Tag Archives: South Asia

India-US Relations Blog

In South Asia, graft begets Terror

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What do elections in India have to do with terrorism? Plenty. These days, well-heeled candidates distribute “notes for votes”, passing out currency so as to entice electors into choosing them. While illegal in India’s absurdly restrictive electoral system (where a candidate for a parliamentary seat with more than five million voters breaks the law if he spends more than $30,000 on his election), why should counter-terrorism experts need to experience blood pressure rises at the fact that an estimated $ 800 million was handed out during the 2009 national elections in India to voters? More recently, last month more than $100 million in cash was seized from politicians in just the state of Tamil Nadu, where elections to the state legislature were due.

Most of the cash handed out by generous politicians is counterfeit. They get the currency from the same networks that operate the terror and narcotics syndicates. Apart from North Korea’s Kim Jong Il, the biggest counterfeiter in the world is Pakistan’s ISI, which uses its multiple contacts in India to circulate cash that has been printed for the purpose. India has, of course, made this easy by relying on the same source for printing its currency as Pakistan does for its own, thereby ensuring that the same inks and paper become available to the ISI as are used in printing India’s legal tender. The cash gets moved into India through multiple channels, a lot of it coming into the possession of politcal leaders, who protect the networks involved so as to be assured of their own supplies of counterfeit currency.

Small wonder that Hassan Ali, one of the world’s biggest money launderers, was residing safely in India for decades, even while moving out tens of billions of dollars, most into Swiss banks. Ali is now in jail, but powerful patrons at the Union Cabinet level are seeking to ensure that he avoid naming any but the “small fish” in his roster of clients. The reality is that a Union Cabinet Minister who is holding a powerful portfolio was a close friend of Ali’s closest associate, Kashinath Tapuriah, and frequently used to meet with him in Kolkata. Small wonder that nobody is holding his or her breath waiting for accountability.

India’s top politicians use “hawala” channels to spirit their money abroad, and protect these sources in their own interest. The problem is that most of the major “hawala” channels are run from out of Pakistan, and are staffed by those active in both narcotics and terrorism. By protecting such channels, high-level politicians in India are in effect protecting the votaries of Terror.

Which is where the U.S. can come in. President Barack Obama needs to appreciate that it is not enough that the Treasury Department discover and sanitize cash belonging to terror syndicates that are in US-based entities. The U.S. needs to be similarly active in the case of entities in South Asia as well. And because of its huge size and even greater scale of corruption, India tops the list. Thus far, politicians in power have cleverly defined illegal assets abroad as “tax evasion”, thereby freeing international financial agencies of the responsibility for identifying and eliminating them, something that would need to be done, were these assets correctly labeled. For the fact is that such assets are the proceeds of crime, and need to be defined as such. Why authorities in India are resisting this is because such a change would mean that banks abroad would be duty bound to reveal the names of their clients.

Some politicians in India park funds with relatives abroad, many of whom have foreign passports. There needs to be complete transparency on the assets and occupations of the relatives of key decision-makers in India, so that the public can be alerted if – for example – a high-school dropout who may be the sister of a prominent politician in India becomes a millionaire through paths that are obscure. More than the fact that such individuals are living high on the hog at the expense of the Indian taxpayer who has been cheated of his assets, the reality is that much of the cash sent abroad through “hawala” is tainted by association with narcotics and terror syndicates. What is needed is for the U.S. to publicly offer to assist South Asian states to identify funds that have been parked abroad as a consequence of graft. This would help the War on Terror as much or more as military hardware.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Reconstructing Afghanistan’s natural balance

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Why India must try to bring the United States, Iran and Russia together over Afghanistan

Imagine Afghanistan without extra-regional powers like the United States, NATO and others. Its stability would depend on the stability of the balance of power between Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan and India. The external actors would broadly fall into two camps, based on the degree of convergence of their interests: China, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the red corner, and India, Iran and Russia in the blue. This was roughly the situation obtaining in Afghanistan in the second-half of the 1990s towards the end of which the red corner seized a dominant upper hand through the military success of Mullah Omar’s Taliban regime. After 9/11, the U.S. and NATO stepped in and disrupted the natural geopolitical dynamics of the region.

