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India’s Attempts at Conflict Resolution: A Balance Sheet

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The ultimate aim of a nation’s armed forces is to deter war; fighting and winning is necessary only if deterrence breaks down. As the primary underlying cause of future conventional conflict on the Indian sub-continent is likely to be unresolved territorial and boundary disputes, it is necessary to speedily resolve the existing disputes. Despite over one dozen rounds of talks between India’s National Security Advisor and China’s Vice Foreign Minister, it has not been possible to make major headway in the resolution of the India-China territorial dispute. In fact, it has not even been possible to demarcate the Line of Actual Control on the ground and on military maps so as to prevent frequent complaints about intrusions and transgressions and to minimise the probability of an armed clash between patrols. China’s intransigence and its recent claims to Tawang have led to a stalemate in negotiations. On its part India must continue to impress on the Chinese leadership the importance of the early resolution of the territorial and boundary dispute. Simultaneously, India must continue its efforts to improve border infrastructure and create adequate offensive operations capability to deter another round of conflict.

Resolution of the dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is equally complex as, besides India and Pakistan, the people of J&K – straddling the Line of Control (LoC) – are also party to the conflict. While some progress had been made during the Musharraf regime, the General’s troubles at home led him to back off. A ray of hope had emerged once again with the installation of an elected civilian government in Pakistan but the terror strikes in Mumbai in November 2008 put paid to the rapprochement process, which is still in limbo despite recent talks between the Foreign Secretaries. Neither government has made any effort to mould public opinion for a possible solution. Entrenched political and religious constituencies on both the sides are likely to noisily stall any understanding that the two governments might reach. Hence, it is difficult to be optimistic about the early resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

In stark contrast with the difficulties of conflict resolution on the external front, the last couple of years have seen substantial progress in resolving internal conflicts. The central government’s cease-fire with the Nagas, which has now held fairly well for over a decade even while internecine quarrels among the Nagas have continued unabated, has led to tangible progress in negotiations with both the Issak-Muivah and the Khaplang factions of the NSCN and there is cause for optimism about the early resolution of the long drawn conflict. The ULFA in Assam has begun negotiations with the central government without any pre-conditions except for the break-away military wing led by Paresh Barua who is said to be taking shelter in Myanmar and is getting covert support from the Chinese. It is to be hoped that the ULFA leadership will act in a statesman-like manner for the good of the people of Assam rather than continue to pursue power for its own sake.

There is less cause for optimism regarding resolution of the conflict being waged by Maoist or Naxalite insurgents in almost 220 districts of Central India. The leadership of the CPI (Maoist) seeks to one day fly its flag from the ramparts of the Red Fort in Delhi and is pursuing its aim methodically and systematically. Despite the Home Minister’s offer for talks, it continues to indulge in wanton acts of violence, kidnappings and extortion. A comprehensive three-pronged strategy that simultaneously emphasises security, development and governance – with skilful perception management – is necessary to defeat the menace of left Wing Extremism (LWE).

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan’s Annual Deception

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By Rajiv Nayan,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses

The Conference on Disarmament is an organ of United Nations (UN) for negotiations on disarmament and related issues. The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is the centre for pre-negotiation activities on disarmament. The FMCT is a core issue in CD negotiations. Other issues are nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. All 65 members have to agree before, negotiations can commence on any issue. No decision can be possible without a consensus.

Over and above other reasons articulated in previous years, Pakistan had an additional excuse this time. On earlier occasions, Pakistan had stated that the 2008 India-specific exemptions given by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) had adversely affected the strategic balance in its neighbourhood. Though it did not mention India this year, yet the language and its earlier explicit references to India leave no doubt about what it wants to convey. Referring to South Asia’s strategic environment and to a non- NPT member, Pakistan said: “…it cannot agree to negotiations on a FMCT in the CD owing to the discriminatory waiver provided by the NSG to our neighbour for nuclear cooperation by several major powers, as this arrangement will further accentuate the asymmetry in fissile materials stockpiles in the region, to the detriment of Pakistan’s security interests.”

