Tag Archives: IAEA

Iran Imbroglio?

Is the U.S. sanctions regime against Iran’s petroleum sector undermining India’s energy security efforts? One might think so given the dispute that played out between New Delhi and Tehran over the past few weeks. India is Iran’s second largest oil customer after China and absorbs about 20 percent of its crude exports. But because U.S. sanctions complicate the payment process, the Islamic Republic had threatened to cut off deliveries unless India paid some $5 billion in outstanding arrears by August 1. If implemented, the threat would have disrupted 12 percent of India’s oil imports.

Credit: http://irdiplomacy.ir Tehran’s atomic ambitions have become an irritant in US-India relations. President Obama signed into law last summer a new round of anti-Iran penalties, which affected some Indian companies and prompted complaints from New Delhi about the extra-territorial reach of U.S. laws. Some believe that continued friction over the issue might endanger New Delhi’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, while others fear that compliance with U.S. laws will compromise India’s foreign policy independence.

In truth, though, the issue is losing its potency to bedevil US-India ties. This is not because Washington will cease regarding the Iranian nuclear program as a matter of concern. Nor will South Block finally figure out how to painlessly balance its simultaneous quest for constructive relations with Iran and its American nemesis.  Rather, now that Tehran has largely accumulated the requisite materials and technology for a nuclear weapon, U.S. policymakers are increasingly coming to the grudging realization that there are real limits as to what can be done to elicit Iranian compliance with the global nonproliferation regime.

One of the ironies of the diplomatic process that eventuated in the US-India civil nuclear accord is that as concerns about Indian proliferation activities ceased being a hindrance to closer bilateral ties, the Iranian nuclear issue surfaced as a new point of discord. Indeed, in some quarters in both Washington and New Delhi, the two developments were inextricably linked. In the months following the path-breaking July 2005 summit between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, US Ambassador David C. Mulford continuously sounded the alarm that a failure to back a series of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) motions censuring Iran risked jeopardizing Congressional support of the agreement.

Influential Congressional voices underscored the admonishments. The U.S. Congress gave preliminary assent to the nuclear initiative when it passed the so-called Hyde Act in late 2006. But it also attached provisions to encourage Indian backing of the U.S. approach on Iran, thus ensuring that the issue would continue hanging in the air throughout the negotiations over the enabling “123 Agreement.” Congressional leaders also sent a toughly-worded letter to Prime Minister Singh in May 2007 warning of “grave concern” that India’s ties with Iran “have the potential to significantly harm prospects” for the accord’s final passage.

Although President Bush took the position that the Hyde Act’s provisions on Iran were “advisory” in nature, an odd alliance of the Indian Left and Right regarded them as an outright affront to the country’s sovereignty. Pointing to New Delhi’s support of the IAEA censures in late 2005 and early 2006, they accused Mr. Singh of purchasing Washington’s concessions on the civil nuclear initiative by mortgaging India’s prized strategic autonomy. These passions came to a head in the parliamentary vote of confidence that occurred in July 2008, an unprecedented act for a foreign policy matter.

Given what was at stake in the US-India nuclear negotiations – not only critically-need access to reactor technology and fuel but also the prospect of converting a strategic rapprochement with the world’s premier power into a full-fledged partnership – it is not surprising that New Delhi sought to mollify Washington’s concerns on Iran. Still, the charges leveled against the Singh government were off the mark. The IAEA votes in 2005 and 2006 represented a tactical adjustment rather than a wholesale shift occasioned by excessive deference to U.S. policy preferences.

This is not to say that India would otherwise have been supportive of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. New Delhi has been consistent that Tehran must live up to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a position that was reaffirmed in November 2009 when it backed another IAEA rebuke of Iran.

Yet the Indian government also has done little to surrender the pursuit of what it considers important national interests vis-à-vis Tehran. This is vividly demonstrated by the recent acrobatics in finding a mechanism to pay for crucial energy imports from Iran. Acceding to U.S. pressure, New Delhi barred Indian oil and gas companies last December from settling payments through the Tehran-based Asian Clearing Union. Iran had advertised the ACU as a means of sidestepping U.S. economic sanctions and Indian enterprises made extensive use of the facility. Through American officials hailed the move as a “significant step,” New Delhi quickly arranged an alternative conduit, using an Iranian-owned bank in Germany to funnel euro-denominated payments.

