Immigration Blog

A Thanksgiving Special: Immigration to America in the Days Before H-1Bs, Green Cards and Illegal Immigration

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Immigration policy in America is difficult to understand. But it is a little easier to understand if one knows about the early history of U.S. immigration. To help people comprehend better what the world was like before the days of H-1Bs and Green Cards, below is a brief history of immigration during the decades before and after the first Thanksgiving.

Opposition to Immigration

Opposition to immigration has always existed in America, with the degree of practical obstacles to those immigrating influenced by the country’s economic circumstances and Americans’ perceptions of international events. A political cartoon once showed two Native American (Indians) on a shore watching the Pilgrims arrive at Plymouth Rock. One knowingly says to the other: “Illegal immigrants.”

Although the first settlers to America at Jamestown and Plymouth were immigrants they were not breaking any immigration laws, since none existed. In fact, it would be a long time before those coming to America would face any serious impediments or legal restrictions.

Early History

In 1607, the first immigrant-settlers to America arrived in Jamestown. To say these first settlers experienced hardship would understate the case. “The hard winter of the Starving Time [1608] reduced a population of about 500 to barely sixty . . . Everything from the horses . . . to rats, snakes, mice and roots dug from the forest were consumed, and emaciated survivors took to eating the dead.”

In 1610, the surviving settlers decided to abandon Jamestown but were soon met at sea by ships with supplies and new settlers and chose to return to the colony. The settlement became important as an example of self-government. While King James and later his son, Charles I, retained the authority to enact laws and govern the colony, the settlers had the right, they believed, to decide purely local matters and established an assembly of burgess.

Plymouth Rock

The first immigrants at Plymouth Rock endured many hardships. Unlike the Jamestown settlement, which was organized by the Virginia Company, the Pilgrims sailed to America as a group of like-minded religious individuals and families seeking freedom to worship without interference from governmental authority. “The First Thanksgiving marked the conclusion of a remarkable year. Eleven months earlier the Pilgrims had arrived at the tip of Cape Cod, fearful and uninformed,” writes Nathaniel Philbrick, author of Mayflower. “They had spent the next month alienating and angering every Native American they happened to come across. By all rights, none of the Pilgrims should have emerged from the first winter alive . . . ”

The immigrants quickly learned a lesson about food production and private property that three centuries later Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong failed to grasp, resulting in the unfortunate deaths of millions in 20th century China and the Soviet Union. The lesson was simple – people work harder when they own property and can enjoy the fruits of their labor for themselves and their families.

Nathan Philbrick explained: “The fall of 1623 marked the end of Plymouth’s debilitating food shortages. For the last two planting seasons, the Pilgrims had grown crops communally – the approach first used at Jamestown and other English settlements. But as the disastrous harvest of the previous fall had shown, something drastic needed to be done to increase the yield. In April, Bradford had decided that each household should be assigned its own plot to cultivate, with the understanding that each family kept whatever it grew. The change in attitude was stunning. Families were now willing to work much harder than they had ever worked before . . . The Pilgrims had stumbled on the power of capitalism. Although the fortunes of the colony still teetered precariously in the years ahead, the inhabitants never again starved.”

Early Colonial Period

Historian Bernard Bailyn estimates total migration to Colonial America between the founding of the Jamestown colony and 1760 of “at least 700,000,” including slaves forced to America against their will. The scale of immigration from 1630 to 1775 was large given the population size of America and the sending countries. Even in the 1630s and 1640s, concerns about religious persecution sent another 21,000 Puritan immigrants to New England. Between 1630 and 1660, an estimated 210,000 British immigrants came to America. Approximately 75,000 German immigrants arrived between 1727 and 1760, while about 100,000 to 150,000 Scotch-Irish came to the colonies from 1717 to 1760.

The pace of immigration increased after 1760. Bailyn calculates approximately 221,500 arrivals between 1760 and 1775, an average of about 15,000 a year compared to about 5,000 annually in earlier decades. And here is an amazing figure: about 3 percent of Scotland (40,000 people) and 2.3 percent of Ireland (55,000) came to the colonies from 1760 to 1775.

A Correct Prediction of How Immigration Would Transform America Into a World Power

A prescient writer in the London Chronicle in 1773 understood the significance of the large flow of migrants from Britain: “America will, in less than half a century, form a state much more numerous and powerful than their mother-country…”

And this turned out to be true. As we now know, the early immigrants and their descendants became the people who fought for American independence, giving us the country we have today.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

The Real Tragedy of Memogate

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The key lesson of the Memogate controversy is the readiness of the Pakistani political class to exploit the civil-military imbalance for tactical advantage.

