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Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan: The Turmoil Within

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The situation in Pakistan appears to worsen by the day. Consequent to President Asif Ali Zardari’s return from Dubai, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has spoken of “conspiracies being hatched to bring down his elected government.” He has vowed to “continue to fight for the rights of the people of Pakistan, whether or not we remain in the government.” Fears of another military coup are writ large in Gilani’s statement made in Pakistan’s parliament.

In a related development, in the wake of the tensions between the elected government and the army, Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence has stated that it has “no operational control over the army and ISI.” It made this admission in an affidavit filed in the Supreme Court regarding its inability to respond formally on behalf of the armed forces and the ISI in respect of their stand on the ‘memogate’ scandal. Tensions between the army and the civilian government have been rising over a memo that was reportedly sent at President Zardari’s behest to Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, about a coup that the army was said to be planning following the killing of Osama bin Laden.

Meanwhile, the army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani, has petitioned the Supreme Court to “thoroughly investigate” the memogate scandal as it has a bearing on national security and sovereignty. It emerges clearly that the army and the ISI are at loggerheads with the elected civilian government and would like it to go. However, they do not as yet appear to be prepared to stage another military coup to dislodge the government.

Given the stranglehold that the Pakistan army enjoys over the country’s polity, the army should be content to drive the country’s major policies from the back seat. However, if there is another military coup, it will certainly not be the last one. Pakistan has a history of military coups that go back to the era of General Ayub Khan. General Musharraf was the last military dictator of the country. He yielded power to a civilian dispensation very reluctantly and that too only after being hounded by an uncharacteristically pro-active Supreme Court.

Pakistan has become a rentier state that is dependent on Uncle Sam’s aid. Its economy is in shambles. It can default any time on its loan repayment obligations. Its currency is down to rupees 90 to a U.S. dollar. Inflation is flying high in double digits. The number of people living below the subsistence level is going up steadily. Relations with the U.S. are at an all time low. The security situation within Pakistan is dismal. Interior Minister Rehman Malik was recently reduced to thanking the Taliban for maintaining peace during Muharram.

At a time when all sections of Pakistan’s polity should unite together to fight the scourge of internal instability and creeping Talibanisation, it is incomprehensible that the army and the ISI should be jostling for narrow political gains to restore their hegemony. Unless Pakistan’s army is tamed and cut to size, it will continue to thwart Pakistan’s fledgling democracy from taking firm roots. Only an Arab Spring type of revolution will be able to clip the army’s wings. Alas, it does not look imminent.

 

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India-Pakistan Track-II Peace-making Efforts

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India-Pakistan Track-II (back channel diplomacy) conferences and round-table discussions have been taking place for many years. The Neemrana Group is perhaps the oldest and the best known. The participants in these discussions mainly comprise retired Generals, Admirals and Marshals and a few diplomats and academics. Recently, members of the other branches of civil society – civil servants, media persons and human rights activists, among others – have also been invited.

Given the levels of hostility between the official establishments on both the sides, Track-II gatherings are usually held in other countries. Kathmandu used to be the perennial favourite for these dialogues, but has fallen out of favour since the Maoist insurgency began. Now the discussions take place at exotic overseas locales like Bangkok, Colombo, Dubai and Singapore and, occasionally, in European towns like Como and the Bellagio Centre, both located on the bank of the very pretty Lake Como near Milan in Italy. Salubrious surroundings – and good wine – undoubtedly contribute immensely to the success of these verbal sparring bouts!

The sponsors, who are frowned upon by both the governments, include well-meaning overseas foundations like the Frederick Foundation and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Germany, several overseas universities that manage to raise funds from their respective governments, well-known think tanks in India and abroad and, sometimes, organisations with an advocacy agenda like the infamous Ghulam Nabi Fai’s various ISI-supported centres in Europe and the United States.

The primary aim of most of these Track-II dialogues is to enhance strategic stability in South Asia by reducing the risk of conventional conflict and, if it breaks out, preventing its escalation to nuclear exchanges. The agenda invariably revolves around confidence building measures (CBMs) in the military field, nuclear CBMs and risk reduction measures and measures to improve trade and people-to-people relations through increased contact, cultural exchanges and sports tournaments. Specific issues like the demilitarisation of the Siachen Conflict Zone and the settlement of the international boundary in Sir Creek have been taken up several times.

