Tag Archives: Barack Obama

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India may not be a U.S. ally, but it may become the best partner we have in Asia

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Guest post by Manish Thakur

In terms of symbolism, the President has done a splendid job when it comes to India. His first state dinner was for the Indian Prime Minister. And now, his longest overseas trip to date is to India. So why then does India feel slighted? Simple: after the heady days of Clinton and Bush, the substance of the relationship has stalled. Early naievite by the Administration on Beijing’s good intentions left India (and much of Free Asia) feeling abandoned. More problematic is our our “alliance” with Pakistan, something that is bound to raise concerns in Delhi. Indians like to explain all the downsides of our working with Pakistan. The problem is not that we don’t already know this, but that we don’t have a choice but to placate Pakistan while our troops are still fighting a war in Afghanistan. As long as we are reliant on Pakistan, we will have to expect suspicions about our intentions in Delhi.

For its part, India is also a tough party to deal with. Its obsession with strategic autonomy makes it too difficult to fit into the usual U.S. “ally” relationship, even though that may be in its interests. Furthermore, there is still an anti-U.S. reflexiveness in part of the Indian establishment. The U.S. tore apart global rules to allow India to engage in nuclear trade with the world, and yet it looks like U.S. companies will lose out to French and Russian firms in the fierce race for nuclear trade. The same may happen in India’s choice of defense purchases, where Europe and Russia still are formidable competitors. None of this will engender warm feelings in Washington. India wants U.S. support for a permanent seat on the Security Council, but ignores the fact that it has voted with the U.S. only 30% of the time, hardly giving Washington confidence to support its bid.

Longer term, however, India’s rising economy, common democratic system of government and the general popularity of the U.S. in India will see the two countries through. Also, the threat from China and jihadi terrorism will pull them ever closer, even though quite what that means is still unclear. Even on Pakistan, the U.S. can improve joint intelligence cooperation, and put pressure on Pakistan’s Generals to act against the terror groups that they themselves created.

India and the U.S. are natural partners in Asia, and the relationship certainly has the potential to become one of the defining ones of the 21st Century. I don’t know whether India will be able to join a U.S.-led Asia-Pacific NATO, something that I’ve been advocating for a while. In fact, India has begun its own security dialog with such U.S. allies as Japan and South Korea, making it a possible lynch-pin in a regional security partnership (but its absence is not a reason not to go forward). As the focus of world economic activity and military rivalry moves to the Western Pacific-Indian Ocean region, India will become increasingly central to America’s global security interests. It behooves us, therefore, to afford this relationship the importance it deserves, and not just engage in symbolism.

(This post originally appeared in www.dailyexception.com)

India-US Relations Blog

Obama’s visit: India’s red lines

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Guest post by Raja Karthikeya

The briefing books are ready. The red carpet has been laid out. Indian leaders have made up their mind on the talking points with Obama. However, for what promises to be a historic occasion, U.S. President Obama’s visit has been hailed with surprisingly down-to-earth expectations. But understanding India’s concerns on one element that concerns the U.S. equally – terrorism – may still change the outcome of this visit and this factor goes far beyond David Headley.

Veteran South Asia analyst Ashley Tellis recently wrote that it is ironic that the key issues that pre-occupy policymakers in the U.S. and India alike – Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China have become irritants in bilateral relations. Indeed, there are yet things that Obama can do to converge U.S. and Indian strategy, particularly on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Obama can start by addressing the red lines that India has vis-à-vis specific non-state actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Red lines, in diplomatic parlance, are points that are non-negotiable. But they can also represent the bare minimum demands that a negotiating side expects to have fulfilled, in order to call the discussion a success.

On Afghanistan, India has its reservations on the pace and potential outcome of the Karzai government’s negotiations with the Taliban. Irrespective of how much distance the U.S. puts between itself and the negotiations, Indians continue to believe that the talks could not happen without an implicit U.S. nod. While India closely watches the talks, it has one red line that it expects the U.S. to respect: no negotiation with the Haqqani network. This group, which has most notably been behind the 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, represents everything that worries India about the future of the region. And India’s sentiments towards the Haqqani network are not very different from what the U.S. feels about Hezbollah for the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon or Al Qaeda for the attacks on embassies in East Africa.

When it comes to non-state actors based in Pakistan, the red lines are clear as well. The U.S. should push Pakistan to act against one group’s leadership more than anything else: Lashkar-e-Taiba. It is no surprise that in the latest Pew opinion poll, Indians cited Lashkar-e-Taiba as the greatest threat to their country. And it is hardly reassuring when despite Pakistan’s claims of crackdown on the group, as cited in Bob Woodward’s Obama Wars, the U.S. National Security Advisor finds Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi directing the group’s operations from inside a Pakistani prison.

