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Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Managing India’s Borders: Tough Challenges

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Due to the proclivity of India’s neighbours to exploit the country’s nation-building difficulties, India’s internal security challenges are inextricably linked with border management because Indian insurgent groups have for long been provided shelter across the nation’s borders by inimical neighbours. The challenge of coping with long-standing territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, combined with porous borders along some of the most difficult terrain in the world, has made effective and efficient border management a national priority. India’s borders are manned by a large number of military, para-military and police forces, each of which has its own ethos and each of which reports to a different central ministry at New Delhi.

The national security decision makers need to deal with complex border management issues. India’s rate of growth has far outpaced that of most of its neighbours and this has generated unusual problems like mass migrations into India. The demographic map of Lower Assam, a north-eastern state, has been completely re-drawn by illegal migration from Bangladesh over several decades. The border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism; infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants; emergence of non-state actors; nexus between narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers; left-wing extremism; separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers; and, the establishment of Islamist madrasas, some of which are potential security hazards.

The operationally active nature of the Line of Control (LoC) and the need to maintain troops close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in a state of readiness for operations in high altitude areas, have compelled the army to permanently deploy large forces along the northern borders. While the BSF should be responsible for all settled borders, the responsibility for unsettled and disputed borders, such as the LoC in J&K and the LAC on the Indo-Tibetan border, should be that of the Indian Army. The principle of ‘single point control’ must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed. Divided responsibilities never result in effective control. Despite sharing the responsibility with several para-military and police forces, the army’s commitment for border management amounts to six divisions along the LAC, the LoC and the Actual ground Position Line (AGPL) in J&K and five divisions along the LAC and the Myanmar border in the eastern sector.

The deployment patterns of Central Police and Para-military Organisations (CPMFs) are marked by ad hoc decisions and knee jerk reactions to emerging threats and challenges, rather than a cohesive long-term approach that maximises the strength of each organisation. The major lacunae that exist in the border management process include the deployment of multiple forces in the same area of operations and the lack of well articulated doctrinal concepts. Also, border management is designed for a ‘fire fighting’ approach rather than a ‘fire prevention’ or pro-active approach.

A task force on Border Management led by Madhav Godbole, a former Home Secretary, was constituted by the Group of Ministers (GoM) in 2000 after the Kargil conflict. It had recommended that the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) should be designated as the primary national level counter-insurgency force. This would enable the other CPMFs like BSF and ITBP to return to their primary role of better border management. It had also recommended that all para-military forces managing unsettled borders should operate directly under the control of the army and that there should be lateral induction from the army to the para-military forces so as to enhance their operational effectiveness. These recommendations were accepted by the GoM and are being implemented in phases. Clearly much more needs to be done to make border management more effective.

India-US Relations Blog

What Indians (Some) Want the U.S. to do

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There is little doubt that the left in India wish the United States ill–not that the U.S. has done them any harm. The Indian left, ever since the Soviet bloc collapsed and China turned capitalist and aggressive, has needed an imperialist enemy to focus their enmity upon. After all, their version of socialism or communism ruined nine odd countries whose people revolted against the rule of the proletariat and went back into the capitalist fold. So the U.S. wish to democratize other nations and slap around a few dictators evokes little sympathy in places like JNU.  Opposing national stands taken in other capitals, are looked at by the Indian left benignly, unless the capital concerned is Washington. Any disagreement with Washington arises, according to the left, from an imperialist or capitalist plot, as is for instance the U.S. envoy in Delhi reporting to Washington (according to wikileaks) that dealing with a Mamta ruled Bengal would be easier than dealing with Buddhadeb. If the U.S. consular office reports that Hyderabad is the Center of an Indian visa application forgery scam, that too must be a capitalist plot.

Most Indians have a sensible view of the United States and world order. What do the sensible majority wish the U.S. to do? They certainly don’t want what they see as a huge Republican negativism in opposing the ruling party – for the sake of opposition – even if it means dragging the U.S. down. We have enough of that in our own country, where the beneficial nuclear deal was opposed by a right wing  – left wing anti-national coalition in parliament, when the nuclear deal was originally a BJP idea.

