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Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India-Myanmar Strategic Cooperation

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The winds of change are blowing across Myanmar. Elections of a sort have been held and Ms Aung San Suu Kyi has been released. President Thein Sein recently invited her for direct talks, with which she expressed satisfaction. The international community is gradually opening up to the country and speculation is rife that sanctions may soon be lifted.

India’s relations with Myanmar, a devoutly Buddhist country, have been traditionally close and friendly. Geographically, India and Myanmar share a long land and maritime boundary, including in the area of the strategically important Andaman and Nicobar islands where the two closest Indian and Myanmarese islands are barely 30 km apart. Myanmarese ports provide India the shortest approach route to several of India’s north-eastern states.

India’s national interest lies in a strong and stable Myanmar that observes strict neutrality between India and China and cooperates with India in the common fight against the insurgencies raging in the border areas of both the countries. For India, Myanmar is a bridge between all the countries comprising the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC – Myanmar has observer status) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). External Affairs Minister S M Krishna visited Myanmar in June 2011 to further cement the growing relationship.

The key drivers of the India-Myanmar strategic relationship are cooperation in counter-insurgency operations and the need for India to ensure that Myanmar is not driven into Chinese arms through Indian neglect of its security concerns and arms requirements. Indian insurgent groups (NSCN, ULFA and Manipur rebels among others) have been operating out of bases in the weakly controlled areas across the borders of the Indian states of Manipur and Mizoram and Myanmarese rebels, primarily the Chins and the Arakanese, have often taken shelter on the Indian side. It is in the interest of both the countries to cooperate with each other to fight these insurgent groups in a coordinated manner. The two armies have been cooperating with each other for mutual benefit. India-Myanmar cooperation is also essential to control narcotics trafficking and to curb the proliferation of small arms in the region.

China has made rapid advances into Myanmar and established close political, military and economic relations. Myanmar provides China the shortest land route access to the northern Indian Ocean. China is engaged in exploiting Myanmar’s oil and gas reserves, is building a 1,100 km overland pipeline from Kyaukryu port in Myanmar to the border city of Ruili in Yunnan and is developing Sittwe as a commercial port on Myanmar’s west coast. It is natural that Chinese naval activity in the Bay of Bengal will soon follow. China has also been stepping up arms sales to Myanmar as other nations, including India, are loathe to sell offensive military hardware to the country.

While India is concerned with the slow pace of progress on the issue of national reconciliation and the consequent delay in installing a democratically elected government in power in Yangon, the strategic scenario compels India to balance its security concerns with its support for the emergence of democratic rule. It is only through close engagement that India can promote leverages with the ruling regime to nudge it gently towards national reconciliation. India must also increase its economic footprint in Myanmar, particularly in areas that are contiguous to India.

India and the other regional powers can play a positive role in the re-entry of Myanmar into the international mainstream so that it can be nudged towards becoming a strong and stable democracy that is also mature and responsible and willing to play by the rules and traditions governing international relations. Perhaps multi-national talks, which include India, China, Japan, ASEAN and other stakeholders, would be the best way forward. At least in the initial stages it may be prudent for the U.S. to stay away from such talks.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Troubles increase for the US-Pak relationship

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The post-Osama phase of the US-Pakistan relationship is proving to be extremely turbulent. The swift U.S. reaction to the attack on its embassy in Kabul and the killing of the chief Afghan government negotiator, former president Rabbani, led to an equally strong backlash from the Pakistani establishment.

www.mca-marines.orgIn a scathing indictment of the Pakistan security establishment, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “…the Quetta Shoora and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers. For example, we believe the Haqqani Network – which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency – is responsible for the September 13th attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.”

“We strongly reject assertions of complicity with the Haqqanis or of proxy war,” Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said. “The allegations betray confusion and policy disarray within the U.S. establishment on the way forward in Afghanistan.” General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff dismissed the charge as “very unfortunate and not based on facts.” Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan’s foreign minister, warned that Washington “could lose an ally” if it keeps humiliating Pakistan with unsubstantiated allegations.

The international community has known for long that the Pakistan army and the ISI follow a Janus-faced policy on Afghanistan. While pretending to be allies in the ‘war on terror’, they are careful to target only those terrorist organisations that strike within Pakistan, like the TTP and the TNSM, and nurture and support the Afghan Taliban and their sympathisers. In February 2009, David Sanger, New York Times correspondent, had written in his new book The Inheritance that in a transcript passed to Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence in May 2008, General Kayani was overheard referring to Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani as “a strategic asset”. This had led to the first few armed UAV strikes against the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan inside Pakistan’s FATA province.

While U.S. frustration with Pakistani duplicity is understandable, the U.S. still has 98,000 troops in Afghanistan and is still dependent on the two land routes through Peshawar and Quetta for the logistics sustenance of its own and other NATO-ISAF forces. Though it could step up armed UAV strikes and even launch air strikes into North Waziristan, it does not have the capability to launch follow-on air assault strikes. Also, ground strikes will surely lead to war with Pakistan and war, with all its nuclear overtones, is not in anybody’s interest.

