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Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Non-Proliferation Lobby Analysts Seek to Corner India on CTBT

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By Rajiv Nayan

The international community is discussing how to bring India into the multilateral export control regimes. During his November 2010 visit to India, United States president Barack Obama made a few speeches and issued a joint statement with prime minister Manmohan Singh, which contained a number of significant policy pronouncements. The further accommodation of India in the U.S. and multilateral export control regimes was a notable feature of these pronouncements.

President Obama announced that the U.S. would support India’s candidature in the four multilateral export control regimes—the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. India meets all the criteria for the membership of the MTCR. India may have to add a few items to its dual use technology control list called Special Chemical Organisms, Material, Equipment and Technology (SCOMET) to meet the membership criteria for the Australia Group. For membership in the NSG and Wassenaar Arrangement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) puzzle needs to be solved. For India, the membership of the NSG is strategically relevant.

After Obama’s announcement supporting India’s membership, the French and the Russians also gave their support, and the idea gained ground that India may be given the membership incrementally. It was generally believed that the Australia Group would come first, followed by the MTCR and the NSG and the Wassenaar Arrangement in that order. However, the Indian establishment wants membership to come as a package. The incremental approach has an inherent danger: the membership of the strategically less relevant regimes would become possible but the membership of the strategically more relevant regime, namely, the NSG, would be problematic because of the NPT issue. The Wassenaar Arrangement’s NPT criteria would also have to be amended to enable Indian membership. As for the MTCR, politics, instead of criteria, may be used to delay or block India’s membership.

The Indian government’s position, by and large, seems to have the support of the Indian strategic community. Now the package approach is seen as being preferable to the incremental approach. As this message has been sent across the world, the concerned players may have two options: either deny India the membership of all the regimes or prepare to give it the membership of all the regimes. India’s new profile as a significant economy that is performing well even during difficult global financial times and as an equally important producer, client and consumer of advanced technology may force these actors to accommodate India in the regimes. Indeed, India’s entry would only enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the regimes.

The process of the accommodation seems to have begun. Indian officials and those of relevant regimes countries have started interacting to facilitate India’s membership. Quite expectedly, analysts and non-governmental experts are being consulted over the way(s) to include India in the regimes. Although there is very little information about the official-level interactions, the non-governmental community has however begun to write about this. A good example is the short essay “NSG Membership: A Criteria-based Approach for Non-NPT States” by Pierre Goldschmidt for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Although the essay maintains a semblance of objectivity, the piece unfortunately reflects the prejudice prevalent in a section of the U.S. nonproliferation community. The very first paragraph opens with the cliché: ‘The nuclear policy community widely believes this [the 2008 NSG guidelines] exemption undermines the credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.’

Other non-proliferation writers cite the China-Pakistan deal for building additional reactors at the Chashma complex and Pakistan’s prevention of negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Even a novice in the field would know that Pakistan and China would have cut the deal irrespective of the India-specific exemptions. The Pakistan-China deal has been cut on the basis of some grandfatherly clause of a previous unseen agreement. Similarly, Pakistan would have found some excuse or the other to block FMCT negotiations. For example, this year, it has included U.S. support for India’s membership in multilateral export control regimes as another reason for blocking FMCT negotiations.

In fact, Pierre Goldschmidt has proposed a set of fourteen criteria for membership of the NSG for the non-NPT countries. He claims that these fourteen conditions can ‘correct the inequality created by the Indian exception’. Eleven of the criteria are part of the Indian policy while the other three look unrealistic and may not be taken seriously in India. In reality, these additional conditions are designed to constrain India. The old agenda of the anti-Indian non-proliferation lobby is being pushed through such new arguments. The argument is based on the grievance as to why India was allowed to get away so easily during the September 2008 special plenary session of the NSG. It is a case of sour grapes.

The argument in the Goldschmidt essay is to persist with the unfinished agenda of the July 2005 agreement of the anti-India non-proliferation lobby. Thus, the second criteria proposes that: “To become a full member of the NSG, a non-NPT state must…have in force a Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) with the IAEA whereby the non-NPT State undertakes to place all new nuclear facilities located outside existing military nuclear sites on the list of facilities to be safeguarded by the IAEA… .” This amounts to a reopening of the separation plan. This is unacceptable to India.

