Tag Archives: South China Sea

India’s foreign policy: A year in review

January 2, 2013 admin Leave a comment

As 2012 draws to a close, it’s imperative to assess India’s foreign policy performance, and look ahead to what we can expect in 2013.

So far, the report is mixed: Four foreign policy hotspots, five sweet spots, and two blind spots. About the same as 2011, when we gave six jeers and five cheers for India’s foreign policy performance.

Geopolitically, 2011 was the year of celebrating the shift of global growth and power to Asia; a year later, 2012 has seen the beginning of pushback on Asia from the U.S., which has seen the confidence of newly elected governments in Japan and South Korea and increased aggression from China as a result of its own domestic power shift.

Internationally, India has been an active participant in the creation of alternate financial instruments and institutions from emerging countries. And so far New Delhi has deftly handled the U.S. pivot to Asia, and maintained bi-partisan support in Washington, while simultaneously balancing its energy imports from Iran.

In contrast, New Delhi has been ham-handed at home. This is the year in which the government has been put on the mat by a strong anti-corruption movement started in 2011, to the current anti-rape movement engulfing the country. An enfeebled centre could hang on, or bring on mid-term elections in 2012 – a distinct possibility after the Bharatiya Janata Party’s win in Gujarat this month. It could change if the ruling Congress government genuinely confronts corruption and addresses law and order issues, continues on its path to economic reform and provides jobs to the 14 million youth who join the workforce every year. They are the boiling cauldron of the under-educated and unemployed young who yearn for political and economic change.

Clearly, our international stature is better than our image at home. We present our top foreign policy Hotspots, Sweet spots and Blind spots for 2012.

Foreign Policy Hot spots

The Maldives: In the wake of the regime change in the Maldives in February, New Delhi may have reacted hastily by recognising the new government led by Mohammed Waheed and bypassing the friendly and more secular former president, Mohamed Nasheed. The increasing fundamentalism and political breakdown that have followed in the Maldives have made India an easy target – most recently highlighted by the GMR-Maldives dispute. But two external factors may also be at play: China’s increasing economic influence in the island-nation and possible Western interest in the old World War II military base in Gan, the southernmost island in the Maldives.

Sri Lanka: Bowing to pressure from both domestic coalition politics and international organisations and allies, India voted against Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council in March; the vote eroded our position of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations. In September, the bilateral hit a new low, with threats and attacks on Sri Lankan pilgrims and school children travelling in Tamil Nadu. It was exacerbated by the politically opportunistic demands of the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, that India must stop training Sri Lankan military personnel. Meanwhile, China raised military aid to more than $100 million and billions in strategic infrastructure for Sri Lanka.

South China Sea: Our Chief of Naval Staff’s statement that India is “prepared” to protect Indian interests in the South China Sea was subsequently watered down. Nevertheless, Beijing reacted sharply, stating that it “opposes any unilateral oil and gas exploration activities in disputed areas in the South China Sea,” despite its own infrastructure-building activities in disputed areas of Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The U.S.’s rebalancing in Asia juxtaposed with recent election outcomes in Japan and South Korea have given New Delhi more strategic space to be firm with China. We must continue our policy of balancing our economic interests in trade and attracting Chinese investment and negotiating our concerns on the border with positioning on Chinese disputes with ASEAN members in the South China Sea and its adversarial posturing towards the U.S.

Syria: India’s Track II diplomacy in Syria was not successful for the people of Syria, who remain caught in the battle between the West and Gulf-funded “rebels” and fundamentalists, and the Bashar al-Assad government. Despite India’s close relations with Damascus and efforts to mediate an acceptable solution at the UN Security Council in July, India voted, along with the West, for stronger sanctions against the Syrian regime, while fellow BRICS nations Russia and China exercised a veto. It is only a matter of time before the exit of Assad, but the sectarian fighting could continue for decades, at great cost to the Syrian people and secularism in the region. The conflict may cause further regional destabilisation, more friction between Israel and Iran, and eventually a rise in the price of oil.