When the new connection was shut down this spring, again due to Washington’s insistence, India and Iran began discussions on another arrangement, which despite Iranian threats of shutting off the oil spigot eventuated in an agreement this week to route payments (mainly in euros) through a state-owned bank in Turkey. And even as New Delhi was going through these maneuvers, a consortium of firms, led by the overseas arm of the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, was moving forward with plans to invest $5 billion in developing the Farsi gas field in Iran.

Energy security is a substantial reason for New Delhi’s desire to continue its engagement with Tehran. Possessing the world’s second largest oil and natural gas reserves, Iran ranks just behind Saudi Arabia as India’s most important crude oil supplier. And with the country’s power requirements burgeoning, India will be increasingly dependent upon foreign energy sources, including Iran.

Besides the petroleum connection, geopolitics will also drive New Delhi into a closer relationship with Tehran. India has traditionally relied upon Iran to help blunt Pakistan’s influence in Central Asia and to serve as a bridge to trade and energy opportunities there.  And with the endgame of the Afghan conflict beginning to unfold, this reliance will only deepen. New Delhi now has even less incentive to go along with any new exertions of U.S. sanctions, and India and Iran may go so far as to revive their cooperation during the 1990s that provided critical support to the non-Pashtun militias battling the Taliban regime. The Americans will surely grumble about the cozying up with Tehran, but the strategic logic of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan leaves New Delhi little choice.

But as New Delhi adjusts policy, an even more significant change is underway in Washington, with U.S. options in dealing with Iran narrowing in important ways. Critics urge the Obama administration to be more forthcoming in diplomatic talks, though with the current disarray in the Iranian government it is difficult to see how even the most sincere of efforts could gain meaningful traction. The administration has also pointedly stressed that “all options are on the table,” implying that it is willing to pick up the cudgel of military action in the event Tehran fails to engage diplomatically. Yet this threat always had an air of unreality, given how armed hostilities in the Persian Gulf region – the epicenter of the world’s petroleum lifeline – would have calamitous economic consequences.

And now the saber-rattling option is ringing more and more hollow by the month, in view of the political consensus that is quickly growing in Washington in favor of reducing the country’s strategic commitments. Acknowledging that the U.S. military establishment is “exhausted,” just-retired Defense Secretary Robert Gates pointedly cautioned against launching any new conflicts in the Middle East.

Of course, the American focus on a nuclear Iran will not flag entirely.  New unilaterally formulated and enforced sanctions are certainly possible and these could come to ensnare Indian firms.  But the lack of viable alternative options will compel Washington’s acquiescence were Iran to develop a strategic arsenal, affecting in turn the demands that it places on allies and partners.

Indeed, the real challenge for Indian policymakers these days seems to lie more in Riyadh than in Washington. The simmering rivalry between the Shiite theocracy in Iran and the Sunni monarchy in Saudi Arabia is once again coming to a boil. A senior member of the Saudi royal family has reportedly warned that Riyadh is preparing to employ all of its economic, diplomatic and security assets to blunt Tehran’s regional ambitions. India may well get caught in the crossfire. If it does, satisfying the demands of its principal suppliers of crude oil will be South Block’s next balancing act.

Nuclear Dividends?

Was the U.S.-India agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation worth all the trouble? Six years on, observers in both countries are accusing the other of perfidy.

Was the U.S.-India agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation worth all the trouble?  How have the expansive promises touted by its champions and dire warnings issued by its critics panned out? With the approach of the six-year anniversary of the landmark July 2005 summit between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, observers in both countries are at work tallying up the pay-offs and drawbacks.

PhotoThe Bush-Singh deal was momentous in both symbolic and material import. It implicitly recognized India as a nuclear weapons state, a gesture New Delhi very much wanted but which the Clinton administration refused to make. And by promising to end a decades-long embargo on nuclear energy technology against India, the Bush administration committed to overturning U.S. laws and global non-proliferation norms for New Delhi’s singular benefit.

