Category Archives: Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

US Errs in Equating Wahabbism with Islam

1 Comment

After the execution of terror mastermind Osama bin Laden on May 2, U.S. military personnel organized a burial at sea for the Yemeni, complete with Islamic rites. Such an action is in line with a string of others from the U.S. side, that identifies Islam with what is an entirely separate faith, Wahabbism.

Since its discovery three centuries ago, the Wahabbi faith has evolved in a direction toxic to international harmony. Resembling the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) in its absolutist and exclusivist doctrines, Wahabbism got traction by its success in convincing the Al Saud family in Saudi Arabia that it was the essence of Islam. In fact, its doctrines are a perversion of the mercy, benevolence and compassion of the true faith, which was revealed more than fifteen centuries ago to Prophet Mohammad.

The Al Sauds – in common with most other Middle East heriditary rulers – owe their ascension to power to western countries, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the then British Empire. The harsh dictums of the Wahabbi faith were found to be useful in convincing several unlettered bedouin that the Sufi variant of Islam favored by the Turkish caliphate was the antithesis of the faith, when in fact it expressed its moderate essence quite well. London used the Wahabbis to create a divide between the Caliphate and the Arabs, a policy justified by the rivalry between Turkey and the UK. Subsequently, in the 1950s and until the start of the 1980s, Wahabbism was found effective as an antidote to the Arab nationalism preached by Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed ben Bella and other secular leaders. In the 1980s, the new faith became the core of the CIA-created resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Since then, however, the ill effects of the policy of relying on fanatics to achieve geopolitical goals has become evident. The world’s “Archipelago of Terror” relies entirely on Wahabbism and its twin, Khomeinism, for recruits. Within Muslim societies, both Wahabbists as well as Khomeinsts are working ceaselessly to create and sustain regimes based on intimidation and injustice. Although the overwhelming majority of Muslims still have the moderate reflexes of the true faith (that revealed to Prophet Mohhammad, in contrast to that created by Abdel Wahab and Ayatollah Khomeini), sadly the US, the U.K. and other western countries persist in regarding Wahabbism as “pure” Islam.

Small wonder that so many Muslims are unable to understand that Wahabbism is not identical to Islam, but is in fact its antipode. It is to Islam what Communism is to Catholicism.

This is why it was wrong to have given a Muslim burial to Bin Laden. The man was not a Muslim but a Wahabbi. His life and beliefs were far removed from the qualities of mercy and compassion that suffuse the Quran. By pretending that those following his toxic creed are Muslims, the U.S. has made more distant the day when the Muslim Ummah will throw off the choking, constricting cloak of Wahabbism-Khomeinism that seeks to entomb the true faith for the benefit of a small elite of fanatics, the elite to which Osama bin Laden belonged.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

On the death of Osama and a future with Pakistan

Leave a comment

The location of Osama’s death underlines the work required on Pakistan

After a decade of anxiety, fear and anticipation, the friends and families of the victims of 9/11 have finally received closure. Osama bin Laden was killed in his hideout in Abbottabad in Pakistan through a special operation by U.S. forces in the wee hours of May 1. Osama was found hiding in a mansion, just kilometers from a Pakistani military academy and a few hours from Islamabad.

Though Osama’s killing is a humongous achievement for the U.S. counterterrorism operations and intelligence services, and is sure to affect the morale of the al- Qaeda foot-soldiers, it is by no means the end of the war on terrorism. As security agencies (particularly in US, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan) prepare for a backlash of the killing, it would be necessary to capture the moment and the momentum, and drill deeper to eradicate more such terrorists. The U.S. cannot relax and retreat now that its primary target has been eliminated; it should push forward even harder.

Equally important is dealing with Pakistan. The very fact that Osama bin Laden was found hiding in a ‘mansion’ near a Pakistani military academy, probably for about five years, reconfirms doubts about Pakistan’s support and genuine participation in the war on terror. Given the “efficiency” of the ISI (Pakistan secret service) and the Pakistan Army, it seems improbable that they were oblivious to the location of Osama, on their soil and close to their elite establishment. Rather, it seems as if Osama was secure under the protection of the military and intelligence elite who frequented the region. Otherwise, why would he choose such a “dangerous” location to hide?

To make matters worse for Pakistan, the entire operation was kept secret from its forces, and they did not participate in it in any manner. It is a humiliating display of the distrust for Pakistan, and further rocks the already precarious US-Pakistan relationship. An operation as crucial as this, on Pakistani soil, without the knowledge and participation of Pakistan, is a big slap in its face. From an Indian perspective, it vindicates India’s claims about Pakistan harboring terrorists.

