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India-US Relations Blog

How will Wikileaks affect the U.S.-India dynamic?

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Last week began with a bang as Wikileaks snuck out its latest offering of classified government cables and documents causing a stir in diplomatic circles. The leaked documents provide a glimpse into the U.S. State Department’s dealings with and impressions of various countries and global leaders. While the veracity of these documents will continue to remain suspect, there is little to suggest that all of the contents of the documents are doctored. Assuming that the information contained in these documents is partially true, there are some interesting and disturbing revelations for India, particularly with regard to Pakistan and China.

Image credit www.skuggen.comProbably the most disparaging of comments about India is a poor assessment of the Cold Start strategy, a military strategy to be implemented in retaliation of terrorist attacks in India. The exposed document revels U.S’ doubts about the deterrent capability of Cold Start for Pakistan, and India’s intentions of every using it given that it did not do so after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. It also says that several senior government officials have neither “supported, endorsed or advocated” for Cold Start.

Other documents reveal how China blocked a UN Security Council vote on sanctions against Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and its leader Hafiz Saeed at the behest of Pakistan before the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai.  JuD and Hafiz Saeed have been accused by India of having planned terrorist attacks on India. Since then JuD has been put under sanctions and the Pakistan government is tasked with implementing the freeze on assets. However, JuD and Saeed continue to be operational even today.

Another set of documents show the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s annual budget, raised through private funds and charitable networks of JuD, is $ 5.2 million. Hafiz Saeed and LeT’s Zakir-ul-Rehman Lakhvi are said to continue operating and generating funds in spite of having been detained by Pakistani agencies for their involvement in the Mumbai attacks. Still other documents talk of how Pakistan would not stop supporting terrorists against India no matter how much aid poured in from the U.S.  The documents shows a Pakistan obsessed with animosity with India and no amount of money would not make a difference to its intentions about India.

These and other documents from Wikileaks vindicate India’s allegations about Pakistan sponsored terrorism against India, and their role particularly in the 26/11 attacks. While the contents of these documents might not be particularly surprising, it brings a mixed bag of emotions as far as its relations with the U.S. are concerned. On the one hand the leaked cables show how the U.S. is concerned about terrorism emanating from Pakistan, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and a circumstance necessitated relationship filled with suspicion and distrust. On the other it raises questions about what the U.S was doing sitting on such extensive information about Hafiz Saeed and other terrorist activities in Pakistan? Why did it not act against terrorism in Pakistan with the same speed and determination as it did against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan or against Iraq? Is the U.S. genuinely concerned about terrorism as a whole, or only when it lands on its shores? Is India good only as a trading partner for America, or does it appreciate its strategic importance in South Asia? How true is the ‘natural allies’ rhetoric, or would short term strategic considerations continue to override long-term gains that the U.S-India partnership can provide each country?

India has so far chosen to maintain a stoic silence on the Wikileaks and refrained from criticizing the U.S for the leaking of classified conversations. Irrespective of how damaging the leaks are to security interests or bilateral relations, the sheer number of documents leaked (over 90000) is enough to raise concerns about the confidentiality and privacy of future interactions with the U.S. Though the revelations might not have been too startling, diplomatic bridges have been damaged as is evident from the U.S’ hurried damage control response, including plans to charge Wikileaks founder Julian Assange. With time the memory of these embarrassing revelations will be relegated to history, and all might seem well with the India-U.S relationship. But will the two countries truly be natural allies? Or will the ghosts of Pakistan and U.S’ inaction to the detriment of Indian security interests loom large over this nascent relationship?

Important links:

“WikiLeaks U.S. embassy cables: as it happened”

“US doubts Pak will fight militants”

“WikiLeaks cables portray Saudi Arabia as a cash machine for terrorists.”

“Wikileaks: China thwarted action against anti-India terrorists”

“Cash from Haj pilgrims used to finance 26/11: WikiLeaks”

“WikiLeaks cables: Accused Mumbai plotter runs operations from jail”

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

26/11: India’s options two years after

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Two years ago, on Thanksgiving, as American families sat down to dinner, their TV screens came to life with a macabre spectacle. Ten terrorists, trained to numb their emotions, went on a killing spree in Mumbai unparalleled in modern history.

