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Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

BRICS – India is the biggest loser

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Guest post by Sumantra Maitra

Among other interminable dross that were churned in the recently concluded 5th annual BRICS summit in South Africa, was the idea of a Development bank, by the five ever-rising economic powers. Although the details are vague, like any other diplomatic summit declaration trying to obfuscate the deep fissures within this coalition of unequals, the fact that India agreed to this disaster in the making is a new low in the foreign policy of a country, which is not much known for rational and realistic choices. The idea behind the development bank is indeed noble, “to address…the infrastructure gap in developing countries…”, especially in Africa. But the intention to make it successful or meaningful or the national interest of each member of the coalition is not clear. One thing, which is however clear, is Indian ambivalent skepticism about bandwagoning with any power simultaneously coupled with the Nehruvian idea of being a “messiah of the mass” and trying to be a leader of the third world, which reflects the mindset of Indian bureaucracy and ruling elite, is increasingly drawing India into a dilemma.

The BRIC leaders

The BRICS is not an alliance. It is an arbitrarily formed group, mentioned in passing by an ex-banker, which was so captivating to the ruling elite of the grouped nations that they thought of formalizing it in an institution. Initially starting as rising economies, a perceivable counter balance to the G-8, these economies are no longer rising, with deep structural and institutional flaws, different modes of governance, deteriorating law and order situation and freedom of expression and censorship issues, different economic fundamentals and most importantly, absolutely different and divergent world view and interest. Joshua Keating pointed out why the BRICS couldn’t be more different than each other. The last addition to this coalition, South Africa, is the messiest of them all. The selection of South Africa is ofcourse controversial and political, regarded often as a quota position from the African continent, as it leaves out far more competent and growing economies like Indonesia, Turkey and South Korea. This comes when BRICS are accused of neo-imperialism, and banners like “don’t carve out Africa” were found everywhere near the summit in Durban.

It is well known, that the primary drivers behind the ideation in the BRICS are Russia and China. Russia wants to bandwagon with China to balance the influence of United States. The motivation and Great power nostalgia of Russian elite is simple enough to fathom. The Chinese interest is however far more complex. As a growing hegemon, China actually has interest in Africa, both geo-politically and economically. The resources of Africa are mostly still unexplored, and the market potential of cheap Chinese manufactured goods is enormous. This however comes at a time, when China is increasingly viewed with suspicion in Africa. The last couple of years have seen the murder of Chinese engineers by disgruntled and exploited African labourers, incessant strikes in Chinese operated industries and mines, and the now infamous op-ed by Lamido Sanusi, the governor of Central Bank of Nigeria, where he accused China of having neo-colonial ambitions. China now wants to portray itself as a benevolent and altruistic force, and therefore wanted to soothe Africa under the BRICS front. India, for all its independent and non-aligned foreign policy, is legitimizing Chinese actions.

It is puzzling to fathom why India is following Chinese and Russian lead. For a start, Russia is not what it used to be. It clearly views China as a far superior partner than India, and a market for superior weapons and technology, ironically at the same time when India received massive aid grant from Japan. India and China are not really partners, and as I wrote here before, will probably not be in the near foreseeable future. Nor is Indian business interest in Africa that important, scalable or maintainable. For example, assuming that India invests in some African country under the BRICS development bank, tomorrow if there is some kind of unrest, is India capable or willing to defend its business interest? India never showed any willingness to aggressively promote or defend its business interests, be it Afghanistan, Maldives, or South China Sea, and there is no reason to believe India would do that in Africa. India also lacks such far off power projection capability. Which brings us to question the wisdom; do the benefits of Indian investment in Africa outweigh the cost? What is the incentive of pledging tens of billions of dollars, all Indian taxpayers’ money, in a region which is beset by uncertainty, instability and conflict, or starting a monetary organization, potentially rival to IMF/World Bank which will not be of any direct benefit to the already slowing economy and growth rate?