Goldschmidt’s essay claims that the India-US nuclear deal gave India some ‘guarantees’ that were not granted to other non-nuclear weapons states. Elsewhere in the essay, the author expects India to take up the obligations of other nuclear weapons states as defined by the NPT. This contradictory position dominates the article. The author, in fact, expects India to take on obligations which have not been assumed by members of the NSG. It is beyond comprehension as to why India should not have been allowed to develop nuclear weapons for its security. Has any other nuclear weapon country given this assurance to gain NSG membership?

Similarly, has the United States ratified the CTBT to retain its membership of the NSG? Did China give this undertaking before joining the NSG? When China was made a member, it was in the news for supplying nuclear and missile items to non-NPT and Non-Nuclear Weapons States. Interestingly, afterwards, not only the U.S. government but also a predominant section of the U.S. non-proliferation community went mute, Chinese proliferation was downplayed and China was declared to be an important stakeholder of the non-proliferation system. Any signature without ratification basically means nothing. So, criteria 8 and 9 are meaningless. Actually, the CTBT is a dead issue. The U.S. nonproliferation community has failed to revive the treaty. Flogging the dead horse only spreads dirt and stink. The treaty and related phenomena need a quiet burial.

To resolve the challenge posed by the NPT criteria, the best solution would be to amend the NPT and accommodate India as a nuclear weapon state. However, this does not appear likely in the near future. Pending membership of the NPT, India’s good standing with the treaty may be factored in. India, after becoming a nuclear weapons state, declared its intention to unilaterally follow articles I, III and VI of the NPT. Targeting India seems to be the only motive of this essay; the set of criteria is not relevant for Israel because it is a different case. For NSG membership, it will not modify its strategy of ambiguous nuclear weapon status. The non-proliferation community should avoid recommending any steps which would benefit a rabid proliferator like Pakistan. Continuing to do so will further undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation community.

(This article originally appeared at www.idsa.in . IDSA and USINPAC are content partners.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India’s defense budget increase

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In the 2011 Union Budget presented yesterday in the Indian Parliament, the Finance Minister announced an 11% hike in the defense budget during the next fiscal year. India has now set the defense budget for FY 2011-12 at $36.28 billion. Forty percent of the budget would be spent on capital expenses, while the rest goes towards maintaining the Indian Army, which is one of the largest in the world.

The significant rise in defense spending could be attributed to the increasing military capabilities of India’s two immediate neighbors with whom it has fought wars previously – China and Pakistan. Over the last few years China has been rapidly expanding its defense spending, and it has grown approximately 13% annual on an average since 1989. According to some estimates, China’s defense spending in 2010 was about $100 billion. The size of its army is almost twice that of India’s and is much better equipped.

On its western border, Pakistan has been going through a rough phase of economic, political and social upheaval, while its military budget keeps increasing. Last year it increased its defense spending by 17%, partly to aid U.S. in the war on terror. This is in addition to the economic and military aid the U.S. provides Pakistan for the same purpose. Over the last few weeks there have also been news of a rapid increases in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, with it set to overtake Britain as the fifth largest nuclear power. Pakistan is building its fourth plutonium reactor and has more than 100 deployed nuclear weapons. Not to mention that the Pakistan Army and the ISI policies have traditionally been India-centric, with a majority of the forces deployed along the Indian border.

Under such external circumstances and the need to upgrade and procure equipments and machinery, the Indian defense spending increase seems well placed. India has a few procurement deals lined up for the year, but it would need to do a lot more to match up to China’s standards. As its primary competitor not only economically, but also for geopolitical influence particularly in East Asia and Africa, India needs to speed up and match up its defense capabilities with those of China. A strong military would be essential to counter any potential threats from an unstable AfPak region.

