Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Nuclear Dividends?

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Was the U.S.-India agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation worth all the trouble? Six years on, observers in both countries are accusing the other of perfidy.

Was the U.S.-India agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation worth all the trouble?  How have the expansive promises touted by its champions and dire warnings issued by its critics panned out? With the approach of the six-year anniversary of the landmark July 2005 summit between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, observers in both countries are at work tallying up the pay-offs and drawbacks.

PhotoThe Bush-Singh deal was momentous in both symbolic and material import. It implicitly recognized India as a nuclear weapons state, a gesture New Delhi very much wanted but which the Clinton administration refused to make. And by promising to end a decades-long embargo on nuclear energy technology against India, the Bush administration committed to overturning U.S. laws and global non-proliferation norms for New Delhi’s singular benefit.

At the time, U.S. advocates spoke of portentous opportunities in the strategic and commercial realms. A high-ranking U.S. official described the deal as “the big bang” designed to consummate a broad strategic relationship with a rising India that was aimed at balancing China’s burgeoning power. Ron Somers, the head of the U.S.-India Business Council, argued that “history will rank this initiative as a tectonic shift equivalent to Nixon’s opening to China.” Leading U.S. corporations quickly lined up, expecting that a grateful Indian government would reward them with lucrative contracts in the nuclear power generation and defense systems fields. Estimates were floated that access to India’s expanding nuclear energy sector would alone generate some 250,000 U.S. jobs.

Have the promised gains materialized? According to Michael Krepon (here and here), a prominent critic of the accord, they have not.  Pointing to India’s recent elimination – in the face of heavy U.S. lobbying – of Boeing’s and Lockheed Martin’s bids in its $11 billion fighter aircraft competition, as well as New Delhi’s failure to support U.S. diplomacy on the Libya and Syrian issues, he contends that the significant U.S. concessions made in the agreement have netted little in terms of a strategic or diplomatic return. Likewise, he notes the tough nuclear liability law adopted by India last year has the effect of all but blocking the involvement of U.S. companies in the country’s nuclear energy sector.

The accord’s advocates contended at the time that by granting India a special position in the global nuclear order, the nonproliferation regime would ultimately be strengthened. But Krepon believes the reverse has occurred. By bending the rules for India’s sole benefit, a pernicious precedent was set, one that China has just exploited in justifying its sale of two more reactors to Pakistan. And the failure to extract meaningful restrictions on India’s nuclear-weapon capacity has only spurred a paranoid Pakistan to undertake a significant expansion its own arsenal.

Krepon does not deny that bilateral diplomatic and economic ties have improved measurably in the last six years. But much of this, in his opinion, would have occurred even in the accord’s absence. From his vantage, the accord’s actual benefits are far from what was pledged, while the costs critics warned about have been substantiated.

Krepon’s critique arrives at a time of widespread disappointment in Washington that bilateral ties continue to fall far short of the promise that seemed so glistening just a few years ago. In an interview prior to his departure from New Delhi, U.S. Ambassador Timothy J. Roemer chided the Indian government’s failure to live up to its side of the bilateral relationship, adding that “There’s no doubt this needs to be a two-way street.”

The reasons for this sense of letdown are many, with fault lying both in Washington and New Delhi. Nonetheless, U.S. champions of the Bush-Singh deal were under no illusion that India’s signature registered its enlistment as America’s junior partner in global affairs or the surrender of its foreign policy independence.  For example, Nick Burns, who as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the last administration played a key role in crafting the new U.S.-India relationship, cautioned at the time that “the United States must adjust to a friendship with India that will feature a wider margin of disagreement than [Washington is] accustomed to.”

And even as the deal was proceeding, the two governments were at loggerheads in multilateral trade talks, an impasse that helped bring about the Doha Round’s collapse.  Paradoxically, the U.S. Congress gave its preliminary assent to the nuclear deal in December 2006 at the same moment that frustrations with New Delhi’s position in the Doha negotiations caused legislators to cut some of India’s trade privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences. And in the months prior to Congressional approval of the implementing “123 Agreement,” a high-ranking Bush administration official publicly accused New Delhi of stymieing negotiations and “working behind the scenes for Doha’s demise.”

