India and America: common values, shared success

By Richard G. Lugar

As Secretary of State Clinton’s recent trip to India demonstrated, these are exciting times for India, and for the India-United States relationship. India has liberalized and opened its economy, unleashing the entrepreneurial talent of its people and using its strong technology base to establish leading positions in such fields as telecommunications, information technology and pharmaceuticals.

America and India, for too long estranged during the Cold War, have developed steadily closer ties built on a uniquely strong foundation: both countries are stable, multi-ethnic democracies with a deep tradition of religious tolerance.

With a well-educated middle class that is larger than the entire U.S. population, India can be an anchor of stability in Asia and a center of economic growth. It is already the world’s second-fastest growing major economy, and bilateral trade with the U.S. has more than tripled over the past 10 years. I have worked to build a strategic partnership between the United States and India that will benefit both sides as India plays an ever-larger role on the world stage.

I am also excited by a new opportunity to match India’s entrepreneurial zeal with America’s current need for investment and jobs through the Startup Visa Act, which I introduced earlier this year. The bill would allow an immigrant entrepreneur to receive a two-year visa if he or she can show that a qualified U.S. investor is willing to invest in the immigrant’s startup venture. Many of India’s smartest and most entrepreneurial individuals are already here studying at our universities, so helping them stay to invest in their ideas would create jobs and help all Americans.

The bill would also apply to those already in the U.S. on unexpired H-1B visas, and entrepreneurs living outside the United States who already have a market presence here. If this legislation is enacted, it will help more Indians take part in the great American tradition of immigrant business success.

Another concern of Indians abroad is Pakistan, a concern I share. I believe the U.S. should use its influence to promote stability in the region, which could lead to a Pakistan that is more likely to cooperate and trade with India. That’s one of the reasons I co-sponsored the 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act.

The bill emphasizes economic assistance over military aid, and contains incentives for Pakistan to stabilize its democracy. It requires the Secretary of State to certify every year that Pakistan is meeting specific benchmarks of conduct, namely, that it is cooperating to dismantle supplier networks of nuclear weapons-related material, that it is making “significant efforts” to combat terrorist and extremist groups and that such groups are not receiving support from Pakistan’s military or spy service, and that it is not letting terrorist groups use Pakistan’s territory to stage attacks on other countries.

On that score, the bill specifically mentions Pakistan-based terrorist groups that threaten India as well as the United States and Afghanistan, including al Qaeda, the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which conducted the 2008 Mumbai attack. The legislation aims to encourage Pakistan to re-orient its armed forces to a mission more focused on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency than regional conflict, and calls for a cut-off of assistance if the security forces are deemed to be “subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.” In short, India has much to gain from the success of this legislation.

All this is part of a larger strategic engagement between India and America, which took a major step forward three years ago with the passage of the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement, a step that I strongly supported. The legislation lifted a three-decade American moratorium on nuclear trade with India and opened the door for trade in a wide range of other high-technology items, such as supercomputers and fiber optics.

Some critics called the deal a set-back for U.S. non-proliferation efforts, since India remains outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). I argued, however, that it actually provides incentives for the United States and India to deepen their cooperation in stopping proliferation, and confers numerous other benefits outside the nuclear realm by paving the way for broader economic and strategic collaboration.

The remarkable deepening of US-India ties over the past decade is only a start, as the relationship has still not reached its full potential. If Indians and Indian-Americans continue to contribute their ideas, their energy and their commitment, I am sure that even more exciting days lie ahead.

(Senator Richard Lugar is the Republican leader of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.)

Knocking on APEC’s Door

India’s absence from APEC is a serious omission for the organization. Its entry should be on the agenda of the upcoming APEC Summit in Honolulu.


apecHaving made the calculation that America’s security and prosperity would be enhanced by partnership with India, the United States over the last decade has promoted New Delhi’s admission into global governance structures. For the Bush administration, this meant doing the heavy lifting required to enroll India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an informal cartel governing the global nuclear regime whose original purpose of existence was to exclude New Delhi from its ranks. The Obama administration similarly helped usher India into the Group of 20 forum on the international economy and, most recently, endorsed its long-standing bid for permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council.