The Indian participants assume that their Pakistani counterparts were briefed in GHQ Rawalpindi and by the ISI before their departure and that they will be debriefed on return. The Pakistani participants know that military people do not count for much in India and wonder why they are talking to them at all. However, they are wary of those of us who have a presence in the media. I have noticed that in the last couple of years, members of the civil society from Pakistan like academics and media people have become increasingly strident in their criticism of both the government of Pakistan and the handling of the security situation by the army. And, the Pakistani Generals are now far more conciliatory in their approach to conflict resolution.

The first session, if not the entire first day, is usually spent in telling the other side how obnoxious its policies are and how destabilising its actions are, particularly covert intelligence operations. While the Pakistani participants harp on the fact that they provide only ‘political, diplomatic and moral support’ to so-called Kashmiri freedom fighters, the Indians insist on placing on the record their condemnation of the ISI’s continuing sponsorship of terrorism in India. Though the seasoned veterans of Track-II diplomacy are fairly reserved in their outpourings, the first timers are invariably garrulous and use the occasion to let off pent up steam against their former military adversaries, whom they are meeting for the first time.

The first evening’s dinner serves to calm frayed nerves and, as they talk about dozens of commonalities including cricket, Hindi movies and music, the participants discover that their counterparts from across the international boundary do not have horns – though some of them do have long hair or beards! On the second evening, a dinner on a river cruise or a visit to a famous landmark is thrown in for good measure and adds to the bonhomie.

The second day is spent more fruitfully in getting to grips with the precarious security situation in the Indian Sub-continent, especially the fighting along the Af-Pak border and the impact of creeping Talibanisation in Pakistan. The participants usually agree on the need to institute comprehensive military and nuclear CBMs and promise to take up all the serious issues plaguing the India-Pakistan relationship with their governments and write about them in the media. They concede that conflict is not desirable and that wisdom lies in preventing it rather than in fanning the flames of hatred.

The dialogue thus ends on a happy note and the sponsors are pleased with their efforts. They are relieved that they can report back positively about the usefulness of the dialogue – and hope to raise more funds for the next round.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India-Pakistan Nuclear Confidence Building Measures

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After a long gap, the India-Pakistan nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) joint working group will meet at Islamabad on December 26, 2011. In February 2007, India and Pakistan had signed a long-anticipated agreement on nuclear CBMs and nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs). However, for some inexplicable reasons, the two countries have so far failed to make details of the agreement public.

The aim of instituting nuclear CBMs is to avoid tensions arising from mistrust, misperception, accidents and military brinkmanship. India and Pakistan can never have such high stakes in a future conventional conflict that they could possibly risk nuclear exchanges. It was due to this realisation that the two countries agreed in February 1999 at Lahore to engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields.

Both the countries also committed themselves to undertaking national measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control and had agreed to continue to honour their respective unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests. They had also agreed to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests. This informal understanding was converted into an agreement on the pre-notification of ballistic missile tests on October 3, 2005. Subsequently, both the countries also agreed to provide a “hotline” between the Foreign Secretaries – a cosmetic measure of little consequence.

A number of additional nuclear CBMs and NRRMs need to be implemented by India and Pakistan. The first of these should be a formal agreement on de-mating nuclear warheads from their delivery systems. This implies that warheads for missiles like the Indian Agni and the Pakistani Ghauri and Ghaznavi should be stored separately in a disassembled form, i.e., the atomic core and the conventional high explosive (HE) bomb casing, including the trigger mechanism, should be stored at separate locations during peacetime to reduce the risk of inadvertent or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.

Another viable measure would be to enter into an agreement on the non-use of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) for nuclear deterrence. SRBMs like India’s Prithvi (range 150-250 km) and Pakistan’s Hatf series (Hatf I, II and III – derivative of China’s M-11, with ranges less than 300 km), are inherently destabilising due to their greater mobility, deployment in the close vicinity of the tactical battle area and the short time of flight that gives virtually no reaction time before the missile impacts. As both the nations now have longer-range missiles in service, India and Pakistan would do well to exclude this class of missile completely from their nuclear arsenals. However, by opting to test the nuclear-tipped 65 km range Hatf-9 (Nasr) SRBM, Pakistan has vitiated the atmosphere.

