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India-US Relations Blog

USINPAC condemns the killing of celebrated Indian author Sushmita Banerjee in Afghanistan

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An Indian woman whose memoir about life under Taliban rule was turned into a Bollywood movie was shot dead Thursday by suspected members of the Islamist militia, officials said.

The killing of Sushmita Banerjee was the latest in a string of attacks on prominent women in Afghanistan, adding to fears women’s rights in a country where many are barely allowed outside the house will face setbacks after U.S.-led foreign forces fully withdraw in 2014.

The militants arrived before dawn at Banerjee’s residence in eastern Paktika province, which lies in Afghanistan’s east – a region where the Taliban are especially influential. Her husband, Jaanbaz Khan, answered the door, only to be quickly bound and blindfolded, provincial police chief Gen. Dawlat Khan Zadran told The Associated Press.

The militants then dragged Banerjee outside, took her to a nearby road and shot her at least 15 times, Zadran said. Banerjee, who officials said was in her 40s, was buried Thursday morning, a relative told AP. She lived in Daygan Sorqala village, and was well-known as a medical worker in the area, with special training in gynecology, said the relative, Zafar Khan.

Taliban spokesmen did not answer phone calls seeking comment late Thursday.

Banerjee – who was from Kolkata, India – wrote “A Kabuliwala’s Bengali Wife.” It later became the basis for the 2003 film “Escape from Taliban.”

The book described how she met Jaanbaz in India and agreed to marry him despite her parents’ disapproval and the fact that he was Muslim while she was Hindu. According to summaries of the book online, Banerjee moved to Afghanistan as Jaanbaz’s second wife, only to find that life would become unbearable with the Taliban increasing their hold over the country.

The Taliban militia, which rose to prominence in 1994 and officially ruled the country from 1996-2001, placed severe restrictions on women.

It forced them to wear all-encompassing burqas, banned them from working and prohibited girls from attending schools. The Islamist rulers’ harsh interpretation of their religion meant many women could not get proper medical care because the only physicians available were men who in most hospitals were allowed to examine women only if they were fully clothed.

In an interview posted on India’s Rediff news, entertainment and shopping website, Banerjee described trying to flee Afghanistan multiple times to get away from the Taliban, and how she was ordered executed as a result of her attempts. She made it back to Kolkata in August of 1995.

“I still remember the day I stepped on Indian soil for the first time after I had left,” the interview quotes her as saying. “It was raining outside. People were scurrying for shelter. But I didn’t run. I just stood there and let the rain wash off my pain. I felt if I could bear so much in Afghanistan, I can surely bear my motherland’s rain. I don’t know how long I stood there, but I won’t forget that day.”

Her book was published in 1997, about nine years after she got married, according to the interview, conducted around the time of the film’s 2003 release but reposted Thursday in light of Banerjee’s death. The film starred actress Manisha Koirala.

The relative who spoke to AP, Zafar Khan, is the father of Jaanbaz’s first wife. He said Banerjee was beloved in the area, was known locally by the name Sahib Kamal and that many residents were upset that a peaceful woman had been targeted. Zafar Khan said Banerjee had converted to Islam, though it was not immediately clear when. She and Jaanbaz had no children of their own, Khan said.

“She was a very kind woman. She was very educated – she knew the Internet,” Zafar Khan said. “Myself, I am very sad. Believe me, I haven’t been able to eat.”

Militants have targeted prominent women several times in recent months in Afghanistan.

Last month, officials confirmed that Fariba Ahmadi Kakar, a lawmaker who represents Kandahar province in parliament, was kidnapped and was being held in exchange for four insurgents detained by the government. Also in August, insurgents ambushed the convoy of a female Afghan senator, seriously wounding her in the attack and killing her 8-year-old daughter and a bodyguard.

Senator Rouh Gul Khirzad’s husband, son and another daughter were also wounded in the attack in the Muqur district of Ghazni.

