Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

US-India Strategic Partnership will Counter-balance China’s Growing Assertiveness in Asia

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The India-China strategic relationship is stable at the strategic level, but it is marked by Chinese aggressiveness at the tactical level. Though the probability of conflict is low at present, it cannot be completely ruled out. Given China’s growing assertiveness in Asia, it has now clearly emerged that its rise is likely to be anything but peaceful. Under the circumstances, the US-India strategic partnership is emerging as a counter weight to China’s assertiveness and as a force for stability in Asia.

China is engaged in the strategic encirclement of India, both from the land and from the sea by way of the string of pearls strategy. The China-Pakistan nuclear, missile and military hardware nexus is a threat-in-being for India. Also, China is making inroads into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and emphasising economic cooperation to justify building its own rail and road route linking Xingjian with Karachi. China and Pakistan have a cosy arms trade relationship. Their friendship, in President Hu Jin Tao’s words, is “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans.” Will they collude with each other in a future conflict with India?   The answer to that question is undoubtedly yes. That is why two of the Indian armed forces Chiefs have said recently that there is a possibility of a two-front war in a future conflict either with Pakistan or with China.

China’s far from peaceful rise is marked by the fact that there is not a single bordering country with which China has not fought a war: the erstwhile Soviet Union, Vietnam, India, and Korea.  They have shot down their own satellite in space. They have been firing missiles across the Taiwan Strait. They have begun to physically occupy some of the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands. Due to internal contradictions there is a probability that some time in the future China may implode. There is also a possibility that China may behave irresponsibly towards its neighbours. China has been modernising its military at a very rapid rate. Its defence budget has been growing at 12-16% per annum in real terms. Therefore, 15-20 years down the line, when China has completed its military modernisation and resolved the dispute with Taiwan, it may turn its gaze southwards towards India. China will then be in the position of military strength and India will be in a position of relative military weakness. China will be able to dictate terms to India in the resolution of territorial dispute. The real driving force behind India’s strategic partnership with the U.S. is to counter China’s diplomatic aggression and military assertiveness.  If China implodes or if China behaves irresponsibly, India would need a strong friend, if not an ally, and no one could be better than the US.

India should upgrade its military strategy against China from that of dissuasion to deterrence in terms of both conventional deterrence as well as nuclear deterrence. The army in particular lacks the ability to deliver a strong offensive punch across the high Himalayan mountains on to the Tibetan Plateau. Genuine deterrence comes only from the capability to launch major offensive operations to threaten the key objectives of the adversary. If the Chinese are convinced that India will launch major offensive operations across the Himalayas in retaliation for Chinese aggression, they will be deterred from waging a war.  Local border incidents can, of course, never be ruled out. The strength of the Indian Air Force has gone down from 39 Squadrons to 32 ½ Squadrons. That should be unacceptable to India’s strategic planners. The Indian Navy needs greater support by way of budgetary allocations, capabilities for tri-Service amphibious operations and offensive air support in order to make it a genuinely blue water navy. The one weakness that China has is that its oil tankers and its trade pass through the northern Indian Ocean Region (IOR). If the Chinese decide to mess with India on the high Himalayas, they can be squeezed in the IOR.

India-US Relations Blog

Readout of a Readout

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One of the useful things about summit level meetings such as the Strategic Dialogue is that they provide occasion for a vast cornucopia of information on bilateral relations to come into the public domain, there are pre and post summit briefings, factsheets on various aspects of the Dialogue, press conferences, and the all-important Joint Statement. But, as has been the case increasingly in recent years, there is much less coming out of the Indian side, either because they are so short-staffed or because the various departments are unable to give intelligible inputs, or for some other reason. There was a pre summit briefing to the press (with no questions taken, apparently), but nothing after the summit. In contrast, the Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs gave a speech on India U.S. relations at a think tank after the summit, and also made himself available to the Press after his return to Washington. At a time when glasnost has spread to foreign policy establishments around the world, the reticence from South Block is unfortunate and ends up with only one side of the story being told.

So, what did Blake have to say about the summit? To paraphrase the more interesting parts of his press conference, much of it in response to questions, Secretary Clinton was as taken in by the voluminous factsheets produced by her Department as everyone else and pointed to them as proof that the Relationship had achieved an irreversible momentum. At the same time, even if the stalemate over nuclear liability was not yet an irritant, it had the potential to become the Damocles Sword of the relationship.

