Category Archives: Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Contribution of the Gorkhas to Indian National Security

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A week ago, 2/5 GR (FF) – the Second Battalion of the Fifth Gorkha Rifles, Frontier Force – popularly known as the ‘VC paltan’, celebrated its 125th anniversary. The famous battalion is called VC paltan because of the three Victoria Crosses awarded to its personnel by the British during the Second World War in the Burma Campaign. This is an unparalleled feat in the annals of military history as no other battalion in any army has won the nation’s highest gallantry award three times.

With the spine chilling war cry ‘Jai Mahakali, Ayo Gorkhali’ (‘Victory to Goddess Mahakali, the Gorkhas are coming’), the Gorkhas, have served first the British Indian Army and then the Indian Army with distinction for almost two centuries. Over 200,000 of them participated in the two World Wars; of these 43,000 sacrificed their lives. Hailing mostly from villages of impoverished hill farmers in the Gorkha district of Nepal, the Gorkhas belong to four main ethnic groups: the Gurungs and Magars from central Nepal and the Rais and Limbus from the east.

The British had identified the Gorkhas as a ‘martial race’ for their sterling qualities of toughness and fortitude. The Gorkha soldier is famous the world over for his ferocity and unflinching courage in battle. One author has described the Gorkhas as, “Small of stature, large of heart, accustomed to hardship, good natured with a keen sense of humour, loyal to death, more disciplined than any fighting force in the world, brave and capable, and absolutely without fear.” These hardy troops are undoubtedly tough, bold and durable under withering fire, and they are extremely well disciplined. Close family ties within each battalion ensure that they fight not only for the paltan’s izzat (the honour of the battalion) but also for their own kith and kin.

The Gorkha regiments of the British Indian Army played a key role during both the World Wars. They saw action in Africa, Europe and in Asia and earned battle honours everywhere. Following the partition of India in 1947, under a tripartite agreement between Britain, India and Nepal four Gorkha regiments – 2nd, 6th, 7th and 10th regiments – were transferred to the British Army, eventually becoming the Gorkha Brigade. Of the total of 10 regiments, six (1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th regiments) joined the Indian Army. 11 GR was raised later. Currently there are 39 battalions serving in 7 Gorkha regiments in the Indian Army. While Gorkhas in the Indian Army hail both from Nepal and India’s hill regions, the Nepalese Gorkhas have helped to build strong bonds of friendship between the two armies.

All the Gorkha regiments have performed creditably in India’s wars since independence. Besides the major wars, the Gorkhas have served in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, at the Siachen Glacier and in the UN peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and Sierra Leone. In October 2011, the 4/9 GR won the gold medal in the annual Cambrian Patrol Competition held in Wales, UK.

The Gorkhas still carry into battle their traditional weapon – an 18-inch long wickedly curved, broad-bladed heavy knife known as the khukri. It is the world’s most renowned fighting knife. “Often the mere sight of an unsheathed khukri is enough to discourage any further action by causing a cold, cramped feeling in the nether regions of the stomach.” Legend has it that once a khukri was drawn in battle, it had to ‘taste blood’. If it did not, its owner had to cut himself before returning it to its sheath.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan’s Unsafe Nuclear Warheads

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Pakistan is facing a grave internal security crisis as radical extremists are gradually gaining ground. The crisis is attributable to a large extent to the resurgence of Islamist fundamentalist forces and the army’s inability to fight them effectively. Consequently, the spectre of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations has once again come to the fore. Western commentators are calling for contingency plans to physically secure or destroy the nuclear warheads in the event of a meltdown in the country.

Islamist terrorists can gain possession of nuclear warheads by physically breaching the security ring around them, by subverting the personnel on guard duty or if they succeed in overthrowing the regime in power in Islamabad through a coup. The Pakistani military authorities are extremely concerned about such eventualities and have made elaborate arrangements to ensure that all their nuclear warheads are stored safely. They claim that carefully formulated personnel reliability policies and electronic safety mechanisms have been developed and incorporated by Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority.
The Pakistani military establishment loses no opportunity to emphasize that as a responsible nuclear weapon state Pakistan has always attached great significance to the security of its strategic assets and that these assets are completely safe and secure under multi-layered security and command and control structures that are fully indigenous.

Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are reported to be stored at up to six to 10 separate locations. Besides the actual locations, there are a large number of dummy locations. The warheads are moved frequently to keep American satellites and spies from ascertaining their real locations. The warheads are stored separately from the launchers so as to guard against accidents and unauthorized use. The warheads are reported to be equipped with electronic locks (Permissive Action Links). A three-tier security system has been instituted for the physical protection of the various components of the warheads.

The fissionable atomic core made of highly enriched uranium and the high explosive trigger assembly are stored in fortified underground storage sites. Entry and exit into these “bunkers” is controlled by armed and well-equipped specially selected and meticulously trained personnel of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). As part of the Personnel Reliability Programme, these personnel are screened carefully before induction, are kept under constant surveillance and are frequently rotated.

Personnel selected for the security of the outer perimeter are reported to belong to elite infantry battalions of the Pakistani army. The possibility of any of these personnel being subverted is guarded against by counter-intelligence teams. Military regimes have very strong survival instincts and the SPD ensures that hard-line radical elements are ruthlessly weeded out from the nuclear security detail. The storage sites also have air defense assets allotted to them to defend against attacks from the air.

The delivery systems of Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command, comprising Chinese supplied M-11 and M-9 and the North Korean Nodong and Taepo Dong nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles and their launchers, are based at separate locations. These sites or “hides” are well-dispersed to ensure that maximum warheads survive a conventional air attack during war. They are also well defended against possible commando raids.

However, the possibility that an Islamist fundamentalist organization might overthrow the unstable civilian government with support from a large faction of the army cannot be ruled out. In such an eventuality, the U.S. and its allies may justifiably form another ‘coalition of the willing’ to seize maximum number of warheads in raids by Special Forces and bomb the remaining storage sites from the air to destroy the warheads. It would be in India’s interest to provide the maximum possible assistance that it can.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Developing Leverages to Counter China’s Strategic Encirclement

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China has for long seen India as a major competitor and has been engaged in the strategic encirclement of India through its proxies like Pakistan along India’s land borders and its string of pearls strategy in the northern Indian Ocean region. However, India had till recently adopted no pro-active measures to develop counter leverages of its own. This is now changing gradually as India has begun to reach out to its friends in Southeast Asia and further east along the Asia-Pacific rim as part of a carefully thought through strategy to develop some pressure points. The first step in the new “look east” policy is to propel India’s strategic partnership with Vietnam to a higher trajectory.

One month after China objected to oil exploration by India in the South China Sea under a contract awarded to the Indian state-owned company ONGC Videsh Ltd by the Vietnamese and three months after the Chinese navy warned Indian Naval Ship Airawat, which was sailing in international waters between the Vietnamese ports of Nha Trang and Hai Phong, to leave Chinese waters – a warning that INS Airawat ignored, India and Vietnam signed an agreement on energy cooperation. The agreement was signed during the visit of Vietnamese president Truong Tan Sang to New Delhi to further cement the India-Vietnamese strategic partnership. The two countries also decided to pursue a regular security dialogue, which has further incensed the Chinese.

The Global Times, a mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China, thundered: “China may consider taking actions to show its stance and prevent more reckless attempts in confronting China.” Earlier the paper had warned that prospecting for oil in China-claimed waters would “push China to the limits”. The relatively more moderate People’s Daily also did not mince words: “China must take practical and firm actions to make these projects fall through. China should denounce this agreement as illegal. Once India and Vietnam initiate their exploration, China can send non-military forces to disturb their work, and cause dispute or friction to halt the two countries’ exploration.”