May be a world led by the USA is not an ideal world – but it is more acceptable than, say, a world in which the Chinese have the last word. So the majority of Indians wonder, when is the U.S. going to pull itself out of the economic doldrums, and re-invent itself, as it has done so many times in the past? When are the happy days of oodles of I-20 visas, a thriving Silicon valley, huge back office contracts and masses of desi California weddings coming back? The US-India relationship is largely run by the people, in any case. If we left it to the government they would lower it to the same ‘estranged’ levels as existed in the 1980s. The strength of the U.S. lies in technology innovation. That innovation is converted into dual use merchandise and military power. This process is the US’ monopoly. Techno-innovation comes from concentrating the best brains around booming university towns. To make all that happen again, the U.S. government must pour money into technology innovation, start ups, entrepreneurs and university research. Will the U.S. do all that? Do they have the money to create jobs, fix medical insurance and still have enough money to plough back into the process that makes the U.S. the number one nation? Indians are worried.

Delhi has enough unpredictable allies and friends – from Myanmar to Bangladesh to Sri- Lanka and Afghanistan. But all these unpredictabilities are small compared to the future of the US. Even two U.S. authors of Indian origin have joined in predicting a failing future for the U.S. – but the majority refuse to give up hope.  Of course Obama’s speech on cheap Indian medicine doesn’t help. Hasn’t he seen that the U.S. and India grow rich together? Or that, if the U.S. launches another technological revolution, in say, alternate energy, the Indians in the U.S. will link Indian back offices and labs to execute that revolution to the mutual advantage of both countries?

The Indian government is just as wayward as the U.S. government – flirting with a non-entity of alphabets like BRIC. We really have nothing in common with China buying our iron ore and dumping manufactured goods on us. Our relationship with Brazil is a really stretched concept. The bilateral relationship with Russia is healthy and strong without lumbering it with China and Brazil, in a pointed slap to the Americans. But that is what governments do – make diplomatic headlines  that are of no consequence on the ground.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India’s Attempts at Conflict Resolution: A Balance Sheet

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The ultimate aim of a nation’s armed forces is to deter war; fighting and winning is necessary only if deterrence breaks down. As the primary underlying cause of future conventional conflict on the Indian sub-continent is likely to be unresolved territorial and boundary disputes, it is necessary to speedily resolve the existing disputes. Despite over one dozen rounds of talks between India’s National Security Advisor and China’s Vice Foreign Minister, it has not been possible to make major headway in the resolution of the India-China territorial dispute. In fact, it has not even been possible to demarcate the Line of Actual Control on the ground and on military maps so as to prevent frequent complaints about intrusions and transgressions and to minimise the probability of an armed clash between patrols. China’s intransigence and its recent claims to Tawang have led to a stalemate in negotiations. On its part India must continue to impress on the Chinese leadership the importance of the early resolution of the territorial and boundary dispute. Simultaneously, India must continue its efforts to improve border infrastructure and create adequate offensive operations capability to deter another round of conflict.

Resolution of the dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is equally complex as, besides India and Pakistan, the people of J&K – straddling the Line of Control (LoC) – are also party to the conflict. While some progress had been made during the Musharraf regime, the General’s troubles at home led him to back off. A ray of hope had emerged once again with the installation of an elected civilian government in Pakistan but the terror strikes in Mumbai in November 2008 put paid to the rapprochement process, which is still in limbo despite recent talks between the Foreign Secretaries. Neither government has made any effort to mould public opinion for a possible solution. Entrenched political and religious constituencies on both the sides are likely to noisily stall any understanding that the two governments might reach. Hence, it is difficult to be optimistic about the early resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