Circumstantially as important as it may be, the increases in defense spending of all the three countries contribute to the arms race in the region taking it to the edge of volatility. While it would not be prudent to expect a decrease in expenditures or an end to military procurements and upgrades, the three countries need to make concentrated efforts to reduce the need for the increase in military spending.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Dangerous Conspiracy behind Pak’s Indeterminate Nukes

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By Bhaskar Roy

Indian Review of Global Affairs


Recently, leaked reports from U.S. government sources said Pakistan’s deployed nuclear warheads may have crossed 100, surpassing India’s estimated 60 -70 warheads, with Pakistan emerging as the 5th nuclear weapon power in the world.

paknukesThe Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), has claimed that the latest satellite imagery obtained by it shows that the fourth reactor at Khushab, Pakistan, is at an early stage of construction, and is nearly the same shape and size as the second and third reactors.

The Khushab complex planned to have four reactors.  The first was a heavy water reactor built in the 1990s and known as the Khushab Nuclear Complex-I or KNC-I.  The KNC-II, a plutonium producing reactor became operational in 1996.  It is estimated to produce 22 Kgs of plutonium per year.  The KNC-III, another plutonium reactor is scheduled to become operational this year, 2011.  The KNC-IV is now on the way, and construction work is going on well.  An expert on nuclear weapons proliferation was quoted recently as saying that the KNC-IV reiterates the point that Pakistan was determined to produce a lot of plutonium to make nuclear weapons far exceeding its need.

In addition, Pakistan has a reprocessing facility at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH), and reports suggest other such facilities exist elsewhere in the country.

The Khushab complex also has a tritium production facility, an element that boosts the yield of a nuclear weapon.  Pakistan’s original fissile material facility remains at Kahuta.  This is a gas centrifuge, producing highly enriched uranium (HEU), estimated to produce 100 Kgs of fissile material a year.  Several other uranium enrichment facilities reportedly exist, including one at Golra Sharif, 15 Kms from Islamabad.

Kahuta was the traditional center of Pakistan’s nuclear programme.  Such centers have reportedly spread, to ensure that targeting one does not cripple Pakistan’s capabilities.

Pakistan has two types of delivery vehicles – the F-16 aircraft earlier provided by the US, and a variety of surface-to-surface missiles acquired from China and North Korea initially, and later developed in Pakistan using these designs and components.

The first nuclear weapon capable missile, the M-II with a range of 290 Kms, was acquired from China in 1991-92.  This was followed by the Nadong acquired from North Korea.  The main missiles ready are the Hatf-III (Gaznavi) with a range of 300-400 Kms; the solid fuel-IV (Shaheen), with a range over 450 Kms; and the liquid fuel Hatf-V  (Ghauri) with an approximate range of 1,300 Kms.  The solid fuel Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2), with a range of 2,000 Kms may have already been deployed or soon to be deployed.  The ground based cruise missile (Babur), and the air launched Ra’ad, with ranges around  320 Kms are under development. (see Congressional Research  Service Report, of January 13, 2011).

The above gives a glimpse of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and delivery system.  From the available information, Pakistan’s declaration of maintaining a minimum credible deterrence against India becomes questionable.  How much is still not minimum with more than 100 deployed warheads and ballistic missiles with upto a range of 2000 Kms covering most of India?  Pakistan’s current weapons stockpile is more than is required for its stated deterrence, and a doctrine which includes “first use”, as against India’s 60 to 70 warheads and declared doctrine of ‘no first use”.  Its nuclear weapons build up activities and development of long range ballistic missiles and airborne cruise missiles, suggests an ambition much beyond India.  So, what is Pakistan’s ambition that its burgeoning nuclear arsenal is going to serve?

It is well known that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons achievement is not indigenous.  It had, on the one hand, active foreign assistance which is still continuing.  It also acquired technology and know-how through its own efforts and that of a friendly country.  On the other hand, the United States and several western countries winked and looked away while blatant proliferation was indulged in by Pakistan, China and North Korea.  That is how Pakistan has emerged as the 5th largest nuclear weapons state in the world, and its activities suggest that it may surpass the U.K. and France in another decade.  Operationalization of KNC-III and KNC-IV will ensure that.

