Tag Archives: terrorism

Pakistan’s Unsafe Nuclear Warheads

Increasing urban terrorism and uncontrollable radical extremism in the tribal areas in NWFP-Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA in Pakistan’s north-west have led to internal instability in Pakistan. The ongoing crisis can be attributed to the resurgence of fundamentalist forces and the Army’s inability to fight them effectively. Consequently, the world faces the spectre of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organisations. The assassination of Salman Taseer, Governor of Punjab, by a specially selected bodyguard has led to speculation that perhaps the loyalty of some security guards of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads could also be subverted by Jihadi elements.

The possession of nuclear weapons by Islamist fundamentalist terrorists will pose a grave danger to international security. The Al Qaeda has declared war on the United States (US) and it allies, and Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri are known to have made attempts to buy nuclear warheads. Among Pakistan’s neighbouring countries, India will be particularly vulnerable if hard-line LeT or JeM terrorists and their Al Qaeda and Taliban brothers ever lay their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear warheads. India is one of the nations that the Al Qaeda has named as an enemy. Being a contiguous land neighbour, it is also easier to target, even if sophisticated delivery systems like ballistic missiles are not available.

There is a possibility that an Islamist fundamentalist regime might overthrow the civilian government with support from a radicalised faction of the army. In such an eventuality, the U.S. and its allies may justifiably form another ‘coalition of the willing’ to bomb the nuclear warhead storage sites in Pakistan from the air. The coalition forces could employ cruise missiles and fighter-bombers from stand-off ranges to physically destroy the warheads with deep penetration bombs. A non-kinetic option that employs high-energy microwaves to “fry” the electronic circuitry of the nuclear warheads may also be considered.

The clear and present danger, however, and one that continues to be underestimated, is from nuclear terrorism. Terrorist organisations may assemble radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) – ‘dirty bombs’ in which high explosives (RDX or TNT) are used to blow up and scatter uranium or other radioactive materials over a densely populated area, or to pollute a major water source. Crude RDDs do not require a very high degree of technological sophistication and can be assembled quite easily.

Contingency plans must be debated, analysed, approved, rehearsed and readied for execution to meet unforeseen eventualities. Maximum cooperation must be extended by the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to Pakistan by way of technology, intelligence and training to help Pakistan to secure its own nuclear warheads. While the world waits with bated breath for the crisis in Pakistan to blow over, the government of Pakistan would do well to ensure that all possible measures are adopted to further enhance the safety and security of the country’s nuclear warheads and delivery means.

(The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.)

US, India and aid for Pakistan

In his budget proposal for 2012, President Obama has proposed $3.1 billion in aid to Pakistan. The aid is spread across various parts and will be provided partly under the five year Kerry-Lugar-Berman initiative and Oversees Contingency Operations (OCO). This proposal comes even as the two countries stand-off over the Raymond Davis affair and the news of Pakistan expanding its nuclear weapons program.

Out of the $3.1 billion, $1.9 billion will go towards promoting a “secure, stable, democratic and prosperous Pakistan with a focus on energy, economic growth, agriculture, the delivery of health and education services, and strengthening the government of Pakistan’s capacity to govern effectively and accountably.” However, a recent U.S. Inspector General’s report said that the U.S. (in effect Pakistan) has failed to demonstrate that the $7.5 billion civilian aid package provided in 2009 has improved the availability of basic needs such as food, education, healthcare etc in Pakistan. The former Chairman of Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP), Mr. Khalid Mirza reiterated the lack of economic growth in Pakistan when he said that there is no clarity in the Pakistani government’s economic vision. The political and economic instability in Pakistan gives us no reason to believe that the new $1.9 billion will be spent wisely and to the benefit of the Pakistani people as intended.

Another $1.1 billion of the package will be dedicated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) set up for training Pakistani forces to better fight insurgents along the Western border with Afghanistan. Here again, Pakistan has not provided us sufficient reason to believe that the aid is being used only to fight terrorists and insurgents along its Western border, or the terrorist safe-havens within its own territory. Instead there have been news of an increase in Pakistan’s nuclear capability with the country having more than 100 deployed nuclear weapons; followed by doubts about the construction of a fourth plutonium reactor. U.S. officials themselves are not convinced that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is safe, and are concerned about the volatility in the country.

But apparently U.S. desperation in Afghanistan supersedes all other considerations, and the U.S. is willing to overlook Pakistan’s inefficiency and transgressions in fighting terrorists and insurgents. The carrots and stick strategy is but a populist rhetoric, and the U.S. is willing to forgo the sticks and appease Pakistan with carrots and more in the hope that Pakistan will help it win the war on terror. The irony of the situation is however, appalling.