The time has now come for Washington to sponsor New Delhi’s entry into another international institution from which it has been barred for much too long.  India for decades has desired formal involvement in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which engages over half of world gross domestic product and a large fraction of global trade. But its application has continuously been passed over due to a lack of consensus inside the grouping, which currently numbers 21 members. Some APEC countries have expressed concerns that the institution is too unwieldy as it is and cannot accommodate India or the dozen other interested countries lined up at its door. Others argue that India is not really a Pacific Rim country and is therefore outside of APEC’s geographic parameters.

But with India poised to become one of the world’s top economies in the years ahead, its absence is a serious lacuna for the organization. New Delhi already participates as a full member in regional leadership groups like the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, both important venues for political and security discussions. It is also a full ASEAN dialogue partner.

Southeast Asia has historically been an area of deep Indian trade and cultural influence but was neglected diplomatically during much of India’s independent existence. Seeking to make up for lost time, New Delhi launched the “Look East” policy in 1992. It has proved to be a very successful initiative, paving the way for significant and rapidly-growing economic and diplomatic linkages in the region. The ten member-countries of ASEAN now constitute India largest export market. Southeast Asia takes in more than half of Indian exports, up from around 40 percent just a decade ago.  Indeed, India’s total trade volume with East Asia now exceeds that with the United States or the European Union. And New Delhi’s trade diplomacy has been on a tear recently in Asia, with major economic agreements being signed with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. It has commenced negotiations with Indonesia to boost the $12 billion in trade the two countries conducted in 2010.

India has also emerged as a major security player in East Asia and is fast becoming a key factor in the region’s geopolitical calculus. A landmark India-Japan security accord was signed in 2008, and important strategic partnerships have been established with Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. Indeed, Tokyo and Singapore lobbied for New Delhi’s membership in the EAS, over Beijing’s objections, in order to counterbalance Chinese influence in the organization. The United States and India now hold regular consultations on Asia-Pacific policy and a trilateral US-India-Japan security dialogue will be instituted next month in Tokyo.

The Indian navy has been conducting exercises with its U.S. and Japanese counterparts for a number of years now in the Pacific Ocean, and as the brief encounter two months ago between the INS Airavat, an amphibious warfare vessel, and the Chinese navy off the coast of Vietnam demonstrates, the navy is becoming a regular presence in the region’s waters.

APEC’s membership moratorium expired last year. With Washington currently holding the forum’s chairmanship, the Obama administration should be preparing the diplomatic groundwork to place India’s admission on the agenda of the APEC Summit that will take place in mid-November in Honolulu. To avoid interminable negotiations about whether other countries should be let in at the same time, the U.S. might repeat its persuasive line about New Delhi’s entry into the global nuclear order: India is simply so important that it merits a special dispensation.

As a previous post argues, New Delhi’s membership in APEC should be part of an overall agenda for advancing US-India economic engagement. But it would also pay major strategic dividends. In his address to the Indian parliament last November, President Obama urged India not only to “look East” but also “to engage East” for the sake of enhanced security and prosperity throughout Asia. Secretary of State Hillary Rodman Clinton underscored this theme in her visit to India two months ago. Speaking in Chennai (formerly Madras), a port city that has significant economic ties with Southeast Asia, Clinton urged India to take on a larger role in shaping the regional architecture for the Asia-Pacific. Reiterating Mr. Obama’s formulation, she stated that “we encourage India not just to look East, but to engage East and act East as well.”

Unused Employment Visas Contributed to Green Card Backlog

The green card backlog is significant for employment-based immigrants, particularly for professionals born in India. It’s possible the overall employment-based backlog is close to half a million people. Absent reform of the per country limits and an increase in the annual quotas it will take years – many years – to clear this backlog.

Few people realize there is a surprising cause for at least some of the backlog – unused employment visas. Since the 1990 Act, the annual quota for employment-based green cards has been 140,000. That includes both the principals and dependent family members.

