Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

US-India Strategic Partnership: Irritants Cast a Shadow

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The U.S-India strategic partnership is moving on an upward trajectory, though not a predictably smooth one. In fact, after the euphoric “indispensable partners” phase of the second administration of President George W. Bush when the Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement was successfully concluded in July 2005, the pace of growth has slowed down.

Though President Bill Clinton had realised the potential of engaging India and had begun the process to get India out of the nuclear dog house, it was President Bush who made it a key foreign policy initiative. India was recognised as a state with nuclear weapons outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), given an NSG waiver to import nuclear technology and fuel, and allowed to sign an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Additional Protocol only placed  India’s civilian nuclear reactors under international safeguards while keeping strategic facilities out of the scope of the safeguards. India was also permitted to reprocess uranium under safeguards for its pressurized heavy water reactors leading to the development of the three-stage thorium fuel cycle.

Under the Next Steps for Strategic Partnership and the Defence Framework Agreement of June 2005 signed under the Bush administration, the technology denial regime is being gradually eased and defense cooperation considerably enhanced. For both the countries, the growing partnership is a hedging strategy against Chinese hegemony in Asia and will prove to be mutually beneficial in case China implodes due to its internal contradictions.

Another crucial area of cooperation between India and the U.S. includes enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation. The CIA has not only given India substantial evidence about the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, but also allowed Indian agencies to interrogate its key plotter David Coleman Headley. The sale of U.S. defense equipment to India has also gained momentum. Besides the P8I Poseidon maritime reconnaissance aircraft, C-130J Super Hercules aircraft for Special Forces, C-17 Globemaster strategic airlift aircraft and the USS Trenton, an amphibious warfare ship, many other defense acquisitions are in the pipeline. India is likely to spend up to $ 100 billion on defense purchases over the next 10 years. However, India would like to move away from a buyer-seller relationship towards transfer of technology and joint development, joint production and joint marketing of latest weapons and technology.

In the midst of this flourishing defense relationship, India feels slighted at being left out of negotiations for the resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan despite its obvious strategic stakes, and immense contribution to the development effort. The sale of conventional arms to Pakistan, including F-16 aircraft and 155mm artillery, ostensibly for counter-insurgency operations, also rankles with India as U.S. arms have emboldened Pakistan to launch both covert and overt military operations against India in the past.

While the End User Monitoring Agreement was signed recently, the U.S. would like to see early progress on the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and the two technology and information safeguards agreements – the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA).

There is no doubt that the growing U.S.-India strategic partnership will define the contours of the geo-politics of the 21st century. However, expectations from president Obama’s forthcoming visit to India are rather low as he has so far not provided the type of leadership and impetus to the relationship that his predecessor had. At best, the two countries might sign a free trade agreement, which in itself will be a good step forward for bilateral trade.

(Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Terrorism, Financial Collapse and China

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Guest post by Manish Thakur

America stands at the crossroads of a number of critical security challenges, none of which can be tackled in isolation. Terrorism, a struggling economy and a resurgent China all require urgent focus. We do not have a choice in dealing with one problem to the exclusion of the others. It will take strong but “cool and collected” leadership over the coming years balancing and prioritizing between them if we are to secure the future. It will also take reinvigorated alliances and new partners, particularly outside of Europe, the traditional focus of most of our security efforts.

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States has been in locked in a far-reaching struggle with jihadi terrorism, whether against the Taliban in Afghanistan or against insurgents following the invasion of Iraq. Our military and security services constantly guard against very real threats of further attacks, particularly from radicalized populations in failing countries such as Pakistan and Somalia, or among disaffected members of immigrant communities in Western Europe. But even as our troops fight abroad, the broader American society has not changed its bad habits of over-consumption at home.  Our ability to borrow cheap foreign money and spend it on cheap foreign goods has resulted in staggering debt, both at the household and at the national level, threatening the integrity of our entire financial system. If the collapse of the Twin Towers signaled an end to the post-Cold War peace dividend, the collapse of Lehman signaled an end to the post-War period of overwhelming American economic preeminence.

Between the fighting and the spending, we nearly miss the really big news of the decade: the remarkable return of China to its historical place as a world leader. Building on a global trading system underwritten by the U.S. military, and buoyed by an undervalued currency, Beijing has quietly amassed massive foreign exchange resources, and now looks to secure its economic rise with a growing military and expanding ties across the Persian Gulf, Africa, Central Asia and Latin America. It is not being alarmist to say that China’s sudden rise could be as destabilizing in the early decades of the 21st Century as Germany’s was at the start of the 20th Century. At best, a mercantile China will co-exist uncomfortably with the U.S. as a trading partner and sometimes rival. At worst, a militaristic China will seek to eject the U.S. altogether from Asia, undermine it in the Gulf, and fashion itself globally as an alternate form of government to liberal democracy.

We face a dangerous world where our “unipolar moment” to project power has truly passed and yet our challenges have multiplied. We must therefore reengage and expect more from our traditional allies even as we seek new ones, particularly those espousing or aspiring to liberal democratic ideals. Our NATO alliance, though vital, is no longer sufficient as America’s primary security alliance given that Europe punches below its weight in world affairs.  Our Middle Eastern alliances are critical in our efforts against jihadi terrorism but will always be compromised by the undemocratic nature of the governments behind them. Our Asian alliances grow ever more important but we need to urgently reengage with them, particularly as China replaces us as the number one trading partner for country after country in the region.

Beyond our traditional partners, we need to establish substantive ties with new countries that can further enhance our security. Among these, no country is more important than India. Its rapidly expanding economy makes it an inevitable player in world affairs. Its democratic polity makes it an enduring partner. Its concerns over the same issues of jihadi terror and an assertive China make it a natural ally.  I believe in this not simply because I am co-Chair of USINPAC’s National Security Committee or because I am an Indian-American. I believe in a meaningful U.S.-India partnership because of its inherent logic for both countries.  I look forward to commencing this National Security blog for USINPAC at this challenging time in our nation’s history, and I welcome your comments.

