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India-US Relations Blog

What Indians (Some) Want the U.S. to do

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There is little doubt that the left in India wish the United States ill–not that the U.S. has done them any harm. The Indian left, ever since the Soviet bloc collapsed and China turned capitalist and aggressive, has needed an imperialist enemy to focus their enmity upon. After all, their version of socialism or communism ruined nine odd countries whose people revolted against the rule of the proletariat and went back into the capitalist fold. So the U.S. wish to democratize other nations and slap around a few dictators evokes little sympathy in places like JNU.  Opposing national stands taken in other capitals, are looked at by the Indian left benignly, unless the capital concerned is Washington. Any disagreement with Washington arises, according to the left, from an imperialist or capitalist plot, as is for instance the U.S. envoy in Delhi reporting to Washington (according to wikileaks) that dealing with a Mamta ruled Bengal would be easier than dealing with Buddhadeb. If the U.S. consular office reports that Hyderabad is the Center of an Indian visa application forgery scam, that too must be a capitalist plot.

Most Indians have a sensible view of the United States and world order. What do the sensible majority wish the U.S. to do? They certainly don’t want what they see as a huge Republican negativism in opposing the ruling party – for the sake of opposition – even if it means dragging the U.S. down. We have enough of that in our own country, where the beneficial nuclear deal was opposed by a right wing  – left wing anti-national coalition in parliament, when the nuclear deal was originally a BJP idea.

May be a world led by the USA is not an ideal world – but it is more acceptable than, say, a world in which the Chinese have the last word. So the majority of Indians wonder, when is the U.S. going to pull itself out of the economic doldrums, and re-invent itself, as it has done so many times in the past? When are the happy days of oodles of I-20 visas, a thriving Silicon valley, huge back office contracts and masses of desi California weddings coming back? The US-India relationship is largely run by the people, in any case. If we left it to the government they would lower it to the same ‘estranged’ levels as existed in the 1980s. The strength of the U.S. lies in technology innovation. That innovation is converted into dual use merchandise and military power. This process is the US’ monopoly. Techno-innovation comes from concentrating the best brains around booming university towns. To make all that happen again, the U.S. government must pour money into technology innovation, start ups, entrepreneurs and university research. Will the U.S. do all that? Do they have the money to create jobs, fix medical insurance and still have enough money to plough back into the process that makes the U.S. the number one nation? Indians are worried.

Delhi has enough unpredictable allies and friends – from Myanmar to Bangladesh to Sri- Lanka and Afghanistan. But all these unpredictabilities are small compared to the future of the US. Even two U.S. authors of Indian origin have joined in predicting a failing future for the U.S. – but the majority refuse to give up hope.  Of course Obama’s speech on cheap Indian medicine doesn’t help. Hasn’t he seen that the U.S. and India grow rich together? Or that, if the U.S. launches another technological revolution, in say, alternate energy, the Indians in the U.S. will link Indian back offices and labs to execute that revolution to the mutual advantage of both countries?

The Indian government is just as wayward as the U.S. government – flirting with a non-entity of alphabets like BRIC. We really have nothing in common with China buying our iron ore and dumping manufactured goods on us. Our relationship with Brazil is a really stretched concept. The bilateral relationship with Russia is healthy and strong without lumbering it with China and Brazil, in a pointed slap to the Americans. But that is what governments do – make diplomatic headlines  that are of no consequence on the ground.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India’s Military Modernization is Stagnating

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According to a recent KPMG report, India is likely to spend up to US$ 100 billion on the purchase of military equipment over the next 10 years. During the last decade, India acquired T-90S main battle tanks; the USS Trenton, an amphibious warfare ship that can lift one infantry battalion; AN-TPQ37 weapon locating radars; and, signed deals for six Scorpene attack submarines as well as for upgrading Mirage 2000 fighter-bomber aircraft. Admiral Gorshkov, a Russian aircraft carrier, will soon be on its way after a prolonged refit and INS Arihant, an indigenously designed nuclear-powered submarine is undergoing sea trials.

USS Trenton; Credit: www.defense.govIndia also acquired a host of low-end equipment for counter-insurgency operations and for upgrading the infantry’s combat efficiency. Besides these purchases, the acquisition or manufacture of 126 MMRCA fighter aircraft, almost 1,500 155mm howitzers, about 250 light helicopters, P8I Poseidon maritime reconnaissance aircraft, C-130J Super Hercules aircraft for Special Forces, C-17 Globemaster heavy lift aircraft and many other items of defense equipment, is in the pipeline.

Are these defense acquisitions part of a carefully structured strategy for military modernisation or are these piecemeal purchases that will only replace obsolescent weapons and equipment with more modern ones but not add substantially to India’s comprehensive military power? In their recent book Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization, Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta aver that the process lacks political support and guidance, is haphazard and bereft of strategic direction and is not in consonance with evolving doctrinal and organisational changes.