It is about time the U.S. realized and acted upon the double-standards of Pakistan where it claims to fight terrorism and harbor terrorist organizations on its soil at the same time. Last month, David Headley (on trial in U.S. courts for prominent role in 26/11 Mumbai attacks) claimed links to ISI and the Pakistani army. India has submitted dossiers after dossiers on the involvement of Pakistan in 26/11, and other terrorist attacks in India. Wikileaks said U.S. considered ISI a terrorist organization. Khaled Sheikh Mohammed was caught in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

The death of Osama bin Laden gives credence to the stories of dangerous liaisons that Pakistan entertains, and President Obama should take a realistic view of his AfPak strategy and engagement with Pakistan. This is a moment to honestly evaluate Pakistan, and the significant time that was wasted chasing mirages in Afghanistan.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Managing India’s Borders: Tough Challenges

Leave a comment

Due to the proclivity of India’s neighbours to exploit the country’s nation-building difficulties, India’s internal security challenges are inextricably linked with border management because Indian insurgent groups have for long been provided shelter across the nation’s borders by inimical neighbours. The challenge of coping with long-standing territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, combined with porous borders along some of the most difficult terrain in the world, has made effective and efficient border management a national priority. India’s borders are manned by a large number of military, para-military and police forces, each of which has its own ethos and each of which reports to a different central ministry at New Delhi.

The national security decision makers need to deal with complex border management issues. India’s rate of growth has far outpaced that of most of its neighbours and this has generated unusual problems like mass migrations into India. The demographic map of Lower Assam, a north-eastern state, has been completely re-drawn by illegal migration from Bangladesh over several decades. The border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism; infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants; emergence of non-state actors; nexus between narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers; left-wing extremism; separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers; and, the establishment of Islamist madrasas, some of which are potential security hazards.

The operationally active nature of the Line of Control (LoC) and the need to maintain troops close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in a state of readiness for operations in high altitude areas, have compelled the army to permanently deploy large forces along the northern borders. While the BSF should be responsible for all settled borders, the responsibility for unsettled and disputed borders, such as the LoC in J&K and the LAC on the Indo-Tibetan border, should be that of the Indian Army. The principle of ‘single point control’ must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed. Divided responsibilities never result in effective control. Despite sharing the responsibility with several para-military and police forces, the army’s commitment for border management amounts to six divisions along the LAC, the LoC and the Actual ground Position Line (AGPL) in J&K and five divisions along the LAC and the Myanmar border in the eastern sector.

The deployment patterns of Central Police and Para-military Organisations (CPMFs) are marked by ad hoc decisions and knee jerk reactions to emerging threats and challenges, rather than a cohesive long-term approach that maximises the strength of each organisation. The major lacunae that exist in the border management process include the deployment of multiple forces in the same area of operations and the lack of well articulated doctrinal concepts. Also, border management is designed for a ‘fire fighting’ approach rather than a ‘fire prevention’ or pro-active approach.

A task force on Border Management led by Madhav Godbole, a former Home Secretary, was constituted by the Group of Ministers (GoM) in 2000 after the Kargil conflict. It had recommended that the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) should be designated as the primary national level counter-insurgency force. This would enable the other CPMFs like BSF and ITBP to return to their primary role of better border management. It had also recommended that all para-military forces managing unsettled borders should operate directly under the control of the army and that there should be lateral induction from the army to the para-military forces so as to enhance their operational effectiveness. These recommendations were accepted by the GoM and are being implemented in phases. Clearly much more needs to be done to make border management more effective.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India’s Military Modernization is Stagnating

1 Comment

According to a recent KPMG report, India is likely to spend up to US$ 100 billion on the purchase of military equipment over the next 10 years. During the last decade, India acquired T-90S main battle tanks; the USS Trenton, an amphibious warfare ship that can lift one infantry battalion; AN-TPQ37 weapon locating radars; and, signed deals for six Scorpene attack submarines as well as for upgrading Mirage 2000 fighter-bomber aircraft. Admiral Gorshkov, a Russian aircraft carrier, will soon be on its way after a prolonged refit and INS Arihant, an indigenously designed nuclear-powered submarine is undergoing sea trials.

USS Trenton; Credit: www.defense.govIndia also acquired a host of low-end equipment for counter-insurgency operations and for upgrading the infantry’s combat efficiency. Besides these purchases, the acquisition or manufacture of 126 MMRCA fighter aircraft, almost 1,500 155mm howitzers, about 250 light helicopters, P8I Poseidon maritime reconnaissance aircraft, C-130J Super Hercules aircraft for Special Forces, C-17 Globemaster heavy lift aircraft and many other items of defense equipment, is in the pipeline.