There have been commentators who’ve pointed out that after all, there are terrorist attacks on a daily basis in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia etc. So why should the Mumbai attacks raise so much consternation? And yet the Mumbai attacks stand out neither for their scale nor the murder – but for their modus operandi and intent. And it wasn’t just the fact that the attackers seemed unmoved by the horror of murder – the slow and calculated shooting of scores of unarmed people. It was also the fact that unlike in other terrorist attacks in the region, the terrorists in Mumbai were neither domestic insurgents nor disaffected citizens of the country. Instead, in Mumbai, the attackers were foreign nationals…Citizens of another country who had crossed an international border explicitly for the task of carrying out an essentially military action during peacetime. The causes cited by the Mumbai attackers were hardly personal. Given the legacy of relations between Pakistan and India the ten terrorists’ action could have been a causus belli. But, India chose not to respond with any form of military action and gave Pakistan an opportunity to deracinate Lashkar-e-Taiba from its soil. And yet the Lashkar, as much a nationalist group as it is a religious extremist group, has thus not been smashed by the strong arm of the Pakistani state. Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, despite being proscribed by the UN, continues to be in public life and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa continues to make news, most recently through its fund-raising drive during Eid-ul-Adha. Ajmal Amir Kasab’s confessions and David Headley’s testimony prove that Lashkar-e-Taiba’s plans are far from over.

Commandos in action during Mumbai attacksSome Pakistani analysts say that deracinating the Lashkar-e-Taiba is impossible because Pakistan’s establishment fears the repercussions of opening up another front by taking on Lashkar-e-Taiba which has powerful patronage networks in the country. Others aver that Pakistan’s military establishment needs such groups for the insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir and that they serve as a “strategic reserve” to achieve the strategic goals of the establishment vis-à-vis India. These reasons are anything but reassuring for anyone that believes in peace between the two countries.

It is clear that should a terrorist attack such as the Mumbai attacks recur, India would not be able to show restraint against the groups. Public opinion is often a strong factor in democracies as was seen in the U.S. response to 9/11. Unsurprisingly, a recent Pew poll indicated that most Indians would support military action against Lashkar-e-Taiba and other extremist groups if they conducted another terrorist attack in India. The only question for India is to determine when its red lines have been breached.

The response by India would be anything but vindictive. India’s objective would not be about destabilizing Pakistan. India recognizes the far-reaching consequences of such a scenario for India’s and international security.  Instead, should another such terrorist attack occur, what India is likely to do is target the cogs and wheels of the “terror machine” – the complex web of non-state actors who are willing to cross an international border to execute military actions – inside Pakistan.

India of course would have costs to bear.  Indian policymakers understand that there are no reliable patterns to be drawn from the history of military response to cross-border terrorist attacks. The attack and India’s response could alleviate tensions in the region enough to have an impact on the India’s economy. There would be costs in terms of human casualties. There may be no guarantees against future attacks. And yet… should a terrorist attack by a Pakistani national or a terrorist attack traceable to Pakistan recur on Indian soil, all the above costs for India would be overshadowed by the cost of doing nothing. India also remembers the adverse impact of the Mumbai attacks on the Indian economy. In short, the cost of doing nothing would have such a serious impact on the political-economy of India that it would have no other option but to respond and strike.

The onus of preventing a future attack therefore, lies as much with Pakistan as with India. The latter would of course have to strengthen its anti-terrorism institutions and structures. Pakistan, on the other hand, has to be resolute and come down hard on Lashkar-e-Taiba and its allies, and extend India the kind of security cooperation that it has extended to other countries such as Iran.

The Mumbai attacks will forever be remembered as one of the most brutal assaults ever perpetrated. Allowing another attack to happen would be just as grave a crime.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Cold Start as Deterrence against Proxy War

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By Sushant Sareen
Indian Review of Global Affairs

For some months now, the Indian Army’s ‘Cold Start’ (CS) doctrine has been attracting a lot of attention from Western diplomats, generals and political leaders. The reason is simple: the Pakistanis, who were reluctant to move against their ‘strategic assets’ (aka Taliban and al Qaeda affiliates like Lashkar-e-Taiba), have self-servingly flagged this doctrine as proof of India’s hostile and aggressive design. Waving the ‘threat’ from India, the Pakistan Army has been resisting pressure from the West to redeploy troops from the eastern border to the western front. The gullible Westerners appear to have bought the Pakistani line and are seeking to persuade India to renounce the CS doctrine. This, the Westerners believe, is the magic bullet to address Pakistan’s sense of insecurity and allow the Pakistan Army to move against terrorist safe havens inside Pakistani territory.

