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Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Constructive Engagement: India-Pakistan Foreign Secretaries Talks

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Although talks between India’s Nirupama Rao and Pakistan’s Salman Bashir in the last week of June 2011 did not produce a major breakthrough, the fact that these were viewed positively by both the sides and were described as constructive and cordial makes the talks special. This is because nothing more than the reiteration of known positions on the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute and on the export of terrorism into India had been anticipated in both the countries. The talks focussed on peace and security, including terrorism and nuclear and military confidence bldg measures; the Kashmir issue; and, the promotion of people-to-people contacts as well as friendly exchanges.

During the talks, India sought early closure on the trial of Pakistani terrorists who were involved in the planning and execution of the Mumbai terror strikes in November 2008 and pointed out that there cannot be any meaningful discussion on Kashmir under the shadow of the gun. Calling for an end to the “shadow of the gun and the violence it has unleashed”, Ms Rao expressed concern over continuing infiltration into Kashmir. She said at a joint press conference that the “ideology of military conflict should have no place in the paradigm of our relationship of the 21st century… Instead, this relationship should be characterised by the vocabulary of peace, all-round cooperation in the interest of our people, growing trade and economic interaction, as well as people to people contacts — and, all this, let me emphasise, in an atmosphere free of terror and violence.”

The issue of terrorism figured prominently in the joint statement: “The foreign secretaries noted that both countries recognize that terrorism poses a continuing threat to peace and security and they reiterated the firm and undiluted commitment of the two countries to fight and eliminate this scourge in all its forms and manifestations. They agreed on the need to strengthen cooperation on counter-terrorism.”

Both the sides agreed to make efforts to expand trans-LoC trade, increase the frequency of the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service and to examine the feasibility of starting a bus service between Kargil and Skardu. Frank talks were held on the issue of peace and security between India and Pakistan. Discussions on CBMs included the establishment of contacts between the training establishments of the armed forces of the two countries, including India’s National Defence College and Pakistan’s National Defence University. New nuclear CBMs and measures for better coordination between India’s Coast Guard and Pakistan’s Maritime Security Agency were also discussed. India had presented a draft agreement to prevent “situations at sea” involving vessels of the two countries at a previous meeting. The Pakistani side agreed to examine the document.

A suggestion for contacts between defence and security think tanks, including the holding of seminars and conferences, was also taken up for discussion. Both the sides agreed that hostile propaganda should not be allowed to cloud the relationship. The two countries decided to constitute a group of experts to discuss conventional and nuclear CBMs to “discuss implementation and strengthening of existing arrangements, and to consider additional measures, which are mutually acceptable, to build trust and confidence and promote peace and security.”

Unlike the frosty talks between India’s External Affairs Minister S M Krishna and his Pakistani counterpart Shah Mehmood Qureshi in 2010, the Foreign Secretary talks resulted in some forward movement. Krishna and Pakistan’s new Foreign Minister – to be appointed shortly, will meet in July 2011 and take up these issues where the two Foreign Secretaries have left off. If they succeed in building on the gains made at Islamabad, the India-Pakistan rapprochement process will once again begin to gather momentum.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

How not to Exit Afghanistan

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According to Henry Kissinger (“How to Exit Afghanistan,” Washington Post, June 8, 2011), four conditions must be met to make the exit strategy viable: “A cease-fire; withdrawal of all or most American and allied forces; the creation of a coalition government or division of territories among the contending parties (or both); and an enforcement mechanism.” None of the four appears viable at present. Nor do these conditions look achievable in the 2014-15 time frame that the exit strategy is planned to be completed.

As had been widely anticipated, the Taliban has launched a vigorous spring offensive and the US-led NATO-ISAF forces have retaliated with equal force. The Pakistan army has apparently learnt nothing from the killing of Osama bin Laden and continues to pretend that his presence at Abbottabad was a mystery. Instead of reinvigorating its efforts to eliminate terrorists who are undermining Pakistan’s security, the army is still holding off from launching the long-delayed offensive against the TTP in North Waziristan. Meanwhile, reports of US drone attacks against terrorists along the Af-Pak border continue to trickle in virtually on a daily basis. While it is early days yet in this year’s military confrontation, a continuing stalemate can be foreseen.

A U.S. Congressional study report, released on June 8, 2011, has found that nation-building efforts in Afghanistan are floundering as the massive economic aid programme lacks proper oversight and breeds corruption. It says that most local officials are incapable of “spending wisely”. It also says that there is little evidence to support the view that even the “politically pleasing” short term results will be sustainable once the draw-down begins. The report notes that the Afghan economy could easily slip into a depression as it is mainly a “war-time” economy that is a “huge distortion”. It is well known, of course, that the U.S. military conducts its own development programme in the areas cleared of the Taliban to win the people’s support, irrespective of the aid programmes approved by the Afghan government.

