Tag Archives: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

India-Bangladesh Settle Boundary Dispute

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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Bangladesh this week has led to the settlement of the complex boundary dispute that had been festering between India and East Pakistan since the British left in 1947 and between India and Bangladesh since the new country was born in 1971. This is a significant milestone in the troubled history of the relationship between the two countries.

The India-Bangladesh border was always in the news as there were frequent clashes between India’s Border Security Force (BSF) and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) at places like the Teen Bigha corridor. The border has a peculiar problem that is usually referred to as ‘Enclaves and Adverse Possessions’. There are 111 Indian enclaves (17,158 acres) within Bangladesh with a population of 37,334 and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (7,110.02 acres) in India with a population of 14,215. 34 tracts of Indian land are under the adverse possession of Bangladesh and 40 pieces of Bangladeshi land are in India’s adverse possession. The demarcation of the boundary was done by signing a protocol to the Land Boundary Agreement of 1974. Though this agreement had provisions for the settlement of the issue of adverse possession, it had not been implemented as the problem was considered politically sensitive. The political leadership of the two countries has at last found the courage to invest time and effort towards resolving this sensitive issue. Now that the border dispute has been settled, unseemly clashes, which do no credit to either side, will no longer occur and spoil relations between the two countries.

The Indian Prime Minister was accompanied by four of the five Chief Ministers (CM) of Indian states bordering Bangladesh. Ms Mamata Banerjee, the CM of West Bengal and the stormy petrel of Indian politics, was reportedly upset at the concessions proposed to be made to Bangladesh ‘at the cost of West Bengal’ in the agreement on sharing of the waters of the River Teesta and dropped out virtually at the last minute. PM Manmohan Singh promised Sheikh Hasina, the Bangladesh PM, that the two sides would continue to discuss the Teesta River issue to reach “a mutually acceptable, fair and amicable arrangement…” However, as a quid pro quo response, Bangladesh retaliated by scuttling the treaty on transit rights that was also on the cards and that would have provided easer access to the rest of the country to some of India’s north-eastern states through Bangladesh.

Some of the other important treaties that were signed included an agreement on Indian aid for development programmes, a pact on overland transit between Bangladesh and Nepal, MoUs on renewable energy and the conservation of the Sunderbans and an understanding on jointly promoting fisheries. India agreed to allow Bangladesh duty free access to 46 textile items to be exported to India. Several MoUs were also signed for cooperation in the fields of education and communications, as also a protocol on conservation of the Royal Bengal Tiger – very few of this majestic species now remain in the wild.

Ever since the government of Sheikh Hasina had cracked down on India’s ULFA insurgents who had been hiding in Bangladesh for long, relations between the two countries had shown signs of thawing. The Hasina government’s policy of counter-terrorism was in stark contrast with the Begum Khaleda Zia government’s policy of providing covert shelter, encouragement and support to various Indian insurgent groups. The signing of the historic boundary agreement has taken the relationship to a much higher trajectory. The two prime ministers deserve to be complimented for their political courage and sagacity in bringing to an end the bitterness of the past.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Iran Imbroglio?

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Is the U.S. sanctions regime against Iran’s petroleum sector undermining India’s energy security efforts? One might think so given the dispute that played out between New Delhi and Tehran over the past few weeks. India is Iran’s second largest oil customer after China and absorbs about 20 percent of its crude exports. But because U.S. sanctions complicate the payment process, the Islamic Republic had threatened to cut off deliveries unless India paid some $5 billion in outstanding arrears by August 1. If implemented, the threat would have disrupted 12 percent of India’s oil imports.

Credit: http://irdiplomacy.ir Tehran’s atomic ambitions have become an irritant in US-India relations. President Obama signed into law last summer a new round of anti-Iran penalties, which affected some Indian companies and prompted complaints from New Delhi about the extra-territorial reach of U.S. laws. Some believe that continued friction over the issue might endanger New Delhi’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, while others fear that compliance with U.S. laws will compromise India’s foreign policy independence.