However, even though the annual quota has been 140,000, that does not mean 140,000 green cards were awarded each year. Due to administrative issues within the federal government, in several years the quota was underutilized. This is detailed in the 2010 Annual Report of the U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman.

As Table 1 illustrates between FY 1992 and FY 2006, more than 506,000 employment-based immigrant visas went unused. The data were provided to the Ombudsman by the U.S. Department of State. In 1995, for example, there were 58,694 employment-based visas that went unused. In 1997, the number that went unused was 40,170. In 1999, the number reached 98,491. As recently as 2003, 88,482 unused visas authorized by Congress were not used due to administrative problems within the federal government.

As the table shows, of the 506,410 employment visas that went unused since the 1990 Act, only 180,039 have been recaptured via special legislation. It is likely most members of Congress do not realize this many green cards authorized by Congress have gone unused. It would take special legislation for the visas to be reauthorized. If Congress were to reauthorize the use of the remaining 300,000-plus unused visas accumulated over the years it would significantly reduce the waiting times for employment-based immigrants and give such immigrants their chance at the American Dream.

Table 1

Unused Employment-Based Visas FY 1992-FY 2009

Fiscal Year

Unused Employment Preference Numbers
1992 21,207
1993 0
1994 29,430
1995 58,694
1996 21,173
1997 40,170
1998 53,571
1999 98,491
2000 31,098
2001 5,511
2002 0
2003 88,482
2004 47,305
2005 0
2006 10,288
2007 0
2008 0
2009 0
2010 0
Total 506,410(180,039 were recaptured by special legislation)

Source: U.S. Department of State; USCIS Ombudsman,

Annual Report to Congress, June 2010, p. 35.

India-Bangladesh Settle Boundary Dispute

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Bangladesh this week has led to the settlement of the complex boundary dispute that had been festering between India and East Pakistan since the British left in 1947 and between India and Bangladesh since the new country was born in 1971. This is a significant milestone in the troubled history of the relationship between the two countries.

The India-Bangladesh border was always in the news as there were frequent clashes between India’s Border Security Force (BSF) and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) at places like the Teen Bigha corridor. The border has a peculiar problem that is usually referred to as ‘Enclaves and Adverse Possessions’. There are 111 Indian enclaves (17,158 acres) within Bangladesh with a population of 37,334 and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (7,110.02 acres) in India with a population of 14,215. 34 tracts of Indian land are under the adverse possession of Bangladesh and 40 pieces of Bangladeshi land are in India’s adverse possession. The demarcation of the boundary was done by signing a protocol to the Land Boundary Agreement of 1974. Though this agreement had provisions for the settlement of the issue of adverse possession, it had not been implemented as the problem was considered politically sensitive. The political leadership of the two countries has at last found the courage to invest time and effort towards resolving this sensitive issue. Now that the border dispute has been settled, unseemly clashes, which do no credit to either side, will no longer occur and spoil relations between the two countries.

The Indian Prime Minister was accompanied by four of the five Chief Ministers (CM) of Indian states bordering Bangladesh. Ms Mamata Banerjee, the CM of West Bengal and the stormy petrel of Indian politics, was reportedly upset at the concessions proposed to be made to Bangladesh ‘at the cost of West Bengal’ in the agreement on sharing of the waters of the River Teesta and dropped out virtually at the last minute. PM Manmohan Singh promised Sheikh Hasina, the Bangladesh PM, that the two sides would continue to discuss the Teesta River issue to reach “a mutually acceptable, fair and amicable arrangement…” However, as a quid pro quo response, Bangladesh retaliated by scuttling the treaty on transit rights that was also on the cards and that would have provided easer access to the rest of the country to some of India’s north-eastern states through Bangladesh.

Some of the other important treaties that were signed included an agreement on Indian aid for development programmes, a pact on overland transit between Bangladesh and Nepal, MoUs on renewable energy and the conservation of the Sunderbans and an understanding on jointly promoting fisheries. India agreed to allow Bangladesh duty free access to 46 textile items to be exported to India. Several MoUs were also signed for cooperation in the fields of education and communications, as also a protocol on conservation of the Royal Bengal Tiger – very few of this majestic species now remain in the wild.