At the time, U.S. advocates spoke of portentous opportunities in the strategic and commercial realms. A high-ranking U.S. official described the deal as “the big bang” designed to consummate a broad strategic relationship with a rising India that was aimed at balancing China’s burgeoning power. Ron Somers, the head of the U.S.-India Business Council, argued that “history will rank this initiative as a tectonic shift equivalent to Nixon’s opening to China.” Leading U.S. corporations quickly lined up, expecting that a grateful Indian government would reward them with lucrative contracts in the nuclear power generation and defense systems fields. Estimates were floated that access to India’s expanding nuclear energy sector would alone generate some 250,000 U.S. jobs.

Have the promised gains materialized? According to Michael Krepon (here and here), a prominent critic of the accord, they have not.  Pointing to India’s recent elimination – in the face of heavy U.S. lobbying – of Boeing’s and Lockheed Martin’s bids in its $11 billion fighter aircraft competition, as well as New Delhi’s failure to support U.S. diplomacy on the Libya and Syrian issues, he contends that the significant U.S. concessions made in the agreement have netted little in terms of a strategic or diplomatic return. Likewise, he notes the tough nuclear liability law adopted by India last year has the effect of all but blocking the involvement of U.S. companies in the country’s nuclear energy sector.

The accord’s advocates contended at the time that by granting India a special position in the global nuclear order, the nonproliferation regime would ultimately be strengthened. But Krepon believes the reverse has occurred. By bending the rules for India’s sole benefit, a pernicious precedent was set, one that China has just exploited in justifying its sale of two more reactors to Pakistan. And the failure to extract meaningful restrictions on India’s nuclear-weapon capacity has only spurred a paranoid Pakistan to undertake a significant expansion its own arsenal.

Krepon does not deny that bilateral diplomatic and economic ties have improved measurably in the last six years. But much of this, in his opinion, would have occurred even in the accord’s absence. From his vantage, the accord’s actual benefits are far from what was pledged, while the costs critics warned about have been substantiated.

Krepon’s critique arrives at a time of widespread disappointment in Washington that bilateral ties continue to fall far short of the promise that seemed so glistening just a few years ago. In an interview prior to his departure from New Delhi, U.S. Ambassador Timothy J. Roemer chided the Indian government’s failure to live up to its side of the bilateral relationship, adding that “There’s no doubt this needs to be a two-way street.”

The reasons for this sense of letdown are many, with fault lying both in Washington and New Delhi. Nonetheless, U.S. champions of the Bush-Singh deal were under no illusion that India’s signature registered its enlistment as America’s junior partner in global affairs or the surrender of its foreign policy independence.  For example, Nick Burns, who as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the last administration played a key role in crafting the new U.S.-India relationship, cautioned at the time that “the United States must adjust to a friendship with India that will feature a wider margin of disagreement than [Washington is] accustomed to.”

And even as the deal was proceeding, the two governments were at loggerheads in multilateral trade talks, an impasse that helped bring about the Doha Round’s collapse.  Paradoxically, the U.S. Congress gave its preliminary assent to the nuclear deal in December 2006 at the same moment that frustrations with New Delhi’s position in the Doha negotiations caused legislators to cut some of India’s trade privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences. And in the months prior to Congressional approval of the implementing “123 Agreement,” a high-ranking Bush administration official publicly accused New Delhi of stymieing negotiations and “working behind the scenes for Doha’s demise.”

India’s decision on fighter aircraft was a sharp disappointment to an Obama administration that lobbied strenuously on behalf of the U.S. contestants – so much so that the decision may have even hastened Ambassador Roemer’s resignation.  And it undoubtedly deepens the perception in Washington that New Delhi has not lived up to its side of the bargain by reciprocating the huge commitment the United States has made over the past decade to bolster India’s great power prospects. But as Ashley J. Tellis demonstrates in a superb piece of analysis, the decision was sui generis, involving the Indian air force’s rigid application of technical desiderata, rather than the anti-U.S. move some have described it as.

The proliferation-related arguments Krepon reiterates formed the core of the criticism against the accord when it was originally announced. But these points were difficult to sustain at the time in view of the strong support Mohamed ElBaradei, then director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, gave to the deal. He called the agreement a “win-win” as well as “a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety.” He has reaffirmed this view in his new book. And in case anyone missed the significance of ElBaradei’s endorsement, this is the same man who butted heads with the Bush administration over nuclear weapon allegations regarding Iraq and Iran – actions that helped earn him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005.  In the end, most nations were persuaded by his view that it was better to welcome New Delhi into the nuclear clubhouse, even if somewhat awkwardly, than to continue leaving it out in the cold.

