Monthly Archives: December 2011

Immigration Blog

Understanding the Potentially Decades-Long Waits for Indian Professionals in the Most Common Employment-Based Green Card Category

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Today, hundreds of thousands of highly skilled foreign nationals, particularly Indians, are languishing in immigration backlogs, waiting years for the chance to obtain permanent residence (also known as a green card). The lack of employment-based green cards harms the competitiveness of U.S. employers and exacts a large personal toll on those who must wait.

Understanding the Indian Green Card Backlog

The long waits for employment-based green cards are caused by two primary factors. First, the 140,000 annual quota is too low to accommodate the number of skilled foreign nationals able to be absorbed successfully in an economy the size of America’s. The 140,000 annual limit includes both the principal and dependent family members. For example, in 2009, dependents utilized more than half of the slots for employment-based visas – 76,935 of 140,903.

In addition to the 140,000 overall annual limit on employment-based green cards, there is also a per country limit, which has a disparate impact on immigrants from countries with a large population of highly educated professionals, particularly India and China. The Immigration and Nationality Act, in Section 202(a), details the per country limit: “[T]he total number of immigrant visas made available to natives of any single foreign state . . . may not exceed 7 percent . . . of the total number of such visas made available under such subsections in that fiscal year.” That would limit employment-based immigrants from one country to approximately 10,000 a year (out of the 140,000 quota), although another provision permits nationals of a country to exceed this ceiling if additional employment-based visas are available. Still, in general, in the most common employment-based category, fewer than 3,000 Indians per year can immigrate.

The Indian Backlog in the Employment-Based Third Preference (EB-3)

The reason Indian nationals will continue to wait a long time for employment-based green cards in the employment-based third preference (EB-3), the most common employment category, is the demand for their labor combined with the per country limit has created a large Indian backlog.

The backlog of Indians in the employment-based third preference could be as large as 210,000. One can estimate the backlog of Indians in the EB-3 category from available data. Earlier in 2010, the U.S. Department of State listed 49,850 Indians on the waiting list in the third preference category with a priority date prior to January 1, 2007. Priority dates normally coincide with the filing of a petition or of labor certification, an early stage in the employment-based green card process. However, that 49,850 figure does not include all the cases at various stages in the process at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services with a priority date prior to January 1, 2007. Rounding that figure upwards would get to at least 60,000 (and it could be higher).

To reach another 150,000 Indians for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 requires only about 15,000 individual Indian professionals sponsored for green cards each year for 5 years, with each averaging one dependent, another 15,000, for a total of 30,000 a year for 5 years or 150,000. To illustrate why an estimate of at least 15,000 Indians sponsored for green cards annually in EB-3 is reasonable, consider that 61,739 new H-1B petitions (for initial employment) were approved for Indians in FY 2008, and 33,961 Indians were approved for new H-1B petitions in FY 2009. A large proportion of H-1B visa holders are sponsored for green cards. In addition, employers frequently sponsor for green cards skilled foreign nationals already inside the country in another temporary status, such as L-1 (for intracompany transferees). Attorneys estimate 20 percent of those waiting for employment-based green cards are in a status other than H-1B.

Backlog is Large and Few Are Removed From Backlog Each Year

With no change to current law, an Indian-born professional sponsored today could wait decades for an employment-based green card. Due to the per country limit, generally no more than 2,800 Indians can receive permanent residence in the EB-3 category each year. Indians averaged fewer than 3,000 green cards annually in that category in 2009 and 2010, according to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

If, as discussed above, the potential backlog in the EB-3 category is 210,000 for Indians (principals and dependents) and 3,000 or fewer Indians can receive permanent residence in the category each year, then that means the theoretical wait for Indian professionals sponsored today in EB-3 is 70 years.