In truth, though, the issue is losing its potency to bedevil US-India ties. This is not because Washington will cease regarding the Iranian nuclear program as a matter of concern. Nor will South Block finally figure out how to painlessly balance its simultaneous quest for constructive relations with Iran and its American nemesis.  Rather, now that Tehran has largely accumulated the requisite materials and technology for a nuclear weapon, U.S. policymakers are increasingly coming to the grudging realization that there are real limits as to what can be done to elicit Iranian compliance with the global nonproliferation regime.

One of the ironies of the diplomatic process that eventuated in the US-India civil nuclear accord is that as concerns about Indian proliferation activities ceased being a hindrance to closer bilateral ties, the Iranian nuclear issue surfaced as a new point of discord. Indeed, in some quarters in both Washington and New Delhi, the two developments were inextricably linked. In the months following the path-breaking July 2005 summit between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, US Ambassador David C. Mulford continuously sounded the alarm that a failure to back a series of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) motions censuring Iran risked jeopardizing Congressional support of the agreement.

Influential Congressional voices underscored the admonishments. The U.S. Congress gave preliminary assent to the nuclear initiative when it passed the so-called Hyde Act in late 2006. But it also attached provisions to encourage Indian backing of the U.S. approach on Iran, thus ensuring that the issue would continue hanging in the air throughout the negotiations over the enabling “123 Agreement.” Congressional leaders also sent a toughly-worded letter to Prime Minister Singh in May 2007 warning of “grave concern” that India’s ties with Iran “have the potential to significantly harm prospects” for the accord’s final passage.

Although President Bush took the position that the Hyde Act’s provisions on Iran were “advisory” in nature, an odd alliance of the Indian Left and Right regarded them as an outright affront to the country’s sovereignty. Pointing to New Delhi’s support of the IAEA censures in late 2005 and early 2006, they accused Mr. Singh of purchasing Washington’s concessions on the civil nuclear initiative by mortgaging India’s prized strategic autonomy. These passions came to a head in the parliamentary vote of confidence that occurred in July 2008, an unprecedented act for a foreign policy matter.

Given what was at stake in the US-India nuclear negotiations – not only critically-need access to reactor technology and fuel but also the prospect of converting a strategic rapprochement with the world’s premier power into a full-fledged partnership – it is not surprising that New Delhi sought to mollify Washington’s concerns on Iran. Still, the charges leveled against the Singh government were off the mark. The IAEA votes in 2005 and 2006 represented a tactical adjustment rather than a wholesale shift occasioned by excessive deference to U.S. policy preferences.

This is not to say that India would otherwise have been supportive of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. New Delhi has been consistent that Tehran must live up to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a position that was reaffirmed in November 2009 when it backed another IAEA rebuke of Iran.

Yet the Indian government also has done little to surrender the pursuit of what it considers important national interests vis-à-vis Tehran. This is vividly demonstrated by the recent acrobatics in finding a mechanism to pay for crucial energy imports from Iran. Acceding to U.S. pressure, New Delhi barred Indian oil and gas companies last December from settling payments through the Tehran-based Asian Clearing Union. Iran had advertised the ACU as a means of sidestepping U.S. economic sanctions and Indian enterprises made extensive use of the facility. Through American officials hailed the move as a “significant step,” New Delhi quickly arranged an alternative conduit, using an Iranian-owned bank in Germany to funnel euro-denominated payments.

When the new connection was shut down this spring, again due to Washington’s insistence, India and Iran began discussions on another arrangement, which despite Iranian threats of shutting off the oil spigot eventuated in an agreement this week to route payments (mainly in euros) through a state-owned bank in Turkey. And even as New Delhi was going through these maneuvers, a consortium of firms, led by the overseas arm of the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, was moving forward with plans to invest $5 billion in developing the Farsi gas field in Iran.

Energy security is a substantial reason for New Delhi’s desire to continue its engagement with Tehran. Possessing the world’s second largest oil and natural gas reserves, Iran ranks just behind Saudi Arabia as India’s most important crude oil supplier. And with the country’s power requirements burgeoning, India will be increasingly dependent upon foreign energy sources, including Iran.