The decision to resume technical discussions on a bilateral investment treaty was highlighted as one of the key deliverables of the visit even though as a journalist present pointed out, a model treaty had been worked out by the U.S. side some time back, and even an interagency review undertaken after which it had been put back in the deep freeze.

On the long-pending Totalization Agreement, as Blake made clear in his remarks, this did not even come up for discussion. According to Blake, this can realistically be taken up only when there were as many Americans working in India as Indians in America. Blake also chided the Indian government for repeatedly raising the issue of H1B visas, noting that Indians had received over 65% of the H1Bs issued last year and that if anything, the Indian government should be “praising” the program.  On the Tri-Valley University issue, Blakes said that it had nothing to do with the American government, implying that the students were at fault for not doing their due diligence before applying in these universities.

Blake was also at pains to point out that the Dialogue was not about deliverables, but more about assessing progress of the many joint Initiatives   entered into and proposing new areas of partnership. This was a bit rich, considering, that at the last Dialogue, the Secretary of State was hell-bent on achieving at least one deliverable and the Indian side was virtually brow-beaten into signing the Technology Support Agreement and the End User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) after demurring from signing other agreements such as the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA), the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA).

On Afghanistan, he clarified that Washington was supportive of India’s plans to pour more money into Afghanistan and invest in its infrastructure and private sector development while India was supportive of Washington’s vision for Afghanistan as a gateway into Central Asia and the integration of the South and Central Asian economic blocs.

Reading between the lines of Gates debrief, one get the sense that there is increasing exasperation that the strategic relationship is not moving forward according to the American script. In fact, it is cooperation in areas such as science and technology, education, and renewable energy  that has picked up momentum but remains confined to the factsheets since the U.S. focus is on the strategic and economic aspects of the relationship.  A debrief on the Indian side would give officials a chance to put forward their perspective of the relationship, and quell the disquiet over a presumed downtick in relations.

Tailpiece: The only indication that the Consular Dialogue announced for July 25 did indeed take place was the official photograph from the State Department. Other than that, nary a word from either side about what was discussed. Perplexing, especially when another fake University has been discovered on American shores.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Iran Imbroglio?

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Is the U.S. sanctions regime against Iran’s petroleum sector undermining India’s energy security efforts? One might think so given the dispute that played out between New Delhi and Tehran over the past few weeks. India is Iran’s second largest oil customer after China and absorbs about 20 percent of its crude exports. But because U.S. sanctions complicate the payment process, the Islamic Republic had threatened to cut off deliveries unless India paid some $5 billion in outstanding arrears by August 1. If implemented, the threat would have disrupted 12 percent of India’s oil imports.

Credit: http://irdiplomacy.ir Tehran’s atomic ambitions have become an irritant in US-India relations. President Obama signed into law last summer a new round of anti-Iran penalties, which affected some Indian companies and prompted complaints from New Delhi about the extra-territorial reach of U.S. laws. Some believe that continued friction over the issue might endanger New Delhi’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, while others fear that compliance with U.S. laws will compromise India’s foreign policy independence.

In truth, though, the issue is losing its potency to bedevil US-India ties. This is not because Washington will cease regarding the Iranian nuclear program as a matter of concern. Nor will South Block finally figure out how to painlessly balance its simultaneous quest for constructive relations with Iran and its American nemesis.  Rather, now that Tehran has largely accumulated the requisite materials and technology for a nuclear weapon, U.S. policymakers are increasingly coming to the grudging realization that there are real limits as to what can be done to elicit Iranian compliance with the global nonproliferation regime.

One of the ironies of the diplomatic process that eventuated in the US-India civil nuclear accord is that as concerns about Indian proliferation activities ceased being a hindrance to closer bilateral ties, the Iranian nuclear issue surfaced as a new point of discord. Indeed, in some quarters in both Washington and New Delhi, the two developments were inextricably linked. In the months following the path-breaking July 2005 summit between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, US Ambassador David C. Mulford continuously sounded the alarm that a failure to back a series of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) motions censuring Iran risked jeopardizing Congressional support of the agreement.