The West or NATO led by the U.S. failed to recognize those activities because of narrow geopolitical objectives.  During the cold war, the US-Pakistan-China axis evolved to counter the Soviet Union, and India was perceived as a Soviet ally.  Post cold war, the deep antipathy towards India remained for quite some time in Washington.  One cannot say with full confidence that the whole of Washington has moved away from the Pakistan appeasing line because of its current engagement in the region.

In parallel, in spite of several run-ins with China last year, the U.S. may not be keen to further antagonise China because of huge economic interests.  Militarily, the US, especially the Pentagon, is looking at Beijing more in bilateral terms (which includes the Asia Pacific region).

The history of China-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation is well known and needs no repetition.  The Pakistan establishment, especially the military is elated with China’s power and assistance.  It believes that it now stands toe-to-toe with India.

China created nuclear Pakistan to counter India, but the Pakistanis are unable to understand that China has used Pakistan all along.  Neither Islamabad nor the GHQ in Rawalpindi have ever stopped to objectively assess how little economic assistance they have received from China over the years.  Today China, with $2.8 trillion foreign exchange reserve, is not doing anything for Pakistan to extricate it from its economic hole.  When Pakistan suffered its worst ever floods, China did pathetically little, given its economic power.  Its investment in Pakistan is basically in the mining area which is to its own interest and in infrastructure like the Gwadar port which will serve China’s interest.  The trade imbalance between the two tells the story.  Pakistan’s economy is kept  afloat  by the U.S. and  the west.  Pakistan hardly realises that China is driving it to become a military nation, a fact which is beginning to worry most countries.  The Pakistani people will ignore this at their own peril.

Although China is a signatory to all non-proliferation regimes, it has been contravening them with impunity.  With its new found economic and military power it believes that it can do very much what it likes.
It is no secret that Pakistan continues to receive active assistance from China for its plutonium route.  It has also received technology to reduce the size of its nuclear warheads, and plutonium is, therefore, important.  The China-Pak alliance mainly targets India.  In the last two years or so China has made several assertive and aggressive moves against India.  Beijing is being extremely irresponsible, because Pakistan ultimately may not follow exactly the script written by China.  That is the emerging threat to the entire international community.
How secure is Pakistan’s nuclear asset?   The US, at the very highest level, have periodically certified that those are secure.  True, after the revelations of the A.Q. Khan Proliferation network, steps were taken to establish multi-layer security.  But the Americans agree that vulnerabilities exist, as stated by former Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Maples in March, 2009.

How secure is secure in a volatile state like Pakistan with rising radical Islamism, with several factions fighting against the state?  The former IAEA Director General Mohammad EL Baradei had also expressed the fear that a radical regime could take over power in Pakistan, thereby acquiring control of the nuclear weapons.
It  must not be forgotten that A.Q. Khan and at least two of his nuclear scientist colleagues were in touch with Ossama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda group between 1988 and 2001/2.  Intelligence reports say the Khan-Ossama meeting was facilitated by the ISI in a safe-house of the organization, and Khan was also flown to Afghanistan in an ISI helicopter.  Recent reports suggest that the Al Qaeda has been seeking fissile material and technology.

One can never be too sure that more A.Q. Khans are not sleeping inside Pakistan’s nuclear establishment.  Even the real brain behind Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, the low profile Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, had close friends among Islamists.  One cannot help but ask the question why Pakistan refused steadfastly to given access to the USA and the IAEA to question Khan.  Could Khan reveal names of his kind still inside the nuclear establishment and the involvement of the army in   the net-work?

The international community must ponder on the recent developments in Pakistan.  Take the case of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer.  He was killed by his own body guard because of his anti-Islamist and secular disposition.  Most  lawyers and the public declined to protest against Taseer’s killer, save a few in the media who are waging a lonely battle against the Islamists.

Fearless, liberal member of the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Sherry Rehman, had to withdraw her bill on Blasphemy Amendment law under pressure from the party and Prime Minister Yusaf Raja Gilani.  The government succumbed to the threat from the Islamists.  The banned terrorist organization, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) can gather  20,000 people on the streets with a click of their fingers.  The LET remains banned in Pakistan in name only.