Obama is likely to ask what would inspire trust in India that Pakistan’s establishment is serious about acting against terrorism. Some very tangible measures by Islamabad would help: 1. Disallow police permission to any public gatherings or rallies by the Jamat-ud-Dawa, an organization proscribed by the UN, particularly in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi. 2. List Jamat-ud-Dawa as a banned organization under the Anti-Terrorism Acts. The absence of this measure led to Hafiz Saeed being released by the courts after arrest more than once 3. Put Hafiz Saeed away for good. His speeches themselves have led to murder and mayhem. And the fingerprints of the organization he leads, Jamat-ud-Dawa, and of LeT’s alumni have been found on several major international terrorist plots from the Mumbai attacks to the 7/7 London bombings to the 2006 transatlantic airliner “liquid bomb” plot. Again, putting a man in prison is not enough if prison turns into a mere retreat from where one can tele-commute. Take the case of Omar Sheikh, the man released in the 1999 Indian airliner hijacking who was later imprisoned in Pakistan for the murder of journalist Daniel Pearl. Just after the Mumbai attacks, safe in the confines of his prison, Omar Sheikh called Pakistani President Zardari pretending to be the Indian foreign minister and raised tempers enough for Pakistan to scramble its jets and for the two nations to almost go to war. To avoid the repetition of such events, the red line on Hafiz Saeed would be that his imprisonment should imply he would not be heard from anymore.

There are those on Obama’s team who believe that the key to peace between India and Pakistan lies in resolution of differences over Kashmir. But if the Zardari government seeks to pick up the thread of the back-channel process that was aborted in 2007, a good start would be to disallow meetings of the “United Jihad Council” – the consortium of violent terrorist groups that strike in Jammu & Kashmir. This consortium holds its annual meetings in Muzaffarabad in full media spotlight where its members, carrying arms, call for violent attacks in India.

If President Obama can assure India of using his influence and sees that these red lines are addressed and that these tangible concerns are met, then this visit would not just be a success – it would be the beginning of a whole new era of trust in India-US relations.

(Raja Karthikeya is a foreign policy researcher.)

India-US Relations Blog

It’s not transactional, stupid!

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Obama’s visit to India is a sign of the symbolism that characterizes a strategic relationship.

People are missing the point.

It doesn’t require the U.S. president to come all the way to India to sell military equipment, make a case for reforming the UN security council, remove hurdles for high-technology co-operation, or indeed, as White House officials tried to project last week, encourage Indian companies to create jobs in the United States.

Such issues are negotiated by the minions, need bureaucratic and political consensus on both sides and are settled at their own pace. Official visits and summits between heads of state at best impose artificial deadlines and can be used to inject urgency into the negotiating machines. We saw it a few years ago when the India-US nuclear deal was pushed through in time for a Bush-Manmohan Singh summit.

Those who measure the significance and success of Barack Obama’s upcoming visit to India through the prism of deals signed and statements made miss the fact that the India-US relationship is strategic, not transactional. Ironically, the strategic nature of the relationship was sealed by a transaction—the nuclear deal—leading many to expect more of the same. Now, there are good reasons for the Indian government to purchase U.S. military aircraft, but not doing so isn’t about to wreck the bilateral relationship. Similarly, there are good reasons for Mr Obama to declare support for India’s place in a reformed UN Security Council, but other than disappointing his hosts, he won’t do much damage if he skips this topic.

For the first time in more than 50 years, the interests of the United States and India are converging geopolitically, geo-economically and, to coin a phrase, geo-democratically. As K Subrahmanyam points out succinctly, the United States needs India to counter China’s rising power. Likewise, India needs a strong United States, not to ally with, but for its own reasons of swing. This is as true from the economic perspective as it is from a political one. [Also see this CNAS report] Most importantly, India and the United States are mutually popular—the bottom-up factor is a powerful driver of closer bilateral relations.

It’s very hard to measure the extent of strategic relationships. Signing of business or arms deals are poor proxies. That’s where symbolism comes in. Obama has no real business to do in India. Yet he is coming. Sure, he’ll do some business when he’s here, but none that absolutely requires his presence. It’s symbolic and it counts.

For that reason Barack Obama will have a very successful trip to India next week. He just has to turn up.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

The Pamir Knot* peace deal

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Reports have been emerging about U.S. involvement in Kashmir, and Pakistan’s repeated attempts to bring the Kashmir issue on President Barack Obama’s agenda when he visits Delhi in first week of November. Also, the matter of India’s seat at the UN Security Council now seems to be only a matter of time, and the Presidential visit is expected to be a step in that direction.

However, none of President Obama’s objectives of protecting the physical and economic security of the U.S. from major harm in the 21st century by the terror emerging from the vast lawless lands of Afghanistan and Pakistan shall be met unless China vacates Kashmir.