On one level, the widening Memogate mystery/conspiracy drama playing out in Pakistan is yet another example of the endemic dysfunctions between the powerful security establishment and their nominal civilian masters that have lead the country throughout its history to the brink of ruin. But the affair also demonstrates the long-running failure of the political class to understand that, even in the throes of competitive politics, it has a common interest – indeed a fiduciary obligation – in upholding the principle of civilian supremacy over the military.

The unfolding saga centers on an unsigned backchannel note delivered to U.S. military authorities following the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden. The document, whose authenticity has yet to be ascertained, requests U.S. help in preempting a feared military coup against Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari. In exchange, a host of tantalizing, albeit incredible, concessions is offered, including:

 installation of a new national security team in Islamabad filled with pro-American officials;

 transferring to U.S. custody the leaderships of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Haqqani insurgent network;

 giving American forces “carte blanche” to conduct operations on Pakistani territory;

 bringing greater transparency to Pakistan’s swelling nuclear arsenal;

 abandoning support of militant groups in Afghanistan.

Suspicions over the note’s provenance have come to rest with Zardari himself, and Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington, Husain Haqqani, a close Zardari ally as well as outspoken critic of the Pakistani military, is alleged to have orchestrated its delivery.  Both men have denied involvement.  But the controversy has now cost Haqqani his job and speculation is rife that army leaders will utilize the uproar to further diminish Zardari, perhaps even ousting him from office.

Nawaz Sharif, the leader of Pakistan’s main opposition party, has now waded into this combustible mix. His remarks this past weekend offer a particularly egregious example of the political class habitually using the issue of civil-military relations for myopic gain. Speaking at a political rally, Sharif blasted Zardari for “bargaining on national sovereignty and people’s self-respect.” He thundered that Haqqani is “asking the U.S. to control the Pakistani military when we should resolve our own problems.” His younger brother, Shahbaz Sharif, the chief minister of Punjab, has likewise charged Zardari with selling out the country’s sovereignty, while Sharif’s political supporters even accuse Zardari of committing treason.

Given how Nawaz once committed the very same acts for which he is now bludgeoning Zardari, he is trafficking in rank hypocrisy. In 1999, during Nawaz’s second stint as prime minister, he was the target of considerable criticism, including accusations of undermining the army’s honor and betraying the Kashmir cause, for cutting a desperate deal with President Bill Clinton to end the Kargil War. (A vivid portrait of Nawaz’s panicky state at the time, which included apprehensions that his life was endangered, is contained in Bruce Riedel’s first-hand account about the deal.) Fearing that the Pakistani army, under the leadership of General Pervez Musharraf, was about to take its revenge by overthrowing him, Nawaz urgently dispatched Shahbaz to Washington to seek the Clinton administration’s intercession.

As British journalist Owen Bennett-Jones relates in his acclaimed book, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, Shahbaz pleaded that Washington had a moral obligation to protect his brother given the political risks he ran on Kargil. But Shahbaz also padded his case by passing along Nawaz’s offer to take a harder line with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and help hunt down Bin Laden. The trip had the desired effect when U.S. officials signaled their opposition to “extra-constitutional actions” against Nawaz.

In the end, the warning shot failed to avert a military take-over and Sharif was expelled from the prime ministership and subsequently exiled to Saudi Arabia. Given his vexatious history with the army chieftains, one might expect Sharif to have a greater sense of solidarity regarding Zardari’s own travails with the military. Yet there he was over the weekend appearing to pander to the generals in Rawalpindi, announcing that his antagonisms with them were a thing of the past and that they would find in him a most suitable partner in the event they grow tired of Zardari.

To be sure, Sharif is only following a well-worn script. Pakistani history is replete with examples of opportunistic politicians who view the imbalance in civil-military relations as something to be exploited for tactical gain rather than rectified for the nation’s good. In an irony that ultimately cost him his life, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto built up ISI’s capabilities in order to suppress his political opponents. As the military constantly rotated them in and out of the prime minister’s office in 1990s, Benazir Bhutto and Sharif took turns celebrating the other’s demise rather than condemning the debasement of the Constitution. And instead of uniting following the Abbottabad raid to claw back decision-making authority from a humbled military, civilian leaders instead equated patriotism with fealty to the army.

The Rawalpindi crowd deserves the lion’s share of the blame for the deep morass that Pakistan has fallen into. But as the Memogate controversy illustrates, the political class is all too often willing to come along for the ride.

 

Immigration Blog

EB-2 Green Card Situation Improves for High-Skilled Indians and Chinese

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The new State Department Visa Bulletin indicates the availability of green cards is improving slightly for Indian and Chinese nationals sponsored in the employment-based second preference, known as EB-2. (A copy of the latest visa bulletin can be found here.)