Are these defense acquisitions part of a carefully structured strategy for military modernisation or are these piecemeal purchases that will only replace obsolescent weapons and equipment with more modern ones but not add substantially to India’s comprehensive military power? In their recent book Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization, Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta aver that the process lacks political support and guidance, is haphazard and bereft of strategic direction and is not in consonance with evolving doctrinal and organisational changes.

In the absence of a resolute strategic culture and the gross neglect of long-term national security planning, it is difficult to dispute Cohen and Dasgupta’s finding that India is arming without aiming. Not only does India not have a coherent national security strategy, but also lacks the tools and processes necessary to formulate such a strategy. While there is a National Security Council for long-term defence planning, its apex body – which essentially comprises the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) plus the National Security Advisor (NSA) – seldom meets to deliberate over long-term threats and emerging challenges and the adversaries’ military capabilities that should together drive military strategy, force structures and the modernisation plans necessary to meet and defeat future threats.

The armed forces have drawn up a long-term integrated perspective plan (LTIPP), but it is yet to be approved by the government. The 11th Defence Plan (2007-12) is now in its fifth year and has not been accorded formal approval. The armed forces are left with no choice but to stumble along from one financial year to the next. The defence acquisition process is plagued by tardy decision making and large amounts of budgetary allocations on the capital account are surrendered every year, leading to completely haphazard military modernization.

However, not all is lost. The two new mountain divisions now under raising by the army clearly indicate that the emphasis in defence planning has shifted from Pakistan, whose military power is rapidly declining, towards a rising and increasingly assertive China, which shall indisputably remain a long-term military threat as long as the territorial dispute is not satisfactorily resolved. The acquisition of strategic sealift and airlift capabilities and air-to-air refuelling for fighter aircraft signals India’s attempts to build intervention and rapid reaction capabilities in keeping with its regional power status. The importance being given to upgrading command and control (C4I2SR) systems shows the aspirations of the armed forces to acquire the tools necessary to benefit from the combat synergies provided by network-centric and effects-based operations.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Afghanistan: No Cause for Hope

1 Comment

The unending conflict in Afghanistan poses the foremost threat to regional stability in Southern Asia. Although President Obama has tripled the number of U.S. forces to 100,000 in the two years he has been in office,,this surge in force levels has failed to effectively counter the long-term threat posed by the Taliban and its Al Qaeda partners. In 2010, every single month was worse than the preceding month in terms of the number of incidents, the casualties to ISAF forces and the killing of innocent civilians. Along the Af-Pak border, despite continuing drone attacks, there has been a steady deterioration in the ability of ISAF to eliminate safe havens for the Taliqaeda extremists. Even the Pakistan army has not fared well in its fight against the TTP cadres holding out in North Waziristan.

The report on the situation in Afghanistan released recently by the White House banks more on hope than reality. It admits that the “challenge remains to make our goals durable and sustainable.” Commanders on the ground, including General Petraeus, continue to claim that the security situation is improving steadily and that the Taliban offensive has been contained. In testimony before Congress in early March 2011, Petraeus claimed that the momentum achieved by the Taliban has been “arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of areas.” However, he stressed that the “successes are fragile and reversible.”

The Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan police are to be entrusted with the responsibility to independently take over the security function from ISAF in selected provinces beginning in July 2011 so that the planned draw-down of forces can begin. So far the Afghan security forces have not exhibited the standards of professionalism, battalion cohesion and the qualities of junior leadership that are necessary for success in the complex and challenging security environment prevailing in Afghanistan. They still need ISAF officers and quick reaction teams to accompany them for operations, failing which they tend to lose unit cohesion very quickly and disperse in panic.

Negotiations with the so-called “good Taliban” have also floundered. None of the main Taliban leaders – Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – have shown any inclination to conduct serious negotiations with the Karzai government or directly with Western negotiators. They are, of course, keen to buy time by pretending to be interested in a negotiated settlement.  

The development work being undertaken by the Karzai government and the PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams) has not reached the poorest provinces as efforts are concentrated on areas that are well connected by roads. The PRTs spend large sums of money on security for their supply convoys and most of this money ultimately ends up as a source of funding for the Taliban. The traditional notion that development work can be successfully undertaken by external agencies has not been borne out over the last 10 years in Afghanistan. A better method would be assist the Afghans with aid, materials and expertise and let them take the responsibility for development. However, due to the lack of efficient governance and rampant corruption, this method is also has serious pitfalls.

The Taliban are fond of saying that the ISAF forces have the watches but they have the time. They are convinced that the U.S. and NATO forces do not have the political will or the military staying power to last the course and they are biding their time for the foreign forces to quit. Their Pakistani friends are giving them similar advice: hang in there; these guys will soon go away. The prognosis for Afghanistan is far from rosy and a spring offensive may soon muddy the waters further.