On the other hand, India will eventually be viewed as just another neo-colonial resource grabbing power like China, if it continues to be with the BRICS. The respect that India enjoyed in Africa, and the goodwill as a potential democratic competitor of China will fade away, with India just being a satellite of Chinese ambitions, a satisfied mid level power in an institution guided by Russian and Chinese geo-political interests. Nor is Indian interest, in the BRICS assisted conflict resolution in Central African Republic understandable. Again, the question is geo-political, what IS India’s interest? Tomorrow if Russia leads the BRICS into conflict resolution in Syria, will India be willing to commit its resources?

As this Economist essay explains, India is utterly confused about its growing clout and new found respect as a rising power, lacks a political will, strategic culture, a status-quo bureaucracy, and timely and fast decision making infrastructure. Added to that is the notorious ambivalence towards aligning with the West, even though being perfectly aware that in the great scheme of the game, China stands as the largest potential rival. This ambivalence and skepticism stems from the utterly discredited NAM mentality which is still somehow widely followed among the Indian foreign policy circles, and the moral, altruistic, socialist Nehruvian world view, without any long term planning or Realist Raison D’etat. With the BRICS now attracting countries like Egypt, a slow and painful repetition of the outdated Indian NAM policies are in the process. Everyone knows how NAM turned out. One can only hope that India’s policymakers realize soon where her interests lie.

(Sumantra Maitra is a freelance journalist from India and a tutor of New Zealand Foreign Policy and Theories of International Relations, at the University of Otago, New Zealand. You can follow him on twitter @dailyworldwatch.)

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Placing India on the Global Front

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Guest blog by Madhu Nair

Over the past two decades India’s stand on foreign affairs has undergone a sea change. Its view of the world and itself, as well as the world’s perception of India has undergone profound changes. From a country that was rather conservative in foreign matters to the present one that is actively engaging itself with world powers – it is a welcome change. The changing dynamics in geopolitics and the fluctuating economic condition has made sure that India makes the necessary correction in its foreign code to prepare itself better for the future. For years, India has tried to maintain a balance when it came to managing relations with external powers. Be it the unstable neighbors, the unreliable west or the fluctuating middle-east, India has been managing them with good care.

Dealing with international relations is a tricky affair. Any let up could scumble India’s image as an international player thereby causing harm to its political and economic interests. According to Dr. C. Raja Mohan, a leading foreign policy analyst, there are five challenges that the nation faces in the near future. These include:

•    The creation of an area of peace and prosperity in the South-Asian Subcontinent
•    The construction of a stable architecture for peace and cooperation in Asia
•    The peaceful management of Asia’s maritime commons
•    A new internationalism that will be shaped by a deepening integration with the global economy and an effective contribution to the management of global problems
•    A clear line between celebrating its own democratic values and imposing them on others.

To meet these challenges India’s foreign policy needs a pragmatic approach with dedicated efforts from all quarters of the establishment; the polity, the bureaucracy and subject matter experts. The credit to the positive change in the last few decades may well go to dynamic foreign affairs officials whose sole objective was to place India on the global map.

The first name that crops up in the list of illustrious diplomats the country has seen is that of Late Ambassador Bimal Sanyal. Mr. Sanyal is remembered as one of the most sincere and hardworking diplomat who pioneered many firsts in the service. He was the very first Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs exclusively entrusted with ‘Economic Relations’ as a tool of diplomacy which has since become a mantra for India’s modern day diplomacy. The Association of Indian Diplomats awards The Ambassador Bimal Sanyal Memorial Medals to outstanding officers each year. It awards a Gold medal for the Best IFS Officer trainee each year and a Silver medal for the Best dissertation.

The architect of India’s modern foreign policy, Brajesh Mishra is undoubtedly the next in line. Principal Secretary to former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Mishra was also the first National Security Advisor. Known for his tough stand on various issues and his ability to make things work, Mishra built a good rapport with officials, ministers and diplomats alike. A troubleshooter in many ways, his sole motive was to make India’s position known on a myriad of issues. Mishra’s death leaves behind a legacy that has become a cornerstone for many aspiring and serving officers of the time.