Source: NBC29

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Afghanistan – Getting the Bare Bones Right

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As the US and NATO forces prepare for a withdrawal from the active theater in Afghanistan in 2014, and as Afghanistan heads into a presidential election in the same year, there is heightened concern about how the situation will play out.

In a manner of simple-speak, there are players within the country, and proverbially saying, without the country, who are each maneuvering to either minimize or maximize their positioning and stakes in the post-2014 scenario.

That the outcome of the situation in Afghanistan has immense ramifications on the country itself, the region, and globally is not a matter of concentric circles – with global security least and last affected.

Each geographic construct is at an equal scale of vulnerability if dysfunction, violence, and hatred breed in Afghanistan. Be it the men, women, and children of Afghanistan , Pakistan, the United States, any country in Europe, India, China, or, you name it.

Minimization versus Maximization

The various summits, conclaves, seminars, bilateral, track 2 and such diplomacy, the covert and intelligence assets, and the development aid, civic society engagements, inter-faith and a plethora of capacity building are all circling around this issue – how to minimize the ripple effects of an explosive Afghanistan.

On the other hand, an equally intense dynamic strategy is in progress by varied stakeholders on how to maximize their strategic interests in the vacuous space that is expected to emerge post-2014 in Afghanistan.

The intent of this column is not to analyze the strategies of maximization, minimization or optimization that are being considered, or countered amongst the matrix of stakeholders. Those shall be, and what results we see, for the good or bad, shall be.

Rather the goal of this column is to bring focus on a tactical strategy that can have a significant impact on the ground while the mile-high grand strategies inter-play.

There is perhaps only fact which is assured in a post-2014 Afghanistan. That there shall be geographic nodes within Afghanistan where some residual U.S. and NATO forces shall maintain a presence – irrespective of the outcomes of known and unknown negotiations and the power-play that emerges post-withdrawal of the forces.

Of course, the first objective of these outposts shall be to ensure their own security. More so in the newer environment when the withdrawal is abdicating the once-upon-a-time objective of foreign forces to bring peace to the entire country.

Thus, in a realistic scenario what shall be any tactical strategy that is real, on the ground – and with at least some chances of a modicum of success – as the country hurtles towards chaos and violence?

The Skeleton Strategy

The physical nodes across the territory of Afghanistan where the few and remaining U.S. and NATO forces will entrench themselves (and some of the Afghan outposts that can contribute to this strategy) will be the only outposts of security in a most likely situation in 2014 – with their influence extending to a radius of perhaps no more than one to two kilometers around the base.

Is it conceivable that these outposts, tens or hundreds of miles apart, are at least connected to and with each other? Via secure road-links? In fact the very planning of where to locate these outposts must be done with this strategy in mind. More on that later.

The entire military and any developmental aid that outside governments and agencies give to Afghanistan must be focused only on these road-links to create a bare-bones skeleton which can give confidence to the people and writ of the state of Afghanistan.

These corridors of connectivity, security, and development are the bare bones that will give hope to the people and nationalists of Afghanistan that peace is possible and can endure in this country. If, as is expected, the U.S. and NATO forces will be withdrawing into these nodal cocoons and not undertake any combat roles, then any capacity building of the Afghan security forces must firstly be focused on establishing peace and security among these inter-connected nodes.

Scholars of history and civilizations will note the key role that roads and routes played in the development of any society, community, nation, or civilization. Sure, the jury is still out whether the cities emerged first and then the nomads and traders created these routes connecting these cities; or, these cities emerged because the hunters, nomads, and traders took to settling in these locations as they progressed on their journeys.

Where are the joints of the skeleton?

History is history. We are now in the 22nd century, and cities and towns may have emerged in Afghanistan but they are not connected for free flow and exchange of people, trade, and ideas.

Much as they tried, the U.S. and NATO failed to create this connectivity between the cities and trade routes of Afghanistan. Therefore it is now necessary to re-look into the routes in Afghanistan.
Military and development planners now need to think not about cities and trading centers, but rather think about military outposts, and connect them to create functional roads and routes. And this brings us to the issue we highlighted earlier – where should the U.S. and NATO military outposts be located post-2014?