Nobody Will Wait 70 Years for a Green Card

In practice, no one can wait 70 years for a green card. That holds important implications for whether highly skilled foreign nationals from India will be able to stay long-term in the United States without changes to the law. Foreign nationals would have concerns that children included as part of the immigration petition would “age out” and not be allowed to become permanent residents. Moreover, generally speaking, spouses are not able to work. The numbers provide an illustration of how long the waits for permanent residence could be absent action by Congress. Eliminating the per country limit for employment-based green cards and raising the quotas for skilled immigrants will have a significant impact on reducing the time Indians wait for green cards.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Systemic Weaknesses in India’s Counter-terrorism Policy

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While the year gone by has not seen a major terrorist attack, systemic weaknesses in India’s counter-terrorism policy are continuing to hamper its successful execution. Though recent terrorist strikes have been sporadic and have been spaced out in time, the overall impression that has been created is that of an unstable internal security environment in which the initiative lies with the terrorist organisations and they are able to strike at will. The government needs to review its largely reactive policies and adopt pro-active measures to fight terrorism, particularly the variety that emanates from the soil of inimical neighbouring countries.

A democratically elected government ultimately has to reflect the will of the people in its policies. However, the “Panipat Syndrome” appears to have been deeply ingrained into the Indian psyche, in that the leaders and the bureaucracy react only when the tiger is already at the doorstep. What is needed is a coordinated approach, with all organs of the state coming together to formulate and implement a national-level counter-terrorism strategy to fight terrorism. The government must draw up a comprehensive strategy that is inter-ministerial, inter-agency and inter-departmental in character. Such a strategy must also balance the interests of the Central and the State governments.

India’s response to the Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008 was slow and laborious and poorly coordinated among the Central and the State governments and their various agencies. Coastal security was virtually non-existent; the Marine Police were too few in number to effectively patrol the vast area entrusted to them; they were ill-equipped and inadequately trained; and, there was poor coordination between the Coast Guard and the Marine Police. It took far too long to begin flushing out operations and then to eliminate the nine terrorists who were holed up at three separate locations.

Counter-terrorism policy must hinge around strong laws to fight terrorism. India’s experiments with POTA, TADA and UAPA have failed to deliver the desired results. Laws must be just and humane, but must not be designed to either be vindictive towards or shield any particular community or religious denomination. The experience of many other countries has proved that it is possible to formulate strong yet egalitarian counter-terrorism laws. The U.S. established a strong Department of Homeland Security and there has not been a major terrorist attack since 9/11.

One major source of the lack of a coordinated approach is the gross disconnect between how the Central and the State governments view counter-terrorism. The Constitution must be amended to move “law and order” from the State List to the Concurrent List so that the Central Government can act on its own initiative when necessary, particularly in the case of externally-sponsored terrorism. And, it is time the government bifurcated the internal security function of the Ministry of Home Affairs into a separate ministry headed by a cabinet minister.

Besides prevention through accurate ‘humint’ and ‘techint’ intelligence gathering, successful counter-terrorism requires the effective intelligence penetration of terrorist groups so that their leadership can be systematically neutralised by an empowered anti-terrorism agency. More comprehensive planning and better stage management are necessary for the quick elimination of a group of terrorists while they are on a killing spree. Post-incident investigation is aimed at unraveling the identities of the planners and the plotters and bringing to justice the perpetrators of the incident of terrorism. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) should have been modeled on the U.S. FBI to give it both preventive and investigative powers. The NIA needs to be reconstituted as it lacks teeth in its present form.

India’s intelligence coordination and assessment apparatus at the national level remains mired in the days of innocence. The NATGRID (National Intelligence Grid) and the NCTC (National Counter-terrorism Centre), which were announced by Home Minister Chidambaram with so much fanfare over two years ago, are yet to take off. It was reported recently that the three-member committee headed by the NSA and appointed to deliberate upon the organisation and the executive powers of the NCTC and its links with the NATGRID and the existing Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) has submitted its recommendations. These must be taken up on priority by the Cabinet Committee on Security.

Finally, the government must seriously consider enlarging the scope of its counter-terrorism policy to covertly eliminate the leaders of terrorist organisations abroad who are sponsoring terrorism in India. Unless the problem is addressed at its roots, the solution will remain beyond the grasp of the government.

