Tag Archives: India

Immigration Blog

Small House Bill on Per Country Limits Could Mean Big Changes

Leave a comment

Out of the more than 300 million people residing in the United States, it is likely fewer than 1 percent realize highly skilled foreign nationals endure long waits for green cards. On the other hand, those aware of the long waits likely are personally affected, either because they or a family member are the ones waiting. For those waiting the longest for green cards, on a scale of 1 to 10 the issue is an off the charts “50.”

Sponsored by Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-UT), HR 3012, “The Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act,” is a small bill by any standards. In recent years, various bills to change U.S. health care or immigration policy have reached lengths of 500 to 1,000 pages. In contrast, H.R. 3012 is barely 6 pages in length. Yet since it may have a legitimate chance of becoming law, it could have a bigger impact on people’s lives than bills 100 times greater in length. (A copy of H.R. 3012 can be found here.)

What Would the Bill Do?

After a transition lasting three years, HR 3012 would eliminate the per country limit for employment-based immigrants. Under the law, employment-based immigration is limited annually to 140,000. In addition, per country caps generally limit the number of employment-based immigrants to 7 percent of the total (except if immigrant visas would otherwise go unused). Because of their large populations, India and China are most negatively affected by these limits. As a result, highly educated Indian and Chinese nationals wait longer for employment-based green cards than their peers from other countries.

Under H.R. 3012, in fiscal years 2012, 2013 and 2014, no more than 85 percent of employment-based immigrant visas could go to nationals of one country. That was designed to prevent Indian nationals, who as a group have been waiting the longest, from potentially using up all the employment-based green cards. Still, Indian and Chinese nationals will be the greatest beneficiaries of the legislation.

The legislation would also increase the per country limit for family-sponsored immigrants to 15 percent (from the current 7 percent). That will primarily benefit nationals from Mexico and the Philippines, many waiting more than a decade in the sibling and adult children categories.

Likely Impact

The bill is likely to shorten the wait times for Indians and Chinese in both the employment-based second preference (EB-2) and employment-based third preference (EB-3). A recent analysis by the National Foundation for American Policy (found here) concluded: “A key part of any solution to reducing wait times is to eliminate the per country limit for employment-based immigrants . . . Eliminating the per country limit would reduce the typical wait for Indians applying today in the EB-3 category from 70 to 12 years. While 12 years is still too long, it would be a welcome reform that would provide green cards for Indian and Chinese professionals waiting the longest in the EB-3 and EB-2 (employment second preference) categories and equalize the wait times in the EB-2 category at about two to three years without regard to country of origin (as opposed to potential waits of 6 years or more for Chinese and Indian nationals in the EB-2 category).”

The House Markup

For a bill to move forward in the legislative process it usually must be “marked up” in committee. In an October 27, 2011 House Judiciary Committee mark-up, H.R. 3012 passed by a voice vote. (That means it had sufficient support that no registered vote was deemed necessary.) Some amendments were ruled out of order and no significant amendments passed to change the core of the bill. The full transcript of the House markup can be found here.

Next Steps

The next step for the legislation is to be voted on by the entire House of Representatives. If the bill passes the House, it would then go to the US Senate. If H.R. 3012 passes the Senate, it would be the first bill to improve high-skill immigration to pass Congress in several years.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Pakistan’s Intransigence over Prosecution of Perpetrators of the Mumbai Terror Strikes is Hampering Rapprochement

7 Comments

Three years ago, on November 26, 2008, ten Lashkar-e-Tayebba terrorists, trained, equipped, sponsored and directed by Pakistan’s ISI, landed by boat at Mumbai and carried out audacious strikes on four iconic targets before nine of them were eliminated by Indian security forces. Ajmal Kasab, the lone survivor, was tried by a Special Court and has been sentenced to death. Despite the voluminous evidence provided to Pakistan about the perpetrators and the planners of the diabolical strikes by India, and corroborated by independent investigations conducted by the United States and Israel, the Pakistan government has failed to act against any of them.