What the U.S. can do is to carefully calibrate the aid being given to Pakistan and make the government and the army accountable for cooperation in the war on terror. The Pakistan army and the ISI must not be allowed to get away with impunity for their support to terrorist organisations operating against the US and NATO-ISAF forces as well as in India. It should also consider rescinding its alliance with Pakistan when the bulk of troops are drawn down by 2014. As Stephen Cohen has put it so eloquently, “India is a friend, but not an ally; and, Pakistan is an ally, but not a friend.”

India-US Relations Blog

India and America: common values, shared success

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By Richard G. Lugar

As Secretary of State Clinton’s recent trip to India demonstrated, these are exciting times for India, and for the India-United States relationship. India has liberalized and opened its economy, unleashing the entrepreneurial talent of its people and using its strong technology base to establish leading positions in such fields as telecommunications, information technology and pharmaceuticals.

America and India, for too long estranged during the Cold War, have developed steadily closer ties built on a uniquely strong foundation: both countries are stable, multi-ethnic democracies with a deep tradition of religious tolerance.

With a well-educated middle class that is larger than the entire U.S. population, India can be an anchor of stability in Asia and a center of economic growth. It is already the world’s second-fastest growing major economy, and bilateral trade with the U.S. has more than tripled over the past 10 years. I have worked to build a strategic partnership between the United States and India that will benefit both sides as India plays an ever-larger role on the world stage.

I am also excited by a new opportunity to match India’s entrepreneurial zeal with America’s current need for investment and jobs through the Startup Visa Act, which I introduced earlier this year. The bill would allow an immigrant entrepreneur to receive a two-year visa if he or she can show that a qualified U.S. investor is willing to invest in the immigrant’s startup venture. Many of India’s smartest and most entrepreneurial individuals are already here studying at our universities, so helping them stay to invest in their ideas would create jobs and help all Americans.

The bill would also apply to those already in the U.S. on unexpired H-1B visas, and entrepreneurs living outside the United States who already have a market presence here. If this legislation is enacted, it will help more Indians take part in the great American tradition of immigrant business success.

Another concern of Indians abroad is Pakistan, a concern I share. I believe the U.S. should use its influence to promote stability in the region, which could lead to a Pakistan that is more likely to cooperate and trade with India. That’s one of the reasons I co-sponsored the 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act.

The bill emphasizes economic assistance over military aid, and contains incentives for Pakistan to stabilize its democracy. It requires the Secretary of State to certify every year that Pakistan is meeting specific benchmarks of conduct, namely, that it is cooperating to dismantle supplier networks of nuclear weapons-related material, that it is making “significant efforts” to combat terrorist and extremist groups and that such groups are not receiving support from Pakistan’s military or spy service, and that it is not letting terrorist groups use Pakistan’s territory to stage attacks on other countries.

On that score, the bill specifically mentions Pakistan-based terrorist groups that threaten India as well as the United States and Afghanistan, including al Qaeda, the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which conducted the 2008 Mumbai attack. The legislation aims to encourage Pakistan to re-orient its armed forces to a mission more focused on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency than regional conflict, and calls for a cut-off of assistance if the security forces are deemed to be “subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.” In short, India has much to gain from the success of this legislation.

All this is part of a larger strategic engagement between India and America, which took a major step forward three years ago with the passage of the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement, a step that I strongly supported. The legislation lifted a three-decade American moratorium on nuclear trade with India and opened the door for trade in a wide range of other high-technology items, such as supercomputers and fiber optics.

Some critics called the deal a set-back for U.S. non-proliferation efforts, since India remains outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). I argued, however, that it actually provides incentives for the United States and India to deepen their cooperation in stopping proliferation, and confers numerous other benefits outside the nuclear realm by paving the way for broader economic and strategic collaboration.

The remarkable deepening of US-India ties over the past decade is only a start, as the relationship has still not reached its full potential. If Indians and Indian-Americans continue to contribute their ideas, their energy and their commitment, I am sure that even more exciting days lie ahead.

(Senator Richard Lugar is the Republican leader of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India-Bangladesh Settle Boundary Dispute

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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Bangladesh this week has led to the settlement of the complex boundary dispute that had been festering between India and East Pakistan since the British left in 1947 and between India and Bangladesh since the new country was born in 1971. This is a significant milestone in the troubled history of the relationship between the two countries.

The India-Bangladesh border was always in the news as there were frequent clashes between India’s Border Security Force (BSF) and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) at places like the Teen Bigha corridor. The border has a peculiar problem that is usually referred to as ‘Enclaves and Adverse Possessions’. There are 111 Indian enclaves (17,158 acres) within Bangladesh with a population of 37,334 and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (7,110.02 acres) in India with a population of 14,215. 34 tracts of Indian land are under the adverse possession of Bangladesh and 40 pieces of Bangladeshi land are in India’s adverse possession. The demarcation of the boundary was done by signing a protocol to the Land Boundary Agreement of 1974. Though this agreement had provisions for the settlement of the issue of adverse possession, it had not been implemented as the problem was considered politically sensitive. The political leadership of the two countries has at last found the courage to invest time and effort towards resolving this sensitive issue. Now that the border dispute has been settled, unseemly clashes, which do no credit to either side, will no longer occur and spoil relations between the two countries.