This time, Pakistan’s objection was that India’s membership of the four multilateral export control regimes, with the support of the U.S. and other countries, would destabilise the region. In November 2010, the U.S. supported India’s candidature for membership of the NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Later, France also endorsed the U.S. move. It was followed by the Russian support for the membership of those régimes of which Russia is a member – Russia is not a member of the Australia Group. Many more countries are expected to support India’s candidature given its rising global status. Pakistan’s statement in the CD showed its resentment regarding the likely modification of criteria to accommodate India in the NSG and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

It is necessary to examine the objections raised by Pakistan regarding the 2008 India-specific waiver in the NSG. Is it really going to allow India to accumulate so much fissile material that the region around Pakistan would be destabilised? Would the exemption enhance the fissile production capabilities of India? Actually, such propaganda may well serve as an excuse for Pakistan to increase its own fissile material production. In the past, some Pakistani diplomats misled the world by saying that India’s eight unsafeguarded reactors can comfortably produce 1400 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium – sufficient for around 280 nuclear weapons a year – if run for that purpose, or even more if totally dedicated to fissile material production purposes.

When the India-US civil nuclear energy agreement was being debated before the 2008 waiver, one of India’s leading strategic analysts argued in favour of the agreement saying that it would enable India to ‘release’ its indigenous uranium for nuclear weapons, and to use imported uranium for nuclear energy generation. This was one of the many arguments used by both the supporters and opponents of the agreement. However, many of these arguments were unsubstantiated and polemical. The U.S. non-proliferation community followed by the Pakistan government used some of these polemics for their convenience and propaganda. Moreover, India’s indigenous uranium can be allocated in any way by the government, so, the word—release—is basically meaningless.

First, India’s strategic and security imperatives demand that it rely on nuclear weapons mainly for deterrence. If there is a choice between national security and electricity generation, India may prefer the former. Electricity can be generated by other means – despite the growth in nuclear energy production in recent months, overall electricity generation stays around three per cent.

True, there are eight reactors in the strategic category. The categorisation of these and other fast breeder reactors outside the civil category should not imply that India would go in for unlimited and unnecessary fissile material production. These reactors are not going to produce fissile materials round the clock. India’s nuclear doctrine is one of credible minimum deterrence, meaning India will not needlessly hoard nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Moreover, a new nuclear weapon country like India has the benefit of learning from the Cold War experience of nuclear weapons accumulation by the two super powers. The unnecessary accumulation of nuclear weapons created the problem of disposal – not only of nuclear weapons through arms control – but also of excess fissile materials.

Even if we accept the logic that the reactors outside the civil category may be used to produce fissile materials, under the Indo-US nuclear deal India has increased its number of power reactors in the civil category from 6 to 14. Therefore the increase in the number of power reactors in the civil category and the decrease of power reactors outside it should indicate that Indian fissile material production may be decreased, not increased. Any logical analysis would underscore this. Of course, propaganda has its own logic!

This leads to the question: If India is not interested in unnecessary production of fissile materials, why is it retaining eight reactors in the strategic category? The answer is simple: to deal with an uncertain strategic environment. There are some declared NPT and non-NPT nuclear weapon countries which have not made their fissile material stockpiles public. The nuclear weapon declarations of these countries are also uncertain and lack credibility. At the same time, there are undeclared and potential nuclear weapon countries, which are likely to further complicate the strategic environment in the future.

The new Pakistani argument against FMCT negotiations in the CD, namely, that the Indian membership of the multilateral export controls regimes may adversely affect regional stability, is superficial. The membership of the regimes has nothing to do with regional stability; in fact, it is about enabling India to play a role in promoting international peace and stability by participating in the global strategic trade management. Pakistan’s obsession with projecting itself as a competitor to India is frequently leading it to make ridiculous and incomprehensible moves like the one in the CD. Instead, it may do well to imitate India’s responsible nuclear behaviour. It does not realise that the proliferation network and terrorism may not be able to sustain the Pakistani state for long. Pakistan needs to change.