Besides the petroleum connection, geopolitics will also drive New Delhi into a closer relationship with Tehran. India has traditionally relied upon Iran to help blunt Pakistan’s influence in Central Asia and to serve as a bridge to trade and energy opportunities there.  And with the endgame of the Afghan conflict beginning to unfold, this reliance will only deepen. New Delhi now has even less incentive to go along with any new exertions of U.S. sanctions, and India and Iran may go so far as to revive their cooperation during the 1990s that provided critical support to the non-Pashtun militias battling the Taliban regime. The Americans will surely grumble about the cozying up with Tehran, but the strategic logic of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan leaves New Delhi little choice.

But as New Delhi adjusts policy, an even more significant change is underway in Washington, with U.S. options in dealing with Iran narrowing in important ways. Critics urge the Obama administration to be more forthcoming in diplomatic talks, though with the current disarray in the Iranian government it is difficult to see how even the most sincere of efforts could gain meaningful traction. The administration has also pointedly stressed that “all options are on the table,” implying that it is willing to pick up the cudgel of military action in the event Tehran fails to engage diplomatically. Yet this threat always had an air of unreality, given how armed hostilities in the Persian Gulf region – the epicenter of the world’s petroleum lifeline – would have calamitous economic consequences.

And now the saber-rattling option is ringing more and more hollow by the month, in view of the political consensus that is quickly growing in Washington in favor of reducing the country’s strategic commitments. Acknowledging that the U.S. military establishment is “exhausted,” just-retired Defense Secretary Robert Gates pointedly cautioned against launching any new conflicts in the Middle East.

Of course, the American focus on a nuclear Iran will not flag entirely.  New unilaterally formulated and enforced sanctions are certainly possible and these could come to ensnare Indian firms.  But the lack of viable alternative options will compel Washington’s acquiescence were Iran to develop a strategic arsenal, affecting in turn the demands that it places on allies and partners.

Indeed, the real challenge for Indian policymakers these days seems to lie more in Riyadh than in Washington. The simmering rivalry between the Shiite theocracy in Iran and the Sunni monarchy in Saudi Arabia is once again coming to a boil. A senior member of the Saudi royal family has reportedly warned that Riyadh is preparing to employ all of its economic, diplomatic and security assets to blunt Tehran’s regional ambitions. India may well get caught in the crossfire. If it does, satisfying the demands of its principal suppliers of crude oil will be South Block’s next balancing act.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Non-Proliferation Lobby Analysts Seek to Corner India on CTBT

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By Rajiv Nayan

The international community is discussing how to bring India into the multilateral export control regimes. During his November 2010 visit to India, United States president Barack Obama made a few speeches and issued a joint statement with prime minister Manmohan Singh, which contained a number of significant policy pronouncements. The further accommodation of India in the U.S. and multilateral export control regimes was a notable feature of these pronouncements.

President Obama announced that the U.S. would support India’s candidature in the four multilateral export control regimes—the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. India meets all the criteria for the membership of the MTCR. India may have to add a few items to its dual use technology control list called Special Chemical Organisms, Material, Equipment and Technology (SCOMET) to meet the membership criteria for the Australia Group. For membership in the NSG and Wassenaar Arrangement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) puzzle needs to be solved. For India, the membership of the NSG is strategically relevant.

After Obama’s announcement supporting India’s membership, the French and the Russians also gave their support, and the idea gained ground that India may be given the membership incrementally. It was generally believed that the Australia Group would come first, followed by the MTCR and the NSG and the Wassenaar Arrangement in that order. However, the Indian establishment wants membership to come as a package. The incremental approach has an inherent danger: the membership of the strategically less relevant regimes would become possible but the membership of the strategically more relevant regime, namely, the NSG, would be problematic because of the NPT issue. The Wassenaar Arrangement’s NPT criteria would also have to be amended to enable Indian membership. As for the MTCR, politics, instead of criteria, may be used to delay or block India’s membership.

The Indian government’s position, by and large, seems to have the support of the Indian strategic community. Now the package approach is seen as being preferable to the incremental approach. As this message has been sent across the world, the concerned players may have two options: either deny India the membership of all the regimes or prepare to give it the membership of all the regimes. India’s new profile as a significant economy that is performing well even during difficult global financial times and as an equally important producer, client and consumer of advanced technology may force these actors to accommodate India in the regimes. Indeed, India’s entry would only enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the regimes.