The answer is simple – these military outposts should be located outside the main trading cities and towns of Afghanistan. These locations must not be chosen for military exigency, and laziness of thought about location. Rather, these must be carefully mapped out, with a skeleton strategy clearly in the mind. Just because an ISAF air-base in some remote location has been operating for last ten years is no reason to locate an Afghan police training institute at this location. Shut down that base – and create a strategic node outside a town or city. Connect this node with another military node outside some nearby town or city.

Development money must be channelized to stimulate social and economic development along the route of these potentially-to-be-connected-nodes. This is the meat around the bones of connectivity.

A bare-bones skeleton in Afghanistan must stand up post-withdrawal of U.S. and NATO in 2014 – even a minimalist exemplar. It can be a hub-spoke, with few radials of even 100 miles each; or it can be a linear model of a corridor of a few hundred miles; or it can be a matrix of nodes. As long as there is security at end of the connecting nodes, and development at least 100 meters to each side of the connectivity.

While each outside stakeholder, ranging from Pakistan to the ISI, Taliban, Al Qaeda, The United States, Iran, Russia, and India, are trying to maximize their own interests; and while each internal stakeholder in Afghanistan is also trying to maximize its own interests – can we commit ourselves and force a consensus on a minimalist, bare bones, and skeleton strategy?

If the Afghan people and the international community are together not able to stand-up or progress towards such a skeleton, then we can all be rest assured that blood and mayhem shall be what we get – in Afghanistan and across the world.

 

 

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Afghanistan, its Security, Stability and Prosperity

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USA and other NATO led troops of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are now preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan.  As a matter of future policy USA will leave some elements behind to be able to exercise and influence events in Afghanistan. However rebuilding Afghanistan will be a herculean task. It will require international support, humongous human and material resources, and a steadfast political commitment. The size of the country , the extent of the human needs, the absolute decay of  infrastructure, and the scarcity of local professional capacity combine to make restoring Afghanistan an immense challenge.

The only way in which Afghanistan can return to the state of lasting peace is to establish a political procedure by which various Afghan tribes and leaders can develop a common national agenda. This method can offer opportunities for extensive and widespread participation of various Afghan groups at all levels, and must realistically account for current power realities in the country. The solution agreed to by the Afghan factions represented in Bonn is only the first step towards a long-term process of creating a unified, representative, and stable government. It will require consideration not only to the political process itself, but also to security and public order needs, justice concerns, and economic and social needs. A new, steady Afghan government must be an essential partner in the struggle to prevent terrorists from using the country’s domain once again.

Afghanistan’s economic potential majorly depends on economic links to their neighbors for everything from markets for its agricultural products, infrastructure investments, and a possible natural gas pipeline. Given high debt burdens and severe governance challenges throughout the region, addressing economic and political development in both a regional and bilateral context is peremptory.

The potential of Afghanistan’s professional diaspora living all over the world must be tapped to contribute to a strengthening of the socio-economic sector. Return of committed, educated and skilled Afghanis, along with increased investment and the opening of trade channels, are needed to reverse the substantial “brain drain” that Afghanistan has suffered due to over three decades of violent conflict.

US India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) in association with American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) and Foundation of India and Indian Diaspora Studies (FIIDS) is organizing a conference focusing on the issue of  “ Afghanistan and the Region: Security, Stability and Prosperity” on Tuesday, July 23, 2013 at the Capitol Hill, Washington DC. The conference which has been divided into 3 sessions will be graced by some of the most eminent speakers, in short the people who matter. Here is the schedule:

Session 1- 10:00 A.M to 11:15 A.M

Management of Transition and Ensuring Stability

Speakers:

  • Congressman Eliot L. Engel, Ranking Member, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Opening Speaker)
  • Congressman Joseph Crawley, Co-Chair, Congressional Caucus on India and Indian-Americans
  • Mr. Kanwal Sibal, Former Foreign Secretary of India
  • Ms. Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation
  • Mr. Micheal O’ Hanlon, Director of Research, Brookings Institute