Influential Congressional voices underscored the admonishments. The U.S. Congress gave preliminary assent to the nuclear initiative when it passed the so-called Hyde Act in late 2006. But it also attached provisions to encourage Indian backing of the U.S. approach on Iran, thus ensuring that the issue would continue hanging in the air throughout the negotiations over the enabling “123 Agreement.” Congressional leaders also sent a toughly-worded letter to Prime Minister Singh in May 2007 warning of “grave concern” that India’s ties with Iran “have the potential to significantly harm prospects” for the accord’s final passage.

Although President Bush took the position that the Hyde Act’s provisions on Iran were “advisory” in nature, an odd alliance of the Indian Left and Right regarded them as an outright affront to the country’s sovereignty. Pointing to New Delhi’s support of the IAEA censures in late 2005 and early 2006, they accused Mr. Singh of purchasing Washington’s concessions on the civil nuclear initiative by mortgaging India’s prized strategic autonomy. These passions came to a head in the parliamentary vote of confidence that occurred in July 2008, an unprecedented act for a foreign policy matter.

Given what was at stake in the US-India nuclear negotiations – not only critically-need access to reactor technology and fuel but also the prospect of converting a strategic rapprochement with the world’s premier power into a full-fledged partnership – it is not surprising that New Delhi sought to mollify Washington’s concerns on Iran. Still, the charges leveled against the Singh government were off the mark. The IAEA votes in 2005 and 2006 represented a tactical adjustment rather than a wholesale shift occasioned by excessive deference to U.S. policy preferences.

This is not to say that India would otherwise have been supportive of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. New Delhi has been consistent that Tehran must live up to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a position that was reaffirmed in November 2009 when it backed another IAEA rebuke of Iran.

Yet the Indian government also has done little to surrender the pursuit of what it considers important national interests vis-à-vis Tehran. This is vividly demonstrated by the recent acrobatics in finding a mechanism to pay for crucial energy imports from Iran. Acceding to U.S. pressure, New Delhi barred Indian oil and gas companies last December from settling payments through the Tehran-based Asian Clearing Union. Iran had advertised the ACU as a means of sidestepping U.S. economic sanctions and Indian enterprises made extensive use of the facility. Through American officials hailed the move as a “significant step,” New Delhi quickly arranged an alternative conduit, using an Iranian-owned bank in Germany to funnel euro-denominated payments.

When the new connection was shut down this spring, again due to Washington’s insistence, India and Iran began discussions on another arrangement, which despite Iranian threats of shutting off the oil spigot eventuated in an agreement this week to route payments (mainly in euros) through a state-owned bank in Turkey. And even as New Delhi was going through these maneuvers, a consortium of firms, led by the overseas arm of the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, was moving forward with plans to invest $5 billion in developing the Farsi gas field in Iran.

Energy security is a substantial reason for New Delhi’s desire to continue its engagement with Tehran. Possessing the world’s second largest oil and natural gas reserves, Iran ranks just behind Saudi Arabia as India’s most important crude oil supplier. And with the country’s power requirements burgeoning, India will be increasingly dependent upon foreign energy sources, including Iran.

Besides the petroleum connection, geopolitics will also drive New Delhi into a closer relationship with Tehran. India has traditionally relied upon Iran to help blunt Pakistan’s influence in Central Asia and to serve as a bridge to trade and energy opportunities there.  And with the endgame of the Afghan conflict beginning to unfold, this reliance will only deepen. New Delhi now has even less incentive to go along with any new exertions of U.S. sanctions, and India and Iran may go so far as to revive their cooperation during the 1990s that provided critical support to the non-Pashtun militias battling the Taliban regime. The Americans will surely grumble about the cozying up with Tehran, but the strategic logic of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan leaves New Delhi little choice.

But as New Delhi adjusts policy, an even more significant change is underway in Washington, with U.S. options in dealing with Iran narrowing in important ways. Critics urge the Obama administration to be more forthcoming in diplomatic talks, though with the current disarray in the Iranian government it is difficult to see how even the most sincere of efforts could gain meaningful traction. The administration has also pointedly stressed that “all options are on the table,” implying that it is willing to pick up the cudgel of military action in the event Tehran fails to engage diplomatically. Yet this threat always had an air of unreality, given how armed hostilities in the Persian Gulf region – the epicenter of the world’s petroleum lifeline – would have calamitous economic consequences.

