one counts native-born children of immigrants as (immigration) costs when they are young but then fails to count them as tax contributors once they reach adulthood.

3) Another amnesty need not beget more amnesties. If Congress legalizes the status of individuals here unlawfully it does not need to be an amnesty, which usually requires little or no action on the part of the recipient. Instead, Congress can impose a series of conditions for that forgiveness, including fines and future obligations.

4) Legalizing or admitting less-skilled workers will not undermine U.S. culture or the English language. Immigrants and their children are learning English. A total of 91 percent of second-generation Hispanic immigrants (the children of immigrants) said they speak English “well” or “pretty well,” which rises to 97 percent by the third generation.

5) Allowing in more temporary visa holders or legalizing existing workers without legal status will not increase the unemployment rate. Immigrants help make Americans more productive, while having no impact on the unemployment rate. As economists like Mark J. Perry, a professor at the University of Michigan, Flint campus, point out, there is no fixed number of jobs, so there is no way for immigrants to “take away jobs from Americans.” There is no evidence unemployment rates rise over time at either the state or national level simply because additional people enter the labor force, whether immigrants or recent graduates from U.S. schools or colleges.

Conclusion

These are not popular arguments to make in a climate when economic recovery remains incomplete in America. And the strongest opponents of immigration reform will not likely be persuaded. However, those who support a better solution than the status quo will need to continue the debate and responding to critics. Otherwise, other problems, such as the need to add more green cards for skilled immigrants, may never be addressed in a Washington, D.C. that remains divided on immigration issues.

What’s Happening with H-1B Visas?

Press outlets are abuzz with stories signaling that H-1B visa numbers are down and, therefore, no longer held in favor by employers. Is that the case?

The key article, which has led to other press articles, was a May 6 Wall Street Journal piece entitled “Long-Prized Tech Visas for U.S. Entry Lose Cachet.” The story began, “A visa program designed to supply skilled foreign workers to companies in the U.S. has slowed sharply, attracting about 50% fewer petitions so far this year than last year, and 80% fewer than in 2009.” The article cites three possible factors: a mediocre U.S. economic recovery, increased opportunities for workers to stay or return to their home countries and higher visa fees against primarily Indian companies.

Because of the great demand for H-1B visas, in recent years, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has accepted H-1B applications for the next fiscal year on April 1, 6 months before new workers would be allowed to start work. That means current petitions filed by employers are for new H-1B visa holders to start work on October 1, 2011, which is the start of fiscal year 2012. (Fiscal year 2012 runs from October 1, 2011 to September 30, 2012.)

The argument that a major slowdown in hiring H-1Bs is taking place rests on the observation that in April 2010 over 16,000 petitions were filed and in April 2009 employers filed 45,000, according to USCIS. Moreover, back in 2008, employers filed enough petitions early on that the quota was reached in the first week filing petitions was permitted. Therefore, when compared to those earlier years, current numbers are down.

A Short History of the H-1B Quota

Congress did not “create” an H-1B visa program in 1990. Individuals had long been permitted to come into the United States on H-1 temporary visas to work in high skill jobs. Prior to 1990, going back to the 1950s, H-1s generally could not enter the United States if they intended to stay permanently.

Congress changed the law in 1990 to allow (explicitly) “dual intent,” which allowed H-1B visa holders to intend to become permanent residents (green card recipients), while also placing an annual limit of 65,000. Much of the debate over H-1Bs has centered on this annual cap.

By 1997, the 65,000 annual limit established by Congress in 1990 proved to be insufficient. Since 1997, employers have exhausted the supply of H-1B visas every year except during FY 2001 to FY 2003, when the ceiling was increased. In the past 9 years employers used up all the visas before or during the fiscal year. In 1998 and 2000 Congress passed short-term H-1B numerical increases that eventually expired.