Session 2- 11:30 A.M to 12:30 P.M

India, Afghanistan and Regional Security (Keynote Session)

Speakers:

  • Congressman Ed Royce, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
  • Mr. Rajnath Singh, President, Bhartiya Janata Party,  (BJP) India
  • Mr. Amrullah Saleh, Former Head of Afghan Intelligence

Session 3- 1:00 P.M to 2:30 P.M

Moderate and Balanced Afghanistan- Imperative for Regional Security

Speakers:

  • Mr. Ajit Doval, Former Director, Intelligence Bureau (IB), India
  • Mr. Mehran Baluch, Baloch Leader
  • Mr. Senge  Sering, President, Institute of Gilgit Baltistan Studies Moderate and Balanced Afghanistan- Imperative for Regional Security

The conference aims to engage communities to discuss factors affecting security, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan and surrounding region. The sessions will focus on critical dimensions of a balanced and unified strategy that can lead to Afghanistan’s stable and secure development. Participate in the discussion on how the management of political environment can be a force to bring peace and prosperity in Afghanistan and its consequential effect on nearby nations including India. We hope that you will be able to join us for this unique conference where leading international speakers are featured.

 

Attendance Strictly by RSVP only

RSVP: events@usinpac.com

India-US Relations Blog

India’s foreign policy: A year in review

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Guest post by Gateway House

As 2012 draws to a close, it’s imperative to assess India’s foreign policy performance, and look ahead to what we can expect in 2013.

So far, the report is mixed: Four foreign policy hotspots, five sweet spots, and two blind spots. About the same as 2011, when we gave six jeers and five cheers for India’s foreign policy performance.

Geopolitically, 2011 was the year of celebrating the shift of global growth and power to Asia; a year later, 2012 has seen the beginning of pushback on Asia from the U.S., which has seen the confidence of newly elected governments in Japan and South Korea and increased aggression from China as a result of its own domestic power shift.

Internationally, India has been an active participant in the creation of alternate financial instruments and institutions from emerging countries. And so far New Delhi has deftly handled the U.S. pivot to Asia, and maintained bi-partisan support in Washington, while simultaneously balancing its energy imports from Iran.

In contrast, New Delhi has been ham-handed at home. This is the year in which the government has been put on the mat by a strong anti-corruption movement started in 2011, to the current anti-rape movement engulfing the country. An enfeebled centre could hang on, or bring on mid-term elections in 2012 – a distinct possibility after the Bharatiya Janata Party’s win in Gujarat this month. It could change if the ruling Congress government genuinely confronts corruption and addresses law and order issues, continues on its path to economic reform and provides jobs to the 14 million youth who join the workforce every year. They are the boiling cauldron of the under-educated and unemployed young who yearn for political and economic change.

Clearly, our international stature is better than our image at home. We present our top foreign policy Hotspots, Sweet spots and Blind spots for 2012.

Foreign Policy Hot spots

The Maldives: In the wake of the regime change in the Maldives in February, New Delhi may have reacted hastily by recognising the new government led by Mohammed Waheed and bypassing the friendly and more secular former president, Mohamed Nasheed. The increasing fundamentalism and political breakdown that have followed in the Maldives have made India an easy target – most recently highlighted by the GMR-Maldives dispute. But two external factors may also be at play: China’s increasing economic influence in the island-nation and possible Western interest in the old World War II military base in Gan, the southernmost island in the Maldives.

Sri Lanka: Bowing to pressure from both domestic coalition politics and international organisations and allies, India voted against Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council in March; the vote eroded our position of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations. In September, the bilateral hit a new low, with threats and attacks on Sri Lankan pilgrims and school children travelling in Tamil Nadu. It was exacerbated by the politically opportunistic demands of the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, that India must stop training Sri Lankan military personnel. Meanwhile, China raised military aid to more than $100 million and billions in strategic infrastructure for Sri Lanka.