The China Energy News said that “India is playing with fire by agreeing to explore for oil with Vietnam in the disputed South China Sea… its energy strategy is slipping into an extremely dangerous whirlpool.” Such a jingoistic campaign has not been launched by the Chinese media against India in recent times. Chinese analysts are perhaps unaware that ONGC’s association with Vietnam for oil and gas exploration goes back 23 years. For the time being India has chosen to ignore Chinese warnings and continue its activities in accordance with the contract signed by ONGC Videsh with Vietnam.
Recent news reports have suggested that India is considering the sale of the non-nuclear BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to Vietnam. The geo-political implications of India’s enhanced strategic cooperation are not lost on anyone. Some Indian analysts have gone to the extent of saying that India should project Vietnam as “India’s Pakistan” in its quest to develop leverages against China as Vietnam offers India an entry point through which it can “penetrate China’s periphery.”

Clearly, as India begins to flex its maritime muscles, the footprints of the navies and the merchant fleets of both the countries will criss-cross each other in future and there is need for a serious dialogue to avoid clashes. Also, arrangements for security will need to be made in consultation with the government concerned so that Indian assets being employed for legitimate commercial purposes are not vandalised or destroyed by either adversary states or state-sponsored terrorists who can operate with plausible deniability.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

China is Emerging as a Water Hegemon in Asia

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A crisis of gargantuan proportions with unprecedented geo-political repercussions is gradually taking shape in Asia. Tibet is the source of several large Asian rivers. The Indus River with its source in Tibet flows through India and Pakistan; the Brahmaputra (known as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) flows from Tibet through India and Bangladesh; and, the Sutlej flows through India into Pakistan. From its source in Tibet, the Salween enters Yunnan in China and then flows through Myanmar, finally forming the border between Myanmar and Thailand. Originating on the Tibetan Plateau, the Mekong River, which is the heart and soul of mainland Southeast Asia, flows through Yunnan, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Similarly, the Amur, Illy, and Irtysh rivers flow through Russia and Central Asia.

Amazingly, contrary to good international practices, as the upper riparian state with physical possession of the headwaters of Asia’s major rivers, China has not entered into equitable international agreements with any of the lower riparian states the lives and livelihood of whose people depend on the uninterrupted flow of these rivers. And, to confound matters even further, news reports keep surfacing with alarming regularity about China’s plans to divert the waters of some of these rivers to make up for the declining water levels in the rapidly drying up rivers in the heartland of China. These include the Yangtze River, which too originates in Tibet, and the Huang He (formerly Howang Ho or Yellow River, also called ‘China’s Sorrow’).

According to Indian analyst Brahma Chellaney, “China rejects the very notion of water sharing or institutionalised cooperation with downriver countries… Whereas riparian neighbours in Southeast and South Asia are bound by water pacts that they have negotiated between themselves, China does not have a single water treaty with any co-riparian country.” Only recently China has begun to selectively share ‘flow statistics’ with the lower riparians. However, Chellaney is of the view that “these are not agreements to cooperate on shared resources, but rather commercial accords to sell hydrological data that other upstream countries provide free to downriver states.”

China’s diabolical plans to divert the waters of the Brahmaputra and other rivers to the deficient Yangtze River along the ‘Great Western Route’, though officially denied, will cause untold misery to the downstream populations of many Asian countries, including India and Bangladesh. According to Tibetan data, 10 dams have already been completed on the Brahmaputra, three others are under construction, seven new dams are under active consideration and eight more have been proposed.

Satellite images reveal that plans are proceeding at a rapid pace to construct a 38,000 megawatt dam at Metog (Motuo in Chinese) on the Brahmaputra. The project will be double the size of the Three Gorges Dam, which has caused immense environmental damage.  This project on the ‘Great Bend’ of the river will result in a large dam with serious seismological repercussions as the Himalayas are young mountains with frequent earthquakes. China is also planning to construct a hydro-electric power project at Dadiqua. This project will exploit the natural 2,500 metres drop in the river and will not need a large dam.

Run-of-the-river projects, like the one proposed to be constructed at Dadiqua, will not materially affect the lower riparians, but large dams with plans for the diversion of water to areas on mainland China will have serious implications for the people downstream. It is in the interest of China as well as the lower riparian nations to enter into multilateral river water sharing agreements in keeping with international norms and practices. So far, China has steadfastly refused to enter into any such agreements. Contrary to its self-professed ‘peaceful rise’, China is pursuing hegemonic tendencies that are a sure recipe for instability that may ultimately lead to conflict.