A historic Pamir Knot peace deal for the region requires that China must be involved in the security of this region – and irrespective of whichever framework or formula emerges about Kashmir, China must first vacate the lands of Kashmir that it occupies. The regions of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), and China-occupied Kashmir (CoK) must be merged to create a “Naya Kashmir”* independent of occupation. With democracy and right-to-self determination in the merged areas of PoK and CoK, the “Naya Kashmir”, the people of the region would have peace and prosperity, and not be cesspools of ignorant hatred and poverty, with access to even nuclear and others weapons and methods of mass disaster.

While India officially says that it shall brook no interference by any third party, the U.S. administration is understood to believe that a solution to the Kashmir issue will substantially improve peace and security in the region, greatly reduce danger to the domestic and global interests of the United States, and help it resolve the Afghanistan imbroglio. President Obama is under intense pressure to bring troops home from Afghanistan, and unless he succeeds there is great danger to not only the U.S., but entire Western nations and Pakistan itself.

I understand that this recommendation may be controversial initially – but we all now need to re-imagine the world for our next generations. Otherwise, the U.S., this region, and the world will face greater and greater threats in years to come. It is time for the U.S., China, and India to make a grand deal and bring peace and security to Pakistan and Afghanistan. It must also be impressed upon President Obama that in return for obtaining peace and security in Asia to safeguard American national interests, China must commit in perpetuity that it shall cease and desist from any machinations on India’s eastern borders.

*The Pamir is a high mountainous plateau that is sometimes described as a “knot” because it lies at the intersection of several of Asia’s great mountain ranges: the Himalaya, the Karakoram, the Hindu Kush, and the Tian Shan.

*Naya Kashmir, the word “naya” means “new” in Hindi language.

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(The post originally appeared on the Imagindia Insititue website on October 22, 2010.)

(Image source: www.centraasiatravel.com)


India-US Relations Blog

Musings on a Presidential Visit

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As the President’s visit draws nearer, the delicate dance being played out by both sides is fascinating to watch. While the American side would prefer the Tango, the hosts have decided that a carefully choreographed (with emphasis on choreographed) ballet is the way to go.  The managers of the visit seemed to have decided to err on the side of caution when drawing up the Presidential itinerary, major considerations being his way with words, what he symbolizes in his persona, and the volatility of the inter-governmental relationships in the region. So, out went the President’s visit to Chabad House on security grounds. Out also went the President’s visit to Wagah border where he would presumably have made a speech on the lines of Ronald Reagan’s 1997 entreaty to President Gorbachov at the Brandenberg Gate which brought the Berlin Wall crashing down.  Whether a speech would have had any result other than further burnish his Nobel Peace prize can only now exist in the realms of speculation.

As is the norm during such State visits, both sides draw up wish lists and there then ensues some hard bargaining with lots of give and take.  This worked when such visits were few and far between.  Whilst summit level diplomacy worked well in case of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Deal (that has proved to be a flash in the pan), Prime Minister Singh’s State visit to Washington  in November last yielded very little by way of substance.  The increased frequency of these visits has meant that the list of issues that are yet to find closure for various reasons, from a totalisation agreement, to defense agreements is growing, even as new issues such as the legislation on H1-B visa and outsourcing are bringing new irritants into the relationship. The parlous state of the U.S. economy plus the fact that a Democrat administration is in power would mean that these new issues will also go into the intractable issues column on that list.

Reading between the lines, the Americans seem to have made it clear that discussion on issues that would impact American jobs is a no-go area.  The American argument seems to be that when the going was good, we welcomed thousands of Indians to the United States and provided them with jobs; and now it’s your turn to help us out by buying our goods and services in a big way. This argument is of course somewhat fallacious since the United States was responding to the needs of its own economy, as it has always done, when it opened the gates for foreign workers.

If the United States is bent on improving trade relations, then on top of its agenda should be the removal of the constraints on trade and collaboration in high-technology items. That however, does not seem to be the case, with the U.S. still stopping short of completely removing these impediments. The nuclear deal notwithstanding, this is still a transactional relationship with strategic considerations very much playing second fiddle. As the Prime Minister’s successful visit to Japan amply testifies, a strategic relationship finds traction only when there is a clear and overwhelming desire on both sides to take that relationship forward. Of course, one advantage with the India-Japan Strategic Partnership is the absence of domestic spoilers. The Japanese Prime Minister has no need to turn Bangalore into a bogeyman for domestic audiences nor do sections of India polity look on Japan with suspicion.

Administration officials have been tom-tomming the fact that this is one of only two visits by an American President to India in the first two years of his first term in office. Well, the earlier one was by President Jimmy Carter, and we all know how that went. For those too young to recollect, it began with “the biggest crowds [Carter] had addressed as President” assembling at the Ram Lila grounds in Delhi on New Year’s Day of 1978 and ended with Carter (caught off mike) telling his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that “after we return, we must write a letter, very cold and blunt” to Prime Minister Morarji Desai. (This was in the context of Desai refusing to Carter’s request to open Indian nuclear facilities to international inspection.) The Indian authorities are no doubt hoping that the similarities between the two visits are confined to the positive.