(This post originially appeared at IDSA. USINPAC and IDSA are content partners.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

The Dragon Bares its Fangs

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China’s Increasing Defence Expenditure is a Cause for Concern

While India’s defence budget for financial year (FY) 2011-12 has remained unchanged in inflation-adjusted real terms (1,64,425 crore, US$ 36 billion), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has been given a 13 per cent increase in planned defence expenditure to US$ 91.5 billion). Though China’s official defence expenditure (ODE) is now about 1.5 per cent of its GDP, China’s GDP has been growing consistently at over 10 per cent per annum. Consequently, given its low inflation base and a strong Yuan, China’s defence expenditure has grown at over 10 per cent annually in real terms over the last decade.

Credit: Telegraph.co.ukChinese analysts invariably claim that the rather steep hike is “caused by the sharp increase in the wages, living expenses and pensions of 2.3 million People’s Liberation Army officers, civilian personnel, soldiers and army retirees.” However, other defence analysts look at the spectacular anti-satellite test successfully conducted by China in January 2007, pictures of the first Chinese aircraft carrier under construction, the acquisition of SU-30 fighter-bombers with air-to-air refuelling capability, the drive towards acquiring re-entry vehicle technology to equip China’s ICBMs with MIRVs, a growing footprint in the South China Sea and cannot not help wonder whether a 21st century arms race has well and truly begun.

China’s military aims and modernisation strategy were clearly enunciated in the Defence White Paper of December 2006. “The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationised armed forces and being capable of winning informationised wars by the mid-21st century.”

Due to China’s vigorous military modernisation drive, the military gap between India and China is growing every year. India needs to invest more in improving the logistics infrastructure along the border with Tibet, in hi-tech intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems for early warning and in generating land- and air-based firepower asymmetries to counter China’s numerical superiority. India also needs to raise and suitably equip more mountain strike divisions to carry the fight into Chinese territory if it ever becomes necessary.

All of these capabilities will require a large infusion of fresh capital. India’s growing economy can easily sustain a 0.5 to 1.0 per cent hike in the defence budget over a period of three to five years, especially if the government shows the courage to reduce wasteful subsidies.

China’s overall aim is to close the wide military gap between the PLA and the world’s leading military powers, particularly in hardware designed to provide strategic outreach capabilities. Consequently, India must enhance its investment in modernising its armed forces so that they are not found wanting in case of another conflict in the Himalayas in future, both in terms of the adequacy of force levels for carrying the conflict into Tibet and the military hardware (firepower, crew-served weapons and C4I2SR), that is necessary to fight at altitudes above 11,000 feet on the Tibetan Plateau.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Rising Challenges, Declining Resources

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India’s defence budget continues to be pegged at less than 2.0 per cent of the country’s GDP despite the recommendations of successive Standing Committees on Defence in India’s Parliament that it should be at least 3.00 per cent if the emerging threats and challenges are to successfully countered.

Credit: news.xinhuanet.comIn his budget speech on February 28, 2011, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee set aside Rs 1,64,425 crore (US$ 36 billion) for defence during the next financial year (FY 2011-12). Though the present allocation shows an increase of 11.59 per cent over the budgetary estimates for FY 2010-11 and 8.47 per cent over the revised estimates, it is barely adequate to neutralise the annual rate of inflation. Inflation in weapons, ammunition and defence equipment is usually much higher than domestic inflation.

Of the total allocation for defence, on the revenue account the army will get Rs 64,250 crore, the navy Rs 10,590 crore, the air force Rs 15,93 billion and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Rs 5,624 crore. The total revenue expenditure planned for the year is Rs 95,216 crore (US$ 21 billion, 58 per cent of the budget). The remaining amount of Rs 69,199 crore (US$ 15 billion, 13.75 per cent increase, 42 per cent of the budget) has been allotted on the capital account for the acquisition of modern weapon systems, including 126 multi-mission, medium-range combat aircraft, C-17 Globemaster heavy lift aircraft, 197 light helicopters, 145 Ultra-light Howitzers and C-17 heavy-lift aircraft. It is well known that India plans to spend approximately US$ 100 billion over 10 years on defence modernisation.