Both the countries should agree to establish national-level risk reduction and monitoring centers, with a suitable communications infrastructure, to build mutual trust. Such centres would act as a hotline between the strategic forces commands. Subsequently, nuclear CBMs and NRRMs could be upgraded to include measures that might appear fanciful today: verifiable deployment restrictions and limitations; shared early warning arrangements; prior information about the movement of nuclear-capable air force squadrons from one base to another; and, identification and notification of training and testing areas for nuclear forces units to distinguish them from deployment areas

The best nuclear CBM between India and Pakistan would be to negotiate and sign a mutually acceptable and verifiable no first use treaty. However, this is unlikely to be acceptable to Pakistan at present as Pakistan relies on its nuclear arsenal to balance India’s conventional superiority.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India must Upgrade its China Strategy from Dissuasion to Deterrence

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It is in India’s interest to focus its diplomatic efforts to expedite the delineation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the Indo-Tibetan border and urge China to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute in an early time frame. In conventional weapons and present force levels, the Indian Army has adequate combat capability to defend the border, but not sufficient to deter war as it lacks a potent offensive operations capability. The gap between India and China in overall military potential, particularly the gap in strategic weapons, is increasing rapidly in China’s favour. China is also actively engaged in upgrading the military infrastructure in Tibet in substantive terms. The all-weather railway line to Lhasa, being extended further to Shigatse and later to Kathmandu, will enable China to build up rapidly for a future conflict. New roads and military airfields have also been built. Military camps are coming up closer to the border. China has inducted a large number of SRBMs into Tibet and can rapidly induct another 500 to 600 SRBMs for a future conflict by moving them from the coastline opposite Taiwan. With improvements in military infrastructure, China’s capability of building up and sustaining forces in Tibet has gone up to 30 to 35 divisions. The PLA’s rapid reaction divisions can also significantly enhance its combat potential over a short period of time. As China’s military power in Tibet grows further, it will be even less inclined to accept Indian perceptions of the LAC and the boundary.

Another factor of concern to India is the emplacement of Chinese nuclear-tipped missiles in Tibet, reportedly first brought to the Tibetan plateau in 1971. While these missiles may have been targeted against the Soviet Union till recently, the present Russia-China rapprochement would make such targeting illogical. The mere presence of Chinese nuclear-tipped missiles in Tibet poses a direct and most serious threat to India as these missiles (DF-2, DF-3, DF-4 and, possibly, DF-5) are capable of reaching all Indian cities. Beijing has been very effective in hiding details of the number of missiles actually deployed and India is only now acquiring the technological means to track and pinpoint the exact locations of these missiles or any others in the Lanzhou-Chengdu region and at the Datong and Kunming missile bases which may have the potential to reach and target Indian cities. This shortcoming needs to be overcome as early as possible through an Indian military intelligence satellite and by humint means.

India, therefore, needs to build up adequate military capabilities to deter the threat from China. In the short-term, the requirement is to ensure that there are no violations of the LAC through effective border management while maintaining a robust dissuasive conventional posture. India must step up its diplomatic efforts to seek early resolution of the territorial dispute, particularly the immediate delineation of the LAC physically on ground and map. Efforts to develop military infrastructure in the border areas for the speedy induction of forces need to be stepped up. India must maintain a strong capability to defend island territories in the Bay of Bengal and to safeguard national interests in the Exclusive Economic Zone. Diplomatic efforts to increase India’s influence in the CARs, Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and with the ASEAN countries should be pursued vigorously.

The long-term requirement is to match China’s strategic challenge in the region and develop a viable military deterrence capability against the use of nuclear and missile weapons systems. Threats posed by nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles cannot be countered by the deployment of land forces and conventional air power alone. Nuclear weapons are best deterred by nuclear weapons and, as a logical corollary, only missiles can deter missiles. Hence, India must develop, test and operationally induct the Agni-III, Agni-IV and Agni-V IRBMs and raise two mountain Strike Corps so as to be able to upgrade its present strategic posture of ‘dissuasion’ to one of credible ‘deterrence’ against China.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

The Liberation of Bangladesh: India’s Greatest Military Victory

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On December 16, 1971, over 90,000 Pakistani soldiers led by Lt Gen A A K Niazi, surrendered to Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, Commander-in-Chief of India’s Eastern Command, at the Dhaka race course and the new nation of Bangladesh was born. A day later, on December 17, 1971, the guns fell silent after India’s unilateral offer of a cease fire was accepted by Pakistan’s military ruler General Yahya Khan.