In the absence of a resolute strategic culture and the gross neglect of long-term national security planning, it is difficult to dispute Cohen and Dasgupta’s finding that India is arming without aiming. Not only does India not have a coherent national security strategy, but also lacks the tools and processes necessary to formulate such a strategy. While there is a National Security Council for long-term defence planning, its apex body – which essentially comprises the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) plus the National Security Advisor (NSA) – seldom meets to deliberate over long-term threats and emerging challenges and the adversaries’ military capabilities that should together drive military strategy, force structures and the modernisation plans necessary to meet and defeat future threats.

The armed forces have drawn up a long-term integrated perspective plan (LTIPP), but it is yet to be approved by the government. The 11th Defence Plan (2007-12) is now in its fifth year and has not been accorded formal approval. The armed forces are left with no choice but to stumble along from one financial year to the next. The defence acquisition process is plagued by tardy decision making and large amounts of budgetary allocations on the capital account are surrendered every year, leading to completely haphazard military modernization.

However, not all is lost. The two new mountain divisions now under raising by the army clearly indicate that the emphasis in defence planning has shifted from Pakistan, whose military power is rapidly declining, towards a rising and increasingly assertive China, which shall indisputably remain a long-term military threat as long as the territorial dispute is not satisfactorily resolved. The acquisition of strategic sealift and airlift capabilities and air-to-air refuelling for fighter aircraft signals India’s attempts to build intervention and rapid reaction capabilities in keeping with its regional power status. The importance being given to upgrading command and control (C4I2SR) systems shows the aspirations of the armed forces to acquire the tools necessary to benefit from the combat synergies provided by network-centric and effects-based operations.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Afghanistan: No Cause for Hope

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The unending conflict in Afghanistan poses the foremost threat to regional stability in Southern Asia. Although President Obama has tripled the number of U.S. forces to 100,000 in the two years he has been in office,,this surge in force levels has failed to effectively counter the long-term threat posed by the Taliban and its Al Qaeda partners. In 2010, every single month was worse than the preceding month in terms of the number of incidents, the casualties to ISAF forces and the killing of innocent civilians. Along the Af-Pak border, despite continuing drone attacks, there has been a steady deterioration in the ability of ISAF to eliminate safe havens for the Taliqaeda extremists. Even the Pakistan army has not fared well in its fight against the TTP cadres holding out in North Waziristan.

The report on the situation in Afghanistan released recently by the White House banks more on hope than reality. It admits that the “challenge remains to make our goals durable and sustainable.” Commanders on the ground, including General Petraeus, continue to claim that the security situation is improving steadily and that the Taliban offensive has been contained. In testimony before Congress in early March 2011, Petraeus claimed that the momentum achieved by the Taliban has been “arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of areas.” However, he stressed that the “successes are fragile and reversible.”

The Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan police are to be entrusted with the responsibility to independently take over the security function from ISAF in selected provinces beginning in July 2011 so that the planned draw-down of forces can begin. So far the Afghan security forces have not exhibited the standards of professionalism, battalion cohesion and the qualities of junior leadership that are necessary for success in the complex and challenging security environment prevailing in Afghanistan. They still need ISAF officers and quick reaction teams to accompany them for operations, failing which they tend to lose unit cohesion very quickly and disperse in panic.

Negotiations with the so-called “good Taliban” have also floundered. None of the main Taliban leaders – Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – have shown any inclination to conduct serious negotiations with the Karzai government or directly with Western negotiators. They are, of course, keen to buy time by pretending to be interested in a negotiated settlement.  

The development work being undertaken by the Karzai government and the PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams) has not reached the poorest provinces as efforts are concentrated on areas that are well connected by roads. The PRTs spend large sums of money on security for their supply convoys and most of this money ultimately ends up as a source of funding for the Taliban. The traditional notion that development work can be successfully undertaken by external agencies has not been borne out over the last 10 years in Afghanistan. A better method would be assist the Afghans with aid, materials and expertise and let them take the responsibility for development. However, due to the lack of efficient governance and rampant corruption, this method is also has serious pitfalls.

The Taliban are fond of saying that the ISAF forces have the watches but they have the time. They are convinced that the U.S. and NATO forces do not have the political will or the military staying power to last the course and they are biding their time for the foreign forces to quit. Their Pakistani friends are giving them similar advice: hang in there; these guys will soon go away. The prognosis for Afghanistan is far from rosy and a spring offensive may soon muddy the waters further.

India-US Relations Blog

Indo-US Defence Cooperation: Obama has Delivered on his Promise

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The United States administration has removed the names of nine organisations, mostly ISRO and DRDO subsidiaries, from the Entities List and opened the doors for the export of high technology to India. In an even more significant and far reaching move, the notification has moved India from a country group that required strict monitoring under the U.S. Export Administration Regulations to the group comprising members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in recognition of India’s adherence to the regime and its impeccable non-proliferation credentials even though India is not a signatory to the MTCR.

