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Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan’s internal turmoil

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Despairing at the role played by the Pakistan army in meddling in the country’s politics and governance in the context of the ‘memogate’ scandal, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani called the army a ‘state within a state’. A few days later he termed the army Chief and DG ISI’s replies sent to the Supreme Court unconstitutional and dismissed Lt Gen Khalid Naeem Lodhi (Retd), the Defence Secretary. The army retaliated and Pakistan is again in full blown political and constitutional crisis – even as the internal security situation continues to deteriorate.

The history of civil-military relations in Pakistan is not very encouraging. The military jackboot has ridden roughshod over Pakistan’s polity for most of the country’s history since its independence. While Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia ul Haq and Musharraf ruled directly as Presidents or Chief Martial Law Administrators, the other army chiefs achieved perfection in the fine art of backseat driving. The army repeatedly took over the reins of administration under the guise of the ‘doctrine of necessity’ and, in complete disregard of international norms of jurisprudence, Pakistan’s Supreme Court merrily played along.

The army ensured that Pakistan’s fledgling democracy was never allowed to flourish. The roots of authoritarianism in Pakistan can be traced back to Ayub Khan who promoted the idea of ‘guided’ or ‘controlled’ democracy. The concept of the ‘Troika’ soon emerged as a power sharing arrangement between the President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). The ‘political militarism’ of the Pakistan army imposed structural constraints on the institutionalisation of democratic norms in the civil society.

Some key national policies have always been dictated by the army. Only the army can determine Pakistan’s national security threats and challenges and decide how to deal with them. Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan and Jammu and Kashmir is guided by the army and the rapprochement process with India cannot proceed without its concurrence. The army controls Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. The civilian government has no role to play in deciding the doctrine, force structures, targeting policies and command and control. The army Chief controls the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and decides the annual defence expenditure.

The politico-military standoff within Pakistan following the ‘memogate’ scandal threatens the continuation in office of the weak civilian government. To cap it all, the economy is in a serious mess – the funds are low, the debts are high, exports have dwindled to a trickle and the rupee has fallen to all time low of 90 rupees to a dollar. Pakistan has become a rentier state that is dependent on U.S. largesse to meet its obligations for the repayment of its burgeoning debt.

The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Pakistan is headed towards a dangerous denouement.  The likelihood of a military coup is being openly discussed again despite Kayani’s unequivocal denial of any such plans. Pakistan cannot survive as a coherent nation state unless the army gives up its agenda of seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan, attempting to destabilise India through its nefarious proxy war and stopping its meddling in politics. The army must pull itself up by the bootstraps and substantively enhance its capacity to conduct effective counter-insurgency operations.

The Pakistan army has let down Pakistan and must make amends. In the national interest, the army must give up being a state within a state and accept civilian control, even if it does so with bad grace.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Strategic Uncertainty: Managing Emerging Threats and Challenges

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Though the year gone by was relatively peaceful for India, the security environment in India’s regional neighbourhood has been steadily deteriorating. The greatest causes of regional instability are the strident march of Islamist fundamentalism across the Af-Pak border and the unresolved conflict in Afghanistan. In fact, the scourge of Talibanisation is creeping forward gradually and threatens to cross the Radcliff Line into India if it goes unchecked.

The unstable security situation in Afghanistan continues to be worrisome. The US-led NATO-ISAF troops will soon begin their planned withdrawal even though the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are as yet incapable of taking over independent charge of security, particularly in the districts which are strongholds of the Taliban. The ANSF are too few in number – only 200,000 army and police personnel have been trained so far. They are inadequately trained and ill-equipped and lack the standards of junior leadership that are critical for success in intense counter-insurgency operations.

Since the elimination of Osama bin Laden, the precarious relationship between the Pakistan army and the ISI and their U.S. counterparts – ostensibly major allies in the war against terrorism – has weakened further. The killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers during the bombardment of a border post by NATO-ISAF aircraft in November outraged Pakistan and led to the decision to stop the flow of logistics convoys through Quetta and Peshawar, deny base facilities at Shamsi and demand re-negotiation of the rules of engagement. The worst fallout has been the politico-military standoff within Pakistan that threatens the continuation in office of the fledgling civilian government.