Ever since the government of Sheikh Hasina had cracked down on India’s ULFA insurgents who had been hiding in Bangladesh for long, relations between the two countries had shown signs of thawing. The Hasina government’s policy of counter-terrorism was in stark contrast with the Begum Khaleda Zia government’s policy of providing covert shelter, encouragement and support to various Indian insurgent groups. The signing of the historic boundary agreement has taken the relationship to a much higher trajectory. The two prime ministers deserve to be complimented for their political courage and sagacity in bringing to an end the bitterness of the past.

The Continuing Proxy War in Kashmir

The situation in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) continues to remain a cause for concern to the government of India. Since end-1989, Pakistan has been waging a ‘proxy war’ against India in J&K. It has done this by aiding and abetting disaffected and misguided Kashmiri youth to rise against the Indian state. Despite the cease-fire on the Line of Control (LoC) since November 2003 and the tenuous rapprochement process, Pakistan continues to surreptitiously practice its peculiar brand of state-sponsored terrorism. This is borne out by the continuing attempts at infiltration in Kashmir during the summer of 2011.

Till some years ago, Pakistan’s official position was that it provides only ‘diplomatic, political and moral’ support to ‘freedom fighters’. However, it is now internationally accepted that the Pakistan army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate have been providing military training, weapons, military equipment, ammunition and explosives to the terrorists, besides financial support. The ISI spends approximately Rs 5 to 10 crore (USD 1 to 2 million) per month on its proxy war campaign. Till the present cease-fire came into effect, the Pakistan army actively supported terrorist bids to infiltrate into J&K by engaging Indian posts along the routes of infiltration with artillery and small arms fire.  Though infiltration has now been reduced due to effective counter-infiltration measures by the Indian army, even the present low levels would not be possible but for the encouragement and steady support being given to the Jihadi extremists by the Pakistan army.

Throughout the prolonged period of Pakistan’s proxy war, India has shown tremendous restraint and immense tolerance in the face of grave provocation to its security. It is inconceivable that any other nation would have acted with the sense of responsibility that India has in not launching trans-LoC operations to eliminate militant training camps and interdict known routes of infiltration. Many Indian analysts have been advocating a pro-active trans-LoC and trans-border counter-proxy war policy.

Former RAW analyst B. Raman has written: “The main reason why India has not yet been able to effectively put an end to Jihadi terrorism against it and its civilian population sponsored by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is because India’s counter-terrorism operations are directed only against the terrorists operating in its territory. They are not yet directed against the State sponsoring them despite a persistent demand from growing sections of the Indian population for targeting the State of Pakistan too.”

While Pakistan had reduced the overt infiltration of so-called Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’ across the LoC during Musharraf’s rule, it continued to do so covertly by looking for smarter methods of inducting more Jihadis; for example, through neighbouring countries like Nepal and Bangladesh. The remaining roots of terrorism in Kashmir now lie in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and in Pakistan itself and, unless India shows the political will necessary to eliminate these roots, Pakistan’s proxy war is likely to continue unabated even though it may become more sophisticated and covert in its approach.

The Pakistan army is under tremendous pressure from Jihadi elements responsible for internal instability and from the Americans to deliver more in the so-called War on Terror. Despite these pressures, there is unlikely to be any change in the Pakistan army’s hostility towards India and its covert support, even sponsorship, of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism across the LoC and the international boundary (IB) from Pakistan soil. Prime Minister Gilani said recently that Pakistan will continue to provide diplomatic, moral and political support for what he says is a ‘freedom struggle’ in Kashmir.

Clearly, the rapprochement process is a tactical ploy to tide over current domestic difficulties and there has not been a strategic change of heart. Pakistan’s proxy war with India will go on because the Pakistan army will not allow the civilian leadership to change its fundamental policy towards India. Hence, lasting peace in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan will remain a distant dream.