India’s decision on fighter aircraft was a sharp disappointment to an Obama administration that lobbied strenuously on behalf of the U.S. contestants – so much so that the decision may have even hastened Ambassador Roemer’s resignation.  And it undoubtedly deepens the perception in Washington that New Delhi has not lived up to its side of the bargain by reciprocating the huge commitment the United States has made over the past decade to bolster India’s great power prospects. But as Ashley J. Tellis demonstrates in a superb piece of analysis, the decision was sui generis, involving the Indian air force’s rigid application of technical desiderata, rather than the anti-U.S. move some have described it as.

The proliferation-related arguments Krepon reiterates formed the core of the criticism against the accord when it was originally announced. But these points were difficult to sustain at the time in view of the strong support Mohamed ElBaradei, then director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, gave to the deal. He called the agreement a “win-win” as well as “a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety.” He has reaffirmed this view in his new book. And in case anyone missed the significance of ElBaradei’s endorsement, this is the same man who butted heads with the Bush administration over nuclear weapon allegations regarding Iraq and Iran – actions that helped earn him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005.  In the end, most nations were persuaded by his view that it was better to welcome New Delhi into the nuclear clubhouse, even if somewhat awkwardly, than to continue leaving it out in the cold.

It should also be noted that as the nuclear accord was being debated by the international community, Beijing explicitly assured Washington that it would not exploit India’s special carve-out in the nonproliferation regime to provide more reactors to Pakistan. It is also unclear how large a factor the deal looms in the rapid expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capabilities. Most likely, Islamabad’s anxiety about India’s “Cold Start” military doctrine – which focuses on deterring Pakistan’s use of jihadi proxies by holding out the threat of swiftly-mounted but calibrated military offensives against Pakistani territory – plays at least as significant a role.

While Krepon accuses India of failing to live up to the broad spirit of the Bush-Singh deal, Indian observers are presently charging Washington with an outright breach of faith. Specifically, they see restrictions just promulgated by the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal cartel regulating global nuclear commerce, as undercutting the privileged perch the accord gave India in the international nuclear hierarchy. The NSG prohibitions are designed to prevent the spread of uranium-enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing technology to countries, like India, that have not signed on to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Technically speaking, the provisions, which were advanced by the Obama administration, are not country-specific. However, there is little question they are aimed squarely at India, and this has revived cries about American perfidy that were at fever pitch in New Delhi’s tumultuous debate over the nuclear accord three years ago. Once again, the Communist Party of India and the Bharatiya Janata Party are making allegations about Mr. Singh’s lack of candor in revealing the agreement’s details.

Anil Kakodkar, a former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission who played a major role in drafting the nuclear deal, has also joined the present fray, characterizing the NSG move as a “betrayal,” while G. Parthasarathy, a leading light in the foreign policy establishment, concludes that “we cannot trust the U.S. as a long-term and reliable partner on nuclear issues.” The Hindu newspaper exclaims that “the Indian side has scrupulously adhered to its side of the broad bargain and has assumed the U.S. and the NSG would do the same. But if the latter are going to cherry-pick which of their own commitments they will adhere to and which they will not, India may well be tempted to examine its own options.” Indeed, the Indian government has threatened to withhold coveted reactor contracts from any country enforcing the new rules.

Beyond the perceived affront to national honor, made all the more palpable since the NSG was founded in response to India’s first nuclear detonation in 1974, it is unclear whether the restrictions will have any practical effect. India already can reprocess material from its fast-breeder reactor program to supply its nuclear arsenal. And the country’s chief nuclear partners – the United States, France and Russia – have rushed to assure New Delhi that the restrictions will in no way impinge upon their previous commitments. Still, it is curious why the Obama administration chose to press the new restrictions at the very same moment it was championing New Delhi’s membership in the NSG (read the U.S. paper on India’s candidacy here).

The growing irritations on both sides will be aired out at the mid-July convening of the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue in New Delhi. The confab was originally scheduled for April but was postponed, ostensibly at least, because Defense Minister A.K. Antony had to campaign in the Kerala state elections. More likely, Antony and others in the Indian leadership were looking for an excuse to dodge the Obama administration’s full-court press on the fighter aircraft decision. As it turns out, the meeting will now take place with both sides nursing grievances.