The story had begun about a year earlier. In elections held in 1970, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, had won 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan and a simple majority in the lower house of Pakistan’s parliament. Though he had lawfully earned the right to form the government, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, refused to accept defeat. As the deadlock lingered on, there were widespread protests in East Pakistan and General Yahya Khan gave orders to the army to crush dissent. On the night of March 25, 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and the army began a large-scale, brutal crackdown.

Under Lt Gen Tikka Khan, known as the ‘Butcher of Bengal’, the Pakistan Army unleashed horrific atrocities on the innocent Bengalis. Thousands of them were killed in cold blood. Many more were tortured over several months; many hapless women were raped and molested. Intellectuals and minority Hindus were particularly singled out. The genocide led to a mass exodus and about 10 million refugees straggled across the border into neighbouring Indian states. Despite India’s own difficulties, they were accommodated in refugee camps and were provided with food and shelter.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi condemned the arrest of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the atrocities in East Pakistan. She asked the armed forces to prepare for war as India’s security was being undermined by the massive influx of refugees. General S H F J Manekshaw (later Field Marshal) told the Prime Minister that the army needed some time to prepare for what would be a war on both the eastern and the western front. The monsoon was but a few months away, the Himalayan passes on India’s border with Tibet would remain open till mid-November and the Chinese could intervene. It was sound military advice as the troops needed for offensive operations in East Pakistan could be pulled out from the Chinese border only after the passes closed. The Prime Minister accepted the advice given to her.

Bengali troops in East Pakistan soon revolted and deserted in large numbers to join the Mukti Bahini, a guerrilla force that began to conduct covert operations against Pakistani forces. India provided political, diplomatic and moral support to the Mukti Bahini. While the armed forces began their preparations for war, Indira Gandhi launched a diplomatic campaign to create awareness about the situation in East Pakistan. She toured major world capitals to appeal to the international community to intercede with the government of Pakistan to put an end to the continuing atrocities and to provide humanitarian assistance to India to look after the refugees, but did not receive anything other than sympathy.

On December 3, 1971, Yahya Khan launched pre-emptive air strikes against 11 forward Indian air bases and India and Pakistan were once again at war. India responded with multi-pronged offensive operations into East Pakistan. On December 6, 1971, India accorded formal recognition to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told Parliament, “The people of Bangladesh battling for their very existence and the people of India fighting to defeat aggression now find themselves partisans in the same cause.”

The grand strategy in the war was to fight a holding action on the western front and to liberate Dhaka from Pakistan’s tyrannical rule. The Indian Army, with support from the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force and hand-in-hand with the Mukti Bahini, made rapid progress. Pakistani strong points based on towns and other built up areas were bypassed by the leading columns and left for follow-on troops to clear while the spearheads advanced rapidly towards Dhaka.

Within a week, it became clear to all perceptive observers that Dhaka would soon fall. Maj Gen Rao Farman Ali, Military Adviser to the Governor of East Pakistan, expressed the administration’s willingness to surrender and on December 16, 1971, Maj Gen J F R Jacob, Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, flew into Dhaka to negotiate the terms of surrender. Later that day, Lt Gen Aurora accepted one of military history’s greatest surrenders. Announcing the surrender in Parliament, Indira Gandhi said, “Dhaka is now a free capital of a free country… We hail the people of Bangladesh in their hour of triumph. All nations who value the human spirit will recognize it as a significant milestone in man’s quest for liberty.”

The victory in Bangladesh was the result of a systematically planned and brilliantly executed politico-military campaign. Indira Gandhi proved herself to be a resolute leader who refused to buckle under the pressure of the U.S. fleet led by the USS Enterprise that sailed into the Bay of Bengal during the war. By signing a treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union before the war, she ensured that the Chinese were kept at bay. Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw emerged as a charismatic military leader who succeeded in forging rare unity among the three Services so that the full potential of Indian combat power was exploited in an optimal and synergised manner.

It was truly India’s finest hour. Forty years later, it can be truthfully said that it was a just war and the sacrifices made by Indian soldiers, sailors and airmen were not in vain.