How the Law Works

Under the law, there are 5 employment-based preferences: First Preference (EB-1, priority workers); Second Preference (EB-2, worker with advanced degrees or exceptional ability); Third Preference (EB-3, professionals, skilled workers and other workers); Fourth Preference (EB-4, special workers, such as religious workers); and the Fifth Preference (EB-5, employment creation or investor visas).

A total of 40,040, or 28.6 percent of the 140,000 annual quota is used by each of the first, second and third preferences. The second preference can use any numbers not utilized by EB-1, while EB-3, the third preference, can use any visa numbers not utilized by the EB-2 category. For the employment-based second preference, generally the employer needs to require the position to be filled by someone with a masters degree or higher and the individual possesses such a degree.

The employment-based immigrant categories have per country limits, which makes the waits longer for nationals from large countries. India and China are most affected by those limits in the employment categories.

Priority Dates

The setting of priority dates is used to manage the flow of immigrant visas within the limits set by Congress. A visa number generally is “available” for an individual with a priority date earlier than the date listed in the State Department’s most recent Visa Bulletin. A priority date is usually triggered by the date a labor certification application or an immigrant petition is received by the federal government.

In the December 2011 Visa Bulletin, just published online, the priority date for EB-2 is March 15, 2008.  In the November 2011 Visa Bulletin, the priority date for the employment-based second preference was November 1, 2007. This type of movement in a short period is used to encourage more applicants to help ensure the quota is close to fully utilized without going over the annual limit.

The Situation for EB-2 Applicants

In recent years, because of the fall down of immigrant visas from the EB-1 category, about 50,000 immigrant visas a year have been available in the employment-based second preference. Nationals from India and China can exceed the per country limit allocation for their respective countries if otherwise immigrant visas within a category would go unused.

A brief analysis of the EB-2 situation can be found here on the website of the law firm Berry Appleman & Leiden. The analysis notes, “A foreign national cannot apply for permanent residence (a green card) until a visa is available based on their priority date, preference category, and country of birth.” It goes on to explain: “The DOS [Department of State] has predicted that it is possible that immigrant visa availability could move forward again in the January and February 2012 Visa Bulletins, but then retrogress later in the year. Last year, according to the DOS, there were 3,000 EB-2 petitions filed on behalf of individuals born in India who already have priority dates established through EB-3 petitions.  Because those individuals can use their previous EB-3 priority date for the EB-2 category, the movement in EB-2 numbers for India is likely to slow down.”

The attorneys at Berry Appleman & Leiden also offer this advice: “While we cannot predict whether movement will occur in the Visa Bulletin, it is important that any Indian or Chinese national with a current priority date files the last step of the green card process as soon as the priority date is current in December.  If visa numbers regress before the application has been filed, the foreign national will lose the opportunity to apply for permanent residence, which would negatively affect dependent children who are close to turning 21.”

The Bottom Line

The bottom line is that absent Congressional changes to employment-based immigrant quotas and the per country limit improvement in green card availability for highly educated Indian nationals may only be short-lived.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Emerging Contours of the Indo-US Strategic Partnership

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At a symposium on the emerging contours of the Indo-US strategic partnership, organised by the Woodrow Wilson Centre at Princeton University on November 11-12, 2011, most participants agreed that the partnership was indispensable and that it would shape the geo-political contours of the 21st century. The present state of drift in the relationship does not portend a break down in the long term. The symposium was attended by leading members of the strategic community, including policy analysts, military experts, academics and journalists, from India and the United States.

An Indian analyst was of the view that the balance of power is shifting gradually from Europe and America to the Asia-Pacific region. He ascribed this to the ongoing rise of China and India as emerging economic and military powers. China is investing rapidly in enhancing its military capabilities as it wishes to safeguard its sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean by deploying the PLA Navy.

A U.S. analyst identified three main trends in China’s rise: China is governed by ‘arbitrary despotism’; the main engine of economic growth, i.e. the large-scale move of rural population to urban centres is declining; and, nationalism is on the rise in China. China is likely to engage in a new Cold War with its regional neighbours and the U.S. can and must play a role in acting as a balancer.

Another U.S. analyst spelt out three core pillars of the U.S. strategy in Asia: U.S. engagement anchored by treaty obligations; developing a strong relationship with emerging Asian powers like India, Indonesia and Malaysia; and, building multilateral institutions like ASEAN for stability.