Writing in the Hindu last week, Praveen Swami stated, “Sajid Mir, Lashkar commander who crafted the assault plan, has been reported by both the United States and India’s intelligence services as operating out of his family home near the Garrison Club in Lahore; Pakistan’s Federal Investigations Agency hasn’t yet got around to paying him a visit. Muzammil Bhat, who trained the assault team, is claimed by Pakistan to be a fugitive, though two journalists who went looking for the terror commander in Muzaffarabad located him without great effort. Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, sole senior Lashkar operative held for his alleged role in the attacks, has continued to communicate with his organisation from prison. Pakistan hasn’t, tellingly, even sought to question David Headley, Pakistani-American jihadist who has provided the investigators with a detailed insider account of the attacks — including the role of the Inter-Services Intelligence in directing them.”

Pakistan’s intransigence in bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror strikes to justice does not augur well for the recently resumed Composite Dialogue Process. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has stated that he will travel to Pakistan only after the terrorists who attacked Mumbai are convicted by Pakistani courts. Even Hillary Clinton, the U.S. secretary of State has expressed her reservations about the Pakistan government’s “continuing failure, in our view, to fulfil all of the requirements necessary for prosecution related to the Mumbai attacks.” Unless Pakistan makes serious efforts to prosecute the terrorists and their handlers, the gains in the relationship made recently due to the announcement of MFN status by Pakistan and the proposed liberalisation of the Visa regime will lose value.

Within India too the follow up action to prevent another Mumbai-type terror strike has left much to be desired. The government had launched five major initiatives to shore up counter-terrorism capabilities. The first of these was to decentralise the deployment of the National Security Guards (NSG) – the agency that had eliminated the terrorists holed up in two hotels and the Jewish centre at Mumbai – to the major metropolitan centres besides Delhi so as to reduce the time taken to react against a terrorist strike. This has been done though the NSG commandos continue to face accommodation problems. The government has set up the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for post-incident investigation of major terrorist strikes. Unlike the U.S. FBI, the NIA lacks a counter-terrorism punch and cannot, therefore, assist in the prevention of terrorist strikes. It is to be hoped that the NIA will not be politicised like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CB).

While some efforts have been made to enhance coastal security, these efforts have fallen much short of the desired capabilities and India’s long coastline remains vulnerable to attacks from the sea. This was demonstrated with telling effect when an abandoned ship drifted all the way across the Arabian Sea to beach on the Mumbai coast without being detected by either the Indian Navy or the Coast Guard or the Marine Police.

Intelligence gathering, analysis, assessment and dissemination still need to be improved by an order of magnitude. The functioning of the existing Multi-agency Centre (MAC) has been streamlined but Home Minister P Chidambaram’s initiatives to establish a National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC) to coordinate all counter-terrorism efforts and a National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) database to maintain widely shared records of all terrorism-related intelligence and activities, are still to see the light of day because of Centre-State issues and inter-ministerial turf battles.

Clearly, India’s counter-terrorism responses continue to resemble a lumbering elephant, rather than a tiger ready to pounce.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India-Myanmar Strategic Cooperation

Leave a comment

The winds of change are blowing across Myanmar. Elections of a sort have been held and Ms Aung San Suu Kyi has been released. President Thein Sein recently invited her for direct talks, with which she expressed satisfaction. The international community is gradually opening up to the country and speculation is rife that sanctions may soon be lifted.

India’s relations with Myanmar, a devoutly Buddhist country, have been traditionally close and friendly. Geographically, India and Myanmar share a long land and maritime boundary, including in the area of the strategically important Andaman and Nicobar islands where the two closest Indian and Myanmarese islands are barely 30 km apart. Myanmarese ports provide India the shortest approach route to several of India’s north-eastern states.

India’s national interest lies in a strong and stable Myanmar that observes strict neutrality between India and China and cooperates with India in the common fight against the insurgencies raging in the border areas of both the countries. For India, Myanmar is a bridge between all the countries comprising the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC – Myanmar has observer status) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). External Affairs Minister S M Krishna visited Myanmar in June 2011 to further cement the growing relationship.