Shiv Shankar Menon, India’s present National Security Advisor is yet another torchbearer of India’s interest on the international platform. Menon was instrumental in shaping the Indo-US nuclear deal which remains a milestone in US-India relations. Coming from a family of diplomats, Menon has helped India come out of the age-old nonalignment concept which has brought India closer to the West.

The year 2012 has rather been regretful for India. The arrest of the Italian marines and the following controversy has cast a shadow on India-Italy relations. Norway’s displeasure on the cancellation of 2G licenses to Uninor, a telecom joint venture by Telenor and Unitech India, has put the relations under strain. Perhaps the only silver lining for this year, the FDI in retail, too has come under tremendous pressure from opposition parties and is giving the government sleepless nights. With the 2014 elections coming close, the year 2013 will play the decider in which way the tide moves.

India’s foreign policies must be framed around how the world stands and not what it feels it should be; a problem that still plagues the country’s leadership. Though it has come a long way from being unrealistic, India still needs to make concentrated efforts to make itself relevant on the global stage. Much of it again will depend on the men who manage India’s foreign affairs.

Disclaimer: All views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of USINPAC.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog, India-US Relations Blog

A Rocky Road Ahead

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Since the United States has announced its intentions to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by 2014, leaders in the White House have been looking toward India as an ally in facing the coming strategic and military challenges in the region. For the U.S., the choice of India is an obvious one. Its growing geopolitical presence and commitment to democracy is a strong force among unstable countries, and deep economic ties with Afghanistan (last year, India gave Afghanistan almost $2 billion a year alone in economic and development aid!) all make India a prime candidate to manage postwar reconstruction. Yet what has been heralded as “a full-blown strategic partnership” in shepherding the region’s development is drastically falling short.

On one side is the growing diplomatic tension between the U.S. and India, which has forestalled bilateral commercial trades and sharply highlighted differences in priorities. To be clear, the U.S. and India have dramatically improved their relationship following the Cold War, when the U.S. sided with India’s rival, Pakistan, and India maintained economic and military relations with the Soviet Union. Since then, economic interests were better aligned, as bilateral trade has reached almost $100 billion just last year alone. Still, India is defiantly opposed to complying with U.S. demands if they were to compromise its own economic interests. In Iran, for example, the U.S. has called for sanctions against Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities, and has asked India to cease its commercial transactions with the country. But India views things differently, stating that oil and natural gas purchase from Tehran are vital to its economy. Moreover, Indian diplomats assert that it is “in India’s interest to maintain good ties with Iran, with whom it shares deep historical, cultural and religious connections.” They also believe that purchasing Iranian oil will “strengthen ties with Iran as a hedge against an uncertain future in Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal,”, and are thus reluctant to rebuke Iran’s nuclear purchases.

Differences in priorities in China are also a source of contention between Indian and U.S. lawmakers. The U.S. has made strides in containing what it perceives to be a geopolitical threat by China, due to its growing military strength and influence in Asia. Indeed, leaders in Beijing have even suspected that the U.S. is attempting to partner with India in containing China, claims that the U.S. staunchly denies. But India is not interested in upsetting China and has worked very hard in cooperating in areas of mutual interest and opportunity and believes than an alliance with the U.S. will fracture that relationship.

Finally, currency problems in India are hampering its ability to provide stable finances for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. High interest rates have destabilized India’s investment climate, forcing it to focus inward and shrink expenditures.

The future of the U.S.-India relationship will depend heavily on who wins this November. The Democratic Party will likely continue on its current trajectory, gently pushing India to open its markets for investment and to align with the U.S. The Republican Party’s foreign policy is traditionally more aggressive, and will probably reiterate demands for Indian liberalization and compliance with Iran sanctions.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Blood Feud in Islamabad Complicates U.S.-Pakistan Relations

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A long summer of political turmoil has begun that makes harder the search for a new equilibrium with Washington

A tale of two capital cities in the grip of political uncertainty unfolded in South Asia last week.   Islamabad was the scene of a fast-paced soap opera that throws into further doubt the future of the democratization process and complicates efforts to repair the breakdown of U.S.-Pakistan relations.  Meanwhile in New Delhi, simmering tensions within the coalition government erupted into open revolt, further constraining decision-making at a time when the United States in seeking to draw closer strategically.