How much the CS doctrine has spooked the Pakistanis is clear from the statements of the Pakistani political leaders and generals. Addressing senior officers in the GHQ on 1st January, the Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani called the CS doctrine “an adventurous and dangerous path”. He flogged this theme during his talk at the NATO headquarters in Brussels and later in a meeting with Pakistani journalists where he showed deep concern over the Indian Army’s preparations for making the CS doctrine operational. Taking the cue from him, the National Command Authority of Pakistan issued a statement in which it said that “offensive doctrines like Cold Start…tend to destabilise the regional balance.” The Azm-e-Nau military exercises, held in April-May 2010, were primarily aimed at countering the CS strategy of the Indian Army. Completely at a loss to understand Pakistan’s recalcitrance over acting against Islamist terror groups, the West appears to have latched on to Pakistan’s India bogey as a possible solution to end the Pakistani double-game in the war on terror. Hence, the efforts to try and make India back off from the CS strategy.

Wagah border ceremony The problem, however, is that no amount of disavowals by India, and no amount of security assurances by the U.S. or other Western nations, will ever convince Pakistan, which has been badly rattled by the CS doctrine, that India’s basic defence posture is defensive in nature and orientation. Despite the Indian Army Chief General VK Singh denying the existence of any such doctrine, the CS strategy has acquired a life of its own in the Pakistani military mind.

Come to think of if, this is probably not such a bad thing from India’s point of view. Even as strategists debate the practicality or otherwise of the concept of a limited war under a nuclear overhang and the CS doctrine as a military strategy – after all, the battleground has a nasty habit of springing surprises that can ground the most well-prepared battle plans – the doctrine’s validity has been confirmed by Pakistan’s frenetic efforts to put in place a counter strategy. That the Pakistan Army is preparing to counter the CS by its conventional forces and not through use of nuclear weapons is a tacit acceptance of both the theory of limited war under a nuclear overhang as well as the exploitation of this strategic space through the device of CS doctrine.

More important, however, has been the utility of the CS doctrine as a tool of psy-war. Not only has it unsettled the adversary, it has also put in place an effective deterrent against the proxy war unleashed by Pakistan-sponsored terror groups in India. In other words, Pakistan can no longer be sure whether or not India will resort to lightening strikes across the border in response to actions by Pakistani terror groups inside India. The prospect of sudden retaliation by India effectively means that the impunity with which Pakistan was exporting terror to India is in grave danger. Perhaps, this is one of the major reasons why there has been no major terrorist attack in India since 26/11.

But the utility of CS as a deterrent to sub-conventional warfare or proxy warfare depends in large measure on the credibility of the deterrent. In a sense, the dynamics and dialectics of a sub-conventional deterrence like CS are no different from those of nuclear deterrence. As and when India effectively operationalises the CS doctrine, it will have to ensure that the adversary knows the resolve of the Indian state to implement this strategy in response to another major terrorist strike. This is critical to prevent any miscalculation or misreading by Pakistan of India’s resolve. While the retaliation does not have to be immediate – to quote Mario Puzo “revenge is a dish that tastes best when it is cold” – any failure by India to resort to CS in response to a terror attack supported, inspired or originating from Pakistan will degrade the value of the deterrence.

It is in this sense that the CS doctrine is a double-edged weapon for both India and Pakistan. To retain credibility India will have to retaliate militarily using the CS strategy, otherwise not only will India lose all credibility but it will also embolden Pakistan to continue to unleash jihadist terror on India. But retaliation will put India on the escalation ladder which could easily go beyond the scope and scale of CS operations. The big unknown is that with sub-conventional deterrence in the form of CS doctrine breaking down, how much time and what level of desperation of either party will force them to take the next escalatory step which in turn could lead to making real the spectre of a nuclear exchange in the subcontinent.