Once external powers withdraw Afghanistan the natural geopolitics will again kick into action: with the China-Saudi-Pakistan triad seeking dominance over the landlocked country against the interests of India, Iran and Russia. The United States has the power to set the future trajectory by choosing sides. The tragedy of the last decade is the sheer inability or unwillingness (complicity or incompetence?) of the United States to appreciate the intrinsic geopolitics of the region. It would have done much better for itself and for Afghanistan if it had recognised how the fundamental interests of the region’s powers were stacked up, and aligned itself accordingly.

The single most important reason for this, perhaps, was the dysfunctional relationship between Iran. There still is no love lost between Washington and Tehran. Worse, even as China consolidates its alliance with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the United States seeks to split India and Iran. For its part, India has shown no appetite for bringing about a rapprochement between the United States and Tehran.

This must change, and 2011 has opened a window for India, Iran and the United States to attempt to increase co-operation over Afghanistan. Writing in the Washington Post, a well-connected Saudi commentator has declared a US-Saudi split. The Pakistani establishment is checking how much support it will receive from China before deciding how much to part ways with the United States. Before the killing of Osama bin Laden upset the scoreboard, General Kayani and Prime Minister Gilani had asked Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s president, to cut his links with the United States. In the current circumstances China doesn’t have to do anything bold: it just needs to wait.

In contrast, even after Abbottabad, the United States remains wedded to a failed strategy of pretending that the Pakistani military establishment is its ally. This only strengthens the position of the China-Saudi-Pakistan triad, and weakens its own. New Delhi is unlikely to be persuaded that it enjoys a genuinely strategic relationship with the United States as long as the latter continues to scaffold Pakistan. Tehran has many reasons to be opposed to the United States. A good part of that is ideological. What gets less attention is the fact that the realists in Tehran have reason to be wary of the United States because they see Washington as the protector of both Israel and, more importantly, the Sunni bloc consisting of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. There are some differences between New Delhi and Tehran, but nothing that can’t be resolved if Washington were to change course. Russia enjoys good relations with both Iran and India, and is likely to prefer such a re-arrangement of relations.

If realism prevails in Washington, New Delhi and Tehran, their diplomats will be galvanised into working out how the three could co-operate, albeit in a limited context, over Afghanistan. It may be that nearly three decades of estrangement has left the tribal world of Washington policymaking with few advocates of making up with Iran. That’s why India has a role—it must muster up the imagination and diplomatic chutzpah to attempt this project.

It is frustrating to see resigned minds give up before even trying.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Could India Do An Abbottabad?

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Just like the United States, India too has a host of enemies who have taken shelter or been given sanctuary deep inside Pakistan. So how likely is it that New Delhi could pull off a daring commando assault against them? A chorus of Indian voices (here and here) is asking precisely this question. The chief of the Indian air force, responds, somewhat cryptically, in the affirmative. One might note that the country recently took receipt of six C-130 HERCULES transport aircraft outfitted for special-forces operations, and that there is no doubt that the air force has the wherewithal to strike terrorist camps located in the Pakistani portion of Kashmir. India also maintains a well-regarded naval commando unit.

But does the Indian military possess the capacity for audacious direct raids on high-profile terrorist targets located further away from its home turf? The short answer is no.

A series of technical, operational and political constraints all but rule out such an operation. First, the Indian capacity for sophisticated, multi-dimensional (combining on-the-ground operatives, satellite reconnaissance and communications intercepts) tracking of terrorism suspects is virtually non-existent. As Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta note in their new book, India’s external intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), possesses a good reputation for covert action but performs poorly with actual intelligence gathering and analysis. Former army chief General V.P. Malik also points to the pervasive lack of coordination among the various parts of India’s national security machinery as a major obstacle to launching cross-border commando raids.

The embarrassing inability to mount a speedy airlift of National Security Guard commandos the 850 miles from New Delhi to Mumbai during the November 2008 terrorist strike calls into severe question India’s operational capacity to launch complex, lightning-fast airborne assaults far inside hostile territory. And one important reason that U.S. helicopters flying out of Afghanistan were able to arrive at the Bin Laden compound undetected is that the bulk of Pakistani air defense systems are oriented toward India.

