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Capacity Building for Future Conflict

In view of India’s unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan in the mountainous Himalayan region, there is a very high probability that the next major land conflict on the Indian sub-continent will again break out in the mountains and, in order to avoid the possibility of escalation to nuclear exchanges, the conflict will in all probability remain confined to mountainous terrain.

A strategic defensive posture runs the risk of losing some territory to the adversary if capabilities do not exist to be able to launch a deep ingress to stabilise the situation. India’s must upgrade its military strategy of dissuasion against China to that of genuine conventional and nuclear deterrence that can come only from the ability to take the fight deep into the adversary’s territory through the launching of major offensive operations. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to raise and position one mountain Strike Corps each in Jammu and Kashmir for offensive operations against China and Pakistan and in the northeast for operations against China. In addition, other defensive corps must be given limited capability to launch offensive operations with integral resources.

Manoeuvre is extremely limited in the mountains due to the restrictions imposed by the terrain. In the plains too India’s Strike Corps cannot execute deep manoeuvres due to the risk of Pakistan’s nuclear red lines being threatened early during a campaign. As firepower is the other side of the coin, it is necessary to substantially upgrade capabilities of the armed forces to inflict punishment and indeed achieve victory through the orchestration of overwhelming firepower, or else India will have to be content with a strategic stalemate.

These capabilities include conventionally-armed SRBMs to attack high value targets in depth. Air-to-ground and helicopter-to-ground attack capabilities need to be modernised, particularly those enabling deep ground penetration and accurate night strikes. In fact, the Indian Air Force should aim to dominate the air space and ground strikes must paralyse the adversary’s ability to conduct cohesive ground operations. Artillery rockets, guns and mortars must also be modernised. Lighter and more mobile equipment is required so that these can be rapidly moved and deployed in neighbouring sectors.

India’s holdings of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) continue to be low. In recent conflicts like the war in Iraq in 2003 and the ongoing Afghan conflict, PGMs have formed almost 80 per cent of the total ammunition used. Indian PGM holdings must go up progressively to at least 20 to 30 per cent in order to achieve high levels of operational efficiencies. India’s defence planners must recognise that it is firepower asymmetries that will help to achieve military decisions and ultimately break the adversary’s will to fight.

Capabilities for heliborne assault, vertical envelopment and amphibious operations are inadequate for both conventional conflict and dealing effectively with contingencies that might arise while discharging India’s emerging regional responsibilities. Two rapid reaction-cum-air assault divisions (with an amphibious brigade each) need to be raised by the end of the 13th Defence Plan, i.e. by 2017-22. The expenditure on these divisions will be highly capital intensive and will be subject to the defence budget being gradually raised to first 2.5 per cent and then 3.0 per cent of India’s GDP.

C4I2SR capabilities are still rudimentary in nature and must be substantially modernised to exploit the synergies that can be achieved by a network centric force. A seamless intelligence-cum-targeting network must be established to fully synergise the strike capabilities of air and ground forces in real time. A good early warning network will enable the army to reduce the number of troops that are permanently deployed for border management and will add to the reserves available for offensive operations. Infrastructural developments along the northern borders have failed to keep pace with the army’s ability to fight forward and must be speeded up.

US-India Strategic Partnership will Counter-balance China’s Growing Assertiveness in Asia

The India-China strategic relationship is stable at the strategic level, but it is marked by Chinese aggressiveness at the tactical level. Though the probability of conflict is low at present, it cannot be completely ruled out. Given China’s growing assertiveness in Asia, it has now clearly emerged that its rise is likely to be anything but peaceful. Under the circumstances, the US-India strategic partnership is emerging as a counter weight to China’s assertiveness and as a force for stability in Asia.

China is engaged in the strategic encirclement of India, both from the land and from the sea by way of the string of pearls strategy. The China-Pakistan nuclear, missile and military hardware nexus is a threat-in-being for India. Also, China is making inroads into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and emphasising economic cooperation to justify building its own rail and road route linking Xingjian with Karachi. China and Pakistan have a cosy arms trade relationship. Their friendship, in President Hu Jin Tao’s words, is “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans.” Will they collude with each other in a future conflict with India?   The answer to that question is undoubtedly yes. That is why two of the Indian armed forces Chiefs have said recently that there is a possibility of a two-front war in a future conflict either with Pakistan or with China.