Foreign Policy Sweet spots

India-Myanmar: After 25 years of cautious engagement, India’s policy of not shunning military governments – while simultaneously maintaining support for Myanmar’s democratisation – put us on the right side of history. Successive high-level visits this year resulted in a credit line worth $500 million to Myanmar and various agreements on border issues, energy and infrastructure. India is poised to play a vital role in Myanmar: as a model for democratic institution-building and also with business and development solutions that are affordable and adaptable. In particular, Myanmar can benefit from India’s experience in addressing complex identity issues.

Alternate financial instruments: In March, New Delhi proposed a BRICS Bank and in December the government moved further to promote more SAARC currency swaps. India already has currency swap deals with Japan worth $15 billion and is part of a SAARC deal worth $2 billion. These are positive signs of emerging economies taking the initiative to design alternative financial instruments to mitigate the volatility caused by the financial crises of the U.S. and Europe. Could a viable multilateral option emerge from BRICS? Can bilateral currency swap deals be the building blocks of an alternative financial system?

Afghanistan: India hosted the first ‘Investment Summit on Afghanistan’ in June, probably with the cooperation of Washington, and then participated in the first India-U.S.-Afghanistan trilateral dialogue in September. Indian business is supporting New Delhi’s efforts in Afghanistan, and more than $10 billion is likely to be invested in the Hajigak iron ore mines and various coal, fertiliser and small development projects. New Delhi must now amplify its role on the ground in Afghanistan – through both security and infrastructure cooperation. This, however, entails a dilemma: how can India expand its presence without becoming a target for the Taliban and unfriendly Pakistani entities?

Energy security: So far, India has successfully balanced two fundamental interests: our strategic relationship with the U.S. and our escalating energy requirements. The MT Omvati Prem became the first ship with Indian insurance to load oil from Iran in August, after European Union sanctions came into force in July. With increasing instability in West Asia, we will need more such creativity to maintain the steady flow of oil from the Gulf and we must also look for alternative suppliers in other geographies.

ASEAN: The recently-concluded negotiations of the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in services and investments is a significant step in improving regional connectivity. Over the past two decades, our engagement with ASEAN has intensified and become multifaceted, with a massive increase in trade from $2.9 billion in 1993 to $80 billion in 2012. The region is not only at the centre of our Look East policy, but it is also vital to our efforts to economically and strategically balance China in an Asia that is increasingly important globally.

Foreign Policy Blind Spots

Central Asia: We have not been able to leverage our cordial relations with the Central Asian states to advantageous positions on energy, on membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), trade, and tactical cooperation in Afghanistan. We should more actively engage with Central Asia to press our case for membership of the SCO and to expand economic exchanges.

Lost Opportunities for Growth: India’s fiscal problems were highlighted many times in 2012 – in April, for instance, when S&P revised our outlook from stable to “negative” with the threat of an investment rating downgrade to “junk” status within 24 months. India’s growth rate continues to slide and is now 5.3 percent. India is struggling with a falling rupee and a rising oil import burden, along with the budgetary imperative to reduce fuel subsidies. We are condemned to a continuing economic slowdown unless the government confronts corruption more seriously and implements economic reforms.

Looking forward to 2013

What can we expect for 2013? Despite the best efforts of our Prime Minister to keep India-Pakistan relations on an even keel, the critical issues with Pakistan – Jammu & Kashmir, water, terrorism – remain intractable. Don’t hold your breath: nothing will change till Pakistan’s elections in May 2013 and perhaps even our own in 2014. Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik’s disastrous recent visit to India has set back the improvements that had come with New Delhi’s patient diplomacy. Just as we have been able to successfully do with Myanmar and Iran, we should resist American efforts to influence us to make concessions on Pakistan, and handle the relationship according to our own imperatives.