To an extent, the escalation ladder will depend on how Pakistan responds to a CS by India. The dilemma for Pakistan will be that if it does not respond with its nuclear weapons, it will not only validate India’s belief of space for a limited war under a nuclear overhang but, more seriously, rob Pakistan of its nuclear deterrent, if only in the context of a limited war. In other words, Pakistan will face a Hobson’s choice: it can either degrade the quality of its nuclear deterrent or it can unleash a nuclear holocaust which will not only wipe it out but wreck horrendous damage on India and indeed on the rest of the world.

As long as the sub-conventional deterrence holds, the enunciation of the Cold Start doctrine actually introduces a degree of strategic stability in the region by forcing Pakistan to exercise extreme caution in unleashing terrorist violence in India. Far from asking India to renounce the CS doctrine or put it in the cold storage, the West needs to impress upon Pakistan that it can no longer expect India to roll over and play dead in response to actions of terror groups based inside Pakistan. If Pakistan stops using terror as an instrument of state policy, the CS strategy will stay in the cold storage. Otherwise, all bets are off.

(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)

India-US Relations Blog

An Untold Story of US-India Relations

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My belief and experience is that the U.S. and India have a great deal in common, both as people and as nations. Some of these commonalities are rather obvious such as the democracies in the two countries, and the multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious societies. People in both nations cherish their diversity. Both nations have taken practical steps to build institutional safeguards to protect the freedoms of minorities. They are welcoming of immigrants such that the U.S. is even recognized as the land of immigrants. Maybe very few people know though that India has been for centuries the land of immigrants.

As the world gets more complex, both nations are discovering that they have a similar view towards major geo-strategic issues facing the world. Both view China as their major economic partner and a potential adversary. India and the U.S are interested in a stable Afghanistan with strong institutions even if not fully democratic one. Both nations have tremendous stake in protecting maritime links and freedom of navigation. Both are victims of Islamic terrorism and face the prospects of constant terrorist attacks.

These factors make India and the U.S. natural allies in today’s world. There is therefore also a bipartisan support for President Obama’s initiatives for a broader India-U.S. interaction and partnership.

However, one area has escaped attention, and could very well be the most relevant area of U.S.-India congruence. It is a shared view of economic and monetary policy. The United States is an open economy, an economy that has invited companies from other countries to export their goods and services to America. This posture of the United States has benefited the U.S. consumer by bringing goods to them at a lower price, and it has benefited the exporting countries by increasing their prosperity. Threatened by neo-mercantile countries, America has begun to feel that it is the only country with such an open-minded posture.

At this time, it is important to note that India shares this American vision. India is increasingly open to trade and to foreign companies exporting their goods and services to India. A quick visit to India confirms this. American and European companies are increasing their presence in India and, unlike in China, these companies are making money.

Both the U.S and India are principally domestic consumption economies. This may not be obvious to many. India is now anchored in people’s minds as a technology outsourcing economy and the global success of U.S. brands makes America appear intent on dominating the world. But under this imagery lies the reality of domestic consumption as the principal driver of American and Indian economies. Both countries have physically large and deep markets with the capacity to absorb foreign goods and foreign capital. Perhaps because of this, both the U.S. and India have large current account deficits and trade deficits. These two countries are also dependent on foreign capital to sustain their growth.

This makes the U.S.-India pair relatively unique in the G-20. China, Germany, Japan and Brazil are export dynamos. Most of the Asian countries are semi-mercantile exporting economies. They depend on weak currencies to make their products less expensive. They have gathered a huge hoard of foreign exchange reserves in the past 10 years. These forex reserves are now approaching $6 trillion and have grown ten-fold in the past 10 years. The principal beneficiary is, of course, China that has accumulated about $2.5 trillion in reserves, almost 50% of the total growth in the past decade.

These neo-mercantile countries are engaged in exporting their capital to domestic consumption countries like America and India in addition to their products. They need domestic consumption countries to increase spending and consumption, increase imports and maintain strong currency levels.

This is where the global battle lines are being drawn today. The U.S. and India find themselves on the same side & as partners in this battle. This is why Prime Minister Singh seconded President Obama’s strong partnership mantra and said, “A strong, robust, fast-growing United States is in the interests of the world.”

