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Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

China is Preparing Tibet as a Future War Zone

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China’s massive infrastructure build-up in Tibet far in excess of genuine civilian requirements is causing concern to the government of India. Defence minister A K Antony has spoken in parliament of the rapid development of rail, road, airfield and telecom infrastructure and military camps being undertaken by the Chinese authorities in Tibet. He assured the MPs that ‘necessary steps’ were being taken to counter these developments.

Antony acknowledged that a road network stretching across 58,000 km has been constructed and five operational airfields have come up at Gongar, Pangta, Linchi, Hoping and Gar Gunsa in Tibet. Extension of the Qinghai Tibet Railway (QTR) line to Xigaze and another line from Kashgar to Hotan in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is also in progress.

Control over Tibet forms part of the larger concept of Chinese national integration under President Hu Jintao’s dictum of ‘going down the road of development with Chinese characteristics and a Tibetan flavour.’ In the wake of ethnic violence in Tibet in 2008, increased force levels of the paramilitary people’s armed police, Chinese frontier guards and the garrison duty forces have been stationed in the region.

China has chosen to upgrade the infrastructure and logistics system in Tibet to enhance the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to become a more mobile and better-equipped fighting force that can be deployed faster and sustained over a longer period of time. The concentrated expansion of infrastructure in Tibet has improved the PLA’s capability to rapidly induct integrated forces.

The QTR railway line is being further extending westwards from Lhasa to Xigaze. Along with the rapid development of the lateral road network in Tibet, a large number of axial roads leading to passes bordering India are being constructed. The roads are being constructed to military specifications in order to be turned over to the PLA in the event of war or an internal disorder. The logistics build-up opposite India’s eastern theatre is a cause for concern since it augments the PLA’s ability to deploy rapidly from the mainland.

Construction of new airfields and the upgradation of advanced landing grounds (ALGs) and helipads in and around the TAR, coupled with the acquisition of new transport aircraft, will enhance China’s strategic airlift capability resulting in faster induction and concentration of field formations in comparatively shorter time-frames and, consequently, over shorter warning periods. It also boosts the striking range of PLA Air Force fighter aircraft and provides the ability to strike and engage targets in India on a broad front and in depth.

Another major infrastructure development is the construction of new missile bases in Tibet. China has placed advanced Dong Feng-21 medium-range ballistic missiles along the borders it shares with India. During a future conflict with India, the PLA could easily move 500 to 600 mobile ballistic missile launchers to bases close to the Indian border from their current deployment areas opposite Taiwan.

Complexities of the Tibetan terrain, vagaries of climate, and sustenance capacities of the thrust lines chosen, are all factors that influence the depth of operations that are planned to be undertaken. To address this aspect, the PLA is reportedly constructing Hyperbaric Chambers to facilitate the rapid acclimatisation of troops brought in from lower altitudes. It is also building the first batch of oxygen-enriched barracks using plants for troops in the TAR at the Nagchu Military Sub-Command at an altitude of 4,500 metres.

It is in the Indian interest to upgrade the logistics infrastructure in the states bordering Tibet so as to facilitate the rapid reinforcement of sectors threatened by the Chinese during any future conflict. Simultaneously, India should enhance its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to maintain all round vigil on the border. The army and the air force must also upgrade their firepower capabilities by an order of magnitude so as to engage and destroy PLA forces at a distance.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Non-Proliferation Lobby Analysts Seek to Corner India on CTBT

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By Rajiv Nayan

The international community is discussing how to bring India into the multilateral export control regimes. During his November 2010 visit to India, United States president Barack Obama made a few speeches and issued a joint statement with prime minister Manmohan Singh, which contained a number of significant policy pronouncements. The further accommodation of India in the U.S. and multilateral export control regimes was a notable feature of these pronouncements.

President Obama announced that the U.S. would support India’s candidature in the four multilateral export control regimes—the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. India meets all the criteria for the membership of the MTCR. India may have to add a few items to its dual use technology control list called Special Chemical Organisms, Material, Equipment and Technology (SCOMET) to meet the membership criteria for the Australia Group. For membership in the NSG and Wassenaar Arrangement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) puzzle needs to be solved. For India, the membership of the NSG is strategically relevant.