For India-U.S. relations, a visit by Barack Obama, which would be an unprecedented second visit by a serving U.S. president, could propel the strategic bilateral relationship to new heights.

We hope for better times in 2013: an end to the conflict in Syria, more stability in Pakistan, less aggressive posturing by China in Asia and a recovered global – and Indian – economy.

(This article originally appeared at Gateway House and has been republished with their approval. All views mentioned in the article are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or positions of USINPAC in any manner.)

India-US Relations Blog

The curious case of two Asian giants

July 24, 2012 shybu.khan Leave a comment

The burgeoning interest in India-China relations from around the world is to be expected considering the two giants of Asia are the growth engines of not only the Asian economy, but they also form a crucial cog in the wheel that is driving the world economy forward. The two most populous nuclear neighbors with the fastest growing economies in the world are poised to be the key drivers of what promises to be an “Asian Century”.

The trade between China and India is expected to reach USD 100 billion by 2015, but economics and trade tend to occupy the back pages of the media, which for some reason, basks in the hype news around troop movement and test of ballistic missiles creates in both countries, not to mention the interest it stirs up across the world.

It has been seen more often than not that the media and analysts go into a real frenzy concerning any developments surrounding India and China. It seems to be in a delirious rush to fulfill the perennial appetite for news relating to countries that sustains approximately 40% of the world population – and surprisingly one of them, India, doesn’t even have a seat in the Security Council of the United Nations, which is a travesty in itself for some, and something that many Indians feel strongly about. They argue that it is not surprising that the Council is squabbling over what to do with Syria where there seems to be more vetoes than agreement, made all the worse by the fact that innocents are being killed every day.

However, in essence, and many media practitioners have made this point time and again, that the media isn’t wrong in its entirety as the relationship between the behemoths hasn’t been hunky-dory at the best of times with contentions ranging from respective country’s stance on Kashmir and Tibet; India’s claim to Aksai Chin, which is reciprocated by China’s claim on the whole of Arunachal Pradesh, that China prefers to call, South Tibet – much to the ire of India; India’s asylum to Tibetans and the Dalai Lama; China’s all-weather support to Pakistan; increasing competition in scouting for energy sources around the world, deep-rooted suspicions of expansionism, military coercion and strategic containment on both sides, apart from the stake that the two countries have on international politics and world affairs, which go off on a tangent on many issues, are only some of the factors that dominate proceedings as far as India-China relationship goes.

The latest disputation is arising from India’s presence in the disputed water of the South China Sea with China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei being parties to the dispute. This dispute was the focal point at the recent ASEAN Summit 2012 held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, which unfortunately didn’t yield any tangible results. In fact things seems to have deteriorated recently with China clearly expressing its intention on the matter by sending troops to disputed islands in South China Sea, which gives credence to the thought of an armed skirmish in the region.

China also views the rise in arms sales to India by the U.S. is part of a larger plan to counteract its dominance in the region. China has also taken cognizance of the development of a powerful three-dimensional Navy by India to increase its capabilities in the Indian Ocean and beyond, which could also be used to protect its asset in the South China Sea which China lays claims to if such a situation becomes ineluctable.

The South China Sea dispute has the potential to morph into a major military flashpoint if current political powwow for a peaceful resolution doesn’t bear fruit soon, and India’s presence in the region hasn’t gone down well with the Chinese with repeated veiled warnings emanating from China’s official sources for foreign countries, particular India and the US, to stay away, with India refusing to budge as it strives to fulfill the needs of a power hungry nation that is largely depended on external sources to fuel its growth.

All these factors make the relationship between the two countries inordinately complicated and something that the next President of the United States has to carefully manage and no doubt will be one of his top priorities in the Oval Office. It will also be one of the fundamental criterions that will determine the success of his tenure as far as foreign affairs goes – and therefore the Presidential Election of 2012 attains all the more significance as it will determine the dynamics that will shape the future of the relationship between the three great nations. This leaves the role of the U.S. President rendered increasingly non-envious with the mistrust that China has for the U.S. which sees it as trying to position India as a credible alternative in a policy of perceived containment, all part of grand scheme under a geopolitical balancing act that aims to thwart its march to the top.