The Obama administration, with its call for change, has not managed to change the U.S. attitude on Pakistan, and continues to be willing to excuse all of its excesses. New Delhi has also been unsuccessful in breaking the cycle in spite of its ‘strong’ relations with Washington. All it gets is a couple of statements from the U.S. showing support and sympathy for its position and threat from Pakistan. But when it comes to action, all is forgotten and Pakistan emerges the winner with billions in aid every year it fails. Probably India needs to learn diplomatic manipulation from its western neighbor.

Along with talking with the U.S. administration and agencies, India should begin engaging the Indian-American community that has a large stake in the security of both the U.S. and India. The increasing political participation and strength of the community should be harnessed by the Indian government to lobby the U.S. to rethink the quantity and nature of economic assistance, and enforce strict accountability mechanisms for all aid to Pakistan. It is incumbent upon the Indian side to secure its own national security interests. The U.S. cannot be expected to reprioritize its national interests and goals to align with Indian interests.

The Raymond Davis Drama

Looks like the North Waziristan operation will be postponed again

From the very beginning, it was hard to shake off the suspicion that the Raymond Davis affair involved covert operatives from both the United States and Pakistan. That Mr Davis was engaged in diplomacy by other means should have been clear to anyone with a passing familiarity of the business (attained, perhaps, by the study of the scholarly works of David John Moore Cornwell or Ian Lancaster Fleming). Once the U.S. embassy confirmed that he enjoyed diplomatic immunity it was a matter of pedantic or professional interest as to whether he worked for the CIA, DHA, State Department or indeed was a private security contractor employed by the U.S. government.

raymond.davisBut what was less discussed, at least until a couple of days ago, was that the two Pakistanis men (referred to as ‘youths’ or ‘boys’ in the Pakistani media) he killed might have also been engaged in diplomacy by other means. (Incidentally, Express Tribune pulled the initial report, here’s the cached article). Diplomats and foreign journalists who have served in Pakistan are familiar with such diplomacy, not infrequently conducted from a motorcycle. It would be of pedantic or professional interest as to whether they worked for the ISI, Intelligence Bureau or some other “agency”.

It is possible that the dust-up between Mr Davis and the two Pakistanis was the result of the escalation of free and frank discussions to a higher calibre. It is also possible that the two Pakistanis, and one of their innocent counterparts, lost their lives in the risky venture of creating a dust-up.

Consider. There are two possibilities why Lahore police would arrest a white American man who identified himself as U.S. diplomat with immunity. First, that they were told to do so by higher authorities. Second, that the local authorities were so radically anti-American—consistent with general public sentiment—that they were willing to disregard claims of diplomatic immunity, and brazen out the consequences. This is unlikely, not least because it would mean some people would lose their jobs in the process.

General Kayani’s guidance to the interior minister reminding him to keep Mr Davis’ military background in mind supports the hypothesis that the military-jihadi complex instigated this drama. Why?

That is hard to say. It is, however, the biggest beneficiary of the crisis. Politically, it is the Zardari government—which it has no love for—that is on the ropes, caught between an increasingly tough Washington and an increasingly anti-American public sentiment. Even if the matter is resolved in a few days’ time by getting the judiciary to affirm his diplomatic immunity, the episode can be offered as a reason, yet again, for the Pakistani army to avoid launching the much delayed operation against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in North Waziristan. The overall rise in temperature works to call for a reduction in U.S. drone attacks, using the argument that doing so is necessary to lower anti-American feelings.

The Pakistani military leadership calculates that the United States can suspend bilateral relations or aid for a short while, but overall, the risk of a permanent break is low. It is not wrong. That is why it can afford to rock the boat—with terrorist attacks or diplomatic dramas—to pre-empt U.S. coercion. After all, for the Pakistani military-jihadi complex, poking the United States in the eye is less risky compared to having to really fight itself.

From Tunisia through Egypt to Kashmir

The Jasmine revolution in Tunisia is only the latest manifestation of the power of the people to decisively compel dictatorial forces to yield. In February 1986, the Philippine people had brought down a dictatorship and restored democracy in their dramatic four-day People Power Revolution. Though the Soviet communist regime had quelled both the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the 1968 Prague Spring with tanks in the street, the influence of Lech Walesa’s Solidarity movement in Poland led to the intensification and spread of anti-communist ideals throughout the countries of the Eastern Bloc, weakening their oppressive communist governments.

egyptunrest

In August 1989, a Solidarity-led coalition government was formed in Poland and, almost simultaneously, the citizens of neighbouring Czechoslovakia threw off the shackles of four decades of totalitarian communist rule in what has been called the “Velvet Revolution”. The victory of the Ukrainian people’s Orange Revolution over their country’s corrupt leadership and the installation of Viktor Yushchenko as President in January 2005 represented a new landmark in the history of people’s movements for democracy. The Cedar Revolution in April 2005 ended the Syrian military occupation of Lebanon after 30 years. The Nepalese revolution in April 2006 led to the overthrow of the monarchy, reaffirming once again that the power of the people ultimately prevails.