After Obama’s announcement supporting India’s membership, the French and the Russians also gave their support, and the idea gained ground that India may be given the membership incrementally. It was generally believed that the Australia Group would come first, followed by the MTCR and the NSG and the Wassenaar Arrangement in that order. However, the Indian establishment wants membership to come as a package. The incremental approach has an inherent danger: the membership of the strategically less relevant regimes would become possible but the membership of the strategically more relevant regime, namely, the NSG, would be problematic because of the NPT issue. The Wassenaar Arrangement’s NPT criteria would also have to be amended to enable Indian membership. As for the MTCR, politics, instead of criteria, may be used to delay or block India’s membership.

The Indian government’s position, by and large, seems to have the support of the Indian strategic community. Now the package approach is seen as being preferable to the incremental approach. As this message has been sent across the world, the concerned players may have two options: either deny India the membership of all the regimes or prepare to give it the membership of all the regimes. India’s new profile as a significant economy that is performing well even during difficult global financial times and as an equally important producer, client and consumer of advanced technology may force these actors to accommodate India in the regimes. Indeed, India’s entry would only enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the regimes.

The process of the accommodation seems to have begun. Indian officials and those of relevant regimes countries have started interacting to facilitate India’s membership. Quite expectedly, analysts and non-governmental experts are being consulted over the way(s) to include India in the regimes. Although there is very little information about the official-level interactions, the non-governmental community has however begun to write about this. A good example is the short essay “NSG Membership: A Criteria-based Approach for Non-NPT States” by Pierre Goldschmidt for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Although the essay maintains a semblance of objectivity, the piece unfortunately reflects the prejudice prevalent in a section of the U.S. nonproliferation community. The very first paragraph opens with the cliché: ‘The nuclear policy community widely believes this [the 2008 NSG guidelines] exemption undermines the credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.’

Other non-proliferation writers cite the China-Pakistan deal for building additional reactors at the Chashma complex and Pakistan’s prevention of negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Even a novice in the field would know that Pakistan and China would have cut the deal irrespective of the India-specific exemptions. The Pakistan-China deal has been cut on the basis of some grandfatherly clause of a previous unseen agreement. Similarly, Pakistan would have found some excuse or the other to block FMCT negotiations. For example, this year, it has included U.S. support for India’s membership in multilateral export control regimes as another reason for blocking FMCT negotiations.

In fact, Pierre Goldschmidt has proposed a set of fourteen criteria for membership of the NSG for the non-NPT countries. He claims that these fourteen conditions can ‘correct the inequality created by the Indian exception’. Eleven of the criteria are part of the Indian policy while the other three look unrealistic and may not be taken seriously in India. In reality, these additional conditions are designed to constrain India. The old agenda of the anti-Indian non-proliferation lobby is being pushed through such new arguments. The argument is based on the grievance as to why India was allowed to get away so easily during the September 2008 special plenary session of the NSG. It is a case of sour grapes.

The argument in the Goldschmidt essay is to persist with the unfinished agenda of the July 2005 agreement of the anti-India non-proliferation lobby. Thus, the second criteria proposes that: “To become a full member of the NSG, a non-NPT state must…have in force a Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) with the IAEA whereby the non-NPT State undertakes to place all new nuclear facilities located outside existing military nuclear sites on the list of facilities to be safeguarded by the IAEA… .” This amounts to a reopening of the separation plan. This is unacceptable to India.

Goldschmidt’s essay claims that the India-US nuclear deal gave India some ‘guarantees’ that were not granted to other non-nuclear weapons states. Elsewhere in the essay, the author expects India to take up the obligations of other nuclear weapons states as defined by the NPT. This contradictory position dominates the article. The author, in fact, expects India to take on obligations which have not been assumed by members of the NSG. It is beyond comprehension as to why India should not have been allowed to develop nuclear weapons for its security. Has any other nuclear weapon country given this assurance to gain NSG membership?