It should also be noted that as the nuclear accord was being debated by the international community, Beijing explicitly assured Washington that it would not exploit India’s special carve-out in the nonproliferation regime to provide more reactors to Pakistan. It is also unclear how large a factor the deal looms in the rapid expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capabilities. Most likely, Islamabad’s anxiety about India’s “Cold Start” military doctrine – which focuses on deterring Pakistan’s use of jihadi proxies by holding out the threat of swiftly-mounted but calibrated military offensives against Pakistani territory – plays at least as significant a role.

While Krepon accuses India of failing to live up to the broad spirit of the Bush-Singh deal, Indian observers are presently charging Washington with an outright breach of faith. Specifically, they see restrictions just promulgated by the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal cartel regulating global nuclear commerce, as undercutting the privileged perch the accord gave India in the international nuclear hierarchy. The NSG prohibitions are designed to prevent the spread of uranium-enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing technology to countries, like India, that have not signed on to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Technically speaking, the provisions, which were advanced by the Obama administration, are not country-specific. However, there is little question they are aimed squarely at India, and this has revived cries about American perfidy that were at fever pitch in New Delhi’s tumultuous debate over the nuclear accord three years ago. Once again, the Communist Party of India and the Bharatiya Janata Party are making allegations about Mr. Singh’s lack of candor in revealing the agreement’s details.

Anil Kakodkar, a former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission who played a major role in drafting the nuclear deal, has also joined the present fray, characterizing the NSG move as a “betrayal,” while G. Parthasarathy, a leading light in the foreign policy establishment, concludes that “we cannot trust the U.S. as a long-term and reliable partner on nuclear issues.” The Hindu newspaper exclaims that “the Indian side has scrupulously adhered to its side of the broad bargain and has assumed the U.S. and the NSG would do the same. But if the latter are going to cherry-pick which of their own commitments they will adhere to and which they will not, India may well be tempted to examine its own options.” Indeed, the Indian government has threatened to withhold coveted reactor contracts from any country enforcing the new rules.

Beyond the perceived affront to national honor, made all the more palpable since the NSG was founded in response to India’s first nuclear detonation in 1974, it is unclear whether the restrictions will have any practical effect. India already can reprocess material from its fast-breeder reactor program to supply its nuclear arsenal. And the country’s chief nuclear partners – the United States, France and Russia – have rushed to assure New Delhi that the restrictions will in no way impinge upon their previous commitments. Still, it is curious why the Obama administration chose to press the new restrictions at the very same moment it was championing New Delhi’s membership in the NSG (read the U.S. paper on India’s candidacy here).

The growing irritations on both sides will be aired out at the mid-July convening of the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue in New Delhi. The confab was originally scheduled for April but was postponed, ostensibly at least, because Defense Minister A.K. Antony had to campaign in the Kerala state elections. More likely, Antony and others in the Indian leadership were looking for an excuse to dodge the Obama administration’s full-court press on the fighter aircraft decision. As it turns out, the meeting will now take place with both sides nursing grievances.

A US-India Nuclear Alliance

Although President George W Bush understood the need to ensure parity for India with France and the U.K. in a 21st century alliance calculus, the Europeanists within his administration slowed down his effort at ensuring an equal treatment for India. Much the same as Winston Churchill in the previous century, they regard it as a “country of a lesser god” that is simply undeserving of any except a subservient status. Sadly, the Obama administration has become even more a Europeanists’ delight than its predecessor, and it has very rapidly sought to dilute the few concessions that President Bush succeeded in extracting from his skeptical team.

Credit: IBNLive.com

This has been especially pronounced in the nuclear field. It is not rocket science that India’s ascent into middle income status will depend on a huge increase in its generation of energy, and that such an increase, given existing green technologies, will need to be powered mostly by energy from nuclear sources. The nuclear industries of India and the U.S. have excellent synergy between them, provided the U.S. acknowledges the implicit premise of the 2005 Singh-Bush statement and the 2008 unanimous vote of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to allow commerce and cooperation with India.