In all this, the Pakistan army remained silent.  It is well known that the government cannot move one inch in issues related to security and foreign policy without the army’s clearance.  So, what was the army’s role in the government giving way to the Islamists?  It may be recalled that radical Islamism was brought to the fore by the Pakistani army, especially Gen. and President Zia-ul-Haq.  The Islamist groups remain assets of the army in Afghanistan and in the operations against India.

The silence of the international community over Pakistan’s rapid accumulation of nuclear weapons, and China’s assistance, is confounding.  The obvious answer is Pakistan’s importance in combating extremists and militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan, though it is evident whatever Pakistan has done in fighting terrorism has been done under pressure.

Imagine a man like Zia-ul-Haq, becoming the Chief of the army and, in a coup, takes over the government. With such a huge nuclear arsenal which is still growing, Pakistan will not remain India-centric.  It will move against the Christian west with the U.S. as the central target. 9/11 may look like a school play compared to what they can do.  This may be an extreme scenario.  More likely is the possibility of fissile material with dirty bomb technology falling in the hands of the jehadis across the region. Jehadis have among them highly educated technology savvy members.

The U.S. and the west remain short sighted and narrowly focussed, refusing to acknowledge and address a growing threat of dimensions never seen before.  The U.S. must accept that the billions of dollars it is pumping into Pakistan for development is not feeding the hungry but fattening the war machine of Pakistan.

(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan’s Unsafe Nuclear Warheads

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Increasing urban terrorism and uncontrollable radical extremism in the tribal areas in NWFP-Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA in Pakistan’s north-west have led to internal instability in Pakistan. The ongoing crisis can be attributed to the resurgence of fundamentalist forces and the Army’s inability to fight them effectively. Consequently, the world faces the spectre of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organisations. The assassination of Salman Taseer, Governor of Punjab, by a specially selected bodyguard has led to speculation that perhaps the loyalty of some security guards of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads could also be subverted by Jihadi elements.

The possession of nuclear weapons by Islamist fundamentalist terrorists will pose a grave danger to international security. The Al Qaeda has declared war on the United States (US) and it allies, and Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri are known to have made attempts to buy nuclear warheads. Among Pakistan’s neighbouring countries, India will be particularly vulnerable if hard-line LeT or JeM terrorists and their Al Qaeda and Taliban brothers ever lay their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear warheads. India is one of the nations that the Al Qaeda has named as an enemy. Being a contiguous land neighbour, it is also easier to target, even if sophisticated delivery systems like ballistic missiles are not available.

There is a possibility that an Islamist fundamentalist regime might overthrow the civilian government with support from a radicalised faction of the army. In such an eventuality, the U.S. and its allies may justifiably form another ‘coalition of the willing’ to bomb the nuclear warhead storage sites in Pakistan from the air. The coalition forces could employ cruise missiles and fighter-bombers from stand-off ranges to physically destroy the warheads with deep penetration bombs. A non-kinetic option that employs high-energy microwaves to “fry” the electronic circuitry of the nuclear warheads may also be considered.

The clear and present danger, however, and one that continues to be underestimated, is from nuclear terrorism. Terrorist organisations may assemble radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) – ‘dirty bombs’ in which high explosives (RDX or TNT) are used to blow up and scatter uranium or other radioactive materials over a densely populated area, or to pollute a major water source. Crude RDDs do not require a very high degree of technological sophistication and can be assembled quite easily.

Contingency plans must be debated, analysed, approved, rehearsed and readied for execution to meet unforeseen eventualities. Maximum cooperation must be extended by the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to Pakistan by way of technology, intelligence and training to help Pakistan to secure its own nuclear warheads. While the world waits with bated breath for the crisis in Pakistan to blow over, the government of Pakistan would do well to ensure that all possible measures are adopted to further enhance the safety and security of the country’s nuclear warheads and delivery means.