The two-year old efforts to move towards reconciliation with the so-called “good Taliban” have not made much headway. Secret talks being mediated by Germany between the U.S. government and Tayyab Agha, said to be a close confidante of Mullah Mohammed Omar, are unlikely to achieve a major breakthrough as no one is quite sure whether Agha is actually negotiating on behalf of Mullah Omar or whether the Taliban are simply using the talks as a ploy to buy time. The Haqqani shoora, that enjoys ISI support and patronage, is not part of the reconciliation process.

While regional efforts to secure peace in Afghanistan remain haphazard, these are likely to slowly gather momentum as the date for the draw-down of forces approaches. During a visit to Kabul in mid-May, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh endorsed President Karzai’s “process of national reconciliation” and said, “We hope that Afghanistan will be able to build a framework of regional cooperation that will help its nation-building efforts.”

There is so far no sign that the U.S. and its allies are planning to make substantive efforts to put in place a viable international peacekeeping force to help the Afghan government to maintain security after their own exit from Afghanistan in 2014. If this is not done, the Taliban will gradually seize one province after another, with covert help from Pakistan, and will eventually force the capitulation of the government – paving the way for their triumphant return to power. Conflict termination on such terms would signify the failure of President Obama’s exit strategy.

India-US Relations Blog

Is America Achieving The Improbable in Afghanistan, India & Pakistan?

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Recently I returned from a trip to India. The biggest story during my visit was the spectacular raid inside Pakistan to get Osama Bin Laden. It was pure shock and awe. There was an instantaneous burst of applause for America’s brilliant action.

Unfortunately, within a day or two, the sentiment changed. India, like Afghanistan, had always maintained that Pakistan provides sanctuary to terrorists and in many cases actively encourages, aids and provides material support to terrorists. This reality, Indians thought, was ignored by America either because of America’s self-interest or gullibility.

The discovery that Bin Laden was hiding in the open in a Pakistani military town confirmed to Indians that they were right and America was wrong for all these years. Indian society then compared the execution of Osama Bin Laden to the complete freedom provided within Pakistan to the terror-masters of the horrific 2008 Mumbai attack.

Indians have always accused America of a double standard for terrorists. This feeling morphed into certainty after the Bin Laden raid. Then came statements by American officials exonerating Pakistan’s Top Leadership and proclamations about how Pakistan was still America’s ally.

The insult and the injury cut very deep. The people I spoke to were quietly livid. I was stunned by the intensity of their feelings against what they see as America’s duplicitous dealings with Pakistan.

These were Lawyers, Doctors, Teachers and others in India’s middle class, the heart of India’s educated society. They understand the good about America. They understand the need for Indo-American partnership. But gone is their euphoria about the heady Bush days of Indo-US Strategic Partnership. Today, their anger and contempt towards America seemed unanimous. As one said simply, “this country (America) cannot be our friend”.

The India-Pakistan relationship has been a zero-sum game. So this sentiment within India should translate into a vote of confidence for America inside Pakistan. Right?

But the anger against America seems to be even more intense within Pakistan. From reports in the New York Times and the Washington Post, the rank and file of the Pakistani Army is “seething with anger” against America. Most Pakistanis seem convinced that America is trying to bring mayhem and terror to Pakistan to meet its own objectives in Afghanistan.

What about Afghanistan? America is pouring billions into Afghanistan every year to protect Afghans from the Taliban. This seems more and more like a waste of money and more importantly lives of young American soldiers.

credit: static.guim.co.ukThis week, the Taleban launched attacks in the northern cities of Herat and Taloqan. Also this week, about 200 Afghan militants crossed into northwestern Pakistan and engaged in a gun battle with Pakistani security forces. Rather than work even more closely with American forces, President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan issued an ultimatum this week to American Forces and NATO to cease all strikes against Afghan homes. Why?

As Stratfor, the widely respected geo-strategy firm wrote this week “Opposition to the ISAF and the counterinsurgency-focused campaign across the country is on the rise among even anti-Taliban elements of the government and general population…… the trajectory of declining patience and tolerance of and increasingly virulent opposition to ISAF military operations across broader and broader swaths of Afghan society continue to worsen,…..”.

America is deeply involved in these three countries in different ways. American leadership would like to be a mediator between these countries and facilitate accommodation between them, if not peace. Unfortunately, America seems to be achieving just the opposite.

These are three societies at conflict with one another. When you are a friend or enemy of one society, you automatically are not an enemy or a friend of the other society. But today these vastly different societies have developed the same image of America.

If this isn’t an improbable achievement, I don’t know what is!

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Reconstructing Afghanistan’s natural balance

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Why India must try to bring the United States, Iran and Russia together over Afghanistan

Imagine Afghanistan without extra-regional powers like the United States, NATO and others. Its stability would depend on the stability of the balance of power between Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan and India. The external actors would broadly fall into two camps, based on the degree of convergence of their interests: China, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the red corner, and India, Iran and Russia in the blue. This was roughly the situation obtaining in Afghanistan in the second-half of the 1990s towards the end of which the red corner seized a dominant upper hand through the military success of Mullah Omar’s Taliban regime. After 9/11, the U.S. and NATO stepped in and disrupted the natural geopolitical dynamics of the region.