The fragrance of Tunisia’s jasmine has spread rapidly to other Arab states including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen. Libya and perhaps even Saudi Arabia may soon be smothered by its scent. Morocco and Syria may be next in line. Can non-Arab states ruled by tin-pot dictators under various garbs be far behind? Iran could be ripe for another revolution. The Pakistan army and the government of the day must surely be deeply concerned that the people might rise in revolt. They would be even more concerned about the prospects of hard-line Islamist support to the people’s aspirations for genuine self rule.

Even though India is a legitimate democracy and the people have enough avenues available to them to air their grievances and let off steam, many sections of society have felt a sense of alienation from the national mainstream for several decades. Some of them may take inspiration from the happenings in West Asia. Almost 100 stone-pelting youth had died in the Kashmir Valley in the summer of 2010 and many more were injured in police firing. The reason for the spontaneous students’ uprising appeared to be the collective weight of the hardships suffered over 20 years of militancy and terrorism and the central government’s often heavy-handed response. Though the sorry state of affairs was eventually brought under control through a measured response and the initiation of a sustained dialogue by government interlocutors with the people’s representatives, the situation remains volatile. Subterranean tensions may again rise to the surface without major provocation.

If the Kashmiri people come out on the streets of Srinagar, Baramulla, Sopore, Kupwara, Anantnag and half a dozen other towns like they did in 1988-89, in today’s mega-media age, it will be well nigh impossible for India to keep Kashmir by force. The Government of India must lose no further time in meeting the aspirations of the Kashmiri people for autonomy and self rule within the framework of the Indian Constitution. It is time to stop inflaming passions on vote-bank based party lines and to act in a statesman-like manner in keeping with the national interest.

(Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.)


War Strategy in Afghanistan and Regional Concerns

The long awaited review of U.S. and NATO strategy in Afghanistan was completed by the Obama administration in December 2010. The publicly released version of the report claimed major gains against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, particularly in the core areas under their control for long including the Helmand and Kandahar provinces. However, the report acknowledged that the gains were fragile and could be undone unless the Pakistan army acted against the Taliban operating from safe havens in the NWFP and FATA with equal vigour.

The broad goal of the U.S.-NATO-ISAF war strategy in Afghanistan is to ensure that Afghanistan acquires the stability that is necessary to be able to control its territory so that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are prevented from operating successfully from its soil against the U.S. and its allies, and also to reduce the risk of a return to civil war. The U.S. plans to transfer all combat responsibilities to the Afghan security forces by 2014. President Obama cannot afford to lose a war on his watch and yet hope to win re-election in 2012. The exit strategy will be based on a phased drawdown with not more than 10,000 troops being withdrawn each year till an “equilibrium that is manageable” is achieved. The U.S. and NATO troops are still thin on the ground while the Taliban has shown a marked degree of resurgence.

Afghanistan lies on the strategic crossroads between South Asia and Iran, West Asia, the Caucasus and the Central Asian Republics. Its regional neighbours have important geo-political and energy security interests in the area. Neighbours like India have invested over US$ 1 billion and immense time and effort in the post-2001 reconstruction of Afghanistan, but have been completely marginalised in U.S.-NATO-ISAF discussions for the resolution of the ongoing conflict.

The foremost concern of Afghanistan’s regional neighbours is that the coalition forces will begin their deadline-mandated exit before putting in place a strong alternative force to continue their work. A major apprehension is that the Taliban will defeat the weak and poorly trained Afghan National Army, take over Kabul, extend their reach to the countryside in due course and once again begin to practice their peculiar brand of Jihad and cultural bigotry. Both Iran and China are wary of the return of Wahabi Islam to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s regional neighbours, including the CARs, China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Russia, must come together to seek a solution to the conflict. This would involve putting together a regional force, preferably under a UN flag, to provide a stable environment for governance and development till the Afghan National Army can take over. The diplomatic aim should be to work towards a stable Afghan state, which is governed by a dispensation that is neutral between India and Pakistan. It is in the regional interest to support the continued operational commitment of U.S.-NATO-ISAF forces beyond July 2011 till the situation comes under control and security can be handed over to the Afghan National Army.

(Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.)