Marked reduction in the levels of infiltration across the LoC into Kashmir over the last few years and the fact that no major terrorist strike has been initiated by ISI-backed organisations like the LeT and JeM since 26/11, convinced India to resume the stalled rapprochement process. However, the two armies continue to face off eyeball-to-eyeball on the LoC and at the Saltoro Ridge west of Siachen Glacier and a small incident could bring the informal cease-fire to an abrupt end. Toning down of the anti-India rhetoric and terrorist strikes is a tactical ploy to tide over internal difficulties, rather than a long-term change in the military strategy designed to bleed India through a thousand cuts. The Pakistan army and the ISI are keeping the machinery for terrorist strikes well oiled so that they can raise the ante in a short time frame whenever they choose to do so.

The Chinese have been aggressively opposing even a non-military Indian presence aimed at prospecting for oil and gas in the South China Sea while themselves seeking naval bases in the Indian Ocean. Chinese scholars have expressed strong reservations against India’s quest to reach out strategically to democracies in East Asia. They have denounced multilateral (Australia, India, Japan and US) naval exercises aimed at enhancing maritime cooperation in the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean as being aimed at the strategic encirclement of China.

The Chinese abruptly postponed the 15th round of boundary talks between the special representatives in November 2011 as India refused to relent on the Dalai Lama’s participation in a private conference on Buddhism. Chinese diplomatic, political and military assertiveness at the tactical level is likely to continue into 2012 and beyond. However, at the strategic level the relationship will remain stable.

The government of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh has reversed decades old anti-India policies and has begun to cooperate with India in rooting out insurgent groups operating against from its soil. The resolution of the boundary dispute is now being addressed in a friendly manner. Iran’s continuing quest to obtain nuclear weapons may lead to a standoff with the U.S. in the Strait of Hormuz if Iran blocks the flow of oil. India’s relations with Myanmar’s relatively more open Thein Sein regime have been improving steadily, resulting in better security cooperation. However, the Myanmarese government is struggling to bring the Kachin, Karen and Shan insurgencies under control.

Despite many extensions in the deadline, Nepal has failed to frame a new constitution or find an amicable solution to the integration of former Maoist cadres in the army. With the increasingly pervasive Chinese presence in Nepal, resentment against India is growing. Even though the Sri Lankan government has made little effort to successfully address the decades old aspiration of the Tamil people for ‘eelam’, the country has remained free of violent conflict.

The internal security situation in India has shown significant improvement. The army and other security forces have gained ascendancy in Kashmir and the number of incidents of violence has declined sharply. Insurgencies in north-east India have begun to recede and negotiations to resolve the crises are making progress. The areas worst affected by Naxalite or left wing extremism have been fairly quiet and the central police organisations are gradually gaining ground.

Concerted political, diplomatic and military efforts must continue to resolve outstanding disputes and better manage the manifold threats and challenges to national security. The armed forces and the central police and para-military forces must keep their chins up and their powder dry.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Rice’s Revelations and Omission

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Condoleezza Rice’s new memoirs contain some interesting details about recent crises in India-Pakistan relations.  But her silence on the peace process they undertook in 2004-07 is unfortunate. 

 

The disclosures about the landmark U.S.-India nuclear cooperation accord that are contained in Condoleezza Rice’s new memoirs of her service in the Bush administration, No Higher Honor, have been widely reported. Less noticed are the interesting nuggets about two signal episodes in the recent arc of India-Pakistan relations. The first is the egregious assault upon the Indian parliament while it was in session by Pakistan-based jihadi groups in December 2001, which in turn precipitated a serious military confrontation that lasted for most of 2002. The second is the spectacular November 2008 terrorist strike in Mumbai that is often regarded as “India’s 9/11.”