This post will focus on the Pakistani case, the more acute of the two; a subsequent post will deal with the political tussles in India, which might ultimately prove to be cathartic.

Pakistan has long been marred by political ructions that have more to do with clashing personalities than principled disputes.  The country’s trajectory might well be materially different absent the blood feud between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s.  Likewise the on-going vendetta between Sharif and Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan’s current president and Bhutto’s widower, is impeding progress on critical national problems as well as tarnishing the very concept of democratic governance.

Yet even against this background, last week’s events were extraordinary.  Striking, too, was how, with the country once again earning a top place in the roster of failed states, Pakistan could reliably be counted on to give credence to that dubious billing.   This time Zardari and Iftikhar Chaudhry, the Supreme Court’s chief justice, were the ones spewing bad blood, in the process upending a tenuous measure of political stability that had recently emerged in Islamabad.

Since its installation in March 2008, Zardari’s government has been in a running struggle with the powerful military establishment and an assertive judiciary.  These ructions have given rise to persistent fears of yet another army coup – as recently as earlier this year – as well as accusations that the Supreme Court is acting in cahoots with the military to undermine Zardari and his prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani.  Against heavy odds, however, the two somehow managed to limp along.  Last month Gilani became the country’s longest-serving prime minister, a signal accomplishment in view of how many of his predecessors have been hanged, exiled and otherwise forcibly evicted from office.  And while his administration was highly unpopular and hardly a model of competence, it was well on its way to becoming the country’s first democratically-elected government to serve out its allotted five-year term.

Yet this past week, the Supreme Court suddenly sent Gilani packing on the grounds that his contempt-of-court conviction in April disqualified him from holding office and serving in parliament.  The conviction stemmed from Gilani’s defiance of the court’s order to reactivate a dormant money-laundering case brought by the Swiss government against Bhutto and Zardari.  Chaudhry’s focus on the case strikes many observers as overzealous, given Swiss reluctance to re-open the investigation, the constitutional immunity Zardari enjoys as president, and the long record of Islamabad power brokers using corruption allegations to harass political opponents.

Chaudhry justified Gilani’s removal as demonstrating the rule of law in a country where governmental malfeasance is endemic.  Some commentators view the action as part of the institutional skirmishes that can be expected in Pakistan’s halting democratic transformation and note that Chaudhry also has turned his attention on abuses perpetuated by the security establishment.  An activist Supreme Court that sees itself as a guardian of the public integrity has likewise emerged in neighboring India.

But Gilani’s dismissal appears to be less about the advancement of constitutional concepts than the settling of personal scores.  The chief justice, a hero of the popular movement that forced Pervez Musharraf into exile, is reportedly indignant that Zardari refused, until forced to bow to public pressure, to reinstate him to the bench after Musharraf sacked him at the start of the state of emergency that was declared in November 2007.  Once returned to the court, Chaudhry promptly struck back by invalidating a general amnesty that Musharraf had forged with Bhutto and Zardari, thereby opening Zardari to criminal prosecution once he leaves the presidency.

The rationale and timing of Gilani’s ouster also seems suspect.  Since parliament is the only body empowered to dismiss a prime minister, many observers (here and here) describe it as a sort of judicial coup.  Moreover, when the Supreme Court first convicted Gilani on contempt charges, it seemed content to limit itself to the highly symbolic sentence it meted out – detention amounting to mere seconds.  Its abrupt ruling last week has led some to conclude that it was a diversion meant to deflect attention away from bribe-taking accusations against Chaudhry’s own son, which Zardari’s camp may be orchestrating.

Gilani’s removal proved to be the opening act of a chaotic week.  Zardari quickly settled on Makhdoom Shahabuddin as a replacement, only to have a court issue an arrest warrant for the man.  The warrant has to do with Shahabuddin’s alleged involvement in a drug importation scandal while he was serving as health minister.  Significantly, the court acted upon the request of an anti-narcotics body run by the military.  Gilani’s son is also implicated in the matter and a warrant was similarly issued for his detention.