Giving his reaction to the Finance Minister’s budget speech, Defence Minister A K Antony said, “We welcome it as our concerns have been by and large addressed and the Finance Minister has stated that if we have any fresh requirements, they would be made up without any difficulty.” However, while the reactions of the armed forces are not known, they are unlikely to be satisfied as their plans for modernisation have been stymied year after year by the lack of committed budgetary support. The 11th Defence Plan, which will enter its fifth and final year on April 1st, has not yet been accorded approval in principle by the government and, therefore, lacks committed budgetary support. The only silver lining on the horizon is that the funds earmarked on the capital account for FY 2010-11 have been fully spent by the government for the first time in many years.

In addition to the defence budget, the government has also earmarked adequate resources in the annual budget of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for homeland or internal security. A portion of these funds will be utilised for setting up a National Intelligence Grid and the National Counter-terrorism Centre – measures which are considered necessary consequent to the Mumbai terror strikes in November 2008. Also, funds for the modernisation of central police and para-military forces will be provided from the budget of the MHA.

This year’s defence budget is 1.84 per cent of the projected GDP and 13.07 per cent of the total Central government expenditure. China’s official defence expenditure is US$ 78 billion (3.5 per cent of its GDP) while its actual expenditure is well above US$ 100 billion. The U.S. defence expenditure was US$ 530 billion in fiscal year 2010, excluding funds allotted for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, the 13th Finance Commission has recommended that the nation’s defence expenditure should progressively come down to 1.76 per cent of the GDP by 2014-15. Quite clearly the Finance Ministry appears to have decided to pay heed to this advice.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India’s defense budget increase

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In the 2011 Union Budget presented yesterday in the Indian Parliament, the Finance Minister announced an 11% hike in the defense budget during the next fiscal year. India has now set the defense budget for FY 2011-12 at $36.28 billion. Forty percent of the budget would be spent on capital expenses, while the rest goes towards maintaining the Indian Army, which is one of the largest in the world.

The significant rise in defense spending could be attributed to the increasing military capabilities of India’s two immediate neighbors with whom it has fought wars previously – China and Pakistan. Over the last few years China has been rapidly expanding its defense spending, and it has grown approximately 13% annual on an average since 1989. According to some estimates, China’s defense spending in 2010 was about $100 billion. The size of its army is almost twice that of India’s and is much better equipped.

On its western border, Pakistan has been going through a rough phase of economic, political and social upheaval, while its military budget keeps increasing. Last year it increased its defense spending by 17%, partly to aid U.S. in the war on terror. This is in addition to the economic and military aid the U.S. provides Pakistan for the same purpose. Over the last few weeks there have also been news of a rapid increases in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, with it set to overtake Britain as the fifth largest nuclear power. Pakistan is building its fourth plutonium reactor and has more than 100 deployed nuclear weapons. Not to mention that the Pakistan Army and the ISI policies have traditionally been India-centric, with a majority of the forces deployed along the Indian border.

Under such external circumstances and the need to upgrade and procure equipments and machinery, the Indian defense spending increase seems well placed. India has a few procurement deals lined up for the year, but it would need to do a lot more to match up to China’s standards. As its primary competitor not only economically, but also for geopolitical influence particularly in East Asia and Africa, India needs to speed up and match up its defense capabilities with those of China. A strong military would be essential to counter any potential threats from an unstable AfPak region.

Circumstantially as important as it may be, the increases in defense spending of all the three countries contribute to the arms race in the region taking it to the edge of volatility. While it would not be prudent to expect a decrease in expenditures or an end to military procurements and upgrades, the three countries need to make concentrated efforts to reduce the need for the increase in military spending.