While India values its strategic autonomy and recognises that each bilateral relationship is important in its own way, there can be no doubt that the India-US strategic partnership more than any other will shape the geo-political contours of the 21st century in a manner that enhances peace and stability the world over. The recent Obama visit to India succeeded in taking the India-US strategic partnership to a much higher trajectory.
Perhaps the most important though understated aspect of the Obama visit was the forward movement on almost all facets of defence cooperation. Hi-tech weapons and equipment will now be provided or offered to India by the US. Advanced dual-use technologies will give an edge to India over China, both in security-related and civilian sectors. The recent decision to transform the existing bilateral export control framework for high-tech exports has put an end to the decades old discriminatory technology denial regimes that India had been subjected to. The proposal to lift sanctions on ISRO, DRDO and Bharat Dynamics Limited is a welcome step forward and perhaps the Department of Atomic Energy will also be taken off the Entities List soon.

The proposal to undertake joint development of future weapons systems is also a good development as it will raise India’s technological threshold. However, no transfer of technology has occurred yet. Inevitably, doubts about the availability of future technological upgrades and reliability in supplies of spares will continue to linger in the Indian mind. The case for spares which is pending with the labyrinthine U.S. bureaucracy for long in respect of the AN-TPQ37 Weapon Locating Radars has left a bad taste. The notion that the U.S. cannot be trusted to be a reliable supplier was not dispelled convincingly during President Obama’s visit.

India’s reluctance to sign the CISMOA and BECA agreements continues to dampen U.S. enthusiasm to supply hi-tech weapons and equipment. Massive U.S. conventional military aid to Pakistan militates against India’s strategic interests. While U.S. compulsions and constraints in dealing with the failing Pakistani state are understandable, the supply of military equipment that cannot be used for counter-insurgency operations, will inevitably invite a strong Indian reaction. This was conveyed unequivocally to the U.S. President.

China’s increasing assertiveness and its reluctance to work in unison with the international community to uphold the unfettered use of the global commons like the sea lanes for trade, space and cyberspace have also served to bring the U.S. and India closer. The two countries view their strategic partnership as a hedging strategy against irresponsible Chinese behaviour in Asia. Finally, the Obama visit further consolidated the India-US strategic partnership. It can only gain additional momentum in the decades ahead though the road will undoubtedly be uphill and will be dotted with potholes.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Humanitarian Intervention: Should the international community intervene in Libya?

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The ongoing struggle of people across the Arab world to get rid of military dictators and tyrannical monarchies has led to a new debate about the efficacy of the emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention. A UN Security Council resolution approved the imposition of a no fly zone on March 17 but ruled out the deployment of a “foreign occupation force.” The Western Alliance has launched air and missile strikes on Libya – ostensibly to protect the population against attacks from Gaddafi’s forces. However, the strikes are clearly designed to bring about a regime change.

Credit: d.yimg.comJohn Mackinlay of King’s College, London, has argued that in the “complex emergencies which increasingly threaten security in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Africa, international response mechanisms have failed from the outset to take a realistic approach that reflected the needs of the crisis… due to vested interest, conservatism and a lack of vision beyond the narrow limitations of national and professional interest.” With some exceptions, most nations today agree to join an international intervention effort only when their own national interests are served by intervening and rarely so where the cause is humanitarian. The world had failed to intervene to stop the genocide in Rwanda.

John Hillen, a policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, a U.S. think tank, has suggested the following criteria for future U.S. military interventions: should defend national security interests; should not jeopardise the ability of the U.S. to meet more important security commitments; should strive to achieve military goals that are clearly defined, decisive, attainable and sustainable; should enjoy Congressional and public support; and, the armed forces must be allowed to create the conditions for success.

Justifications of the right to intervene militarily, which are being increasingly propagated and are finding reluctant acceptance among some countries forming part of the Western alliance, include: defence of democracy and the prevention of the excessive curtailment of a people’s right to participate in decision making; prevention of severe violation of human rights of a people by a totalitarian regime; protection of minority groups from severe repression; prevention of acute environmental degradation; and, prevention of possible attempts to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction.

Regardless of the contours of the emerging doctrine of intervention, it must remain a cardinal principle of international relations that the territorial integrity of each member state of the UN must be collectively guaranteed by all the other member states. The non-observance of this collective security imperative can only lead to anarchy and the rule of the jungle where might is right. This can be done only by strengthening the UN system to emerge as the sole arbiter of the need for intervention. Individual nation-states must not be permitted to assemble “coalitions of the willing” to intervene anywhere in the world to further their own necessarily narrow national interests.

As Gaddafi’s forces were clearly targeting civilians along with the rebel forces, the ongoing military intervention is justified. Surgically precise air and missile strikes should continue to be employed to achieve limited military objectives. Emphasis should be laid on the minimum use of force. However, all out efforts must be made to prevent collateral damage, with particular reference to civilian casualties and property.