Zardari’s second choice, Raja Pervez Ashraf, easily won parliamentary approval by week’s end but he, too, has had run-ins with the judiciary.  The Supreme Court earlier ended his stint as the federal minister in charge of power production when it found that a program he oversaw to spur private generation of electricity was riddled with graft.  Ruling that he is “liable both for civil and criminal action,” the court has instructed the National Accountability Bureau, an anti-corruption agency, to open an inquiry.

Given Chaudhry’s doggedness on the matter, Ashraf is unlikely to be left off the hook regarding Zardari’s corruption case, opening up the possibility that he, too, could be removed from office in short order.  And another opportunity to nettle the president will arrive in the coming days as the Supreme Court moves forward on the bizarre Memogate affair.  A judicial commission earlier this month concluded that Zardari confidante Husain Haqqani was guilty of disloyalty to the nation during his recent stint as Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington.  The finding opens Haqqani open to possible treason charges and has become another political headache for the beleaguered Zardari.

As argued in a previous post, the rising tumult of domestic politics is exacerbating the strains in U.S.-Pakistan relations and complicating efforts to resolve the seven month-long blockade of NATO supply lines into Afghanistan that is costing Washington a $100 million a month as cargo is shipped via more expensive routes in Central Asia.  A quick end of the dispute is very much in Islamabad’s interests and on several occasions appeared to be within reach.  The thread-bare public treasury – not to mention the Pakistani army’s vast business empire – is in desperate need of revenue that would come from increased transit fees as well as the $3.5 billion in military and economic assistance that the Obama administration has requested for the upcoming fiscal year.  Moreover, the country will soon be forced to turn once again to the International Monetary Fund for a financial lifeline, a move that will require Washington’s sufferance.

Given Islamabad’s record of turning over Al Qaeda figures as a means of buying American good will, last week’s announcement of the capture of a militant thought to be in charge of some of the terror network’s international operations may be a further signal that the security establishment wants to mend ties with Washington.

Yet events of the past week herald the beginning of a long summer of political turmoil in Islamabad that makes harder the search for a new equilibrium in U.S.-Pakistan relations.  Don’t be surprised if the resulting exasperation in Washington results in renewed calls for unilateral military action on Pakistani soil, for further reductions in U.S. aid levels, and an for overall approach of “congagement” or “benign neglect” toward Islamabad.

This commentary was originally posted on Chanakya’s Notebook.   I invite you to follow me on Twitter.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Time to Cool the Rhetoric on Pakistan

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However justified, the public berating of Islamabad has become counterproductive

The comments made by Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta during his swing through South Asia last week once again raise the question of how coordinated the Obama administration’s regional policy is.  An earlier post flagged this issue two months ago by noting the curious timing of Washington’s decision to offer a large bounty for the arrest or capture of Hafiz Muhammed Saeed, a major jihadi leader allowed to live in plain sight in Pakistan.

True, the decision was overdue and eminently warranted, as Saeed is a man who for too long has escaped the dispensation of justice.  But it was announced in a way sure to rub Islamabad’s already inflamed sensibilities, just as Washington began an effort to salvage collapsing relations with Pakistan.  It was unveiled during a visit to New Delhi by Wendy Sherman, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who no doubt wanted to address complaints that the administration was letting Pakistan slide on the issue of anti-Indian terrorism.  But as it was issued on the eve of Deputy Secretary of State Thomas R. Nides’ arrival in Islamabad, the open reminder about their perfidy was a strange way to commence a trip aimed at making nice with Pakistani leaders.

Panetta’s words were similarly understandable but also counterproductive.  While in New Delhi he took a gratuitous swipe at Pakistani officials by publicly joking about the necessity of keeping them in the dark about the U.S. commando mission that killed Osama bin Laden – “They did not know about our operation.  That was the whole point.”  And in Kabul, he lashed out by warning Islamabad that U.S. leaders are reaching “the limits of our patience” regarding the sheltering of Afghan insurgents in the tribal areas.  The rebukes also follow the conspicuous snubbing of President Asif Ali Zardari at the NATO summit in Chicago last month.