The non-proliferation lobby within the U.S. (a group heavily represented in the Obama administration) made India its primary target since 1974, neglecting to take account of the leaching of nuclear and missile technology from China and other locations to Pakistan and North Korea. Small wonder that it has demonized the India-US deal as a “danger to non-proliferation efforts”, despite the fact that a democracy of a billion-plus people is as much entitled to critical technologies as France or the UK. The reality, however, is that the Manmohan Singh government made several concessions to the U.S. side that have had the effect of substantially degrading India’s offensive capability. An example was the closing down of the CIRUS reactor, which was producing weapons-grade plutonium for decades. In exchange, India was to be given access to re-processing technology. Not merely has such technology continued to be denied to India, but the Obama administration is seeking to cap, roll back and eliminate India’s homegrown reprocessing capabilities.

Apart from strong-arm (and secret) tactics designed to force India to agree to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the Obama administration is now seeking to force India to give up its Fast Breeder Reactor program. As if on cue, those commentators in the world’s second-largest English-speaking country – including those not known for any previous interest in matters nuclear- who hew to the line of any incumbent U.S. administration have used the Fukushima disaster to call for the FBR program to be abandoned.

Whether by accident or by design, since 2007, this program has slowed down substantially, to the dismay of scientists working in the Atomic Energy Establishment who were rooting strongly for the India-US nuclear deal on the premise that this would ensure a much-needed alliance between the nuclear industries of both countries.

 Instead, because of the present administration’s steady drumbeat of fresh conditions (and retrogressive tweaking of existing agreements), nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and India has remained frozen, even while that with Russia has bloomed. Hopefully, such a state of affairs will not continue for long.

One sector where a vigorous India-US partnership would immensely benefit both countries (of course, on the assumption – challenged by key elements in the Obama administration – that India is entitled to the same status as other key U.S. allies) would be in the field of thorium. India has nearly 300,000 tons of thorium (Th), more than enough to power the nuclear industries of both countries. India has already gone a substantial distance towards a viable thorium-based technology. The catch is that this involves reprocessing on a significant scale, a technology that the Churchillians in the U.S. administration say should be denied to India. This is despite the fact that when anyone last checked, India was not an authoritarian state but a democracy. Unless of course, such a prejudice is based on instincts that are not mentionable in polite company.

Despite having been treated as a pariah state by the US, India consistently abided even by agreements that the U.S. side had unilaterally discarded, for example at Tarapur. In this facility, a huge amount of radioactive material has piled up, that India has not re-processed, despite having the technology to, because the plant was set up in collaboration with the US. Some of the spent fuel has been converted after much expense and effort from unsafeguarded radioactive material to safeguarded irradiated fuel, especially in RAPS 1 and 2.

Despite such good behavior, not to mention an impeccable non-proliferation record, the Obama administration in effect continues to treat India as a nuclear pariah, seeking to drive it down to the status of a recipient country under the proposed international scheme for nuclear cooperation. Such a mindset would put paid to any possibility of an India-US alliance, and would be very good news to a country that U.S. non-proliferationists treat with kid gloves, China.

Credit: www.dae.govIndia has already developed two thorium-based systems, the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) and the Compact High Temperature Reactor (CHTR). Although for some reason there seems to be a sharp deceleration in such plans by the present Manmohan Singh government, plans are for the entry of the Indian private sector in this greenfield industry. Ideally, these would partner with U.S. companies, but the way matters are going, it would seem that Russian state enterprises may eventually end up as the preferred partners. This is presumably the reason why there is a significant lobby within India that opposes those within the government who seek to buy either the F -16 or the F-18 for the Indian Air Force. The continued reluctance to give India its due as a major power is behind the skepticism in South and North Block about relying on the U.S. for critical defense equipment. The Obama administration’s cavalier treatment of India’s rights as a responsible nuclear power are behind the pressure by elements of the armed forces to backtrack on plans for a comprehensive defense partnership with India. India gets treated as a Sudan or as a Gautemala in such a pairing, rather than get located in the same bracket as France and the US.