Immigration Blog

New Survey: Indian Graduate Student Enrollment in U.S. Not Growing, While Enrollment from China Grows Rapidly

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An overlooked development is that Indian student enrollment at U.S. graduate schools has not been growing over the past four years. At the same time, Chinese student enrollment has been skyrocketing. This is the conclusion of the latest survey of U.S. graduate school programs by the Council of Graduate Schools. (Find the survey here.)

Nathan Bell, director of research and policy analysis at the Council of Graduate Schools, authored the report. Bell found, “Offers of admission to prospective graduate students from China increased 21% in 2011 following a 15% gain in 2010 and a 17% gain in 2009; this is the sixth consecutive year of double-digit growth. Offers of admission to prospective graduate students from the Middle East & Turkey increased 16% in 2011 following a 10% gain in 2010 and a 14% gain in 2009. Offers of admission to prospective graduate students from India rose 2% in 2011, the first increase to occur for students from India since 2007. This year’s 2% increase follows a 5% decline in 2010 and a 14% drop in 2009. Offers of admission to prospective graduate students from South Korea fell 2% in 2011, marking the fifth consecutive year of declines. The most recent declines for South Korea were a 7% decrease in 2010 and a 14% drop in 2009.”

Indian Student Graduate Admission Falling

However, the 2 percent rise in first-time graduate enrollment in the U.S. by Indian students from 2010 to 2011 India masked a longer-term trend. From 2007 to 2008, Indian student enrollment fell by 2 percent. From 2008 to 2009, first-time graduate enrollment from India fell again by 16 percent. Then, from 2009 to 2010, Indian student first-time graduate enrollment declined by 3 percent. Finally, from 2010 to 2011, it increased by 3 percent.

Change in Indian Student First-Time Graduate Enrollment in U.S.

2007 to 2008  -2%

2008 to 2009  -16%

2009 to 2010  -3%

2010 to 2011  +3%

 

Chinese Student Graduate Admission Rising

At the same time Indian student enrollment at U.S. graduate schools has been falling (or at least growing little in 2010 to 2011), Chinese student enrollment has increased significantly. From 2007 to 2008, Chinese graduate student enrollment in the United States rose by 14 percent. From 2008 to 2009, first-time graduate enrollment from China increased by 16 percent. From 2009 to 2010, Chinese student first-time graduate enrollment rose by 20 percent. And for 2010 to 2011 it rose again, by 21 percent.

Change in Chinese Student First-Time Graduate Enrollment in U.S.

2007 to 2008  +14%

2008 to 2009  +16%

2009 to 2010  +20%

2010 to 2011  +21%

 

Conclusion

This survey of major U.S. graduate school program does not include responses from all programs. However, it is useful as a way to evaluate trends, particularly in technical fields. The survey notes, “The majority (63%) of all international graduate students at U.S. institutions are enrolled in one of three broad fields: engineering, physical & earth sciences (which includes mathematics and computer science), and business. Life sciences and social sciences & psychology also account for large numbers of international graduate students at U.S. institutions.”

The survey does not offer an opinion as to why Chinese student first-time enrollment at U.S. graduate schools has increased at the same time that Indian student enrollment has declined. It will take further examination to know if the reason is additional recruitment efforts by U.S. universities in China, economic trends in India and China, U.S. immigration policies, or other factors. Whatever the reason, a continuation of this trend could potentially have a major impact on future immigration patterns among employment-based immigrants to the United States.

India-US Relations Blog

Is Nancy Powell the right choice for India?

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Although fluent in honeyed words, in substance, the Obama administration is proving to be a disappointment for India. None of the promises of the George Bush years has been realized: neither hi-technology cooperation nor an effort to ensure that the Indian military be given access to sufficient equipment in order to maintain parity with an expanding PLA.

Now, the choice of a career foreign service officer, Nancy Powell, as the new U.S. ambassador to India underscores the fact that President Obama has left U.S.-India relations with the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while he focuses on the far more consequential relationship between China and the U.S.