China’s far from peaceful rise is marked by the fact that there is not a single bordering country with which China has not fought a war: the erstwhile Soviet Union, Vietnam, India, and Korea.  They have shot down their own satellite in space. They have been firing missiles across the Taiwan Strait. They have begun to physically occupy some of the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands. Due to internal contradictions there is a probability that some time in the future China may implode. There is also a possibility that China may behave irresponsibly towards its neighbours. China has been modernising its military at a very rapid rate. Its defence budget has been growing at 12-16% per annum in real terms. Therefore, 15-20 years down the line, when China has completed its military modernisation and resolved the dispute with Taiwan, it may turn its gaze southwards towards India. China will then be in the position of military strength and India will be in a position of relative military weakness. China will be able to dictate terms to India in the resolution of territorial dispute. The real driving force behind India’s strategic partnership with the U.S. is to counter China’s diplomatic aggression and military assertiveness.  If China implodes or if China behaves irresponsibly, India would need a strong friend, if not an ally, and no one could be better than the US.

India should upgrade its military strategy against China from that of dissuasion to deterrence in terms of both conventional deterrence as well as nuclear deterrence. The army in particular lacks the ability to deliver a strong offensive punch across the high Himalayan mountains on to the Tibetan Plateau. Genuine deterrence comes only from the capability to launch major offensive operations to threaten the key objectives of the adversary. If the Chinese are convinced that India will launch major offensive operations across the Himalayas in retaliation for Chinese aggression, they will be deterred from waging a war.  Local border incidents can, of course, never be ruled out. The strength of the Indian Air Force has gone down from 39 Squadrons to 32 ½ Squadrons. That should be unacceptable to India’s strategic planners. The Indian Navy needs greater support by way of budgetary allocations, capabilities for tri-Service amphibious operations and offensive air support in order to make it a genuinely blue water navy. The one weakness that China has is that its oil tankers and its trade pass through the northern Indian Ocean Region (IOR). If the Chinese decide to mess with India on the high Himalayas, they can be squeezed in the IOR.

Yesterday, once more?

And just like that, the much awaited, once postponed India-US Strategic Dialogue came and went, with not even the the tiniest frisson of excitement of that had accompanied previous Dialogues. Minders on both sides must have been secretly pleased that the Murdoch slugfest in London came in as a suitable excuse to explain away the limited interest and analysis of the Strategic Dialogue in the media. With new lists of grievances building up on both sides to replace the long-drawn out lists of the Cold War era, the Strategic Dialogue process has had the unintended consequence of focusing attention on these issues for which all available political capital has been expended or there is no solution even at the highest political levels.  Given this reality, the reports of half-hearted wagging of fingers and admonishments behind closed doors were more for the benefit of respective constituencies than to move the process forward. The overriding urge to prevent any SNAFUs meant that Mrs. Clinton proposal to visit Kolkata as part of itinerary was shot down by the hosts. And whilst Mrs. Clinton broke bread with all her leading interlocutors, from the Prime Minister downwards, the glaring exception was Defence Minister A K Antony, for whom the Dialogue that was to take place in April had been postponed since he was ostensibly busy with the Kerala elections.

01-1The U.S. side, in particular, has become a master at the art of coming out with comprehensive factsheets laying out the massive advances in joint projects, emphasizing the width and breadth of the partnership.   With many of the bilateral agreements signed over the years stuck at various stages of implementation, it is almost as if both sides were virtually scrapping the bottom of the barrel this time around to come out with agreements on cyber security cooperation and cooperation in aviation safety. This is not to belittle the importance of these agreements, and particularly the one on cybersecurity. However, the impression one gets is that there is still a sufficient amount of mistrust on both sides to ensure that even this initiative will live uptoits potential for some time to come. By way of comparison, the agreement between cyber adversaries Russia and the United States on cyber security cooperation signed just the previous week is much more specific on actions and timelines.