In late 2004 Congress approved an exemption of 20,000 from the cap for recipients of an advanced degree from a U.S. university. In earlier legislation, Congress had approved an exemption from the numerical limit for those hired by universities and non-profit or government research institutes. With time Congress has revised the law it has come with greater regulation and, beginning in 1998, higher fees for hiring H-1B professionals.

image1

Market Forces: Why the H-1B Quota is Still Likely to be Fully Utilized

 
If history is a guide, then it is likely the H-1B quota for FY 2012 will be exhausted before the end of the fiscal year. If we examine previous years it is easy to see how labor market conditions have determined the number of H-1B visas used in a year. As noted earlier, for FY 2002 and 2003, Congress temporarily increased the H-1B limit to 195,000. But as Table 1 shows, during those years employers used fewer than 80,000 visas that counted against the cap. That meant about 230,000 H-1B visas went unused in those two years.

In other words, companies did not decide to hire more individuals on H-1B visas during those years simply because the visas were available. And the same is happening today. Employers are analyzing how many people are needed in the United States to accomplish their objectives. In general, smart employers only hire as many people as necessary, since laying off people is costly, inefficient and bad for morale.

What does this mean for H-1B visas? It means that we are still early in the hiring cycle for the 2012 fiscal year, which does not start until October 1, several months from now. Two factors are necessary to keep in mind in projecting H-1B use. First, an H-1B is generally the only practical way to hire a skilled foreign national, including an international student, to work long-term in the United States. Second, the annual quota on H-1B – 65,000 plus the 20,000 exemption for those receiving a masters or higher from a U.S. university – remains low as a proportion of the U.S. labor force, less than one-tenth of one percent.

The fluctuations in H-1B use help demonstrate that employers hire individuals on H-1B visas when it is considered important for the business, not to replace Americans.

 

Table 1

        H-1B VISAS ISSUED AGAINST THE CAP BY YEAR 

Fiscal Year

Annual Limit*

H-1B Visas Unused

1992

65,000

16,400

1993

65,000

3,400

1994

65,000

4,700

1995

65,000

10,800

1996

65,000

9,900

1997

65,000

0

1998

65,000

0

1999

115,000

0

2000

115,000

0

2001

195,000

31,400

2002

195,000

115,900

2003

195,000

117.000

2004

65,000

0

2005

65,000

0

2006

65,000

0

2007

65,000

0

2008

65,000

0

2009

65,000

0

2010

65,000

0

2011

65,000

0

Are Indians Using All the H-1B Visas?

If one follows the press, one would assume Indian companies or Indian nationals use all the H-1B visas. Yet the issue is much more complicated than that. In fact, a focus on about a handful of top-using companies has distorted the overall picture of these visas used for highly skilled foreign nationals across the U.S. economy.

To understand the issue, it’s necessary to divide the use of H-1B visas into two separate categories: 1) H-1Bs petitioned for by India-based companies and 2) H-1Bs received by Indian foreign nationals. While there is an overlap between the two groups, these are not the same thing.

H-1B Visas Used by Indian Companies

A January 2011 headline from the technology blog of the Capitol Hill newspaper The Hill read: “GAO: Disproportionate share of H-1B Visas going to India-based staffing firms.” The article noted, “Almost half of all H-1B visa holders are from India.” The perception that Indian companies use most of the H-1Bs is often utilized by critics to undermine support for H-1B visas more generally.

One of the ironies of the criticism of Indian companies and H-1B visas is that the use of H-1Bs by such companies has declined quite a bit in recent years. As a March 2010 report from the National Foundation for American Policy (NFAP), where I am executive director, explained, “USCIS data show in FY 2009, less than 6 percent of new H-1B petitions went to Indian technology companies. Indentifying 25 India-based firms one finds Indian companies utilized fewer than 5,000 (4,809) new H-1B visas in FY 2009. Moreover, tracking these same companies over time, shows that the number of new H-1B visas utilized by Indian technology firms fell by 70 percent between FY 2006 and FY 2009.” (See Figure 1 below.) Based on the release of a list of the top 10 companies for new H-1Bs in FY 2010, it appears the Indian company use of H-1Bs was greater in 2010 than in 2009.