South China Sea: Our Chief of Naval Staff’s statement that India is “prepared” to protect Indian interests in the South China Sea was subsequently watered down. Nevertheless, Beijing reacted sharply, stating that it “opposes any unilateral oil and gas exploration activities in disputed areas in the South China Sea,” despite its own infrastructure-building activities in disputed areas of Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The U.S.’s rebalancing in Asia juxtaposed with recent election outcomes in Japan and South Korea have given New Delhi more strategic space to be firm with China. We must continue our policy of balancing our economic interests in trade and attracting Chinese investment and negotiating our concerns on the border with positioning on Chinese disputes with ASEAN members in the South China Sea and its adversarial posturing towards the U.S.

Syria: India’s Track II diplomacy in Syria was not successful for the people of Syria, who remain caught in the battle between the West and Gulf-funded “rebels” and fundamentalists, and the Bashar al-Assad government. Despite India’s close relations with Damascus and efforts to mediate an acceptable solution at the UN Security Council in July, India voted, along with the West, for stronger sanctions against the Syrian regime, while fellow BRICS nations Russia and China exercised a veto. It is only a matter of time before the exit of Assad, but the sectarian fighting could continue for decades, at great cost to the Syrian people and secularism in the region. The conflict may cause further regional destabilisation, more friction between Israel and Iran, and eventually a rise in the price of oil.

Foreign Policy Sweet spots

India-Myanmar: After 25 years of cautious engagement, India’s policy of not shunning military governments – while simultaneously maintaining support for Myanmar’s democratisation – put us on the right side of history. Successive high-level visits this year resulted in a credit line worth $500 million to Myanmar and various agreements on border issues, energy and infrastructure. India is poised to play a vital role in Myanmar: as a model for democratic institution-building and also with business and development solutions that are affordable and adaptable. In particular, Myanmar can benefit from India’s experience in addressing complex identity issues.

Alternate financial instruments: In March, New Delhi proposed a BRICS Bank and in December the government moved further to promote more SAARC currency swaps. India already has currency swap deals with Japan worth $15 billion and is part of a SAARC deal worth $2 billion. These are positive signs of emerging economies taking the initiative to design alternative financial instruments to mitigate the volatility caused by the financial crises of the U.S. and Europe. Could a viable multilateral option emerge from BRICS? Can bilateral currency swap deals be the building blocks of an alternative financial system?

Afghanistan: India hosted the first ‘Investment Summit on Afghanistan’ in June, probably with the cooperation of Washington, and then participated in the first India-U.S.-Afghanistan trilateral dialogue in September. Indian business is supporting New Delhi’s efforts in Afghanistan, and more than $10 billion is likely to be invested in the Hajigak iron ore mines and various coal, fertiliser and small development projects. New Delhi must now amplify its role on the ground in Afghanistan – through both security and infrastructure cooperation. This, however, entails a dilemma: how can India expand its presence without becoming a target for the Taliban and unfriendly Pakistani entities?

Energy security: So far, India has successfully balanced two fundamental interests: our strategic relationship with the U.S. and our escalating energy requirements. The MT Omvati Prem became the first ship with Indian insurance to load oil from Iran in August, after European Union sanctions came into force in July. With increasing instability in West Asia, we will need more such creativity to maintain the steady flow of oil from the Gulf and we must also look for alternative suppliers in other geographies.

ASEAN: The recently-concluded negotiations of the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in services and investments is a significant step in improving regional connectivity. Over the past two decades, our engagement with ASEAN has intensified and become multifaceted, with a massive increase in trade from $2.9 billion in 1993 to $80 billion in 2012. The region is not only at the centre of our Look East policy, but it is also vital to our efforts to economically and strategically balance China in an Asia that is increasingly important globally.

Foreign Policy Blind Spots

Central Asia: We have not been able to leverage our cordial relations with the Central Asian states to advantageous positions on energy, on membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), trade, and tactical cooperation in Afghanistan. We should more actively engage with Central Asia to press our case for membership of the SCO and to expand economic exchanges.