Similarly, has the United States ratified the CTBT to retain its membership of the NSG? Did China give this undertaking before joining the NSG? When China was made a member, it was in the news for supplying nuclear and missile items to non-NPT and Non-Nuclear Weapons States. Interestingly, afterwards, not only the U.S. government but also a predominant section of the U.S. non-proliferation community went mute, Chinese proliferation was downplayed and China was declared to be an important stakeholder of the non-proliferation system. Any signature without ratification basically means nothing. So, criteria 8 and 9 are meaningless. Actually, the CTBT is a dead issue. The U.S. nonproliferation community has failed to revive the treaty. Flogging the dead horse only spreads dirt and stink. The treaty and related phenomena need a quiet burial.

To resolve the challenge posed by the NPT criteria, the best solution would be to amend the NPT and accommodate India as a nuclear weapon state. However, this does not appear likely in the near future. Pending membership of the NPT, India’s good standing with the treaty may be factored in. India, after becoming a nuclear weapons state, declared its intention to unilaterally follow articles I, III and VI of the NPT. Targeting India seems to be the only motive of this essay; the set of criteria is not relevant for Israel because it is a different case. For NSG membership, it will not modify its strategy of ambiguous nuclear weapon status. The non-proliferation community should avoid recommending any steps which would benefit a rabid proliferator like Pakistan. Continuing to do so will further undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation community.

(This article originally appeared at www.idsa.in . IDSA and USINPAC are content partners.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Managing India’s Borders: Tough Challenges

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Due to the proclivity of India’s neighbours to exploit the country’s nation-building difficulties, India’s internal security challenges are inextricably linked with border management because Indian insurgent groups have for long been provided shelter across the nation’s borders by inimical neighbours. The challenge of coping with long-standing territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, combined with porous borders along some of the most difficult terrain in the world, has made effective and efficient border management a national priority. India’s borders are manned by a large number of military, para-military and police forces, each of which has its own ethos and each of which reports to a different central ministry at New Delhi.

The national security decision makers need to deal with complex border management issues. India’s rate of growth has far outpaced that of most of its neighbours and this has generated unusual problems like mass migrations into India. The demographic map of Lower Assam, a north-eastern state, has been completely re-drawn by illegal migration from Bangladesh over several decades. The border security scenario is marked by increased cross-border terrorism; infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants; emergence of non-state actors; nexus between narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers; left-wing extremism; separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers; and, the establishment of Islamist madrasas, some of which are potential security hazards.

The operationally active nature of the Line of Control (LoC) and the need to maintain troops close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in a state of readiness for operations in high altitude areas, have compelled the army to permanently deploy large forces along the northern borders. While the BSF should be responsible for all settled borders, the responsibility for unsettled and disputed borders, such as the LoC in J&K and the LAC on the Indo-Tibetan border, should be that of the Indian Army. The principle of ‘single point control’ must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed. Divided responsibilities never result in effective control. Despite sharing the responsibility with several para-military and police forces, the army’s commitment for border management amounts to six divisions along the LAC, the LoC and the Actual ground Position Line (AGPL) in J&K and five divisions along the LAC and the Myanmar border in the eastern sector.

The deployment patterns of Central Police and Para-military Organisations (CPMFs) are marked by ad hoc decisions and knee jerk reactions to emerging threats and challenges, rather than a cohesive long-term approach that maximises the strength of each organisation. The major lacunae that exist in the border management process include the deployment of multiple forces in the same area of operations and the lack of well articulated doctrinal concepts. Also, border management is designed for a ‘fire fighting’ approach rather than a ‘fire prevention’ or pro-active approach.

A task force on Border Management led by Madhav Godbole, a former Home Secretary, was constituted by the Group of Ministers (GoM) in 2000 after the Kargil conflict. It had recommended that the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) should be designated as the primary national level counter-insurgency force. This would enable the other CPMFs like BSF and ITBP to return to their primary role of better border management. It had also recommended that all para-military forces managing unsettled borders should operate directly under the control of the army and that there should be lateral induction from the army to the para-military forces so as to enhance their operational effectiveness. These recommendations were accepted by the GoM and are being implemented in phases. Clearly much more needs to be done to make border management more effective.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

The Dragon Bares its Fangs

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China’s Increasing Defence Expenditure is a Cause for Concern

While India’s defence budget for financial year (FY) 2011-12 has remained unchanged in inflation-adjusted real terms (1,64,425 crore, US$ 36 billion), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has been given a 13 per cent increase in planned defence expenditure to US$ 91.5 billion). Though China’s official defence expenditure (ODE) is now about 1.5 per cent of its GDP, China’s GDP has been growing consistently at over 10 per cent per annum. Consequently, given its low inflation base and a strong Yuan, China’s defence expenditure has grown at over 10 per cent annually in real terms over the last decade.