In stark contrast with the difficulties of conflict resolution on the external front, the last couple of years have seen substantial progress in resolving internal conflicts. The central government’s cease-fire with the Nagas, which has now held fairly well for over a decade even while internecine quarrels among the Nagas have continued unabated, has led to tangible progress in negotiations with both the Issak-Muivah and the Khaplang factions of the NSCN and there is cause for optimism about the early resolution of the long drawn conflict. The ULFA in Assam has begun negotiations with the central government without any pre-conditions except for the break-away military wing led by Paresh Barua who is said to be taking shelter in Myanmar and is getting covert support from the Chinese. It is to be hoped that the ULFA leadership will act in a statesman-like manner for the good of the people of Assam rather than continue to pursue power for its own sake.

There is less cause for optimism regarding resolution of the conflict being waged by Maoist or Naxalite insurgents in almost 220 districts of Central India. The leadership of the CPI (Maoist) seeks to one day fly its flag from the ramparts of the Red Fort in Delhi and is pursuing its aim methodically and systematically. Despite the Home Minister’s offer for talks, it continues to indulge in wanton acts of violence, kidnappings and extortion. A comprehensive three-pronged strategy that simultaneously emphasises security, development and governance – with skilful perception management – is necessary to defeat the menace of left Wing Extremism (LWE).

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan’s Annual Deception

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By Rajiv Nayan,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses

The Conference on Disarmament is an organ of United Nations (UN) for negotiations on disarmament and related issues. The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is the centre for pre-negotiation activities on disarmament. The FMCT is a core issue in CD negotiations. Other issues are nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. All 65 members have to agree before, negotiations can commence on any issue. No decision can be possible without a consensus.

Over and above other reasons articulated in previous years, Pakistan had an additional excuse this time. On earlier occasions, Pakistan had stated that the 2008 India-specific exemptions given by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) had adversely affected the strategic balance in its neighbourhood. Though it did not mention India this year, yet the language and its earlier explicit references to India leave no doubt about what it wants to convey. Referring to South Asia’s strategic environment and to a non- NPT member, Pakistan said: “…it cannot agree to negotiations on a FMCT in the CD owing to the discriminatory waiver provided by the NSG to our neighbour for nuclear cooperation by several major powers, as this arrangement will further accentuate the asymmetry in fissile materials stockpiles in the region, to the detriment of Pakistan’s security interests.”

This time, Pakistan’s objection was that India’s membership of the four multilateral export control regimes, with the support of the U.S. and other countries, would destabilise the region. In November 2010, the U.S. supported India’s candidature for membership of the NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Later, France also endorsed the U.S. move. It was followed by the Russian support for the membership of those régimes of which Russia is a member – Russia is not a member of the Australia Group. Many more countries are expected to support India’s candidature given its rising global status. Pakistan’s statement in the CD showed its resentment regarding the likely modification of criteria to accommodate India in the NSG and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

It is necessary to examine the objections raised by Pakistan regarding the 2008 India-specific waiver in the NSG. Is it really going to allow India to accumulate so much fissile material that the region around Pakistan would be destabilised? Would the exemption enhance the fissile production capabilities of India? Actually, such propaganda may well serve as an excuse for Pakistan to increase its own fissile material production. In the past, some Pakistani diplomats misled the world by saying that India’s eight unsafeguarded reactors can comfortably produce 1400 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium – sufficient for around 280 nuclear weapons a year – if run for that purpose, or even more if totally dedicated to fissile material production purposes.

When the India-US civil nuclear energy agreement was being debated before the 2008 waiver, one of India’s leading strategic analysts argued in favour of the agreement saying that it would enable India to ‘release’ its indigenous uranium for nuclear weapons, and to use imported uranium for nuclear energy generation. This was one of the many arguments used by both the supporters and opponents of the agreement. However, many of these arguments were unsubstantiated and polemical. The U.S. non-proliferation community followed by the Pakistan government used some of these polemics for their convenience and propaganda. Moreover, India’s indigenous uranium can be allocated in any way by the government, so, the word—release—is basically meaningless.