The key drivers of the India-Myanmar strategic relationship are cooperation in counter-insurgency operations and the need for India to ensure that Myanmar is not driven into Chinese arms through Indian neglect of its security concerns and arms requirements. Indian insurgent groups (NSCN, ULFA and Manipur rebels among others) have been operating out of bases in the weakly controlled areas across the borders of the Indian states of Manipur and Mizoram and Myanmarese rebels, primarily the Chins and the Arakanese, have often taken shelter on the Indian side. It is in the interest of both the countries to cooperate with each other to fight these insurgent groups in a coordinated manner. The two armies have been cooperating with each other for mutual benefit. India-Myanmar cooperation is also essential to control narcotics trafficking and to curb the proliferation of small arms in the region.

China has made rapid advances into Myanmar and established close political, military and economic relations. Myanmar provides China the shortest land route access to the northern Indian Ocean. China is engaged in exploiting Myanmar’s oil and gas reserves, is building a 1,100 km overland pipeline from Kyaukryu port in Myanmar to the border city of Ruili in Yunnan and is developing Sittwe as a commercial port on Myanmar’s west coast. It is natural that Chinese naval activity in the Bay of Bengal will soon follow. China has also been stepping up arms sales to Myanmar as other nations, including India, are loathe to sell offensive military hardware to the country.

While India is concerned with the slow pace of progress on the issue of national reconciliation and the consequent delay in installing a democratically elected government in power in Yangon, the strategic scenario compels India to balance its security concerns with its support for the emergence of democratic rule. It is only through close engagement that India can promote leverages with the ruling regime to nudge it gently towards national reconciliation. India must also increase its economic footprint in Myanmar, particularly in areas that are contiguous to India.

India and the other regional powers can play a positive role in the re-entry of Myanmar into the international mainstream so that it can be nudged towards becoming a strong and stable democracy that is also mature and responsible and willing to play by the rules and traditions governing international relations. Perhaps multi-national talks, which include India, China, Japan, ASEAN and other stakeholders, would be the best way forward. At least in the initial stages it may be prudent for the U.S. to stay away from such talks.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Troubles increase for the US-Pak relationship

1 Comment

The post-Osama phase of the US-Pakistan relationship is proving to be extremely turbulent. The swift U.S. reaction to the attack on its embassy in Kabul and the killing of the chief Afghan government negotiator, former president Rabbani, led to an equally strong backlash from the Pakistani establishment.

www.mca-marines.orgIn a scathing indictment of the Pakistan security establishment, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “…the Quetta Shoora and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity. Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers. For example, we believe the Haqqani Network – which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency – is responsible for the September 13th attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.”

“We strongly reject assertions of complicity with the Haqqanis or of proxy war,” Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said. “The allegations betray confusion and policy disarray within the U.S. establishment on the way forward in Afghanistan.” General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff dismissed the charge as “very unfortunate and not based on facts.” Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan’s foreign minister, warned that Washington “could lose an ally” if it keeps humiliating Pakistan with unsubstantiated allegations.

The international community has known for long that the Pakistan army and the ISI follow a Janus-faced policy on Afghanistan. While pretending to be allies in the ‘war on terror’, they are careful to target only those terrorist organisations that strike within Pakistan, like the TTP and the TNSM, and nurture and support the Afghan Taliban and their sympathisers. In February 2009, David Sanger, New York Times correspondent, had written in his new book The Inheritance that in a transcript passed to Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence in May 2008, General Kayani was overheard referring to Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani as “a strategic asset”. This had led to the first few armed UAV strikes against the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan inside Pakistan’s FATA province.

While U.S. frustration with Pakistani duplicity is understandable, the U.S. still has 98,000 troops in Afghanistan and is still dependent on the two land routes through Peshawar and Quetta for the logistics sustenance of its own and other NATO-ISAF forces. Though it could step up armed UAV strikes and even launch air strikes into North Waziristan, it does not have the capability to launch follow-on air assault strikes. Also, ground strikes will surely lead to war with Pakistan and war, with all its nuclear overtones, is not in anybody’s interest.