Lost Opportunities for Growth: India’s fiscal problems were highlighted many times in 2012 – in April, for instance, when S&P revised our outlook from stable to “negative” with the threat of an investment rating downgrade to “junk” status within 24 months. India’s growth rate continues to slide and is now 5.3 percent. India is struggling with a falling rupee and a rising oil import burden, along with the budgetary imperative to reduce fuel subsidies. We are condemned to a continuing economic slowdown unless the government confronts corruption more seriously and implements economic reforms.

Looking forward to 2013

What can we expect for 2013? Despite the best efforts of our Prime Minister to keep India-Pakistan relations on an even keel, the critical issues with Pakistan – Jammu & Kashmir, water, terrorism – remain intractable. Don’t hold your breath: nothing will change till Pakistan’s elections in May 2013 and perhaps even our own in 2014. Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik’s disastrous recent visit to India has set back the improvements that had come with New Delhi’s patient diplomacy. Just as we have been able to successfully do with Myanmar and Iran, we should resist American efforts to influence us to make concessions on Pakistan, and handle the relationship according to our own imperatives.

For India-U.S. relations, a visit by Barack Obama, which would be an unprecedented second visit by a serving U.S. president, could propel the strategic bilateral relationship to new heights.

We hope for better times in 2013: an end to the conflict in Syria, more stability in Pakistan, less aggressive posturing by China in Asia and a recovered global – and Indian – economy.

(This article originally appeared at Gateway House and has been republished with their approval. All views mentioned in the article are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or positions of USINPAC in any manner.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog, India-US Relations Blog

A Rocky Road Ahead

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Since the United States has announced its intentions to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by 2014, leaders in the White House have been looking toward India as an ally in facing the coming strategic and military challenges in the region. For the U.S., the choice of India is an obvious one. Its growing geopolitical presence and commitment to democracy is a strong force among unstable countries, and deep economic ties with Afghanistan (last year, India gave Afghanistan almost $2 billion a year alone in economic and development aid!) all make India a prime candidate to manage postwar reconstruction. Yet what has been heralded as “a full-blown strategic partnership” in shepherding the region’s development is drastically falling short.

On one side is the growing diplomatic tension between the U.S. and India, which has forestalled bilateral commercial trades and sharply highlighted differences in priorities. To be clear, the U.S. and India have dramatically improved their relationship following the Cold War, when the U.S. sided with India’s rival, Pakistan, and India maintained economic and military relations with the Soviet Union. Since then, economic interests were better aligned, as bilateral trade has reached almost $100 billion just last year alone. Still, India is defiantly opposed to complying with U.S. demands if they were to compromise its own economic interests. In Iran, for example, the U.S. has called for sanctions against Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities, and has asked India to cease its commercial transactions with the country. But India views things differently, stating that oil and natural gas purchase from Tehran are vital to its economy. Moreover, Indian diplomats assert that it is “in India’s interest to maintain good ties with Iran, with whom it shares deep historical, cultural and religious connections.” They also believe that purchasing Iranian oil will “strengthen ties with Iran as a hedge against an uncertain future in Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal,”, and are thus reluctant to rebuke Iran’s nuclear purchases.

Differences in priorities in China are also a source of contention between Indian and U.S. lawmakers. The U.S. has made strides in containing what it perceives to be a geopolitical threat by China, due to its growing military strength and influence in Asia. Indeed, leaders in Beijing have even suspected that the U.S. is attempting to partner with India in containing China, claims that the U.S. staunchly denies. But India is not interested in upsetting China and has worked very hard in cooperating in areas of mutual interest and opportunity and believes than an alliance with the U.S. will fracture that relationship.

Finally, currency problems in India are hampering its ability to provide stable finances for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. High interest rates have destabilized India’s investment climate, forcing it to focus inward and shrink expenditures.

The future of the U.S.-India relationship will depend heavily on who wins this November. The Democratic Party will likely continue on its current trajectory, gently pushing India to open its markets for investment and to align with the U.S. The Republican Party’s foreign policy is traditionally more aggressive, and will probably reiterate demands for Indian liberalization and compliance with Iran sanctions.