First, India’s strategic and security imperatives demand that it rely on nuclear weapons mainly for deterrence. If there is a choice between national security and electricity generation, India may prefer the former. Electricity can be generated by other means – despite the growth in nuclear energy production in recent months, overall electricity generation stays around three per cent.

True, there are eight reactors in the strategic category. The categorisation of these and other fast breeder reactors outside the civil category should not imply that India would go in for unlimited and unnecessary fissile material production. These reactors are not going to produce fissile materials round the clock. India’s nuclear doctrine is one of credible minimum deterrence, meaning India will not needlessly hoard nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Moreover, a new nuclear weapon country like India has the benefit of learning from the Cold War experience of nuclear weapons accumulation by the two super powers. The unnecessary accumulation of nuclear weapons created the problem of disposal – not only of nuclear weapons through arms control – but also of excess fissile materials.

Even if we accept the logic that the reactors outside the civil category may be used to produce fissile materials, under the Indo-US nuclear deal India has increased its number of power reactors in the civil category from 6 to 14. Therefore the increase in the number of power reactors in the civil category and the decrease of power reactors outside it should indicate that Indian fissile material production may be decreased, not increased. Any logical analysis would underscore this. Of course, propaganda has its own logic!

This leads to the question: If India is not interested in unnecessary production of fissile materials, why is it retaining eight reactors in the strategic category? The answer is simple: to deal with an uncertain strategic environment. There are some declared NPT and non-NPT nuclear weapon countries which have not made their fissile material stockpiles public. The nuclear weapon declarations of these countries are also uncertain and lack credibility. At the same time, there are undeclared and potential nuclear weapon countries, which are likely to further complicate the strategic environment in the future.

The new Pakistani argument against FMCT negotiations in the CD, namely, that the Indian membership of the multilateral export controls regimes may adversely affect regional stability, is superficial. The membership of the regimes has nothing to do with regional stability; in fact, it is about enabling India to play a role in promoting international peace and stability by participating in the global strategic trade management. Pakistan’s obsession with projecting itself as a competitor to India is frequently leading it to make ridiculous and incomprehensible moves like the one in the CD. Instead, it may do well to imitate India’s responsible nuclear behaviour. It does not realise that the proliferation network and terrorism may not be able to sustain the Pakistani state for long. Pakistan needs to change.

(This post originially appeared at IDSA. USINPAC and IDSA are content partners.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Dangerous Conspiracy behind Pak’s Indeterminate Nukes

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By Bhaskar Roy

Indian Review of Global Affairs


Recently, leaked reports from U.S. government sources said Pakistan’s deployed nuclear warheads may have crossed 100, surpassing India’s estimated 60 -70 warheads, with Pakistan emerging as the 5th nuclear weapon power in the world.

paknukesThe Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), has claimed that the latest satellite imagery obtained by it shows that the fourth reactor at Khushab, Pakistan, is at an early stage of construction, and is nearly the same shape and size as the second and third reactors.

The Khushab complex planned to have four reactors.  The first was a heavy water reactor built in the 1990s and known as the Khushab Nuclear Complex-I or KNC-I.  The KNC-II, a plutonium producing reactor became operational in 1996.  It is estimated to produce 22 Kgs of plutonium per year.  The KNC-III, another plutonium reactor is scheduled to become operational this year, 2011.  The KNC-IV is now on the way, and construction work is going on well.  An expert on nuclear weapons proliferation was quoted recently as saying that the KNC-IV reiterates the point that Pakistan was determined to produce a lot of plutonium to make nuclear weapons far exceeding its need.

In addition, Pakistan has a reprocessing facility at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH), and reports suggest other such facilities exist elsewhere in the country.

The Khushab complex also has a tritium production facility, an element that boosts the yield of a nuclear weapon.  Pakistan’s original fissile material facility remains at Kahuta.  This is a gas centrifuge, producing highly enriched uranium (HEU), estimated to produce 100 Kgs of fissile material a year.  Several other uranium enrichment facilities reportedly exist, including one at Golra Sharif, 15 Kms from Islamabad.