The NFAP report also explained that it is simplistic to assume that visas utilized by an Indian technology company (or any other company) means a loss of jobs in the United States: “When Indian technology companies or other non-Indian IT service providers perform work in the United States it is because U.S. companies believe such work makes their businesses more profitable . . . To the extent Indian (and non-Indian) companies performing information technology service work allow U.S. businesses to focus on core functions, run more efficiently, and enhance shareholder wealth, U.S. companies can hire more people in the long run by becoming more profitable.” This is not the popular perception but just because a viewpoint isn’t popular doesn’t mean it’s not true.

Moreover, when an individual enters the U.S. workforce, he or she earns a salary and spends that money. That spending helps support other jobs in the economy. In addition, when new workers help increase productivity they also help enhance the standard of living in an economy.

                                     Figure 1

H-1B Visas for Indians

A separate issue involves H-1B visas received by Indian nationals. The data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) show Indians are a key source of H-1Bs. This reflects the size of the Indian population, the education level of Indian workers and students, and interest in working in the United States. Many of these individuals have graduated from U.S. universities and are hired off U.S. campuses.

(Source: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, National Foundation for American Policy)

In most years, Indians have not been a majority of the new hires on H-1Bs. (See Table 1.) Examining data from USCIS for “initial employment” one can see Indians represented about 45 percent of H-1Bs in 2000 and 2001, dropped to under 30 percent with the economic downturn in 2002 and 2003, then rose to over 50 percent from 2006 to 2008. In 2009, the Indian percentage dropped to 39 percent. (“Initial employment is the term to denote an H-1B used by a new H-1B visa holder, rather than someone renewing status or switching to a new employer.)

Table 1

H-1B Petitions for Indian Nationals Approved for Initial Employment: FY 2000-2009

Year Percentage used by Indians Number used by Indians
2000 44.5 percent 60,757
2001 45.2 percent 90,668
2002 20.4 percent 21,066
2003 27.8 percent 29,269
2004 46.0 percent 60,062
2005 49.0 percent 57,349
2006 54.4 percent 59,612
2007 55.4 percent 66,504
2008 56.5 percent 61,739
2009 39.4 percent 33,961
43.9 percent (average) 54,098 (average)

                                                                (Source: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services)


Table 2 provides a look at Indian nationals compared to those from other countries in being hired on new H-1B visas. Table 2 shows in FY 2009, Indians utilized 39.4 percent of the petitions approved for “initial employment,” while the next largest recipients were individuals from China (10.4 percent), Canada (5.3 percent), Philippines (4.3 percent), South Korea (2.5 percent) and United Kingdom (2.3 percent).

Table 2

H-1B Petitions Approved for Initial Employment by Country of Birth in FY 2009


Country of Birth Percentage of H-1Bs Approved for Initial Employment
India
39.4 percent
China 10.4 percent
Canada 5.3 percent
Philippines 4.3 percent
South Korea 2.5 percent
United Kingdom 2.3 percent
Japan 2.0 percent
Mexico 1.9 percent

 (Source: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services)


Conclusion

Although the annual H-1B cap is 65,000, there is also an additional 20,000 slots permitted for individuals who receive a masters degree or higher from a U.S. university. H-1B visa holders hired by U.S. universities or non-profit research institutes are exempt from the numerical limits. Overall, we normally see a little more than 100,000 H-1Bs approved in a year for “initial employment.” That annual flow of new H-1B visa holders comes to about 0.06 percent of the U.S. labor force. It should be obvious that while such professionals are important to many employers and the United States as a whole, given this small percentage it is difficult to argue they are creating widespread joblessness or other “evils” that are sometimes attributed to them.

The Ties that Bind

Three years after the conclusion of the path-breaking civilian nuclear agreement, the U.S.-India relationship suffers from the lack of a new energizing project. In its first year or so, the Obama administration did not display much interest in continuing its predecessor’s high-profile engagement with New Delhi, turning its attention instead to expanding ties with Beijing. To be sure, the United States more recently has moved to re-engage India, as evidenced by the warm sentiment flowing from President Obama’s state visit last November. The problem is that Mr. Obama’s rhetoric during the trip made it sound like the visit was more connected to his export-promotion initiative than to any grand foreign policy objective.