The Indian Prime Minister was accompanied by four of the five Chief Ministers (CM) of Indian states bordering Bangladesh. Ms Mamata Banerjee, the CM of West Bengal and the stormy petrel of Indian politics, was reportedly upset at the concessions proposed to be made to Bangladesh ‘at the cost of West Bengal’ in the agreement on sharing of the waters of the River Teesta and dropped out virtually at the last minute. PM Manmohan Singh promised Sheikh Hasina, the Bangladesh PM, that the two sides would continue to discuss the Teesta River issue to reach “a mutually acceptable, fair and amicable arrangement…” However, as a quid pro quo response, Bangladesh retaliated by scuttling the treaty on transit rights that was also on the cards and that would have provided easer access to the rest of the country to some of India’s north-eastern states through Bangladesh.

Some of the other important treaties that were signed included an agreement on Indian aid for development programmes, a pact on overland transit between Bangladesh and Nepal, MoUs on renewable energy and the conservation of the Sunderbans and an understanding on jointly promoting fisheries. India agreed to allow Bangladesh duty free access to 46 textile items to be exported to India. Several MoUs were also signed for cooperation in the fields of education and communications, as also a protocol on conservation of the Royal Bengal Tiger – very few of this majestic species now remain in the wild.

Ever since the government of Sheikh Hasina had cracked down on India’s ULFA insurgents who had been hiding in Bangladesh for long, relations between the two countries had shown signs of thawing. The Hasina government’s policy of counter-terrorism was in stark contrast with the Begum Khaleda Zia government’s policy of providing covert shelter, encouragement and support to various Indian insurgent groups. The signing of the historic boundary agreement has taken the relationship to a much higher trajectory. The two prime ministers deserve to be complimented for their political courage and sagacity in bringing to an end the bitterness of the past.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

The Continuing Proxy War in Kashmir

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The situation in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) continues to remain a cause for concern to the government of India. Since end-1989, Pakistan has been waging a ‘proxy war’ against India in J&K. It has done this by aiding and abetting disaffected and misguided Kashmiri youth to rise against the Indian state. Despite the cease-fire on the Line of Control (LoC) since November 2003 and the tenuous rapprochement process, Pakistan continues to surreptitiously practice its peculiar brand of state-sponsored terrorism. This is borne out by the continuing attempts at infiltration in Kashmir during the summer of 2011.

Till some years ago, Pakistan’s official position was that it provides only ‘diplomatic, political and moral’ support to ‘freedom fighters’. However, it is now internationally accepted that the Pakistan army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate have been providing military training, weapons, military equipment, ammunition and explosives to the terrorists, besides financial support. The ISI spends approximately Rs 5 to 10 crore (USD 1 to 2 million) per month on its proxy war campaign. Till the present cease-fire came into effect, the Pakistan army actively supported terrorist bids to infiltrate into J&K by engaging Indian posts along the routes of infiltration with artillery and small arms fire.  Though infiltration has now been reduced due to effective counter-infiltration measures by the Indian army, even the present low levels would not be possible but for the encouragement and steady support being given to the Jihadi extremists by the Pakistan army.

Throughout the prolonged period of Pakistan’s proxy war, India has shown tremendous restraint and immense tolerance in the face of grave provocation to its security. It is inconceivable that any other nation would have acted with the sense of responsibility that India has in not launching trans-LoC operations to eliminate militant training camps and interdict known routes of infiltration. Many Indian analysts have been advocating a pro-active trans-LoC and trans-border counter-proxy war policy.

Former RAW analyst B. Raman has written: “The main reason why India has not yet been able to effectively put an end to Jihadi terrorism against it and its civilian population sponsored by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is because India’s counter-terrorism operations are directed only against the terrorists operating in its territory. They are not yet directed against the State sponsoring them despite a persistent demand from growing sections of the Indian population for targeting the State of Pakistan too.”

While Pakistan had reduced the overt infiltration of so-called Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’ across the LoC during Musharraf’s rule, it continued to do so covertly by looking for smarter methods of inducting more Jihadis; for example, through neighbouring countries like Nepal and Bangladesh. The remaining roots of terrorism in Kashmir now lie in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and in Pakistan itself and, unless India shows the political will necessary to eliminate these roots, Pakistan’s proxy war is likely to continue unabated even though it may become more sophisticated and covert in its approach.

The Pakistan army is under tremendous pressure from Jihadi elements responsible for internal instability and from the Americans to deliver more in the so-called War on Terror. Despite these pressures, there is unlikely to be any change in the Pakistan army’s hostility towards India and its covert support, even sponsorship, of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism across the LoC and the international boundary (IB) from Pakistan soil. Prime Minister Gilani said recently that Pakistan will continue to provide diplomatic, moral and political support for what he says is a ‘freedom struggle’ in Kashmir.

Clearly, the rapprochement process is a tactical ploy to tide over current domestic difficulties and there has not been a strategic change of heart. Pakistan’s proxy war with India will go on because the Pakistan army will not allow the civilian leadership to change its fundamental policy towards India. Hence, lasting peace in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan will remain a distant dream.