The 2001-02 standoff was the first nuclear crisis of the 21st century. Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee’s Bharatiya Janata Party government came under tremendous domestic political pressure to respond forcefully to the attack. A similar assault two months earlier on the Kashmir state assembly had caused him to warn the United States that India would be forced to take matters into its own hands if Washington could not convince Islamabad to keep in check terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan. He termed the December attack “the most dangerous challenge so far to India’s national security” and vowed that “we will fight a decisive battle to the end.”

To back up its demands that Islamabad crack down on the militants, India went on a vast war footing, including deploying three strike corps along the border with Pakistan, which reacted with a massive counter-mobilization. In short order, some one million soldiers were arrayed in combat readiness posts on both sides of the border.

Rice recounts that the Bush administration had a difficult time assessing the likelihood of war. The Pentagon believed Indian military moves were to be expected and did not by themselves indicate that an attack was imminent. The CIA, however, concluded that Indian retaliation was inevitable. Washington also received reports that New Delhi was moving nuclear-capable Prithvi ballistic missiles to the border area. Rice recounts that in the closing days of 2001 Brajesh Mishra, Vajpayee’s national security adviser, told her that war fever was rising in the Indian government.

Following diplomatic interventions orchestrated by Washington and London, the standoff seemed to be winding down when a terrorist attack on an Indian army base in Kashmir in May 2002 re-inflamed passions. Vajpayee thereafter traveled to the Line of Control in Kashmir where he chillingly instructed Indian troops “to be ready for sacrifice. Your goal should be victory. It’s time to fight a decisive battle. We’ll write a new chapter of victory.” Concerned that tensions were reaching a boiling point, Washington and London evacuated their embassies in New Delhi (though curiously the U.S. embassy in Islamabad was not vacated).

At this point, according to Rice, Mishra urgently called her to say that “I cannot contain the war lobby without some help.” She adds:

Making it clear that he was acting on his own, he asked that the President [George W Bush] make a statement, which he [Mishra] could use internally to try to hold the line.

Acceding to this request, Bush issued a public statement calling on President Pervez Musharraf to do more to rein in militants and then telephoned the Pakistani leader to underscore the message. Following renewed U.S. diplomatic intervention, tensions abated significantly by the summer months and the crisis concluded anticlimactically by October.

Were New Delhi and Islamabad actually on the precipice of war? Much remains unknown about Indian decisionmaking in the crisis. Rice chalks up the reduction of tensions “to the good work of Brajesh Mishra.” Yet not all Indian leaders believed war was imminent. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, for example, has denied that New Delhi was actively contemplating offensive military operations.

Moreover, the window of opportunity for Indian action rapidly closed after January 2002 as Pakistan quickly repositioned forces that were guarding the border with Afghanistan to shore up its eastern flank. For all of the heated rhetoric caused by the May 2002 terrorist attack in Kashmir, senior Indian military officers apparently realized that the likelihood of battlefield success had markedly declined in the intervening months.

The Mumbai terrorist strike that took place in the fall of 2008 was more horrific and brazen than the one that sparked the 2001-02 crisis. In the intervening years, the Indian army had unveiled the Cold Start doctrine which aims to deter Pakistani support for attacks like the one in Mumbai by threatening swift and forceful military retaliation.

Rice states that Washington feared that the doctrine would be implemented in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks. According to her, the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi, David Mulford, reported that “there is war fever here. I don’t know if the prime minister can hold out.” Asif Ali Zardari’s fledgling civilian government in Islamabad was also spooked by a hard-hitting telephone conversation Pranab Mukherjee, then serving as Indian foreign minister, had with his Pakistani opposite number. Alarmed that India is on the warpath, Islamabad frantically began calling on China, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates for diplomatic support.

Worry also started to gnaw at Rice when Mukherjee proved hard to reach by phone. She writes: “Is he avoiding my call because they are preparing for war? I wondered. It still didn’t make sense, but it was India and Pakistan, and anything could happen.” When the Indian at last returned her call, he is taken aback by Pakistan’s frenzy. He is in his parliamentary district campaigning for upcoming elections, he explains. “Would I be outside New Delhi if we were about to launch a war?”