The process of the accommodation seems to have begun. Indian officials and those of relevant regimes countries have started interacting to facilitate India’s membership. Quite expectedly, analysts and non-governmental experts are being consulted over the way(s) to include India in the regimes. Although there is very little information about the official-level interactions, the non-governmental community has however begun to write about this. A good example is the short essay “NSG Membership: A Criteria-based Approach for Non-NPT States” by Pierre Goldschmidt for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Although the essay maintains a semblance of objectivity, the piece unfortunately reflects the prejudice prevalent in a section of the U.S. nonproliferation community. The very first paragraph opens with the cliché: ‘The nuclear policy community widely believes this [the 2008 NSG guidelines] exemption undermines the credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.’

Other non-proliferation writers cite the China-Pakistan deal for building additional reactors at the Chashma complex and Pakistan’s prevention of negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Even a novice in the field would know that Pakistan and China would have cut the deal irrespective of the India-specific exemptions. The Pakistan-China deal has been cut on the basis of some grandfatherly clause of a previous unseen agreement. Similarly, Pakistan would have found some excuse or the other to block FMCT negotiations. For example, this year, it has included U.S. support for India’s membership in multilateral export control regimes as another reason for blocking FMCT negotiations.

In fact, Pierre Goldschmidt has proposed a set of fourteen criteria for membership of the NSG for the non-NPT countries. He claims that these fourteen conditions can ‘correct the inequality created by the Indian exception’. Eleven of the criteria are part of the Indian policy while the other three look unrealistic and may not be taken seriously in India. In reality, these additional conditions are designed to constrain India. The old agenda of the anti-Indian non-proliferation lobby is being pushed through such new arguments. The argument is based on the grievance as to why India was allowed to get away so easily during the September 2008 special plenary session of the NSG. It is a case of sour grapes.

The argument in the Goldschmidt essay is to persist with the unfinished agenda of the July 2005 agreement of the anti-India non-proliferation lobby. Thus, the second criteria proposes that: “To become a full member of the NSG, a non-NPT state must…have in force a Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) with the IAEA whereby the non-NPT State undertakes to place all new nuclear facilities located outside existing military nuclear sites on the list of facilities to be safeguarded by the IAEA… .” This amounts to a reopening of the separation plan. This is unacceptable to India.

Goldschmidt’s essay claims that the India-US nuclear deal gave India some ‘guarantees’ that were not granted to other non-nuclear weapons states. Elsewhere in the essay, the author expects India to take up the obligations of other nuclear weapons states as defined by the NPT. This contradictory position dominates the article. The author, in fact, expects India to take on obligations which have not been assumed by members of the NSG. It is beyond comprehension as to why India should not have been allowed to develop nuclear weapons for its security. Has any other nuclear weapon country given this assurance to gain NSG membership?

Similarly, has the United States ratified the CTBT to retain its membership of the NSG? Did China give this undertaking before joining the NSG? When China was made a member, it was in the news for supplying nuclear and missile items to non-NPT and Non-Nuclear Weapons States. Interestingly, afterwards, not only the U.S. government but also a predominant section of the U.S. non-proliferation community went mute, Chinese proliferation was downplayed and China was declared to be an important stakeholder of the non-proliferation system. Any signature without ratification basically means nothing. So, criteria 8 and 9 are meaningless. Actually, the CTBT is a dead issue. The U.S. nonproliferation community has failed to revive the treaty. Flogging the dead horse only spreads dirt and stink. The treaty and related phenomena need a quiet burial.

To resolve the challenge posed by the NPT criteria, the best solution would be to amend the NPT and accommodate India as a nuclear weapon state. However, this does not appear likely in the near future. Pending membership of the NPT, India’s good standing with the treaty may be factored in. India, after becoming a nuclear weapons state, declared its intention to unilaterally follow articles I, III and VI of the NPT. Targeting India seems to be the only motive of this essay; the set of criteria is not relevant for Israel because it is a different case. For NSG membership, it will not modify its strategy of ambiguous nuclear weapon status. The non-proliferation community should avoid recommending any steps which would benefit a rabid proliferator like Pakistan. Continuing to do so will further undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation community.

(This article originally appeared at www.idsa.in . IDSA and USINPAC are content partners.)