(The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

FMCT Negotiations: Games Pakistan Plays

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By P R Chari
Indian Review of Global Affairs

Pakistan is at it again. Whenever it is in trouble, Pakistan turns up the volume of its anti-India rhetoric. Suicide terrorism is taking a daily toll of lives in Pakistan. Its Afghanistan policy is going nowhere. The Pakistan army is obsessed with gaining ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, and has drafted the Taliban to achieve this objective. But, elements of the Taliban have turned against Pakistan, and are indulging in sustained, uncontrollable violence within the country. The assassination of Salman Taseer – a voice of reason raised against Pakistan’s medieval blasphemy laws – highlights the growing Islamization and chaos in Pakistan. Taseer’s murder was condemnable, but the horrifying fact is that his assassin has become a national hero. Rose petals were showered on him when he was produced in court. Lawyers are flocking to defend him. Liberal opinion in Pakistan, on the other hand, has been marginalized.

In true Nero-fashion Pakistan has now blocked negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in Geneva. Its Ambassador, Zamir Akram, has argued that by ceasing fissile materials production, Pakistan would concede a ‘strategic advantage’ to India. The WikiLeaks inform that Pakistan is currently manufacturing nuclear weapons faster than any other country, according to a cable sent by the U.S. embassy in Islamabad to Washington. A recent study by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists also informs that Pakistan possesses more nuclear weapons than India, but is feverishly manufacturing fissile materials to further enlarge its inventory. Nuclear weapons are not comparable to conventional weapons, and adding to their numbers beyond a point makes no sense. But, this logic is unlikely to impress Pakistan, whose defense and foreign policy is basically driven by the obsessions of the Pakistan Army. Zamir Akram had another grouse. President Obama had pledged to assist India’s admission into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Waasenaar Arrangement during his visit to New Delhi last November. Delivering on that promise the United States has very recently removed export controls on several Indian space and defense-related organizations, signaling a new era in U.S.-India nonproliferation cooperation. Zamir argued that this represented a “paradigm shift in strategic terms.”

Pakistan is actually hoping to somehow revive the debate on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal that was generated in 2008 when that deal was under process. The Bush administration had hammered that deal through the U.S. Congress, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), despite reservations voiced in some countries, collectively named the White Knights. Pakistan is seeking a similar dispensation, and China is working hard to provide Pakistan a comparable nuclear deal by supplying two more 300 MW atomic power reactors for its Chashma complex. Without going into the legal complexities involved, it should be noticed that China needs to place this matter before the Nuclear Suppliers Group for getting its prior approval. A similar approval had been obtained by the United States before finalizing the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. China is reluctant to pursue this route in the knowledge that the NSG may not endorse this deal between two blatant proliferators in the international system.

Reverting back to the collaterally damaged and stalled FMCT negotiations Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State, has unequivocally declared, “Let me just place full emphasis and priority today on my main message, which is to launch the negotiations this year on a fissile material cutoff treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.” She added, “That is a kind of general time frame,” though 2011 was not a “specific deadline.” In diplomatic language these words amount to expressing extreme displeasure with Pakistan, and with good reason. The 65-nation Conference on Disarmament transcended a ten-year deadlock in 2009 by agreeing to address four issues: nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off pact, the prohibition of space-based weapons, and an agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed countries against non-nuclear weapon states. Pakistan has reneged now after endorsing this plan, which derails President Obama’s hopes to operationalize his disarmament agenda; hence, Gottemoeller’s subsequent threat, “If we cannot find a way to begin these negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, then we will need to consider options.”

And, what could be these options? Most effectively, by stopping financial assistance to keep a bankrupt Pakistan afloat. And, cutting off arms transfers, which includes spares and ancillaries, would heighten pressure on Pakistan’s armed forces who are its real rulers. Can the United States afford to ignore Pakistan’s logistics support to sustain the American and ISAF operations in Afghanistan? Will China bail out its distressed ally by defying the international community in this effort, and promoting a further closing of ranks by its neighbours? The United States and China will, no doubt, weigh all their options carefully. Pakistan seems likely to witness interesting times.

(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)