A central question in the Mumbai episode is why New Delhi reacted with what can only be described as remarkable forbearance instead of renewed military confrontation as in 2001-02 or with the retaliatory offensives envisioned in the Cold Start doctrine. Rice attributes the quiescence to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s determination to avoid war. Indeed, some analysts have observed that compared to Vajpayee’s BJP government that controlled decisionmaking in the 2001-02 crisis, Singh’s Congress Party is more reflective of the preference for military restraint over risk-taking that is ingrained in Indian strategic culture. While the Cold Start doctrine was promulgated during the BJP’s tenure in power, the succeeding Congress government has taken pains to distance itself from the concept.

But more seems to have been at work than just party ideology. For all the effort on Cold Start, Indian military leaders reportedly told the government after Mumbai that the armed forces were ill-prepared to go to war. Indeed, in a February 2010 cable to the State Department, Timothy Roemer, the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi, assessed that the strategy “may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints.”

Rice notes that she became fatigued by the crisis-prone nature of India-Pakistan relations. So it is even more striking that she omits all but fleeting mention of the intensive back-channel peace process New Delhi and Islamabad undertook in 2004-07. Although the negotiations ultimately collapsed in the face of Musharraf’s domestic political problems, they may have come tantalizing close to defusing the perennially-inflamed dispute over Kashmir.

Rice’s silence is unfortunate. The talks are a significant counterpoint to arguments that the nuclearization process in South Asia has only served to foment greater tension and conflict. And they may also hold relevant lessons for the peace dialogue the two governments are currently embarked upon.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Systemic Weaknesses in India’s Counter-terrorism Policy

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While the year gone by has not seen a major terrorist attack, systemic weaknesses in India’s counter-terrorism policy are continuing to hamper its successful execution. Though recent terrorist strikes have been sporadic and have been spaced out in time, the overall impression that has been created is that of an unstable internal security environment in which the initiative lies with the terrorist organisations and they are able to strike at will. The government needs to review its largely reactive policies and adopt pro-active measures to fight terrorism, particularly the variety that emanates from the soil of inimical neighbouring countries.

A democratically elected government ultimately has to reflect the will of the people in its policies. However, the “Panipat Syndrome” appears to have been deeply ingrained into the Indian psyche, in that the leaders and the bureaucracy react only when the tiger is already at the doorstep. What is needed is a coordinated approach, with all organs of the state coming together to formulate and implement a national-level counter-terrorism strategy to fight terrorism. The government must draw up a comprehensive strategy that is inter-ministerial, inter-agency and inter-departmental in character. Such a strategy must also balance the interests of the Central and the State governments.

India’s response to the Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008 was slow and laborious and poorly coordinated among the Central and the State governments and their various agencies. Coastal security was virtually non-existent; the Marine Police were too few in number to effectively patrol the vast area entrusted to them; they were ill-equipped and inadequately trained; and, there was poor coordination between the Coast Guard and the Marine Police. It took far too long to begin flushing out operations and then to eliminate the nine terrorists who were holed up at three separate locations.

Counter-terrorism policy must hinge around strong laws to fight terrorism. India’s experiments with POTA, TADA and UAPA have failed to deliver the desired results. Laws must be just and humane, but must not be designed to either be vindictive towards or shield any particular community or religious denomination. The experience of many other countries has proved that it is possible to formulate strong yet egalitarian counter-terrorism laws. The U.S. established a strong Department of Homeland Security and there has not been a major terrorist attack since 9/11.

One major source of the lack of a coordinated approach is the gross disconnect between how the Central and the State governments view counter-terrorism. The Constitution must be amended to move “law and order” from the State List to the Concurrent List so that the Central Government can act on its own initiative when necessary, particularly in the case of externally-sponsored terrorism. And, it is time the government bifurcated the internal security function of the Ministry of Home Affairs into a separate ministry headed by a cabinet minister.