Kahuta was the traditional center of Pakistan’s nuclear programme.  Such centers have reportedly spread, to ensure that targeting one does not cripple Pakistan’s capabilities.

Pakistan has two types of delivery vehicles – the F-16 aircraft earlier provided by the US, and a variety of surface-to-surface missiles acquired from China and North Korea initially, and later developed in Pakistan using these designs and components.

The first nuclear weapon capable missile, the M-II with a range of 290 Kms, was acquired from China in 1991-92.  This was followed by the Nadong acquired from North Korea.  The main missiles ready are the Hatf-III (Gaznavi) with a range of 300-400 Kms; the solid fuel-IV (Shaheen), with a range over 450 Kms; and the liquid fuel Hatf-V  (Ghauri) with an approximate range of 1,300 Kms.  The solid fuel Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2), with a range of 2,000 Kms may have already been deployed or soon to be deployed.  The ground based cruise missile (Babur), and the air launched Ra’ad, with ranges around  320 Kms are under development. (see Congressional Research  Service Report, of January 13, 2011).

The above gives a glimpse of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and delivery system.  From the available information, Pakistan’s declaration of maintaining a minimum credible deterrence against India becomes questionable.  How much is still not minimum with more than 100 deployed warheads and ballistic missiles with upto a range of 2000 Kms covering most of India?  Pakistan’s current weapons stockpile is more than is required for its stated deterrence, and a doctrine which includes “first use”, as against India’s 60 to 70 warheads and declared doctrine of ‘no first use”.  Its nuclear weapons build up activities and development of long range ballistic missiles and airborne cruise missiles, suggests an ambition much beyond India.  So, what is Pakistan’s ambition that its burgeoning nuclear arsenal is going to serve?

It is well known that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons achievement is not indigenous.  It had, on the one hand, active foreign assistance which is still continuing.  It also acquired technology and know-how through its own efforts and that of a friendly country.  On the other hand, the United States and several western countries winked and looked away while blatant proliferation was indulged in by Pakistan, China and North Korea.  That is how Pakistan has emerged as the 5th largest nuclear weapons state in the world, and its activities suggest that it may surpass the U.K. and France in another decade.  Operationalization of KNC-III and KNC-IV will ensure that.

The West or NATO led by the U.S. failed to recognize those activities because of narrow geopolitical objectives.  During the cold war, the US-Pakistan-China axis evolved to counter the Soviet Union, and India was perceived as a Soviet ally.  Post cold war, the deep antipathy towards India remained for quite some time in Washington.  One cannot say with full confidence that the whole of Washington has moved away from the Pakistan appeasing line because of its current engagement in the region.

In parallel, in spite of several run-ins with China last year, the U.S. may not be keen to further antagonise China because of huge economic interests.  Militarily, the US, especially the Pentagon, is looking at Beijing more in bilateral terms (which includes the Asia Pacific region).

The history of China-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation is well known and needs no repetition.  The Pakistan establishment, especially the military is elated with China’s power and assistance.  It believes that it now stands toe-to-toe with India.

China created nuclear Pakistan to counter India, but the Pakistanis are unable to understand that China has used Pakistan all along.  Neither Islamabad nor the GHQ in Rawalpindi have ever stopped to objectively assess how little economic assistance they have received from China over the years.  Today China, with $2.8 trillion foreign exchange reserve, is not doing anything for Pakistan to extricate it from its economic hole.  When Pakistan suffered its worst ever floods, China did pathetically little, given its economic power.  Its investment in Pakistan is basically in the mining area which is to its own interest and in infrastructure like the Gwadar port which will serve China’s interest.  The trade imbalance between the two tells the story.  Pakistan’s economy is kept  afloat  by the U.S. and  the west.  Pakistan hardly realises that China is driving it to become a military nation, a fact which is beginning to worry most countries.  The Pakistani people will ignore this at their own peril.