Immigration Blog

Employers May Soon Need Approval From a Federal Database for New Hires

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It is surprising that only months after taking office on a platform of smaller government, House Republicans appear poised to enact a program that some consider to be quite a big government solution to illegal immigration. The legislation is H.R 2164, sponsored by House Judiciary Committee Chair Lamar Smith (R-Texas). It bears watching in the coming weeks.

E-Verify is an electronic employment verification that allows employers to send, generally speaking, the name and social security number of a potential new hire and get back an answer from the federal government as to whether that individual is legally authorized to work in the United States.

The key issue is not whether such a system should exist. The issue is whether the federal government should require every employer in America to use E-Verify, as mandated in H.R. 2164.

In theory it may make sense to have such a system for checking new hires. But in practice it may be an entirely different story. A new report I completed details some of the problems with making E-Verify mandatory. (A copy of the report can be found here.)

First, it is unclear whether the system will actually reduce illegal immigration in any significant way. A government report by the consulting group Westat found about half of illegal immigrants show up in the system as work authorized, primarily, it’s assumed, by using a false identity. In addition to identify fraud the system could be thwarted by employers that decide not to submit the names of employees suspected of being illegal immigrants.

Second, the errors in the databases are likely to affect individuals here lawfully who seek jobs but are mistakenly shown by the system to be not authorized to work. This could be a major problem, since even under the current system employers often go against protocols and “pre-screen” applicants. That means individuals may not even realize why they are not called back after a job interview.

Misspellings of names and naturalization can lead to errors in the database. It is not surprising that someone with the name Mukherjee or Chidambaram is more likely to have a database error than a guy named Smith or Jones.

By some estimates foreign-born individuals are far more likely to experience problems with the Social Security or U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services databases than native-born. “E-Verify error rates are 30 times higher for naturalized U.S. citizens and 50 times higher for legal nonimmigrants than for native-born U.S. citizens,” according to Congressional testimony by Tyler Morgan of the National Immigration Law Center.

Third, employers should be aware that H.R. 2164 vastly increases fines not only for employing illegal immigrants but also for what may be considered paperwork violations or a failure to submit an individual through the E-Verify system. The legislation puts in place a system more complex than simply checking new hires. An employer is also required to check existing employees under certain circumstances, including if an employee starts working on a state or federal contract or is within 30 days of work authorization expiring. A government allegation that workers were misclassified as independent contractors (and not required to be checked through E-Verify) rather than as employees could potentially trigger fines of at least tens of thousands of dollars.

The House legislation provides a short window for this to be up and running. The largest employers would be required to use E-Verify within 6 months, employers with between 20 to 499 employees within 18 months, and those with 1 to 19 employees would be required to use E-Verify within 24 months. A Senate bill, sponsored by Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) has a shorter window – one year for all employers – and requires all existing employees to be verified as well.

The House legislation could be marked up in the Judiciary Committee as early as this month. If it became law it could mark an enormous change in the operation of the U.S. workplace. Supporters of the bill view that as a good thing. Others are not so sure.

Immigration Blog

A Brief History of Indian Immigration to the United States

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So much attention is paid to current policy controversies that it is easy to lose sight of history. The history of Indian immigration to the United States is, to put it simply, recent history. I’ve put together data that show the stunning change in Indian immigration to America after the 1965 act removed the national origins quotas U.S. law. The data show that more Indians immigrated to the U.S. in the 1960s than had immigrated in the prior 140 years.

Immigration from 1820 to 1959

The history of Indian immigration to the United States can be divided into two periods. The first period is the time prior to the 1965 Act. The second, after the change in U.S. law that opened the door to immigrants from India and other countries that had been mostly barred as countries of origin for U.S. immigration.

Table 1 illustrates that few people from India came to the United States in the 19th century or the first half of the 20th century. For much of that period, arduous and expensive travel likely acted as a limiting factor. Between 1820 and 1959, only 13,363 Indians immigrated to America, compared to over 69,000 in 2010 alone.

Prior to 1921, immigration to the United States was essentially open, with some literacy and health requirements introduced in the early 1900s. However, the 1921 and 1924 immigration acts sought to exclude immigration from eastern European, Asian, and African countries. Anti-Semitism in the period made Jewish immigration and, to an extent, immigration from Italy, the primary targets for exclusion, more than the relatively small amount of immigration from either Asia or Africa.