Besides prevention through accurate ‘humint’ and ‘techint’ intelligence gathering, successful counter-terrorism requires the effective intelligence penetration of terrorist groups so that their leadership can be systematically neutralised by an empowered anti-terrorism agency. More comprehensive planning and better stage management are necessary for the quick elimination of a group of terrorists while they are on a killing spree. Post-incident investigation is aimed at unraveling the identities of the planners and the plotters and bringing to justice the perpetrators of the incident of terrorism. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) should have been modeled on the U.S. FBI to give it both preventive and investigative powers. The NIA needs to be reconstituted as it lacks teeth in its present form.

India’s intelligence coordination and assessment apparatus at the national level remains mired in the days of innocence. The NATGRID (National Intelligence Grid) and the NCTC (National Counter-terrorism Centre), which were announced by Home Minister Chidambaram with so much fanfare over two years ago, are yet to take off. It was reported recently that the three-member committee headed by the NSA and appointed to deliberate upon the organisation and the executive powers of the NCTC and its links with the NATGRID and the existing Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) has submitted its recommendations. These must be taken up on priority by the Cabinet Committee on Security.

Finally, the government must seriously consider enlarging the scope of its counter-terrorism policy to covertly eliminate the leaders of terrorist organisations abroad who are sponsoring terrorism in India. Unless the problem is addressed at its roots, the solution will remain beyond the grasp of the government.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan: The Turmoil Within

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The situation in Pakistan appears to worsen by the day. Consequent to President Asif Ali Zardari’s return from Dubai, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has spoken of “conspiracies being hatched to bring down his elected government.” He has vowed to “continue to fight for the rights of the people of Pakistan, whether or not we remain in the government.” Fears of another military coup are writ large in Gilani’s statement made in Pakistan’s parliament.

In a related development, in the wake of the tensions between the elected government and the army, Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence has stated that it has “no operational control over the army and ISI.” It made this admission in an affidavit filed in the Supreme Court regarding its inability to respond formally on behalf of the armed forces and the ISI in respect of their stand on the ‘memogate’ scandal. Tensions between the army and the civilian government have been rising over a memo that was reportedly sent at President Zardari’s behest to Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, about a coup that the army was said to be planning following the killing of Osama bin Laden.

Meanwhile, the army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani, has petitioned the Supreme Court to “thoroughly investigate” the memogate scandal as it has a bearing on national security and sovereignty. It emerges clearly that the army and the ISI are at loggerheads with the elected civilian government and would like it to go. However, they do not as yet appear to be prepared to stage another military coup to dislodge the government.

Given the stranglehold that the Pakistan army enjoys over the country’s polity, the army should be content to drive the country’s major policies from the back seat. However, if there is another military coup, it will certainly not be the last one. Pakistan has a history of military coups that go back to the era of General Ayub Khan. General Musharraf was the last military dictator of the country. He yielded power to a civilian dispensation very reluctantly and that too only after being hounded by an uncharacteristically pro-active Supreme Court.

Pakistan has become a rentier state that is dependent on Uncle Sam’s aid. Its economy is in shambles. It can default any time on its loan repayment obligations. Its currency is down to rupees 90 to a U.S. dollar. Inflation is flying high in double digits. The number of people living below the subsistence level is going up steadily. Relations with the U.S. are at an all time low. The security situation within Pakistan is dismal. Interior Minister Rehman Malik was recently reduced to thanking the Taliban for maintaining peace during Muharram.

At a time when all sections of Pakistan’s polity should unite together to fight the scourge of internal instability and creeping Talibanisation, it is incomprehensible that the army and the ISI should be jostling for narrow political gains to restore their hegemony. Unless Pakistan’s army is tamed and cut to size, it will continue to thwart Pakistan’s fledgling democracy from taking firm roots. Only an Arab Spring type of revolution will be able to clip the army’s wings. Alas, it does not look imminent.