And now the saber-rattling option is ringing more and more hollow by the month, in view of the political consensus that is quickly growing in Washington in favor of reducing the country’s strategic commitments. Acknowledging that the U.S. military establishment is “exhausted,” just-retired Defense Secretary Robert Gates pointedly cautioned against launching any new conflicts in the Middle East.

Of course, the American focus on a nuclear Iran will not flag entirely.  New unilaterally formulated and enforced sanctions are certainly possible and these could come to ensnare Indian firms.  But the lack of viable alternative options will compel Washington’s acquiescence were Iran to develop a strategic arsenal, affecting in turn the demands that it places on allies and partners.

Indeed, the real challenge for Indian policymakers these days seems to lie more in Riyadh than in Washington. The simmering rivalry between the Shiite theocracy in Iran and the Sunni monarchy in Saudi Arabia is once again coming to a boil. A senior member of the Saudi royal family has reportedly warned that Riyadh is preparing to employ all of its economic, diplomatic and security assets to blunt Tehran’s regional ambitions. India may well get caught in the crossfire. If it does, satisfying the demands of its principal suppliers of crude oil will be South Block’s next balancing act.

India-US Relations Blog

America-India – Did the Bush Administration Oversell or Did the Obama Administration Botch It?

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This week Michael Green and Daniel Twining wrote an opinion article in the Washington Post titled Why aren’t we working with Japan and India? It is an attempt to discuss the reasons for, what they call, the current “listlessness in our two biggest strategic partnerships in Asia.” This is a serious article but deeply flawed.

The article’s key paragraph on India begins with “India has also disappointed.”. It ends with the statement “The refrain in Washington is that the Bush Administration oversold the potential for strategic partnership with New Delhi.”

We disagree. The Bush Administration established the Strategic Partnership with India. It was the most far-reaching step taken by any American President regarding India. President Bush viewed China and India as two huge countries that would play a global role in the 21st century. In his simple yet profound way, he asked which of these two countries would be a better partner for America? The answer was simple, India.

So President Bush in his direct, decisive manner made India a Strategic Partner of the USA. The Bush Administration threw away the old, failed strategy of trying to balance India with Pakistan and looked at India as a key ally, an emerging power on par with China and the only counterweight of size to China.

This is exactly how India perceives itself. This congruence of vision was the sound long term basis for the America-India Strategic Partnership implemented by President Bush. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, expressed the view of the Bush Administration at that time: “Within 20 years, the rise of the new U.S.-India partnership will be considered among the most important developments in U.S. foreign policy in our time.”

Then came President Obama. His framework for the world was completely different than that of President Bush. The Obama Administration spent its first year in trying to woo China. The Obama Administration was convinced that President Bush had gone too far in favoring India and they restored the old policy of maintaining a balance of power between Pakistan & India.

This was not just rhetoric. This has been the consistent policy of the Obama Administration since the inauguration. Witness the clear statement from Secretary Hillary Clinton in April 2010 that the manner in which India & Pakistan have pursued atomic weapons has “upset the balance of nuclear deterrence”. The Bush Administration had realized and accepted the fact that India was going to build a nuclear deterrence against China. The Clinton statement showed that the Obama Administration considered India only from the old Pakistan-India balance of power framework.

In short, the Obama Administration unilaterally destroyed the very foundation on which President Bush had built his America-India strategic partnership. But neither Government was willing to publicly accept this reality.  So both America and India continued to pay lip service to the concept of the America-India strategic partnership.

The sudden u-turn in America’s framework stunned the Indian Government and the entire Indian Establishment. In their naivete, they had assumed that America as a whole had finally understood India and embraced India’s vision of its role in the world. But where foreign policy is concerned, there may be only one India but there are two Americas. It took the Indian Government a year to realize that the America-India strategic partnership they had accepted was only with Bush’s America and not with Obama’s America. Then the Indian Government began hedging its bets and moving away from the Obama Administration. Since then, the relations between America and India have remained “listless”.