 

Despite their worst efforts, the plan to once again consign India to the bottom of the nuclear heap will not succeed. The 21st century mandates a vigorous partnership of the two most populous Anglosphere countries, India and the US. The non-proliferationists in the U.S. ought not to be allowed to make this hostage to their refusal to admit that India and its population are as responsible and deserving of privileges as the people of major U.S. allies in Europe. Should such a Churchillian view on India continue, the geopolitical gainers would be Russia and China.

Building up on the rubble of Japan’s nuclear disaster

Japan was struck by a massive earthquake on March 11, followed by a devastating tsunami that deluged many parts of Japan. Not only was the disaster colossal in terms of the human casualties (more than 10000 at last count), but it also damaged Japan’s nuclear reactors causing radiation leakage. As of this writing, the Fukushima nuclear facility was emitting radiation and warnings about tap-water and certain other foods contamination were being issued.

The nuclear disaster in Japan, led analysts and policy experts across the world to contemplate the safety and disaster preparedness of other nuclear installations in countries such as the US, India, China, Pakistan etc. The radiation leakage prompted some to question the benefits of nuclear energy and if the world would be better off without it. However, the disaster in Japan was also a case in point that the correct design, security mechanisms and emergency preparedness can contain and even avert a nuclear catastrophe when natural disasters strike. Radiation fears are valid, but their actual levels and impact might be exaggerated.

In India, it did not take long for doubts to be raised about the US-India nuclear deal (the U.S. clarified that Japan’s disaster would not affect the deal, and it would continue) and India’s plans to maximize the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation. Though India’s disaster relief and emergency preparedness leaves a lot to be desired, India has so far displayed a disaster-free record when it comes to its nuclear facilities. Expect for minor instances of accidents at such facilities, India’s nuclear program has been disaster-free. The Indian nuclear program and the US-India nuclear deal are also in compliance with the IAEA and NSG safeguards and guidelines. Nothing in India’s nuclear history suggests that India might not be able to deal with a disaster as the one that struck Japan. In fact, during the 2001 and 2004 earthquakes in Gujarat and the Indian Ocean, the nuclear reactors in the vicinity had been successfully shut down.

In 2009, India’s National Disaster Management Authority issued a researched set for guidelines for management of nuclear and radiological emergencies. The report lays down exhaustive guidelines for natural as well as man-made nuclear disasters, and reading it instills confidence that India can effectively deal with and control a nuclear disaster. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has also asked for a security review of all nuclear installations in the country following the Japan earthquake.

While accounting and preparing for a worst-case scenario is essential when it comes to sensitive issues such as nuclear disasters, it is also important to remember that such instances are rare. Earthquakes and tsunamis of the magnitude of that in Japan do not occur regularly. And even when they do, adequate preparations and an efficient people (such as the Japanese) can effectively tame any situation. At a time when global energy needs are expanding and non-renewable resources depleting rapidly, nuclear energy is an important and efficient resource for us to consider. Instead of scurrying to shut down nuclear plants and scrapping nuclear deals out of fear, it is important to build even better reactor designs and safety mechanisms that attempt to nullify the effects of any potential disaster.

The Nuclear Liability Bill (2010) passed recently by the Indian Parliament (as part of the long-drawn process of implementing the US-India nuclear deal) could have been integrated completely into this safety mechanism. However, the bill leaves out liability for the operator in case of “grave natural disasters.” The Japanese earthquake and tsunami combo is definitely a grave natural disaster. While it can be argued that the operator cannot predict natural disasters, and therefore cannot be held accountable for damages caused by forces beyond his control; it also cannot be argued that a company and/or operator is totally without responsibility for ensuring maximum safety standards, including for natural disasters. In fact, attributing accountability would force operators to ensure maximum safeguards at nuclear facilities out of fear of potential monetary losses in case of nuclear disasters. Because such disasters are rare, the probability of them losing money by having to pay compensation is very little.

Along with continuing their commitment to nuclear energy, the U.S. and India should look at the Japanese nuclear disaster as an opportunity to increase collaboration in nuclear research and development, disaster management and emergency preparedness. Nuclear technology has developed significantly since the Fukushima nuclear reactor was installed, but its reaction to the earthquake and subsequent disaster should be studied to make reactors even better equipped to deal with crisis situations. Both India and the U.S. have a big pool of skilled nuclear scientists and engineers, and it is time to increase collaboration between them.