But it is not as if Mrs Clinton would be particularly disappointed by either the dampened expectations or outcome of her visit. From an American perspective, given the flux in the wider Asian region, accelerating the strategic partnership with India in the security and defence realms, especially if it is only on the back of unilateral concessions, will only fetch diminishing returns. One only needs replace India with the U.S. in the previous sentence to come up with the Indian view. On the American side, there is reasonable confidence that an increasingly powerful and belligerent China will eventually drive India into U.S. arms. In the meantime, there is plenty of other fish to fry, particularly when it comes to pushing the economic and people-to-people aspects, part of larger initiativesthat Mrs. Clinton has focused on since taking up stewardship of the State Department.  And therefore it is not surprising that out of the many factsheets brought out by the Department at the end of the visit, it is those on economic ties and education and people-to people ties that have the most substance. While the former leads with talks on a Bilateral Investment Treaty, there is a consolation prize in the establishment of the first ever Consular Dialogue to take place on July 25 “for a full discussion of visa and other consular matters”. From Tri-Valley to the harassment of H1B visa holders and diplomatic pat-downs, there will be much to discuss at this Dialogue. Considering that a similar Consular Dialogue has been part of the EU-IndiaStrategic Dialogue since 2000 and the India-Australia Dialogue more recently,one wonders why this did not come into being earlier even earlier.

On the education and people-to-people front, the noteworthy developments are the publication of the first request for proposals under the aegis of the Obama-Singh Knowledge Initiative with the fields of focus being Energy Studies, Sustainable Development, Climate Change, Environmental Studies, Education and Educational Reform, and Community Development and Innovation. How different this Initiative is from existing programs being carried out under the India U.S. Science and Technology Forum remains to be seen.  The other interesting program to watch out for would be the newly launched Passport to India which will facilitate increasing number of American students to come to India for periods ranging from three weeks to six months, to match the 100,000 odd Indian students in the United States. This, too, has an economic focus since the students will be here on internships with companies rather than for study programmes.

The silver lining in this particular cloud might be this; with both sides forced by exigencies to dial down the relationship a notch, this provides some breathing space to consolidate the initiatives that have been taken up in previous years. The U.S. State Department Inspector General’s office  has recommended that a separate office be established for India since “nations of comparable importance and with important bilateral relationships, such as China, Russia, Cuba, Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, have their own offices”. A similar initiative on the Indian side would go a long way in implementing the many worthy initiatives of the Strategic Dialogue and make it less of the annual junket that it is being perceived to be.

Taking the Long View

Over time, the expansion of Chinese strength will undoubtedly push New Delhi to tighten its security relations with Washington, though the process will neither be as smooth nor as speedy as many would like.

Just as US-India ties were at a nadir following New Delhi’s nuclear tests in 1998 – and just as the United States and China were declaring their own strategic partnership – Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee famously characterized Washington and New Delhi as “natural allies” who would form “the mainstay of tomorrow’s stable, democratic world order.” Two years later, Vajpayee reaffirmed this description.

Judging by the dense bilateral links the two countries have crafted over the past decade, Vajpayee phrase seems to have been vindicated. Not only have a landmark civilian nuclear accord and a spate of defense contracts been concluded, but the two countries have established some 30 bilateral dialogues and working groups on a wide gamut of issues, and the United States holds more bilateral military exercises each year with India than with any other nation.

Yet U.S. elites are suddenly shying away from the term “ally.” Assistant Secretary of State for South & Central Asia Robert Blake, for instance, states that “India and the United States will never be allies in the traditional sense of the term.”  Strobe Talbott, who as Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton administration began the first institutionalized dialogue between Washington and New Delhi, contends that the countries “are not now, and may never be, allies.” Stephen P. Cohen, dean of U.S. South Asianists, likewise maintains that “India is a friend, not an ally” and the new US-Indian strategic alliance is “still more symbolic than real.”

All three underscore the distinction between long-standing U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea, and partners like India that are not bound by formal security commitments. And Blake’s statement was undoubtedly in deference to Indian sensitivities about being sucked into America’s strategic orbit, although he adds that India can no longer be considered a non-aligned country given the “increased convergences in strategic outlook” between Washington and New Delhi. But Talbott and Cohen are less sanguine on this count. The former argues that:

One reason we may never be [allies] or not in the any foreseeable future, is because there is still a huge constituency in support of India’s non-aligned status, despite the fact that I would say that non-alignment and the non-aligned movement is very much an artifact of the Cold War. I remember having a conversation with Natwar Singh [retired Indian diplomat and Manmohan Singh’s first foreign minister] when Congress was out of power and him saying to me that the proudest moment of his career was being secretary general of the non-aligned movement. That sticks in my mind. I took that as a sign that there are still a lot of Indians who take non-alignment seriously.