Table 1

Indian Immigration to the United States: 1820-1959

Year Immigrants from India
1820 to 1829 9
1830 to 1839 38
1840 to 1849 33
1850 to 1859 42
1860 to 1869 50
1870 to 1879 166
1880 to 1889 247
1890 to 1899 102
1900 to 1909 3,026
1910 to 1919 3,478
1920 to 1929 2,076
1930 to 1939 554
1940 to 1949 1,692
1950 to 1959 1,850
Total 13,363

Source: Table 2, 2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security. Note: Country designation is by country of last residence.

The 1965 Act Changed Everything for Indian Immigration

Under the 1924 Act, which requires a separate, more extensive discussion, immigration from the “Asia-Pacific triangle” was limited to an overall ceiling of 2,000. As a result, extensive immigration from India was not possible. It should be noted that Congress legislated various exemptions from the quotas that enabled individuals to immigrate outside of the quotas.

The 1965 Act made several changes to U.S. immigration law but the most important was to eliminate the national origins quotas. Table 2 shows the dramatic change produced in Indian immigration as a result of the 1965 Act. One can see how Indian immigration has climbed post-1965. From 1960 to 1969, 18,638 Indians immigrated to the United States, in the 1970s, 147,997 immigrated. Indian immigration totals increased as well in the next three decades.

Table 2

Indian Immigration to the United States: 1960-2009

Year Immigrants from India
1960 to 1969 18,638
1970 to 1979 147,997
1980 to 1989 231,649
1990 to 1999 352,528
2000 to 2009 590,464
Total 1,341,276

Source: Table 2, 2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security. Note: Country designation is by country of last residence.

Table 3 shows that from 1950 to 1959, America received only 1,850 Indian immigrants. In contrast, from 2000 to 2009, 590,464 Indians immigrated to America. The 1965 Act, combined with the rise of Indian students and employment-based immigration to the United States, produced a dramatic change in the number of people coming from India to America.

Table 3

Indian Immigration to the United States: Pre- and Post-1965 Act

Year Immigrants from India
1950 to 1959 1,850
2000 to 2009 590,464

Source: Table 2, 2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security. Note: Country designation is by country of last residence.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Constructive Engagement: India-Pakistan Foreign Secretaries Talks

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Although talks between India’s Nirupama Rao and Pakistan’s Salman Bashir in the last week of June 2011 did not produce a major breakthrough, the fact that these were viewed positively by both the sides and were described as constructive and cordial makes the talks special. This is because nothing more than the reiteration of known positions on the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute and on the export of terrorism into India had been anticipated in both the countries. The talks focussed on peace and security, including terrorism and nuclear and military confidence bldg measures; the Kashmir issue; and, the promotion of people-to-people contacts as well as friendly exchanges.

During the talks, India sought early closure on the trial of Pakistani terrorists who were involved in the planning and execution of the Mumbai terror strikes in November 2008 and pointed out that there cannot be any meaningful discussion on Kashmir under the shadow of the gun. Calling for an end to the “shadow of the gun and the violence it has unleashed”, Ms Rao expressed concern over continuing infiltration into Kashmir. She said at a joint press conference that the “ideology of military conflict should have no place in the paradigm of our relationship of the 21st century… Instead, this relationship should be characterised by the vocabulary of peace, all-round cooperation in the interest of our people, growing trade and economic interaction, as well as people to people contacts — and, all this, let me emphasise, in an atmosphere free of terror and violence.”

The issue of terrorism figured prominently in the joint statement: “The foreign secretaries noted that both countries recognize that terrorism poses a continuing threat to peace and security and they reiterated the firm and undiluted commitment of the two countries to fight and eliminate this scourge in all its forms and manifestations. They agreed on the need to strengthen cooperation on counter-terrorism.”

Both the sides agreed to make efforts to expand trans-LoC trade, increase the frequency of the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service and to examine the feasibility of starting a bus service between Kargil and Skardu. Frank talks were held on the issue of peace and security between India and Pakistan. Discussions on CBMs included the establishment of contacts between the training establishments of the armed forces of the two countries, including India’s National Defence College and Pakistan’s National Defence University. New nuclear CBMs and measures for better coordination between India’s Coast Guard and Pakistan’s Maritime Security Agency were also discussed. India had presented a draft agreement to prevent “situations at sea” involving vessels of the two countries at a previous meeting. The Pakistani side agreed to examine the document.