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Obama’s Visit and the Nuclear Conundrum

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By Rajiv Nayan
Indian Review of Global Affairs

The 2010 American presidential visit to India was arguably an economy-dominant event. Admittedly, Pakistan and the endorsement of the Indian candidature for permanent membership of United Nations (UN) Security Council dominated media discussions. Both issues constituted a big thriller before and during President’s address to the Indian Parliament. The Strategic Trade management or export controls issue may fall in the grey area. It has both geo-strategic and geo-political connotations.

Other than strategic trade management and the nuclear liability bill, the writings and discussions during the visit did not pay much attention to other nuclear or non-proliferation issues. This was highly unusual, if we make comparisons with previous U.S. Presidential visits especially in recent decades. The current Indian diplomacy needs to be complimented for managing to draw attention away from the contentious non-proliferation or nuclear issues before and almost throughout the visit.

One may also attribute it to a sense of purposelessness of the U.S. non-proliferation community. Surprisingly, the U.S. non-proliferation community and various think tanks working on the subject did not issue any demand list on non-proliferation to make the visit contentious and the relationship tense. True, we heard some occasional noises on the nuclear liability bill and export controls reforms by India.

The Joint Statement issued at the end of the visit had a reasonable section devoted to nuclear and non-proliferation matters. These issues indicate the kind of relationship India is developing with the US. The relationship between the two countries is also called strategic, though the plethora of joint statements on strategic partnerships is increasingly complicating the phrase. The joint statement on nuclear and non-proliferation issues would point to the struggle the negotiators of both countries may have waged to make it a balanced document.

In the joint statement, there are some pleasant issues, but these are hardly inspiring for the relationship. The joint statement has talked about “common ideals, complementary strengths and a shared commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.” Indian diplomacy may be congratulated for making the U.S. talk about nuclear disarmament. It seems it was for the first time that the U.S. administration shared nuclear disarmament ideals in an India-US bilateral document.

Interestingly, the talk of complementary strengths could also be a new experiment for the bilateral agenda. India may delight its Non-Aligned Movement and nuclear disarmament constituency and take the leadership on the issue of nuclear disarmament. This constituency was apparently unhappy with India because of the July 18, 2005 joint statement and subsequent developments. This international force felt that India, the friend and the leader of nuclear disarmament, distanced itself from its long cherished ideal and commitment. The U.S. may have addressed that section of the Western world which is restless about nuclear disarmament.

India or at least a strong section of the Indian strategic community always has had a nuclear disarmament dream. It dreamt when India won its freedom, kept dreaming during the Cold War and even after it, and more importantly, did not stop dreaming in nuclear India. Needless to say, this dream was shattered. It seems the joint statement intends to do something to synthesize a common dream. Chasing American nuclear disarmament dreams may be soothing, but like any dream would end without producing any result.

President Obama’s promised the moon during his elections. A campaign pamphlet of the Democratic Party informed that “Obama and Biden will set a goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and pursue it. But they will take several steps down the long road toward eliminating nuclear weapons.” Obama’s famous Prague speech made a fleeting landing. Obama told the Prague audience, “I’m not naïve. This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my lifetime.” Afterwards, the American nuclear disarmament dream came to an end. Several disarmament enthusiasts all over the world, including Indians, were utterly disappointed. Global disarmament initiatives were left for brave hearts and lofty idealists.

Like the Prague speech, the India-US joint statement awakens us to the reality. In the same line in which a world without nuclear weapons has been mentioned, it talks of global efforts for non-proliferation before universal and non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament in the 21st century. It seems the U.S. priority took over. The struggle continued in the next line. Here it seems Indian diplomacy toiled to incorporate mention of “…the need for a meaningful dialogue among all states possessing nuclear weapons to build trust and confidence….”