Cohen strikes a similar note: “New Delhi has a deep commitment to strategic autonomy, as indicated by its insistent use of the moderating prefix ‘natural’ to describe its U.S. relationship. In the end, India got what it needed from Washington, including recognition of its nuclear weapons program and support for its permanent membership on the United Nations’ Security Council, at little or no cost.”

Believing that strategic ties remain, at best, “aspirational,” Michael Auslin, at the American Enterprise Institute, likewise notes that the

continued adherence to Jawaharlal Nehru’s non-aligned strategy clearly animates the worldview of most thinkers [in India], even if the language used to describe it no longer partakes of such Cold War imagery. There is a firm commitment in New Delhi not to have any firm commitments to any one state. It seems the Indians have taken to heart, far more than the Americans, George Washington’s warning against entangling foreign alliances.

All of these comments come at a time of widespread disappointment in Washington that the bilateral relationship has not lived up to the strategic and economic possibilities that seemed so alive just a few years ago. As my last post noted, some observers are even questioning whether the Bush-Singh nuclear deal has succeeded in its primary aim of invigorating US-India geopolitical cooperation in the face of a rapidly growing and more assertive China.

The Bush administration devoted singular energy to courting New Delhi as a key part of its strategy of strengthening security links with China’s neighbors. In a widely-read article, Condoleezza Rice, then serving as chief foreign adviser to the George W. Bush presidential campaign, observed that Washington “should pay closer attention to India’s role in the regional balance.” She pointedly noted that “India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s, too.” In his first major foreign policy address as a candidate, Bush argued that “we should work with the Indian government, ensuring it is a force for stability and security in Asia.”

Once the nuclear deal was unveiled at a July 2005 summit between Bush and Prime Minister Singh, Rice justified it by calling India “a rising global power that we believe could be a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia.” At the summit, a senior Indian diplomat was quoted as saying that “Bush has a vision that we in India often don’t have. With Europe in decline and China rising, the U.S. sees India as a future global power with the ability to maintain [the] power balance in the 21st century.” A Bush administration official closely involved in the making of policy toward New Delhi commented that “China is a central element in our effort to encourage India’s emergence as a world power. But we don’t need to talk about the containment of China. It will take care of itself as India rises.”

Singh-Wen_PhotoIn the years since, has the growth of Chinese strategic power nudged Washington and New Delhi into tighter security collaboration, as many in the Bush administration expected? Or is Michael Krepon, one of the nuclear deal’s prominent detractors, correct in arguing that “New Delhi continues to titrate improved strategic cooperation with the United States” and that it “continues to improve ties with Beijing.  It is folly to presume that Washington can leverage New Delhi’s dealings with Beijing.”

There’s no denying the American disillusionment caused by India’s rejection of Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s bids in its $11 billion fighter aircraft competition and by the prolonged inability of U.S. companies to capitalize on the nuclear deal due to an Indian liability law that does not conform to international norms. It is also true that India and China have aligned to thwart U.S. objectives in global negotiations on trade and climate change, and that they often take the same side in UN deliberations.

But stepping back a bit in order to take in the wider perspective, it is clear that some fundamental geopolitical forces are at work in spurring India-China strategic frictions.  Instead of being the fraternal titans that drive the Asian Century forward, as envisioned in the “Chindia” chimera, it is more likely that their relationship in the coming years will be marked by increased suspicion and rivalry. The relationship has never really recovered from the trauma of their 1962 border war, and the strains have only increased over the past five years or so. Beijing is now taking a much more hawkish line on territorial disputes in the Himalayans, including asserting a brand new claim that the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh is actually “Southern Tibet.”  It is also expanding its presence in territory controlled by Pakistan, and trying to block New Delhi’s efforts to play a greater role in regional and international institutions.

Much is made of the fact that China is now India’s largest trading partner and that two-way trade soared from $12 billion in 2004 to $60 billion in 2010, and that the countries are on track to reach $100 billion in 2015. When Premier Wen Jaibao visited New Delhi last December, he brought along a larger business delegation than President Obama did a month earlier, and the $16 billion in resulting trade deals eclipsed the $10 billion-mark struck by the Americans. Yet compared to US-India economic links, there are far more competitive elements, and far fewer complementary features, operating in India’s business interactions with China.