A suggestion for contacts between defence and security think tanks, including the holding of seminars and conferences, was also taken up for discussion. Both the sides agreed that hostile propaganda should not be allowed to cloud the relationship. The two countries decided to constitute a group of experts to discuss conventional and nuclear CBMs to “discuss implementation and strengthening of existing arrangements, and to consider additional measures, which are mutually acceptable, to build trust and confidence and promote peace and security.”

Unlike the frosty talks between India’s External Affairs Minister S M Krishna and his Pakistani counterpart Shah Mehmood Qureshi in 2010, the Foreign Secretary talks resulted in some forward movement. Krishna and Pakistan’s new Foreign Minister – to be appointed shortly, will meet in July 2011 and take up these issues where the two Foreign Secretaries have left off. If they succeed in building on the gains made at Islamabad, the India-Pakistan rapprochement process will once again begin to gather momentum.

India-US Relations Blog

The Surge Recedes

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President Obama’s announcement of far larger and more rapid withdrawals of U.S. forces from Afghanistan than many had expected affects Indian security interests and the U.S.-India relationship in significant ways. While it is unfair to characterize the decision as a rush to the exits, it is clear that a deliberate pace is being set.

Obama Speech

Beyond the immediate numbers and timetables involved, the speech’s most memorable line – “America, it’s time to focus on nation building here at home” – signals a new era in South Asia’s geopolitics. U.S. involvement in regional security affairs has oscillated between deep engagement (as in the 1950s, 1980s and the post-9/11 decade) and relative indifference (the 1960s-1970s, and the 1990s). Mr. Obama’s remarks confirm that the pendulum has now begun its swing toward the latter position.

The address will set in motion a train of momentous events for all of Afghanistan’s neighbors. And it is noteworthy that Mr. Obama’s decision was driven more by the exigencies of domestic politics than by a careful assessment of U.S. security objectives in South and Central Asia. As the Washington Post comments , Obama “failed to offer a convincing military or strategic rationale for the troop withdrawals.” The debate inside the administration was reportedly intense but brief, and White House political operatives have not even tried to disguise the fact that the President ignored his top Pentagon advisers.

Parallel to the troop drawdown, President Obama sounded the end to U.S. nation-building efforts in Afghanistan, stating that “we won’t try to make [it] a perfect place.” He underscored Washington’s burgeoning disenchantment with Hamid Karzai’s government in Kabul by once again prodding it to “step up its ability to protect its people, and move from an economy shaped by war to one that can sustain a lasting peace.” Both objectives, however, will prove impossible in the absence of strong U.S. support. A new report by the Democratic majority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee offers a very bleak assessment of Afghanistan’s economic viability in a post-withdrawal era. Yet a day after Obama’s remarks, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton gave notice that the “civilian surge” – which dispatched a thousand U.S. officials to work on governance and development projects in Afghanistan – has likewise peaked.

Karzai’s antics have played a role in this fundamental shift in Washington, with one analyst concluding that “the United States has now clearly washed its hands of the Karzai government.” Tellingly, there was nary a word of praise in Mr. Obama’s remarks for the Afghan president, and one wonders how committed Washington will be to his regime’s survival in any political settlement with the Taliban.

Of course, this is the same government in which New Delhi has invested so much over the last decade. Only six weeks ago, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh traveled to Kabul with the aim of broadening India’s engagement in Afghanistan . He unveiled a significant expansion of Indian aid, with a further commitment of $500 million over the next few years. He and Karzai also issued a joint declaration that the two countries intended to move towards a strategic partnership. According to one analyst , Singh’s purpose was to demonstrate that, unlike Washington, New Delhi has no “exit strategy” in Afghanistan.

The diplomatic process leading to a possible political settlement of the Afghan conflict is only just beginning. But as it unfolds, it is likely that key differences will emerge between the United States and India. Looking towards the exits, Washington may not be too picky over the settlement’s exact details, while New Delhi will be all too focused on how the strategic terrain in its neighborhood is shifting.

