Troubles increase for the US-Pak relationship

The post-Osama phase of the US-Pakistan relationship is proving to be extremely turbulent. The swift U.S. reaction to the attack on its embassy in Kabul and the killing of the chief Afghan government negotiator, former president Rabbani, led to an equally strong backlash from the Pakistani establishment.

www.mca-marines.orgIn a scathing indictment of the Pakistan security establishment, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “…the Quetta Shoora and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers. For example, we believe the Haqqani Network – which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency – is responsible for the September 13th attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.”

“We strongly reject assertions of complicity with the Haqqanis or of proxy war,” Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said. “The allegations betray confusion and policy disarray within the U.S. establishment on the way forward in Afghanistan.” General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff dismissed the charge as “very unfortunate and not based on facts.” Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan’s foreign minister, warned that Washington “could lose an ally” if it keeps humiliating Pakistan with unsubstantiated allegations.

The international community has known for long that the Pakistan army and the ISI follow a Janus-faced policy on Afghanistan. While pretending to be allies in the ‘war on terror’, they are careful to target only those terrorist organisations that strike within Pakistan, like the TTP and the TNSM, and nurture and support the Afghan Taliban and their sympathisers. In February 2009, David Sanger, New York Times correspondent, had written in his new book The Inheritance that in a transcript passed to Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence in May 2008, General Kayani was overheard referring to Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani as “a strategic asset”. This had led to the first few armed UAV strikes against the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan inside Pakistan’s FATA province.

While U.S. frustration with Pakistani duplicity is understandable, the U.S. still has 98,000 troops in Afghanistan and is still dependent on the two land routes through Peshawar and Quetta for the logistics sustenance of its own and other NATO-ISAF forces. Though it could step up armed UAV strikes and even launch air strikes into North Waziristan, it does not have the capability to launch follow-on air assault strikes. Also, ground strikes will surely lead to war with Pakistan and war, with all its nuclear overtones, is not in anybody’s interest.

What the U.S. can do is to carefully calibrate the aid being given to Pakistan and make the government and the army accountable for cooperation in the war on terror. The Pakistan army and the ISI must not be allowed to get away with impunity for their support to terrorist organisations operating against the US and NATO-ISAF forces as well as in India. It should also consider rescinding its alliance with Pakistan when the bulk of troops are drawn down by 2014. As Stephen Cohen has put it so eloquently, “India is a friend, but not an ally; and, Pakistan is an ally, but not a friend.”

Red Lines and Reversed Roles

The South China Sea controversy demonstrates how Beijing’s actions will inevitably draw Washington and New Delhi closer together.

The respective security roles that the United States and India traditionally play in East Asia seemed to switch last week. By deciding not to supply Taiwan with the new fighter aircraft it has requested, the U.S. appeared to defer to China, which had cautioned that the sale was a “red line” that must not be crossed. In contrast, New Delhi’s determined sally into the South China Sea, in defiance of Beijing’s explicit warnings, exemplified the strategic assertion that the Obama administration has been urging on India. The dichotomy offers a glimpse of the shifting power dynamics now underway in Asia and, perhaps, a preview of what the regional security order might look like beyond the horizon.

america20xy.comThe U.S. decision to refurbish Taiwan’s aging F-16 fleet rather than provide it with more sophisticated versions of the aircraft is taken by some in Asia as the latest sign of China’s ascent and America’s subsidence in the western Pacific, an area long thought of as a U.S. lake. The Associated Press reported that Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin sees the decision primarily as a function of Beijing’s growing financial leverage vis-à-vis Washington. “It has a large debt and if China will try to apply pressure, the U.S. can end up in trouble,” he said. “The U.S. has to temper its relations with Taiwan for China.” The report also quoted a South Korean defense analyst as saying that some in that country have reached the conclusion that it would be better to bandwagon with China than continue to adhere to the decades-old security alliance with the United States.

By striking coincidence, a similar storyline was being replicated last week in another part of the world in which Washington has long exercised sway. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner put in an unprecedented appearance at a gathering of European finance officials called to address the region’s burgeoning debt crisis. His presence was intended to signal U.S. concern about the spillover potential of Europe’s financial woes. But some in the audience did not take kindly to his telling them what to do.  Both the Austrian and Belgian finance ministers tartly questioned how the Americans could presume to dispense advice when their own fiscal house is in such visible disarray. One media commentator observed the proceedings underscore that “in the wake of the debt-ceiling debacle, Geithner has lost a significant amount of international heft.” The Europeans, on the other, are much more interested these days in China’s views. With Beijing sitting on top of the world’s largest pile of foreign exchange, regional leaders have started to look to it as a potential financial savior.

India’s actions last week, in contrast, were the very definition of foreign policy steadfastness. On a visit to Vietnam, Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna announced that the overseas arm of India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) would proceed with hydrocarbon exploration activities in the South China Sea, an energy-rich area that in claimed in almost its entirety by Beijing. China has been increasingly brusque in asserting its claim of “indisputable sovereignty” over the waters, which it last year elevated to a “core national interest.” The marker Krishna laid down comes two months after Beijing warned New Delhi against involving itself in the area and after an unusual incident between the INS Airavat, an amphibious warfare vessel, and the Chinese navy off the coast of Vietnam.