For its part, New Delhi is a constrained strategic partner, one that is not well-equipped – ideologically or institutionally – to take on bold bilateral projects. While Prime Minister Manmohan Singh finally did manage to push the nuclear agreement through a balky Parliament, his victory was in important measure pyrrhic, in the end revealing just how small the consensus (see the analysis here and here) is among Indian political elites for undertaking ambitious bilateral initiatives.

Credit: thesouthasian.comThe paucity of visible leadership in both capitals is problematic. It is true that both governments are collaborating as never before at the bureaucratic level. But the U.S.-India partnership has yet to find sure footing and still lacks sufficient institutionalization to advance the new era in bilateral relations. Robert Blackwill has warned that “neither the U.S. nor the Indian bureaucracies at present are yet prepared instinctively to facilitate a deeper and more intimate degree of cooperation between the two countries….It is going to take leadership and direction from the top to change old habits and attitudes.” Ronen Sen has made a similar point: “We have not reached the point where the relationship can be placed on auto-pilot. It still needs to be nurtured.”  And the Hindustan Times noted last year that the Washington-New Delhi connection is still not yet “a machine that will move on its own steam.”

The burden of advancing bilateral affairs, at least in the next few years, will have to be borne by the key societal bonds that helped build the relationship in the first place.  Headlines about the nuclear cooperation accord and expanding military ties notwithstanding, it is important to bear in mind that the foundation for the partnership was actually forged outside the realm of government policy and far beyond the confines of Washington and New Delhi. Unlike most of the relationships maintained by the United States with other leading countries, the one with India is distinguished by the signal role played by societal ties and privatesector initiatives. As Shivshankar Menon, now Prime Minister Singh’s national security advisor, remarked last year, “[I]f anything, the creativity of [American and Indian] entrepreneurs, engineers and scientists has sometimes exceeded that of our political structures.” And Nicholas Burns, who did yeoman’s work in hammering out the details of the nuclear accord, emphasizes that societal bonds are “the greatest strength in the relationship” and that “the big breakthrough in U.S.-India relations was achieved originally by the private sector.”

Consider, for example, the dynamics at work a little more than a decade ago. In response to the 1998 nuclear tests, Washington imposed an array of economic sanctions on India and expelled visiting Indian scientists from U.S. government laboratories. Yet at the same time, concerns about the “Y2K” programming problem led companies in Silicon Valley and in India to set the foundation for today’s strong technology partnership. And as I wrote earlier, the Indian-American community, relatively small but highly influential, has lead the way in building new ties between its native and adoptive countries.

credit: charlierose.comThe significant role played by these societal bonds has caused Fareed Zakaria to compare U.S.-India ties to the special relationships the United States has with Great Britain and Israel. Shashi Tharoor has likewise remarked that “in 20 years I expect the Indo-U.S. relationship to resemble the Israel-U.S. relationship, and for many of the same reasons.”

Although they are often overlooked by national policymakers, societal bonds give fuller texture and equipoise to the bilateral partnership than could be hoped to be achieved at the intergovernmental level alone.  And at a time when bureaucratic mechanisms are not firing on all cylinders, strengthening these ties will be one key in securing the growth of broad-based, resilient relations over the long term since they work to limit the risk that political and diplomatic frictions could escalate and disrupt the overall U.S.-India partnership.

This is particularly important as the structural dynamics of the bilateral relationship will prove challenging to manage in the future.  The basic framework of U.S. security and economic relations with a number of key countries in Europe and Asia was laid down in another era of world politics, when the national power of these states was in decline.  The resulting alliances were, and in many ways still remain, unequal partnerships.  In contrast, India’s power trajectory is upward.

Moreover, foreign policy elites in New Delhi continue to insist on the prerogative of strategic autonomy and, hence, are unlikely to accommodate Washington’s priorities as readily as other U.S. allies.  With continuing divergences over foreign policy objectives, frictions will inevitably develop on a range of issues – from global trade negotiations, climate change and nonproliferation policy, to differential approaches on Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as India’s bid for a higher profile in world affairs. As Nick Burns cautions “the United States must adjust to a friendship with India that will feature a wider margin of disagreement than [Washington is] accustomed to.”