Speaking of political settlements, Obama assured all that “the light of a secure peace can be seen in the distance.” But he was virtually silent on the principles he would pursue in the diplomatic endgame. What would constitute such a peace and how the United States would seek to effect it were items left unmentioned. Nor did Obama address how the Taliban and its Pakistani benefactor could be persuaded to support such an outcome when he has so plainly telegraphed America’s disengagement from Afghanistan.

The coming period will witness an intensified regional scramble for influence in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan. India has strong strategic interests in ensuring that any government in Kabul is strong enough to be a bulwark against Pakistan as well as a gateway to trade and energy links in Central Asia. Both goals would be undermined if a Taliban-dominated regime were to come to power. Yet India’s own capacity to shape the course of events is quite limited in a country with which it shares no borders. For this reason, India will seek to move closer to Iran, whose interests in Afghanistan are roughly congruent.

Indeed, this process has already started. A year ago, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao (now slated as India’s new ambassador in Washington) highlighted the “unique” civilizational ties and “the instinctive feeling of goodwill” between India and Iran. She spoke of how links with Tehran are a “fundamental component” of New Delhi’s foreign policy and how there has been a recent “convergence of views” on important policy issues. Regarding bilateral cooperation in Afghanistan, she argued that India and Iran “are of the region and will belong here forever, even as outsiders [read the Americans] come and go.” A senior Indian official described the outreach to Iran as a policy “recalibration” necessitated by the “scenario unfolding in Afghanistan and India’s determination to secure its national interests.”

Earlier this year, India’s national security advisor, Shivshankar Menon, visited Tehran seeking to shore up strategic ties. In early June, the deputy secretary of Iran’s National Security Council was in New Delhi to continue the talks. New Delhi now has even less incentive to go along with U.S. economic sanctions directed against Tehran, and both countries may go so far as to revive their cooperation during the 1990s that provided critical support to the non-Pashtun militias battling the Taliban regime. The Americans will surely grumble about the cozying up with Iran, but the geopolitical logic of the Obama withdrawal leaves New Delhi little choice.

As the United States progressively takes leave of Afghanistan, its dependence on the (epically dysfunctional) security relationship with Pakistan that the 9/11 attacks brought about will correspondingly lessen. The impact of this development on India is variable. The drawdown in U.S. forces will decrease the logistical requirement to run critical supply lines through Pakistani territory. And as the commando assault on Osama Bin Laden and the marked ramp-up in drone strikes testify, Washington is increasingly willing to do without Pakistani cooperation and conduct military operations on its own.

As the need for Islamabad’s collaboration diminishes, Washington will begin to pull back on the significant military assistance – nearly $20 billion so far – that has caused so much consternation in New Delhi. The Bush administration’s “de-hyphenation” policy – one that pursued relations with India and Pakistan independent of the other – will also re-emerge. Seeing Pakistani cooperation on Afghanistan as a function of addressing its acute security anxieties, the Obama administration put the policy on hiatus and started making noises about the Kashmir issue and discouraging New Delhi from too deep an involvement in Afghanistan . With Washington’s solicitude vis-à-vis Islamabad’s sensitivities coming to an end, the U.S.-Indian security partnership will more and more run on its own dynamics.

On the other side of the ledger, however, the Pakistani military establishment could try to offset the loss of U.S. support by entering into an even tighter security alliance with China. This prospect, which would exacerbate India’s strategic concerns, cannot be ruled out, though Beijing so far has shown a reluctance to be encumbered by Pakistan’s deep internal problems . The rather bizarre trip Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani undertook to Beijing in late May is a case in point . Despite Gilani’s profession that Pakistan and China “are like two countries and one nation,” Beijing appeared discomforted when Islamabad put out the word that the Chinese navy was welcome to take up residence in Gwadar, a strategic port at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

A more worrisome possibility is that U.S. strategic disassociation with Islamabad will also be expressed in a sharp reduction of economic assistance, leading to even greater volatility in Pakistan. In that event, India would find that Pakistan as a failed state is much more of a security headache than it ever was at the peak of its national power.

As the United States markedly reduces its presence in regional security affairs, some hard choices await New Delhi policymakers.