FMCT Negotiations: Games Pakistan Plays

By P R Chari
Indian Review of Global Affairs

Pakistan is at it again. Whenever it is in trouble, Pakistan turns up the volume of its anti-India rhetoric. Suicide terrorism is taking a daily toll of lives in Pakistan. Its Afghanistan policy is going nowhere. The Pakistan army is obsessed with gaining ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, and has drafted the Taliban to achieve this objective. But, elements of the Taliban have turned against Pakistan, and are indulging in sustained, uncontrollable violence within the country. The assassination of Salman Taseer – a voice of reason raised against Pakistan’s medieval blasphemy laws – highlights the growing Islamization and chaos in Pakistan. Taseer’s murder was condemnable, but the horrifying fact is that his assassin has become a national hero. Rose petals were showered on him when he was produced in court. Lawyers are flocking to defend him. Liberal opinion in Pakistan, on the other hand, has been marginalized.

In true Nero-fashion Pakistan has now blocked negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in Geneva. Its Ambassador, Zamir Akram, has argued that by ceasing fissile materials production, Pakistan would concede a ‘strategic advantage’ to India. The WikiLeaks inform that Pakistan is currently manufacturing nuclear weapons faster than any other country, according to a cable sent by the U.S. embassy in Islamabad to Washington. A recent study by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists also informs that Pakistan possesses more nuclear weapons than India, but is feverishly manufacturing fissile materials to further enlarge its inventory. Nuclear weapons are not comparable to conventional weapons, and adding to their numbers beyond a point makes no sense. But, this logic is unlikely to impress Pakistan, whose defense and foreign policy is basically driven by the obsessions of the Pakistan Army. Zamir Akram had another grouse. President Obama had pledged to assist India’s admission into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Waasenaar Arrangement during his visit to New Delhi last November. Delivering on that promise the United States has very recently removed export controls on several Indian space and defense-related organizations, signaling a new era in U.S.-India nonproliferation cooperation. Zamir argued that this represented a “paradigm shift in strategic terms.”

Pakistan is actually hoping to somehow revive the debate on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal that was generated in 2008 when that deal was under process. The Bush administration had hammered that deal through the U.S. Congress, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), despite reservations voiced in some countries, collectively named the White Knights. Pakistan is seeking a similar dispensation, and China is working hard to provide Pakistan a comparable nuclear deal by supplying two more 300 MW atomic power reactors for its Chashma complex. Without going into the legal complexities involved, it should be noticed that China needs to place this matter before the Nuclear Suppliers Group for getting its prior approval. A similar approval had been obtained by the United States before finalizing the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. China is reluctant to pursue this route in the knowledge that the NSG may not endorse this deal between two blatant proliferators in the international system.

Reverting back to the collaterally damaged and stalled FMCT negotiations Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State, has unequivocally declared, “Let me just place full emphasis and priority today on my main message, which is to launch the negotiations this year on a fissile material cutoff treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.” She added, “That is a kind of general time frame,” though 2011 was not a “specific deadline.” In diplomatic language these words amount to expressing extreme displeasure with Pakistan, and with good reason. The 65-nation Conference on Disarmament transcended a ten-year deadlock in 2009 by agreeing to address four issues: nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off pact, the prohibition of space-based weapons, and an agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed countries against non-nuclear weapon states. Pakistan has reneged now after endorsing this plan, which derails President Obama’s hopes to operationalize his disarmament agenda; hence, Gottemoeller’s subsequent threat, “If we cannot find a way to begin these negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, then we will need to consider options.”

And, what could be these options? Most effectively, by stopping financial assistance to keep a bankrupt Pakistan afloat. And, cutting off arms transfers, which includes spares and ancillaries, would heighten pressure on Pakistan’s armed forces who are its real rulers. Can the United States afford to ignore Pakistan’s logistics support to sustain the American and ISAF operations in Afghanistan? Will China bail out its distressed ally by defying the international community in this effort, and promoting a further closing of ranks by its neighbours? The United States and China will, no doubt, weigh all their options carefully. Pakistan seems likely to witness interesting times.

(The article originally appeared at www.irgamag.com. USINPAC and IRGA are content partners.)