To be sure, Panetta’s criticisms are entirely right on the merits.  Evidence of Pakistani treachery is in ample supply and has become the standard by which duplicity among allies will henceforth be measured.  The Abbottabad raid would have ended futilely, and most likely fatally for American forces, were the generals in Rawalpindi brought into U.S. confidence.  Likewise, Pakistan has played an egregious double game in Afghanistan, serving as the toll road for provisions destined for the same U.S. troops being killed and maimed by jihadi militants it enables.  And Panetta’s scolding only echoes the uncharacteristically blunt charges leveled last September by Admiral Mile Mullen, the immediate past chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who more than anyone else in Washington tried to establish a personal rapport with the Pakistani military leaders.

Yet the public smackdowns also undercut important U.S. interests.  A senior Pakistani military leader is quoted in the Washington Post as saying that he views the pointed joke in New Delhi as “an intended insult” and that “It is not the exclusive domain of the United States to lose its patience.”  The Los Angeles Times reports that the reprimands were so ill-received in Pakistan that they derailed a nearly-complete agreement to reopen key NATO supply lines into Afghanistan that Islamabad shut down after an U.S. airstrike killed 26 Pakistani soldiers near the Afghan border last November.

The closure is costing the United States some $100 million a month as cargo is shipped via more expensive routes through Central Asia.  In recent months, Islamabad has publicly insisted on a sharp increase in transit fees and a fulsome apology for the border incident in exchange for restarting the supply lines.  But according to the Times, Pakistani officials in private had in the last few weeks begun to back away from their public calls and many in Washington thought that a transit deal was within sight.  Now, following Panetta’s criticisms, Islamabad is back to demanding a full public apology.  The upbraiding might also have thrown a spanner in the exploratory talks that U.S. and Pakistani officials have held on a new counterterrorism partnership.

More broadly, the harsh rhetoric does not help the fragile democratization process within Pakistan.  A quick resolution of the transit dispute is very much in Islamabad’s interests.  The thread-bare public treasury –not to mention the Pakistani army’s vast business empire – is in desperate need of revenue that would come from increased transit fees as well as the $3.5 billion in military and economic assistance that the Obama administration has requested for the upcoming fiscal year.  Moreover, the country will soon be forced to turn once again to the International Monetary Fund for a financial lifeline, a move that will require Washington’s assent.

But U.S. officials also need to reckon with the new complexity of Pakistan’s domestic politics.  Gone are the times when a military autocrat could simply order up strategic cooperation with Washington, as Pervez Musharraf did at the outset of the U.S. war on terrorism.  Nowadays, Zardari’s elected government must contend with volatile public opinion that is incensed with perceived U.S. affronts to the country’s sovereignty and honor.  It also does not help that many Pakistanis see Zardari as an American patsy, a contention that his chief political rival, Nawaz Sharif, has seized upon with an alacrity that is matched only by its hypocrisy.

This week’s finding by a judicial commission that Husain Haqqani, Zardari’s first ambassador in Washington, is guilty of disloyalty to the nation provides Sharif with another drum to beat.  So Zardari has very narrow space to maneuver, especially as parliamentary elections approach, perhaps as early as this fall.  Sherry Rehman, the current Pakistani envoy in Washington, rightly notes that Panetta’s blunt rhetoric “leaves little oxygen” to those in Islamabad who seek a better relationship with the United States.

In between his broadsides last week, Panetta also said something that should be borne in mind by every Washington policymaker tempted to express his frustrations and indignations in the open:

It’s a complicated relationship, often times frustrating, often times difficult…. But the United States cannot just walk away from that relationship.  We have to continue to do what we can to try to improve (the) areas where we can find some mutual cooperation.

There is surely a place for tough talk in U.S.-Pakistan relations but these days it’s best kept behind closed doors.

This commentary was originally posted on Chanakya’s Notebook.   I invite you to follow me on Twitter.