Barack Obama and Mitt Romney would do well to have a well thought out plan on how to manage its relationship with India, which is actually flourishing, while trudging a thin line vis-à-vis its delicate yet crucial relationship with China. The U.S. has to make sure that it doesn’t antagonize China and push it to the brink as we are in a world where we need partnerships and not one-upmanship. It will be a tightrope trick that the President of the United States will be expected to play to perfection as the world needs a strong and stable troika of the United States, China, and India.

As things stand now, it is difficult to predict what the future holds for the India-China relationship, but it won’t be surprising if these two countries with one of the oldest civilizations in the world and a shared history of thousands of years were to share a prospering history for a long time to come yet. You wouldn’t find many who will bet against that eventuality, and I for one definitely won’t, as a strong and prosperous neighbor does more good than harm, with Pakistan being a case in point.

Defence And Strategic Affairs Blog

Maps, MOUs and Other Contradictions

November 13, 2011 Aanand Kharde 2 Comments

The spat between China’s ambassador in New Delhi and an Indian journalist is a good illustration of the conflicting factors shaping India’s relationship with Beijing.

Last week’s well-publicized spat between Zhang Yan, China’s ambassador in New Delhi, and a persistent Indian journalist is a good illustration of the contradictory forces shaping India’s relationship with the People’s Republic.

Zhang was at a media event highlighting the memorandum of understanding that the Tebian Electric Apparatus (TEA), a Chinese maker of power transformers, has signed to build a $400 million manufacturing facility in the western Indian state of Gujurat. The move is being hailed as a landmark for Chinese investment in India.

The event was meant to showcase growing bilateral economic engagement. Last year, China became India’s largest trading partner, with two-way trade amounting to $60 billion. Two months ago, the two countries convened in Beijing for the inaugural session of their annual strategic economic dialogue and reiterated plans to elevate trade flows to the $100-billion mark by 2015. And if a new report by the Associated Chambers of Commerce & Industry is right, Beijing and New Delhi could well form the world’s largest trading combination by 2030.

It’s also worth noting that the Indian central bank recently permitted companies to borrow up to $1 billion in Chinese yuan, a move that opens the gate for India’s struggling power sector to import much-needed plant equipment. (For more on the sector’s dependence on China, read here.)

Yet instead of focusing on the bright side of the bilateral relationship, the headlines about the event were about festering differences. The corporate brochures TEA circulated at the gathering depicted the state of Arunachal Pradesh – which Beijing insists is actually “South Tibet” – and parts of Ladakh as being with China’s borders. An animated exchange ensued when an Indian journalist call out Ambassador Zhang on the issue, culminating in Zhang – one of his country’s most experienced diplomats – intemperately telling the fellow to “Shut up!”

(This was not the first time Mr. Zhang’s interactions with the freewheeling, sensationalistic Indian media have gone awry. In the run-up to Premier Wen Jiabao’s state visit last December, Zhang intimated that the press was engaged in “a war of words” directed at Beijing and suggested that the Indian government do something to stop it. It was left to then-Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao to remind Zhang of the country’s tradition of press freedom.

And fresh off last week’s incident, the ambassador is now involved in a new face-off with New Delhi. Beijing has nominated him to be the head of the United Nations’ Joint Inspection Unit, an internal watchdog agency, while New Delhi is aggressively campaigning for its own candidate, the current Indian ambassador to the UN institutions in Geneva.)

The map contretemps puts in stark relief the contending factors – increasing economic cooperation mixed with ulcerating historical animosities and an intensifying strategic competition – that tug at India’s relations with China. This last element has lately been on full display. New Delhi hosted two noteworthy state visits last month, both of which had significant implications for the emerging contest with Beijing over which country will be at the helm of the dawning Asian Century.