Although China is a signatory to all non-proliferation regimes, it has been contravening them with impunity.  With its new found economic and military power it believes that it can do very much what it likes.
It is no secret that Pakistan continues to receive active assistance from China for its plutonium route.  It has also received technology to reduce the size of its nuclear warheads, and plutonium is, therefore, important.  The China-Pak alliance mainly targets India.  In the last two years or so China has made several assertive and aggressive moves against India.  Beijing is being extremely irresponsible, because Pakistan ultimately may not follow exactly the script written by China.  That is the emerging threat to the entire international community.
How secure is Pakistan’s nuclear asset?   The US, at the very highest level, have periodically certified that those are secure.  True, after the revelations of the A.Q. Khan Proliferation network, steps were taken to establish multi-layer security.  But the Americans agree that vulnerabilities exist, as stated by former Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Maples in March, 2009.

How secure is secure in a volatile state like Pakistan with rising radical Islamism, with several factions fighting against the state?  The former IAEA Director General Mohammad EL Baradei had also expressed the fear that a radical regime could take over power in Pakistan, thereby acquiring control of the nuclear weapons.
It  must not be forgotten that A.Q. Khan and at least two of his nuclear scientist colleagues were in touch with Ossama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda group between 1988 and 2001/2.  Intelligence reports say the Khan-Ossama meeting was facilitated by the ISI in a safe-house of the organization, and Khan was also flown to Afghanistan in an ISI helicopter.  Recent reports suggest that the Al Qaeda has been seeking fissile material and technology.

One can never be too sure that more A.Q. Khans are not sleeping inside Pakistan’s nuclear establishment.  Even the real brain behind Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, the low profile Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, had close friends among Islamists.  One cannot help but ask the question why Pakistan refused steadfastly to given access to the USA and the IAEA to question Khan.  Could Khan reveal names of his kind still inside the nuclear establishment and the involvement of the army in   the net-work?

The international community must ponder on the recent developments in Pakistan.  Take the case of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer.  He was killed by his own body guard because of his anti-Islamist and secular disposition.  Most  lawyers and the public declined to protest against Taseer’s killer, save a few in the media who are waging a lonely battle against the Islamists.

Fearless, liberal member of the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Sherry Rehman, had to withdraw her bill on Blasphemy Amendment law under pressure from the party and Prime Minister Yusaf Raja Gilani.  The government succumbed to the threat from the Islamists.  The banned terrorist organization, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) can gather  20,000 people on the streets with a click of their fingers.  The LET remains banned in Pakistan in name only.

In all this, the Pakistan army remained silent.  It is well known that the government cannot move one inch in issues related to security and foreign policy without the army’s clearance.  So, what was the army’s role in the government giving way to the Islamists?  It may be recalled that radical Islamism was brought to the fore by the Pakistani army, especially Gen. and President Zia-ul-Haq.  The Islamist groups remain assets of the army in Afghanistan and in the operations against India.

The silence of the international community over Pakistan’s rapid accumulation of nuclear weapons, and China’s assistance, is confounding.  The obvious answer is Pakistan’s importance in combating extremists and militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan, though it is evident whatever Pakistan has done in fighting terrorism has been done under pressure.

Imagine a man like Zia-ul-Haq, becoming the Chief of the army and, in a coup, takes over the government. With such a huge nuclear arsenal which is still growing, Pakistan will not remain India-centric.  It will move against the Christian west with the U.S. as the central target. 9/11 may look like a school play compared to what they can do.  This may be an extreme scenario.  More likely is the possibility of fissile material with dirty bomb technology falling in the hands of the jehadis across the region. Jehadis have among them highly educated technology savvy members.

The U.S. and the west remain short sighted and narrowly focussed, refusing to acknowledge and address a growing threat of dimensions never seen before.  The U.S. must accept that the billions of dollars it is pumping into Pakistan for development is not feeding the hungry but fattening the war machine of Pakistan.

(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)