Credit: Telegraph.co.ukChinese analysts invariably claim that the rather steep hike is “caused by the sharp increase in the wages, living expenses and pensions of 2.3 million People’s Liberation Army officers, civilian personnel, soldiers and army retirees.” However, other defence analysts look at the spectacular anti-satellite test successfully conducted by China in January 2007, pictures of the first Chinese aircraft carrier under construction, the acquisition of SU-30 fighter-bombers with air-to-air refuelling capability, the drive towards acquiring re-entry vehicle technology to equip China’s ICBMs with MIRVs, a growing footprint in the South China Sea and cannot not help wonder whether a 21st century arms race has well and truly begun.

China’s military aims and modernisation strategy were clearly enunciated in the Defence White Paper of December 2006. “The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationised armed forces and being capable of winning informationised wars by the mid-21st century.”

Due to China’s vigorous military modernisation drive, the military gap between India and China is growing every year. India needs to invest more in improving the logistics infrastructure along the border with Tibet, in hi-tech intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems for early warning and in generating land- and air-based firepower asymmetries to counter China’s numerical superiority. India also needs to raise and suitably equip more mountain strike divisions to carry the fight into Chinese territory if it ever becomes necessary.

All of these capabilities will require a large infusion of fresh capital. India’s growing economy can easily sustain a 0.5 to 1.0 per cent hike in the defence budget over a period of three to five years, especially if the government shows the courage to reduce wasteful subsidies.

China’s overall aim is to close the wide military gap between the PLA and the world’s leading military powers, particularly in hardware designed to provide strategic outreach capabilities. Consequently, India must enhance its investment in modernising its armed forces so that they are not found wanting in case of another conflict in the Himalayas in future, both in terms of the adequacy of force levels for carrying the conflict into Tibet and the military hardware (firepower, crew-served weapons and C4I2SR), that is necessary to fight at altitudes above 11,000 feet on the Tibetan Plateau.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India’s defense budget increase

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In the 2011 Union Budget presented yesterday in the Indian Parliament, the Finance Minister announced an 11% hike in the defense budget during the next fiscal year. India has now set the defense budget for FY 2011-12 at $36.28 billion. Forty percent of the budget would be spent on capital expenses, while the rest goes towards maintaining the Indian Army, which is one of the largest in the world.

The significant rise in defense spending could be attributed to the increasing military capabilities of India’s two immediate neighbors with whom it has fought wars previously – China and Pakistan. Over the last few years China has been rapidly expanding its defense spending, and it has grown approximately 13% annual on an average since 1989. According to some estimates, China’s defense spending in 2010 was about $100 billion. The size of its army is almost twice that of India’s and is much better equipped.

On its western border, Pakistan has been going through a rough phase of economic, political and social upheaval, while its military budget keeps increasing. Last year it increased its defense spending by 17%, partly to aid U.S. in the war on terror. This is in addition to the economic and military aid the U.S. provides Pakistan for the same purpose. Over the last few weeks there have also been news of a rapid increases in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, with it set to overtake Britain as the fifth largest nuclear power. Pakistan is building its fourth plutonium reactor and has more than 100 deployed nuclear weapons. Not to mention that the Pakistan Army and the ISI policies have traditionally been India-centric, with a majority of the forces deployed along the Indian border.

Under such external circumstances and the need to upgrade and procure equipments and machinery, the Indian defense spending increase seems well placed. India has a few procurement deals lined up for the year, but it would need to do a lot more to match up to China’s standards. As its primary competitor not only economically, but also for geopolitical influence particularly in East Asia and Africa, India needs to speed up and match up its defense capabilities with those of China. A strong military would be essential to counter any potential threats from an unstable AfPak region.

Circumstantially as important as it may be, the increases in defense spending of all the three countries contribute to the arms race in the region taking it to the edge of volatility. While it would not be prudent to expect a decrease in expenditures or an end to military procurements and upgrades, the three countries need to make concentrated efforts to reduce the need for the increase in military spending.