In Beijing, Gary Locke (a former Cabinet-level official known for his antipathy towards Delhi and sympathy for Beijing) has a direct channel of communication with the White House, unlike Powell, who on occasion may find it difficult even to reach Hillary Clinton, given her relatively modest status in the ranks of power players in Washington.

During Powell’s stint in Islamabad, the soft-spoken envoy became very close to President Pervez Musharraf and her “See-No-Evil” reporting ensured that the Bush administration saw both Musharraf and the Pakistan military as reliable assets of the U.S. in the region. She believed that the Pakistan army could be relied on to faithfully implement the policies cooked up in the Departments of State and Defense, and raised very few red flags. So complete was her trust in the suave commando whom she clearly admired, the coup-leader who became the President of Pakistan.

It is no secret that decision-makers on the South Block (location of the Ministries of Defense and External Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office) share with the North Block (the Home Ministry) a deep distrust of the Pakistan military, especially the army. Administrations in India have not seen any improvement in the ground situation, where irregular elements continue to infiltrate the Line of Control in Kashmir, besides entering India via road from Bangladesh and Nepal. During her period in Islamabad, Powell almost totally ignored such ISI activities against India, concentrating on the situation in Afghanistan and satisfying herself (after briefings from President Musharraf) that Pakistan was fully on board as a major non-NATO ally of the U.S. Doubts about such an assessment began only long after she left her post in Pakistan’s capital. After that, she moved on to Nepal, at a time when the Maoist groups were gaining in strength, thanks to the short-sighted policy of the former monarch in clandestinely backing them against democratic forces in Nepal, whom King Gyanendra regarded as a bigger threat than the Maoists.

Although in the course of her career in the State Department, Powell has had the distinction of being ambassador to both Ghana and Uganda. Her preferred region of interest has remained South Asia, where she evolved a distinctly Pakistan army-centric view of the overall situation. Not surprisingly, her appointment as envoy to India has been welcomed by U.S. experts such as Steven Cohen, Michael Krepon, and Teresita Schaffer. All three of them have vigorously praised the Pakistan army in the past, including the military’s quest for a resolution of the Kashmir issue on lines favorable to itself. In an op-ed in a newspaper in India, Shaffer has called Hillary Clinton’s choice “admirable”. No doubt President Musharraf too would agree, given his close personal friendship with the diplomat. Certainly, he will be ready to proffer her advice on how she should go about her task, something that he is known to do whenever he visits Washington.

Although some within the strategic community in India have delusions of grandeur about the role played by Delhi in the Obama calculus; the Powell appointment has once again shown up the differential treatment between approaches towards China and India. While the first country is a personal priority of President Obama, such that he closely monitors policy to that emerging superpower, in the case of India, Obama confines himself to mere words. The actual policy is left to Hillary Clinton who seems to regard Europe (and in particular the U.K. and now France) as not merely experts on India, but as useful interlocutors. While the expertise of the Secretary of State is most pronounced in the matter of specialty restaurants at the Maurya Sheraton hotel in Delhi (her favored haunt while visiting the country), she has very definite views on India’s role. It is that Delhi needs to behave in the manner that the U.S. and the EU decide is proper for it and forget about seeking parity with China. In that sense, the Powell appointment illustrates the much lower position of India in the strategic calculus of the Obama administration, as compared to China which has always had high-powered envoys, beginning with George H W Bush.

Nancy Powell knows the Pakistan military well and she has kept up her contacts with top generals in India’s western neighbor. However, she has cultivated far fewer links with the Indian establishment, except at the formal level. While key elements of the strategic community in India would like the Obama administration to give up its Euro-centric view of India (as a country that needs to be guided and led by the hand, in the manner of a frisky adolescent), such a development seems remote under Powell’s watch. She has been steeped in the State-Defense culture of seeing India near-exclusively from the prism of India-Pakistan relations and can be expected to follow Hillary Clinton’s instincts and insert herself into the subject almost from the day she assumes office in Delhi from Peter Burleigh, the acting envoy, who too shares with Nancy Powell close ties with the U.S. intelligence community and is a distinguished professor at the University of Miami, which has one of the best International Relations programs in the U.S.