New Delhi’s temerity sparked a passionate reaction in the China Times, a nationalist tabloid affiliated with the Communist Party. It lashed out in a lead editorial that India was engaged in “a serious political provocation” that constitutes a major challenge to China’s national resolve. It urged the Chinese leadership to use “every means possible” to reverse Indian actions. And in what seemed to be a retaliatory move, Beijing quickly announced that it would expand seabed explorations in the southwestern Indian Ocean.

Media commentary in India saw things differently. A Times of India editorial averred that “India has done well to hold its ground” and termed the ONGC move as a befitting response to the infrastructure projects China is conducting in the disputed territory of Kashmir. In a similar vein, Harsh V. Pant, a well-known foreign policy expert, noted that if “China wants to expand its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, New Delhi’s thinking goes, India can do the same thing in East Asia.” And M.K. Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat, called India’s actions “a historic move,” arguing that “India’s ‘Look East’ policy acquires swagger.  The Sino-Indian geostrategic rivalry is not going to be the same again.”

Observing the train of events, Time magazine’s “Global Spin” blog asked “Is This How Wars Start?” Of course, a booming bilateral economic relationship gives New Delhi and Beijing strong reason to moderate impulses toward outright military conflict. But as both countries continue simultaneously to rise in power and prestige, dynamics of competition and one-upmanship will inevitability deepen. This pattern is already evident in their Himalayan border area, in Burma and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean region and as far afield as Africa. And as last week’s events demonstrate, the South China Sea is now emerging as a new arena for strategic rivalry.

Pundits in Washington who doubt the prospects for the United States and India conjoining in a coalition directed against China should take note. The meteoric rise of Beijing’s power and the assertiveness in which it is exercised will ineluctably draw Washington and New Delhi even closer together. As a former U.S. official once predicted, “we don’t need to talk about the containment of China. It will take care of itself as India rises.”

Ambassador Blues

Maneuvers surrounding the appointment of a new U.S. ambassador in New Delhi cast light on Washington’s outlook on India.

There are two ways to look at the quixotic, widely derided campaign by Brad Sherman, a Democratic member of the U.S. Congress from the Los Angeles area, to have Cruz Bustamante, a former lieutenant governor of California, appointed the next U.S. ambassador in New Delhi. Both approaches capture a slice of reality and yet are mutually contradictory. Taken together, however, they form a good picture of Washington’s current outlook on India.

Continue reading Ambassador Blues

India and America: common values, shared success

By Richard G. Lugar

As Secretary of State Clinton’s recent trip to India demonstrated, these are exciting times for India, and for the India-United States relationship. India has liberalized and opened its economy, unleashing the entrepreneurial talent of its people and using its strong technology base to establish leading positions in such fields as telecommunications, information technology and pharmaceuticals.

America and India, for too long estranged during the Cold War, have developed steadily closer ties built on a uniquely strong foundation: both countries are stable, multi-ethnic democracies with a deep tradition of religious tolerance.

With a well-educated middle class that is larger than the entire U.S. population, India can be an anchor of stability in Asia and a center of economic growth. It is already the world’s second-fastest growing major economy, and bilateral trade with the U.S. has more than tripled over the past 10 years. I have worked to build a strategic partnership between the United States and India that will benefit both sides as India plays an ever-larger role on the world stage.

I am also excited by a new opportunity to match India’s entrepreneurial zeal with America’s current need for investment and jobs through the Startup Visa Act, which I introduced earlier this year. The bill would allow an immigrant entrepreneur to receive a two-year visa if he or she can show that a qualified U.S. investor is willing to invest in the immigrant’s startup venture. Many of India’s smartest and most entrepreneurial individuals are already here studying at our universities, so helping them stay to invest in their ideas would create jobs and help all Americans.

The bill would also apply to those already in the U.S. on unexpired H-1B visas, and entrepreneurs living outside the United States who already have a market presence here. If this legislation is enacted, it will help more Indians take part in the great American tradition of immigrant business success.

Another concern of Indians abroad is Pakistan, a concern I share. I believe the U.S. should use its influence to promote stability in the region, which could lead to a Pakistan that is more likely to cooperate and trade with India. That’s one of the reasons I co-sponsored the 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act.

The bill emphasizes economic assistance over military aid, and contains incentives for Pakistan to stabilize its democracy. It requires the Secretary of State to certify every year that Pakistan is meeting specific benchmarks of conduct, namely, that it is cooperating to dismantle supplier networks of nuclear weapons-related material, that it is making “significant efforts” to combat terrorist and extremist groups and that such groups are not receiving support from Pakistan’s military or spy service, and that it is not letting terrorist groups use Pakistan’s territory to stage attacks on other countries.

On that score, the bill specifically mentions Pakistan-based terrorist groups that threaten India as well as the United States and Afghanistan, including al Qaeda, the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which conducted the 2008 Mumbai attack. The legislation aims to encourage Pakistan to re-orient its armed forces to a mission more focused on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency than regional conflict, and calls for a cut-off of assistance if the security forces are deemed to be “subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.” In short, India has much to gain from the success of this legislation.