Speakers from both the countries were critical of the sense of gridlock that has gripped domestic politics, particularly when there has been an economic downturn. Both the governments appeared to have ceded space on driving the respective national agendum. There is a need to enhance diplomatic engagement and reduce the newfound proclivity for military interventionism.

An Indian analyst expressed the view that the growing Indo-US relationship merits an ‘A plus’ report card, but there are bound to be some differences in the approach of the two countries to emerging issues like the conflict in the Middle East/ West Asia and Iran’s purported quest for nuclear weapons. Indian participants conceded that India’s nuclear liability Act was problematic and that India needed to suitably address the apprehensions of international nuclear energy suppliers. However, they were of the view that the Indo-US partnership was strategic in conception and should not be reduced to a transactional relationship.

A U.S. analyst stated that international politics is about the distribution of power and the emerging relationship with India was central to the U.S. approach as a strong partnership with India would ensure a favorable distribution of power. An India that was capable and powerful was desirable from the U.S. point of view even if it did not always support U.S. initiatives. There is a perception in India that U.S. power is flagging and if this gains currency, India will have fewer incentives to go with the US.

An Indian participant stated that India is likely to join a future coalition of the willing for joint operations if the desired goal directly affects India’s vital interests. Recent joint military exercises have gone a long way towards resolving interoperability issues and have led to mutual trust and confidence. Major irritants from the Indian perspective include the continuing sale of conventional arms to Pakistan, the lack of U.S. concern about Indian interests in Afghanistan and the enduring reservations on the part of the U.S. about transferring cutting edge defence technology to India.

There was a broad consensus during the symposium that the U.S. and India must work together for peace and stability in Asia. While the Indo-US strategic partnership is not intended to form a joint front against China, should China behave irresponsibly in Asia, or should it implode due to internal instability, both India and the U.S. will need a strong partner to successfully manage the fallout.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

China-India Strategic Relationship

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Relations between India and China have been fairly stable at the strategic level. Economic relations are much better now than these have been in the past and bilateral trade has crossed US$ 60 billion even though the balance of trade is skewed in China’s favour. The two countries have been cooperating in international fora like WTO talks and climate change negotiations. There has been limited cooperation in energy security. However, at the tactical level, China has lately been exhibiting a markedly aggressive political, diplomatic and military posture.

The major cause for instability is the half-century old territorial and boundary dispute over which the two countries fought a border war in 1962. China continues to be in physical occupation of large areas of Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). On the Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh, China is in possession of approximately 38,000 square kilometres of territory since the mid-1950s. In addition, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory to China in1963 inthe Shaksgam Valley of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir under a bilateral boundary agreement that India does not recognise. China continues to stake its claim to about 96,000 sq km of Indian territory in the eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls Southern Tibet, particularly the Tawang tract.

Chinese interlocutors have repeatedly claimed that the Tawang tract is part of Tibet and that the merger of this area with Tibet is non-negotiable. In 2005, India and China had agreed on “guiding principles and parameters” for a political solution to the territorial dispute. One important parameter was that “settled populations will not be disturbed”. In the case of Tawang the Chinese have gone back on this. If such errant behavior continues, India will find it difficult to accept Chinese assurances of peaceful resolution of the territorial dispute at face value.

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. In fact, despite the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) signed with the Chinese in 1993 and the agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field signed in 1996, border guards of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have transgressed the LAC repeatedly to intrude into Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. They have even objected to Indian road construction efforts and the presence of Indian graziers at their traditional grazing grounds.

Patrol face-offs are commonplace and usually end with both the sides warning each other to go back to their own territory. While no such incident has resulted in a violent clash so far, the probability of such an occurrence is high. Demarcation of the LAC without prejudice to each other’s position on the territorial dispute would be an excellent confidence building measure but little progress has been made in 14 rounds of talks between the two special representatives. Under the circumstances, China’s intransigence in exchanging maps showing the alignment of the LAC in the western and the eastern sectors is difficult to understand.

The military gap between Indian and China is growing steadily as the PLA is modernising at a rapid pace due to the double-digit annual growth in the Chinese defence budget while India’s military modernisation plans continue to remain mired in red tape. China’s negotiating strategy is to stall resolution of the dispute till the Chinese are in a much stronger position in terms of comprehensive national strength so that they can then dictate terms.

During any future conflict with either China or Pakistan, India will have to contend with a two-front situation as both China and Pakistan may be expected to collude militarily with the other – a situation for which the Indian armed forces are not prepared. Hence, it is in India’s interest to strive for the early resolution of the territorial dispute with China so that India has only one major military adversary to contend with. Meanwhile, instability in the security relationship has the potential to act as a spoiler and will ultimately determine whether the two Asian giants will clash or cooperate for mutual gains.