The first, by Vietnam’s president, Truong Tan Sang, underscored Indian determination, in the face of explicit even hyperbolic Chinese warnings, to begin hydrocarbon exploration in the South China Sea. Beijing claims the resource-rich area in almost its entirety and it has emerged as a flashpoint for conflict with China’s neighbors, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. The Tan Sang visit brought forth renewed bluster from Beijing, with the normally sedate China Energy News thundering in a front-page commentary that:

“India is playing with fire by agreeing to explore for oil with Vietnam in the disputed South China Sea. India’s energy strategy is slipping into an extremely dangerous whirlpool…. Challenging the core interests of a large, rising country for unknown oil at the bottom of the sea will not only lead to a crushing defeat for the Indian oil company, but will most likely seriously harm India’s whole energy security and interrupt its economic development.”

During the Tan Sang visit, New Delhi and Hanoi agreed to set up a regular security dialogue. Vietnam has also asked India for military assistance, including the training of fighter pilots and submariners, the transfer of warships and missile systems, as well as help in upgrading Nha Trang port near the strategically-located Cam Ranh Bay. The deepening security relationship caused several Chinese news organizations last week to accuse New Delhi of throwing its lot in with others who are trying to contain China’s ambitions.

No sooner had the Vietnamese dignitaries left the scene than U Thein Sein, the president of Myanmar, showed up. Beijing and New Delhi have long regarded Myanmar as an arena for geopolitical jousting, and Thein Sein’s visit came amid signs that his country has decided to extricate itself from China’s close embrace. A few days before, Myanmar abruptly shelved a $3.6 billion dam project being constructed by the Chinese. Seeing an opportunity to further dilute Beijing’s influence, New Delhi presented Thein Sein with $500 million in infrastructure loans and renewed its pledge to develop the deep-water port of Sittwe on the Bay of Bengal. This landmark $120-million project, scheduled for completion in mid-2013, would directly link India’s isolated northeastern states to the booming markets of Southeast Asia, and so is significant for both commercial and geopolitical reasons.

The recent months also testify to the accelerating military competition between China and India along their long-contested Himalayan border. In September, Defense Minister A.K. Antony declared that Beijing was “aggressively” building up its forces along the border, and General V.K. Singh, the army chief of staff, followed up by claiming that 3,000-4,000 Chinese personnel, including combat engineers from the People’s Liberation Army, had been deployed to the Gilgit-Baltistan region, which is controlled by Pakistan but considered by New Delhi to be an integral part of Kashmir.

Earlier this month, the defense ministry approved a plan to create four new divisions along the China-India border, including two that would form a mountain strike corps geared toward offensive operations. New Delhi has further decided to station supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles in Arunachal Pradesh, the first deployment of offensive tactical missiles against China. Reflecting the darkening suspicions about Beijing’s intentions, a respected think tank affiliated with the defense ministry has released a study examining the pathways by which military conflict could come about, including the possibility of Chinese preventative war.

The future direction of India’s relations with China will most likely come to mirror the present composition of U.S.-China relations. Cooperative impulses emanating from deepening economic engagement will moderate the likelihood of outright military hostilities. Yet the competitive dynamics of power politics will also ensure that the risk of conflict is ever present.

The key question in all of this is how the U.S.-China and China-India rivalries will intersect. Here, too, recent events are indicative. Amid the intensifying competition between Beijing and New Delhi, the Indian government is moving to purchase from the United States another six C-130J “Super Hercules” transport aircraft specially configured for special operations forces as well as 22 AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters. With contingencies against China in mind, the new C-130s will be based in eastern India.

The sense of disappointment in India permeates Washington these days, with some even debating whether New Delhi is or will ever be a true ally. But if the events of the last few months are any guide, Beijing’s increasing strategic reach is ineluctably drawing the United States and India closer together.

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