All this is part of a larger strategic engagement between India and America, which took a major step forward three years ago with the passage of the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement, a step that I strongly supported. The legislation lifted a three-decade American moratorium on nuclear trade with India and opened the door for trade in a wide range of other high-technology items, such as supercomputers and fiber optics.

Some critics called the deal a set-back for U.S. non-proliferation efforts, since India remains outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). I argued, however, that it actually provides incentives for the United States and India to deepen their cooperation in stopping proliferation, and confers numerous other benefits outside the nuclear realm by paving the way for broader economic and strategic collaboration.

The remarkable deepening of US-India ties over the past decade is only a start, as the relationship has still not reached its full potential. If Indians and Indian-Americans continue to contribute their ideas, their energy and their commitment, I am sure that even more exciting days lie ahead.

(Senator Richard Lugar is the Republican leader of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.)

Knocking on APEC’s Door

India’s absence from APEC is a serious omission for the organization. Its entry should be on the agenda of the upcoming APEC Summit in Honolulu.


apecHaving made the calculation that America’s security and prosperity would be enhanced by partnership with India, the United States over the last decade has promoted New Delhi’s admission into global governance structures. For the Bush administration, this meant doing the heavy lifting required to enroll India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an informal cartel governing the global nuclear regime whose original purpose of existence was to exclude New Delhi from its ranks. The Obama administration similarly helped usher India into the Group of 20 forum on the international economy and, most recently, endorsed its long-standing bid for permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council.

The time has now come for Washington to sponsor New Delhi’s entry into another international institution from which it has been barred for much too long.  India for decades has desired formal involvement in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which engages over half of world gross domestic product and a large fraction of global trade. But its application has continuously been passed over due to a lack of consensus inside the grouping, which currently numbers 21 members. Some APEC countries have expressed concerns that the institution is too unwieldy as it is and cannot accommodate India or the dozen other interested countries lined up at its door. Others argue that India is not really a Pacific Rim country and is therefore outside of APEC’s geographic parameters.

But with India poised to become one of the world’s top economies in the years ahead, its absence is a serious lacuna for the organization. New Delhi already participates as a full member in regional leadership groups like the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, both important venues for political and security discussions. It is also a full ASEAN dialogue partner.

Southeast Asia has historically been an area of deep Indian trade and cultural influence but was neglected diplomatically during much of India’s independent existence. Seeking to make up for lost time, New Delhi launched the “Look East” policy in 1992. It has proved to be a very successful initiative, paving the way for significant and rapidly-growing economic and diplomatic linkages in the region. The ten member-countries of ASEAN now constitute India largest export market. Southeast Asia takes in more than half of Indian exports, up from around 40 percent just a decade ago.  Indeed, India’s total trade volume with East Asia now exceeds that with the United States or the European Union. And New Delhi’s trade diplomacy has been on a tear recently in Asia, with major economic agreements being signed with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. It has commenced negotiations with Indonesia to boost the $12 billion in trade the two countries conducted in 2010.

India has also emerged as a major security player in East Asia and is fast becoming a key factor in the region’s geopolitical calculus. A landmark India-Japan security accord was signed in 2008, and important strategic partnerships have been established with Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. Indeed, Tokyo and Singapore lobbied for New Delhi’s membership in the EAS, over Beijing’s objections, in order to counterbalance Chinese influence in the organization. The United States and India now hold regular consultations on Asia-Pacific policy and a trilateral US-India-Japan security dialogue will be instituted next month in Tokyo.

The Indian navy has been conducting exercises with its U.S. and Japanese counterparts for a number of years now in the Pacific Ocean, and as the brief encounter two months ago between the INS Airavat, an amphibious warfare vessel, and the Chinese navy off the coast of Vietnam demonstrates, the navy is becoming a regular presence in the region’s waters.

APEC’s membership moratorium expired last year. With Washington currently holding the forum’s chairmanship, the Obama administration should be preparing the diplomatic groundwork to place India’s admission on the agenda of the APEC Summit that will take place in mid-November in Honolulu. To avoid interminable negotiations about whether other countries should be let in at the same time, the U.S. might repeat its persuasive line about New Delhi’s entry into the global nuclear order: India is simply so important that it merits a special dispensation.

As a previous post argues, New Delhi’s membership in APEC should be part of an overall agenda for advancing US-India economic engagement. But it would also pay major strategic dividends. In his address to the Indian parliament last November, President Obama urged India not only to “look East” but also “to engage East” for the sake of enhanced security and prosperity throughout Asia. Secretary of State Hillary Rodman Clinton underscored this theme in her visit to India two months ago. Speaking in Chennai (formerly Madras), a port city that has significant economic ties with Southeast Asia, Clinton urged India to take on a larger role in shaping the regional architecture for the Asia-Pacific. Reiterating Mr. Obama’s formulation, she stated that “we encourage India not just to look East, but to engage East and act East as well.”