What the U.S. can do is to carefully calibrate the aid being given to Pakistan and make the government and the army accountable for cooperation in the war on terror. The Pakistan army and the ISI must not be allowed to get away with impunity for their support to terrorist organisations operating against the US and NATO-ISAF forces as well as in India. It should also consider rescinding its alliance with Pakistan when the bulk of troops are drawn down by 2014. As Stephen Cohen has put it so eloquently, “India is a friend, but not an ally; and, Pakistan is an ally, but not a friend.”

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

The Continuing Proxy War in Kashmir

1 Comment

The situation in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) continues to remain a cause for concern to the government of India. Since end-1989, Pakistan has been waging a ‘proxy war’ against India in J&K. It has done this by aiding and abetting disaffected and misguided Kashmiri youth to rise against the Indian state. Despite the cease-fire on the Line of Control (LoC) since November 2003 and the tenuous rapprochement process, Pakistan continues to surreptitiously practice its peculiar brand of state-sponsored terrorism. This is borne out by the continuing attempts at infiltration in Kashmir during the summer of 2011.

Till some years ago, Pakistan’s official position was that it provides only ‘diplomatic, political and moral’ support to ‘freedom fighters’. However, it is now internationally accepted that the Pakistan army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate have been providing military training, weapons, military equipment, ammunition and explosives to the terrorists, besides financial support. The ISI spends approximately Rs 5 to 10 crore (USD 1 to 2 million) per month on its proxy war campaign. Till the present cease-fire came into effect, the Pakistan army actively supported terrorist bids to infiltrate into J&K by engaging Indian posts along the routes of infiltration with artillery and small arms fire.  Though infiltration has now been reduced due to effective counter-infiltration measures by the Indian army, even the present low levels would not be possible but for the encouragement and steady support being given to the Jihadi extremists by the Pakistan army.

Throughout the prolonged period of Pakistan’s proxy war, India has shown tremendous restraint and immense tolerance in the face of grave provocation to its security. It is inconceivable that any other nation would have acted with the sense of responsibility that India has in not launching trans-LoC operations to eliminate militant training camps and interdict known routes of infiltration. Many Indian analysts have been advocating a pro-active trans-LoC and trans-border counter-proxy war policy.

Former RAW analyst B. Raman has written: “The main reason why India has not yet been able to effectively put an end to Jihadi terrorism against it and its civilian population sponsored by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is because India’s counter-terrorism operations are directed only against the terrorists operating in its territory. They are not yet directed against the State sponsoring them despite a persistent demand from growing sections of the Indian population for targeting the State of Pakistan too.”

While Pakistan had reduced the overt infiltration of so-called Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’ across the LoC during Musharraf’s rule, it continued to do so covertly by looking for smarter methods of inducting more Jihadis; for example, through neighbouring countries like Nepal and Bangladesh. The remaining roots of terrorism in Kashmir now lie in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and in Pakistan itself and, unless India shows the political will necessary to eliminate these roots, Pakistan’s proxy war is likely to continue unabated even though it may become more sophisticated and covert in its approach.

The Pakistan army is under tremendous pressure from Jihadi elements responsible for internal instability and from the Americans to deliver more in the so-called War on Terror. Despite these pressures, there is unlikely to be any change in the Pakistan army’s hostility towards India and its covert support, even sponsorship, of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism across the LoC and the international boundary (IB) from Pakistan soil. Prime Minister Gilani said recently that Pakistan will continue to provide diplomatic, moral and political support for what he says is a ‘freedom struggle’ in Kashmir.

Clearly, the rapprochement process is a tactical ploy to tide over current domestic difficulties and there has not been a strategic change of heart. Pakistan’s proxy war with India will go on because the Pakistan army will not allow the civilian leadership to change its fundamental policy towards India. Hence, lasting peace in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan will remain a distant dream.