Once external powers withdraw Afghanistan the natural geopolitics will again kick into action: with the China-Saudi-Pakistan triad seeking dominance over the landlocked country against the interests of India, Iran and Russia. The United States has the power to set the future trajectory by choosing sides. The tragedy of the last decade is the sheer inability or unwillingness (complicity or incompetence?) of the United States to appreciate the intrinsic geopolitics of the region. It would have done much better for itself and for Afghanistan if it had recognised how the fundamental interests of the region’s powers were stacked up, and aligned itself accordingly.

The single most important reason for this, perhaps, was the dysfunctional relationship between Iran. There still is no love lost between Washington and Tehran. Worse, even as China consolidates its alliance with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the United States seeks to split India and Iran. For its part, India has shown no appetite for bringing about a rapprochement between the United States and Tehran.

This must change, and 2011 has opened a window for India, Iran and the United States to attempt to increase co-operation over Afghanistan. Writing in the Washington Post, a well-connected Saudi commentator has declared a US-Saudi split. The Pakistani establishment is checking how much support it will receive from China before deciding how much to part ways with the United States. Before the killing of Osama bin Laden upset the scoreboard, General Kayani and Prime Minister Gilani had asked Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s president, to cut his links with the United States. In the current circumstances China doesn’t have to do anything bold: it just needs to wait.

In contrast, even after Abbottabad, the United States remains wedded to a failed strategy of pretending that the Pakistani military establishment is its ally. This only strengthens the position of the China-Saudi-Pakistan triad, and weakens its own. New Delhi is unlikely to be persuaded that it enjoys a genuinely strategic relationship with the United States as long as the latter continues to scaffold Pakistan. Tehran has many reasons to be opposed to the United States. A good part of that is ideological. What gets less attention is the fact that the realists in Tehran have reason to be wary of the United States because they see Washington as the protector of both Israel and, more importantly, the Sunni bloc consisting of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. There are some differences between New Delhi and Tehran, but nothing that can’t be resolved if Washington were to change course. Russia enjoys good relations with both Iran and India, and is likely to prefer such a re-arrangement of relations.

If realism prevails in Washington, New Delhi and Tehran, their diplomats will be galvanised into working out how the three could co-operate, albeit in a limited context, over Afghanistan. It may be that nearly three decades of estrangement has left the tribal world of Washington policymaking with few advocates of making up with Iran. That’s why India has a role—it must muster up the imagination and diplomatic chutzpah to attempt this project.

It is frustrating to see resigned minds give up before even trying.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Developing Intervention Capabilities

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India needs an Air Assault Division

The death of Osama bin Laden is likely to lead to reprisal attacks against western targets and those in India. As the roots of these attacks will in all probability be in Pakistan, military intervention may become necessary under certain circumstances. The Indian armed forces possess limited air assault capabilities, but these need to be modernised and qualitatively upgraded. The Indian army has half a dozen Special Forces battalions, the navy has some MARCOS (marine commandos) and the air force has a Garuda commando unit. These capabilities need to be substantially enhanced, particularly the ability to fly nap-of-the-earth on a dark night while evading radar detection.

General K. Sundarji, former Indian COAS, had advocated the raising of an air assault division comprising three brigade groups by about the year 2000. However, the shoestring budgets of the 1990s did not allow the army to implement his vision. Air assault capability is a significant force multiplier in conventional state-on-state conflict as well. The present requirement is of one air assault brigade group with integral helicopters for offensive employment on India’s periphery. Comprising three specially trained air assault battalions, integral firepower, combat service support and logistics support units, this brigade group should be capable of short-notice deployment in India’s extended neighbourhood by air and sea. Simultaneously, plans should be made to raise a division-size rapid reaction force, of which the first air assault brigade group should be a part, by the end of the 12th Defence Plan (2012-17).

The second brigade group of the air assault division should have amphibious capability with the necessary transportation assets being acquired and held by the Indian Navy, including landing and logistics ships. The third brigade of the division should be lightly equipped for offensive and defensive employment in the plains and mountains as well as jungle and desert terrain. All the brigade groups and their ancillary support elements should be capable of transportation by land, sea and air and should be logistically self-contained. The recent commissioning of INS Jalashwa (former USS Trenton) has given the armed forces the capability to transport one infantry battalion by sea. The air force has limited tactical and strategic airlift capability. All of these capabilities must be enhanced to plug gaps in India’s ability to intervene militarily across its borders when it becomes necessary to do so.

Military intervention capabilities, combined with the employment of Special Forces battalions when necessary, will allow India to undertake surgical strikes like Operation Neptune Spear – should diplomacy and covert operations fail to secure critical national interests. Such capabilities will also have deterrent value as these will raise the cost for rogue intelligence agencies like the ISI to support terrorist strikes in India. Unless India becomes the undisputed master of its own backyard in Southern Asia, including the northern Indian Ocean, it will not be recognised as the numero uno regional power, leave alone its aspirations to become a power to reckon with on the world stage. The time to start is now as India’s strategic environment is getting murkier by the day.