(Manish Thakur is co-Chair of USINPAC’s National Security Committee, with a focus on America’s strategic relationships, particularly with AfPak and China. All views expressed here are his personal opinions and do that reflect those of USINPAC.)

India-US Relations Blog

Did U.S. authorities know about Headley’s terrorist connections?

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The U.S. federal authorities had been warned of David Coleman Headley’s links to Lashkar-e-Taiba by his wives on various occasions before the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, according to media reports today. The New York Times reports that about a year before the attacks, Headley’s Moroccan wife warned U.S. authorities in Pakistan about her husband’s intentions to attack. In 2005, his American wife had complained to authorities about her husband’s potential links with Lashkar-e-Taiba. However, these warnings did not lead to any arrests and Headley continued to make training and reconnaissance trip to Pakistan and India in preparation of the attacks.

An important point to note in David Headley’s relationship with the U.S. authorities is that he was a longtime informer in Pakistan for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Questions are being raised if this connection made U.S. authorities neglect complaints against him. Authorities however, maintained that the complaints by Headley’s wives were followed upon but did not reveal enough for any arrests to take place. Questions are also been raised in India about why India was not sufficiently informed about the matter, if the U.S. had prior information in the case.

During his interrogation by Indian authorities in Washington D.C, Headley revealed plans to attack various other cities including Delhi and the Prime Minister’s residence. He is also said to have revealed links between the ISI and the 26/11 attacks.

David Coleman Headley was arrested last year in Chicago with another co-conspirator, Tahawwur Hussain Rana. He had pleaded guilty to planning the Mumbai attacks and entered into a plea bargain with U.S. authorities which prevent his extradition to any country.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

The Red Dragon’s plans for India

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China’s aggressive strategic posture in Asia indicates that China has given up Deng Xiaoping’s advice to “hide your capabilities and bide your time.” In South Asia, China is clearly engaged in a carefully thought through and meticulously orchestrated policy aimed at the strategic encirclement of India.

China’s nuclear warhead and missile technology nexus with Pakistan has been meticulously documented by several international experts. By giving Pakistan nuclear warhead technology and highly enriched uranium, by gifting fully assembled M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan and by blessing North Korea’s transfer of No Dong and Taepo Dong missiles to Pakistan, China has irrevocably changed the geo-strategic equation in South Asia by propping up Pakistan as a challenger to India.

The “all-weather” friendship between China and Pakistan is, in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words, “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans”. Under a treaty of “Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourly Relations”, signed during Premier Wen Jiabao’s 2005 tour, China has guaranteed Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Had it not been for the cover provided by its nuclear shield, an internally unstable and economically failing Pakistan would have been in no position to wage a proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir through its mercenary terrorists.

China’s deep inroads into Myanmar and support for its military regime; its hobnobbing with the Maoists in Nepal; its covert assistance to the now defunct LTTE in Sri Lanka; its attempts to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) while keeping India out of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); and, its relentless efforts to increase its influence in Bangladesh and the Maldives are all areas of major concern for India. China’s efforts to develop port facilities in Myanmar (Hanggyi), Bangladesh (Chittagong), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), and at Gwadar (Pakistan) are part of a “string of pearls” strategy to dominate the northern Indian Ocean region around 2015-20.

China refuses to discuss nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs) with India on the grounds that India is not a nuclear weapons state recognised by the NPT. The unstable security relationship and lack of progress on the resolution of the territorial dispute could result in these Asian giants clashing in future rather than cooperating for mutual gains.

(Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.)

*Image credit: www.eaglespeak.com

India-US Relations Blog

Hanging around the Y-junction

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It was interesting to see, towards the end of Bob Woodward’s Obama’s Wars, members of the Obama administration realise that the United States is in the same place today as it was in early 2009. Recent events validate that assessment. Frustrated with the Pakistani army’s refusal to shut down taliban safe havens, the US-led forces attacked across the border killing Pakistani soldiers. The Pakistani military retaliated by shutting down the supply route, letting taliban militants destroy some trucks and show that it has the ability to inflict some pain. This was roughly the state of affairs when Barack Obama took over as president.

This is exactly what we had argued, “Sooner or later, the Obama administration will come to realise that it has no way to make the Pakistani military establishment seriously fight and defeat the jihadi groups, which includes the Taliban, al-Qaeda and outfits like the Lashkar-e-Taiba. When that moment comes, Barack Obama will need to choose between direct confrontation with the Pakistani military-jihadi complex and colossal strategic defeat.” (Operation Markarap)

What now? It is unlikely that President Obama would choose “direct confrontation with the Pakistani military-jihadi complex” just yet. The race to find options short of that is almost certainly on, and a “throw them a bone” alternative will be sought. There are three possible bones. First, to accept a pro-Pakistani political dispensation in Afghanistan. Second, to accept the “legitimacy of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons”. Third, to press India to compromise on Kashmir.

The first option doesn’t appeal to General Ashfaq Kayani at this stage because he believes he can get there without the United States. The second option is a status symbol they can do without, not least because China continues to support the expansion of the Pakistani arsenal. The third option might just do the trick, because which Pakistani general is immune to the potential glory of being the one who won Kashmir?

So expect Washington to exert pressure on India over Kashmir. Expect pressure to restart the composite dialogue and suchlike. It’ll take the Obama administration a year or so to realise that this is a dead-end. General Kayani will probably realise it a little before Washington does. And then what?

Well, we told you already. Barack Obama will need to choose between direct confrontation with the Pakistani military-jihadi complex and colossal strategic defeat.