At the press conference, the Prime Minister referred to India and the U.S. as two nuclear weapon countries. This aroused expectations that advancement towards recognition of India’s nuclear weapon status would be made, and the joint statement would use a new formulation recording India’s nuclear weapon status. The 2005 joint statement had alluded to “other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology.” Unfortunately, the joint statement, possibly because of American reluctance, did not refer to India and the U.S. as two nuclear weapons countries. However, for getting the phrase (all states possessing nuclear weapons) used in the joint statement, we must give credit to Indian diplomacy. India may have to consolidate upon this and move forward towards gaining recognition as a nuclear weapons state. Needless to add, the best option would be joining the NPT as a nuclear weapon country.

The other half of the same line talks about “reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines.” This is quite significant. India has a ‘no first use policy’ in its nuclear doctrine. In the run up to the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, many countries as well as inter-governmental and non-governmental groupings campaigned for no-first use. An idea of a no-first use treaty was also floated. However, nothing came of it.

The Indian government and its diplomacy must build on this U.S. commitment, and mobilize American think tanks working on nuclear issues. It could be the first practical step towards reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in the nuclear doctrines of all nuclear weapon countries – declared and undeclared. Other components may be taken up later.

India seems to prefer countering nuclear terrorism with the U.S. framework. The joint statement mentioned the Nuclear Security Summit and the documents produced at the summit. The U.S. has a somewhat different approach towards Pakistan on terrorism in general and nuclear terrorism in particular. Through the summit, it has tried to project Pakistan as a responsible actor. Moreover, the U.S. deals with Pakistan unilaterally and hardly shares information with other countries.

The US’ ambivalent approach towards Pakistan is reflected in the joint statement on illicit nuclear trafficking. This is a major security issue not only for India but also for the US. Pakistan and AQ Khan do not figure in the joint statement. America’s own allies complain about Washington not sharing information about the proliferation network. India should insist on highlighting Pakistan’s involvement. Non-governmental organizations may underscore the role of Pakistani diplomacy in managing the fallout of its nuclear proliferation network. Help from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Interpol and the nuclear security summit framework has been mentioned. The Indian government should make maximum use of these institutions.

The U.S. government and a section of its policy making community saw the Indian civil nuclear liability bill quite negatively. They demanded changes in the provision which made suppliers responsible for supplying defective items that may cause an accident. If an Indian operator finds that the accident has been caused due to defective equipment supplied by a supplier, it has the right to ask for compensation from the supplier under the passed bill.

The joint statement seems to have tried to address American uneasiness. It has secured a level playing field for American companies. U.S. sceptics would do well to remember that there are many Indian suppliers for the Indian nuclear industry. The bill nowhere discriminates between an Indian private supplier and a foreign supplier. It seems the government of India has taken an extra step on the Convention on Supplementary Compensation which has been recorded in the joint statement.

There are other significant nuclear issues in the joint statement. First is the information about the Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in the Indian Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership. During his recent visit to Tokyo, the Indian Prime Minister agreed to work with Japan for development of this Global Centre. The future challenge for Indian diplomacy would be to make the Centre an important hub of nuclear energy and nuclear security activities. It could do well by becoming more transparent.

The joint statement has also talked about Iran. The formulation on Iran is quite positive. Obama began his Presidency and indeed conducted his election campaign by promising to use the diplomatic framework to manage the Iranian nuclear issue. In the last few months, he and his administration seem to have moved away from the diplomatic approach to confrontational and worse, military approach. In the joint statement, the emphasis on diplomacy to deal with the Iranian puzzle has been made. At the same time, the statement has urged Iran “to take constructive and immediate steps to meet its obligations to the IAEA and the UN [United Nations] Security Council.” Quite interestingly, any reference to its treaty obligations is missing. It seems the allusion to IAEA and UN Security Council indirectly addresses the issue.

Quite terribly, some superfluous issues haunted the joint statement. For example, the unnecessary mention of the Indian commitment to unilateral and voluntary moratorium and the American commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty could have been avoided. It is well known that the changed U.S. Congress and the American security establishment would not allow the ratification of the treaty.

In sum, the visit witnessed several positive developments on the nuclear front. The joint statement on nuclear issues reflects the joint endeavour of the two countries to find a new common ground. Yet, the final outcome reflects the struggle of the traditional contending approaches of the two countries. The synthesis of the two approaches tries to paper over old differences, but is becoming manifest at most of the places in the joint statement. In the future, these wrinkles need to go.

(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)