Even if Indian military forces did possess the means for rapier-like, long-distance assaults, they would have to be prepared to engage in a continuous fight on their way home once Pakistani authorities discovered the intrusion. Washington insists that Pakistani officials were not informed in advance of the operation and Pakistani aircraft were reportedly scrambled as U.S. helicopters made their way back to Afghanistan. Yet one of the most intriguing questions surrounding the episode is how American forces, for the 40 minutes they were on the ground, managed to avoid contact with either local police units or the large military presence resident in Abbottabad. Needless to say, an Indian assault team could not count on having such an operationally permissive environment.

Finally it is very difficult to believe that highly risk-averse political leaders in New Delhi would even countenance a raid that has the all but certain probability of sparking a large-scale clash with Pakistani forces, which in turn could escalate more broadly. Hawkish commentators have long condemned the political class for perpetuating India’s image as a “soft state” and for lacking the will for bold, decisive action to defend the country’s security interests. A former vice chief of army staff complains, for example, that “policymakers cannot take hard decisions, and are responsible for the perception that we are a soft state and so can succumb to pressure.” Brajesh Mishra, a former national security adviser to the prime minister, similarly laments that “India is now regarded as a soft state.”

Yet the sense of fundamental caution, most recently on display in New Delhi’s remarkable quiescence following the Mumbai terrorist attack, is deeply rooted among politicians.The argument is making the rounds these days that the Mumbai strike, often regarded as “India’s 9/11” was a game-changer – that India’s leaders have now reached the end of their patience with Pakistan and thus will respond forcefully to the next terrorist assault emanating from that country. Of course, the same thing was said following the brazen December 2001 attack upon the Indian Parliament.

My own guess is that novelist Aravind Adiga may have a more accurate prediction regarding New Delhi’s response to the next major terrorist strike: “The government will immediately threaten to attack Pakistan, then realize that it cannot do so without risking nuclear war, and finally beg the U.S. to do something. Once it is clear that the government has failed on every front – military, tactical and diplomatic – against the terrorists, senior ministers will appear on television and promise that, next time, they will be prepared.”

Such forbearance may very well be the better part of strategic virtue, given Pakistani frailties. But if this is how India’s leaders are likely react to an attack on their own soil, one should not expect heroic actions further afield.

(This post originally appeared in the FPA India blog.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

On the death of Osama and a future with Pakistan

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The location of Osama’s death underlines the work required on Pakistan

After a decade of anxiety, fear and anticipation, the friends and families of the victims of 9/11 have finally received closure. Osama bin Laden was killed in his hideout in Abbottabad in Pakistan through a special operation by U.S. forces in the wee hours of May 1. Osama was found hiding in a mansion, just kilometers from a Pakistani military academy and a few hours from Islamabad.

Though Osama’s killing is a humongous achievement for the U.S. counterterrorism operations and intelligence services, and is sure to affect the morale of the al- Qaeda foot-soldiers, it is by no means the end of the war on terrorism. As security agencies (particularly in US, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan) prepare for a backlash of the killing, it would be necessary to capture the moment and the momentum, and drill deeper to eradicate more such terrorists. The U.S. cannot relax and retreat now that its primary target has been eliminated; it should push forward even harder.

Equally important is dealing with Pakistan. The very fact that Osama bin Laden was found hiding in a ‘mansion’ near a Pakistani military academy, probably for about five years, reconfirms doubts about Pakistan’s support and genuine participation in the war on terror. Given the “efficiency” of the ISI (Pakistan secret service) and the Pakistan Army, it seems improbable that they were oblivious to the location of Osama, on their soil and close to their elite establishment. Rather, it seems as if Osama was secure under the protection of the military and intelligence elite who frequented the region. Otherwise, why would he choose such a “dangerous” location to hide?

To make matters worse for Pakistan, the entire operation was kept secret from its forces, and they did not participate in it in any manner. It is a humiliating display of the distrust for Pakistan, and further rocks the already precarious US-Pakistan relationship. An operation as crucial as this, on Pakistani soil, without the knowledge and participation of Pakistan, is a big slap in its face. From an Indian perspective, it vindicates India’s claims about Pakistan harboring terrorists.