Another factor in the decay of India-US relations has been Washington’s definition of “partnership”. This is borne out by the Washington Post article which assumes a partner of America should not oppose American initiatives but align with them regardless of how the initiatives impact the partner:

Yet, in the first two years of the Obama Administration, the Indians have opposed the United States on climate and trade initiatives (the initiatives were in direct conflict with Indian objectives), failed to enact liability legislation needed for American companies to develop India’s nuclear industry (a political and ethical impossibility in democratic India), resisted meaningful economic reforms (true), cozied up to Burma’s junta with gas and arms deals (a strategic necessity for India just like cozying up to Saudi Arabia is a strategic necessity for America) and rejected U.S. combat aircraft in India’s biggest defense deal to date (the last generation aircraft offered by the U.S. were judged as inferior by the Indian Military).

President Bush had astounded the Indian Government by treating India as a real partner. He understood what India could and could not do. He focused on what was achievable which was plenty. India responded in return and we are convinced that every major Indian deal would have been won by the Bush Administration. In contrast, the Obama Administration kept imposing its own initiatives on India and expected India to to follow. This pressure backfired.

Today, the Obama Administration is facing the virtual collapse of its framework. They have realized that China is a major strategic competitor and perhaps an adversary. So the Obama Administration has gone from wooing China to building a network of allies to contain China. This is the main purpose of Secretary Clinton’s trip to India and Asia.

The Obama Administration’s cherished policy of making Pakistan stronger and more stable has collapsed. But the Administration’s tactical objective has not changed. The Obama Administration still considers Pakistan as their most reliable ticket to exit Afghanistan.

America’s rapid exit from Afghanistan and the Obama plan to give Pakistan all the aid necessary to facilitate this exit remains the most difficult barrier between America and India. Secretary Clinton is trying to get India to steer away from Af-Pak and to get more active against China in the Pacific. The immediate strategic objective of India is to maintain and increase its presence in Afghanistan.

When strategic objectives are in such conflict, how can a strategic partnership make sense? This is the main reason for the current “listlessness” in America-India relations.

(This post originally appeared on Macro Viewpoints and has been republished with the approval of the author.)

Immigration Blog

Labor Certification – Making it Hard for Talented Foreign-Born to Stay in the USA

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Many people would find it odd that after a company recruits for a position the federal government may require the employer to recruit again. That is the strange world of labor certification, a process required by law for many skilled foreign nationals to gain employment-based green cards. Given that Indians are the largest recipients of H-1B temporary visas each year, America’s questionable labor certification policy likely affects Indians more than any other group.

When sponsoring an individual for an employment-based green card, the Department of Labor mandates that employers place advertisements to show no U.S. workers are available to fill the jobs, detail recruitment results, and complete much paperwork subject to government review.

Surprisingly, the actual language of the law does not specifically say employers need to place advertisements. This is an invention of the Department of Labor. The law also does not specify that if employers “test” the labor market they must hire anyone “minimally qualified” for the job. These things come from the Department of Labor’s regulations.

Here is what the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act on labor certification states:

Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that—
(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.


In the past, the Department of Labor has admitted its process is paperwork-intensive for both the government and companies. In 2002, when the Labor Department issued a proposed rule to revise the system, its own rule stated, “The process for obtaining a permanent labor certification has been criticized as being complicated, time consuming and requiring the expenditure of considerable resources by employers, SWAs [state workforce agencies] and the Federal Government. It can take up to two years or more to complete the process for applications that are filed under the basic process and do not utilize the more streamlined reduction in recruitment process.”

While since then the Department of Labor has moved to a somewhat different system called PERM (Program Electronic Review Management), the new system is not much of an improvement. While PERM is theoretically faster in the initial stage, since it relies on attestations, the Department of Labor audits a high percentage of the cases. It also can force employers to engage in “supervised recruitment” if they hope to gain a green card for an employee. A chapter in the American Immigration Lawyers Association’s handbook declared, “Understanding PERM has been one of the greatest challenges in recent times in the practice of immigration law.” And PERM was meant to be the Department of Labor’s “streamlined” system.

The United States is making itself less competitive by requiring such a bureaucratic and counterproductive process for employers that wish to keep skilled professionals working for them long-term. “I have personally seen foreign nationals with U.S. masters degrees go to more welcoming countries abroad to settle because the U.S. system is so time consuming and complex,” said Ann Pinchak, a Houston-based attorney with more than 20 years of experience in immigration law.

If America hopes to retain the most talented workers in the world, a good place to start is reforming the Department of Labor’s labor certification policies. The policies do not “protect” American jobs but waste resources, discourage foreign-born professionals and make U.S. companies less competitive in the global economy.