It is no secret that the road map of the Indian-strategic community in Afghanistan and Kashmir is very different from that of the Pakistan army. Seeking to bridge this gap has been a task that Powell’s admirers in the U.S. academic community have been trying for decades to accomplish. In the final year of his present term in office, President Obama’s most urgent priority seems to be an orderly retreat from Afghanistan. Powell is among those who have long regarded it possible to enlist the Pakistan army in such a mission, if only India were to make enough concessions. Her task in Delhi may be to follow the example of another Clintonite envoy, Frank Wisner, who spent much of his tenure seeking to persuade India to make concessions on Kashmir.

Although there will be the obligatory cheers of welcome for the Powell appointment, deeper than the manufactured headlines and the anodyne statements, there is resentment that President Obama has distanced himself from the longstanding U.S. policy of sending distinguished Thought Leaders to India, rather than career diplomats such as Frank Wisner and Nancy Powell. The omens for a true India-U.S. alliance remain bleak, given Obama’s handover of India policy to his Secretary of State and her favorites. Where is the “change” that we were promised, Mr. President?

You seem to have gone back to Bill Clinton’s policy, of seeing India only within the prism of relations with Pakistan.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan: The Turmoil Within

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The situation in Pakistan appears to worsen by the day. Consequent to President Asif Ali Zardari’s return from Dubai, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has spoken of “conspiracies being hatched to bring down his elected government.” He has vowed to “continue to fight for the rights of the people of Pakistan, whether or not we remain in the government.” Fears of another military coup are writ large in Gilani’s statement made in Pakistan’s parliament.

In a related development, in the wake of the tensions between the elected government and the army, Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence has stated that it has “no operational control over the army and ISI.” It made this admission in an affidavit filed in the Supreme Court regarding its inability to respond formally on behalf of the armed forces and the ISI in respect of their stand on the ‘memogate’ scandal. Tensions between the army and the civilian government have been rising over a memo that was reportedly sent at President Zardari’s behest to Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, about a coup that the army was said to be planning following the killing of Osama bin Laden.

Meanwhile, the army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani, has petitioned the Supreme Court to “thoroughly investigate” the memogate scandal as it has a bearing on national security and sovereignty. It emerges clearly that the army and the ISI are at loggerheads with the elected civilian government and would like it to go. However, they do not as yet appear to be prepared to stage another military coup to dislodge the government.

Given the stranglehold that the Pakistan army enjoys over the country’s polity, the army should be content to drive the country’s major policies from the back seat. However, if there is another military coup, it will certainly not be the last one. Pakistan has a history of military coups that go back to the era of General Ayub Khan. General Musharraf was the last military dictator of the country. He yielded power to a civilian dispensation very reluctantly and that too only after being hounded by an uncharacteristically pro-active Supreme Court.

Pakistan has become a rentier state that is dependent on Uncle Sam’s aid. Its economy is in shambles. It can default any time on its loan repayment obligations. Its currency is down to rupees 90 to a U.S. dollar. Inflation is flying high in double digits. The number of people living below the subsistence level is going up steadily. Relations with the U.S. are at an all time low. The security situation within Pakistan is dismal. Interior Minister Rehman Malik was recently reduced to thanking the Taliban for maintaining peace during Muharram.

At a time when all sections of Pakistan’s polity should unite together to fight the scourge of internal instability and creeping Talibanisation, it is incomprehensible that the army and the ISI should be jostling for narrow political gains to restore their hegemony. Unless Pakistan’s army is tamed and cut to size, it will continue to thwart Pakistan’s fledgling democracy from taking firm roots. Only an Arab Spring type of revolution will be able to clip the army’s wings. Alas, it does not look imminent.