It is about time the U.S. realized and acted upon the double-standards of Pakistan where it claims to fight terrorism and harbor terrorist organizations on its soil at the same time. Last month, David Headley (on trial in U.S. courts for prominent role in 26/11 Mumbai attacks) claimed links to ISI and the Pakistani army. India has submitted dossiers after dossiers on the involvement of Pakistan in 26/11, and other terrorist attacks in India. Wikileaks said U.S. considered ISI a terrorist organization. Khaled Sheikh Mohammed was caught in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

The death of Osama bin Laden gives credence to the stories of dangerous liaisons that Pakistan entertains, and President Obama should take a realistic view of his AfPak strategy and engagement with Pakistan. This is a moment to honestly evaluate Pakistan, and the significant time that was wasted chasing mirages in Afghanistan.

India-US Relations Blog

What Indians (Some) Want the U.S. to do

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There is little doubt that the left in India wish the United States ill–not that the U.S. has done them any harm. The Indian left, ever since the Soviet bloc collapsed and China turned capitalist and aggressive, has needed an imperialist enemy to focus their enmity upon. After all, their version of socialism or communism ruined nine odd countries whose people revolted against the rule of the proletariat and went back into the capitalist fold. So the U.S. wish to democratize other nations and slap around a few dictators evokes little sympathy in places like JNU.  Opposing national stands taken in other capitals, are looked at by the Indian left benignly, unless the capital concerned is Washington. Any disagreement with Washington arises, according to the left, from an imperialist or capitalist plot, as is for instance the U.S. envoy in Delhi reporting to Washington (according to wikileaks) that dealing with a Mamta ruled Bengal would be easier than dealing with Buddhadeb. If the U.S. consular office reports that Hyderabad is the Center of an Indian visa application forgery scam, that too must be a capitalist plot.

Most Indians have a sensible view of the United States and world order. What do the sensible majority wish the U.S. to do? They certainly don’t want what they see as a huge Republican negativism in opposing the ruling party – for the sake of opposition – even if it means dragging the U.S. down. We have enough of that in our own country, where the beneficial nuclear deal was opposed by a right wing  – left wing anti-national coalition in parliament, when the nuclear deal was originally a BJP idea.

May be a world led by the USA is not an ideal world – but it is more acceptable than, say, a world in which the Chinese have the last word. So the majority of Indians wonder, when is the U.S. going to pull itself out of the economic doldrums, and re-invent itself, as it has done so many times in the past? When are the happy days of oodles of I-20 visas, a thriving Silicon valley, huge back office contracts and masses of desi California weddings coming back? The US-India relationship is largely run by the people, in any case. If we left it to the government they would lower it to the same ‘estranged’ levels as existed in the 1980s. The strength of the U.S. lies in technology innovation. That innovation is converted into dual use merchandise and military power. This process is the US’ monopoly. Techno-innovation comes from concentrating the best brains around booming university towns. To make all that happen again, the U.S. government must pour money into technology innovation, start ups, entrepreneurs and university research. Will the U.S. do all that? Do they have the money to create jobs, fix medical insurance and still have enough money to plough back into the process that makes the U.S. the number one nation? Indians are worried.

Delhi has enough unpredictable allies and friends – from Myanmar to Bangladesh to Sri- Lanka and Afghanistan. But all these unpredictabilities are small compared to the future of the US. Even two U.S. authors of Indian origin have joined in predicting a failing future for the U.S. – but the majority refuse to give up hope.  Of course Obama’s speech on cheap Indian medicine doesn’t help. Hasn’t he seen that the U.S. and India grow rich together? Or that, if the U.S. launches another technological revolution, in say, alternate energy, the Indians in the U.S. will link Indian back offices and labs to execute that revolution to the mutual advantage of both countries?

The Indian government is just as wayward as the U.S. government – flirting with a non-entity of alphabets like BRIC. We really have nothing in common with China buying our iron ore and dumping manufactured goods on us. Our relationship with Brazil is a really stretched concept. The bilateral relationship with Russia is healthy and strong without lumbering it with China and Brazil, in a pointed slap to the Americans. But that is what governments do – make diplomatic headlines  that are of no consequence on the ground.