All of these developments have not gone unnoticed by the Singh government.  Famous for his cautious, taciturn nature, Singh has caused a stir with his public expressions of disapproval regarding what he terms Chinese “assertiveness.” In a September 2010 interview he complained that Beijing sought to “keep India in a low-level equilibrium” and that “it would like to have a foothold in South Asia.” Three months later, he shocked his Chinese guests during the Wen visit by refusing to reiterate India’s traditional endorsement of the “One China” policy or customary recognition of Tibet being an inviolable part of the People’s Republic.

Indian military planning is also increasingly focused on the threat from its northern neighbor, from taking major steps to fortify its northeastern border to accelerating the development of the Agni-V ballistic missile. With a reach of over 5,000 kilometers, and capable of carrying multiple warheads, the missile puts China fully within range of a retaliatory nuclear strike.

The strategic entente with India is Washington’s first geopolitical partnership to be forged in the post-Cold War era, meaning that its rhythm is bound to be quite different from the security alliances the United States rapidly created in the aftermath of World War II. Back then, the national power of Washington’s new-found allies was in stark decline, while India’s current power trajectory is visibly upward. The structural dynamics of a bipolar global order also were simpler than today’s messy multipolarity.  Over time, however, the expansion of Chinese strength will undoubtedly push New Delhi to tighten its security relations with Washington, though the process will neither be as smooth nor as speedy as many would like.

China’s Defence Policy Speak softly but carry a big stick

As part of its efforts to appear transparent about its intentions and to dispel its image of a reclusive regime shrouded in secrecy, the Chinese government has been issuing White Papers on national defence every two years since 1998. The latest in the series, China’s National Defence in 2010, was released recently.

The crux of China’s national defence policy is to ensure a stable security environment so as to permit the unrestricted development of its economy and the modernisation of its military. The defence policy relies on military power as a guarantor of China’s strategic autonomy and is designed to ensure that China continues to enjoy unfettered access to critical strategic resources like oil and natural gas. China has apparently decided that its interests lie in projecting a positive, balanced and cooperative image to the international community. China’s growing economic and military power is gradually giving it the leverage to turn the perceived instability in its security environment into a newfound strength through bilateral and multilateral strategic partnerships, mutually beneficial trade and a cooperative attitude towards regional security arrangements.

China stresses that its national defence policy is essentially defensive in nature and that it is subordinate to the higher goal of building a prosperous China. The White Papers emphasise that China launches only counter-attacks in self defence. This is contrary to China’s fairly aggressive military posture and incursions into India, Russia and Vietnam over the last few decades. A significant recent development is China’s pro-active regional posture in diplomatic, strategic, economic and cultural spheres in parallel with China’s increasingly global posture. This is contrary to China’s claim that it “plays an active part in maintaining global and regional peace and stability.” Recent posturing on the Spratly Islands has been criticised all across South East Asia.

While China stresses the “purely defensive” nature of its defence policy, perceptive observers have noted the power projection capabilities that are inherent in China’s growing strategic reach and the increasing role that military power is paying in enhancing China’s comprehensive national power. Roy Kamphausen is of the view that the PLA is currently projecting military power throughout Asia by responding to crises, contributing to deterrence and enhancing regional stability using current capabilities. These efforts derive from and contribute to the building of comprehensive Chinese national power, which, in turn, serves to increase China’s stature in Asia, advance China’s foreign policy goals and even check U.S. influence.”

China continues to proclaim that it follows a “no first use” nuclear doctrine. However, the improvements in the quality of its nuclear-tipped missiles and the progressive increase in their quantity are conferring new options and spurring new thoughts among China’s national security analysts about the efficacy of its nuclear doctrine. Several of them have expressed the view that “under certain circumstances – such as an all-out attack against the country by conventional forces – China should use nuclear weapons.” As more sophisticated ICBMs like DF-31A and SLBMs like JL-2 enter service in larger numbers, China may be emboldened to review its no first use policy. Any Chinese move to discard the no first use policy will be inherently destabilising.

There are still many gaps in what is known about China’s defence policy and military power. There is much more that needs to be learnt about China’s ideas of statecraft, its approaches to the use of force, its perceived vulnerabilities and its preferred operational methods, as well as about the political and military organisations that work on military assessments and plans. Not enough is known about China’s actual military doctrine, command and control and capabilities such as logistics. Although China’s growing interest in coercion and pre-emption strategies and emerging methods of warfare – particularly the employment of missiles and information warfare – are now better understood, it is difficult to accurately assess how these developments will shape China’s overall military capability.